Survey of Developments in Maryland Law, 1983-84 by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 2 Article 6
Survey of Developments in Maryland Law,
1983-84
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Survey of Developments in Maryland Law, 1983-84, 44 Md. L. Rev. 254 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/6
Survey of Developments in Maryland Law,
1983-84
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW .................................... 261
A. Environmental Law ................................ 261
1. Legislation ................................... 261
2. Case Law .................................... 262
B . Education ......................................... 266
C. Worker's Compensation ............................. 272
1. Benefits ...................................... 272
2. Dual Recovery ................................ 274
3. Compensable Activities ....................... 275
D. Employment Discrimination .......................... 277
E. Public Information ................................. 281
F. Government Contracts ............................... 289
G. State and Local Government ......................... 293
H . Other Developments ................................ 297
1. Election Procedures .......................... 297
2. Professional Standards ....................... 299
3. Law Enforcement............................ 300
4. Motor Vehicle Administration ................ 302
5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ....... 302
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................ 304
A. In Personam Jurisdiction-Minimum Contacts Analysis .. 304
B. Finality and Appealability of Judgments ............... 309
1. Order Quashing Service of Process ........... 309
2. In Banc Appeals .............................. 312
3. Interlocutory Orders for the Payment of
M oney ....................................... 3 14
4. Law of the Case .............................. 316
5. Partial Summary Judgment ................... 318
C. Trial Court Powers Pending Appeal ................... 321
D. Statutes of Limitations .............................. 323
E. Jury Prejudice-Exposure to Extraneous Matter ........ 325
F. Class Actions ...................................... 329
G . Standing .......................................... 331
III. COMMERCIAL LAw ........................................ 334
A. Arbitration ........................................ 334
254
1985] TABLE OF CONTENTS 255
B. Attachments ....................................... 337
C. Banks and Banking ................................ 340
D . Bankruptcy ........................................ 343
E. Commercial Torts .................................. 346
F. Consumer Protection Laws ........................... 350
1. Installment Contracts ......................... 350
2. U sury ........................................ 353
3. Repossessions ................................ 355
G. Contracts ......................................... 357
1. Insurance .................................... 357
2. Franchising ................................... 360
3. Government Contracts ....................... 361
4. Quantum Meruit ............................. 362
5. Implied Contracts ............................ 364
H . Corporations ...................................... 365
L Covenants Not to Compete ........................... 366
J. Real Property ....................................... 371
1. Guaranty Fund ............................... 371
2. A uction ...................................... 373
3. Broker's Commissions ........................ 374
K. Uniform Commercial Code ........................... 375
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................... 376
A. Commerce Clause ................................... 376
B. Freedom of Speech .................................. 383
1. Percentage Limitations on Charitable Fund-
Raising Expenses ............................. 383
2. Public Employees ............................ 390
C. Equal Protection ................................... 393
1. Rational Basis Test ........................... 393
2. Legislative Districting ........................ 396
D. Due Process ....................................... 400
1. Summary Procedure .......................... 400
2. Right to Counsel and Right to Jury Trial in
Civil Contem pt ............................... 401
E. Maryland Constitutional Law ........................ 405
1. Equal Protection ............................. 405
2. Preem ption .................................. 407
V. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ..................................... 410
A. Search and Seizure ................................. 410
1. Incident to Arrest ............................ 410
2. Plain V iew ................................... 412
3. W iretap ...................................... 4 13
256 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:254
4. O ther ........................................ 4 15
B. Identification Evidence .............................. 417
C. H earsay ........................................... 420
1. Admission of a Party ......................... 420
2. Additional Exceptions ........................ 423
D. Circumstantial Evidence ............................. 425
E. Character and Reputation ........................... 426
1. Witness Impeachment-Prior Bad Acts ....... 426
2. Reputation of W itness ........................ 429
F. Documentary Evidence .............................. 430
G. Enhanced Testimony ................................ 431
H. Sufficiency of Evidence .............................. 433
I. Newly Discovered Evidence ........................... 434
J Other Developments ................................. 436
1. Blood Chemical Test in Drunk Driving Cases . 436
2. Scientific Devices ............................. 438
VI. CRIMINAL LAW ........................................... 439
A. Elements of Crimes ................................. 439
B. Capacity to Commit and Responsibility For Crime ....... 441
1. Insanity ...................................... 44 1
2. N ecessity ..................................... 448
C. Pleas ............................................. 450
1. Plea Bargaining .............................. 451
2. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea .................... 455
D. Grand Jury ....................................... 456
E. Speedy Trial ....................................... 461
1. Procedure for Dismissal ...................... 463
2. Grounds for Dismissal ........................ 465
3. Waiver of Dismissal Sanction ................. 474
4. Nol Pros and Speedy Trial ..................... 476
F. Right to Jury Trial ................................. 478
G. Trial Procedures ................................... 482
1. Access to Pretrial Hearings ................... 482
2. Right to Counsel ............................. 487
a. Custodial Interrogation ................... 487
b. A t T rial ................................... 490
c. Waiver of Right to Counsel ............... 491
3. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ........... 492
4. Joinder ....................................... 494
5. W itnesses .................................... 496
6. Jury Instructions ............................. 498
1985] TABLE OF CONTENTS 257
H . Judgment ......................................... 499
1. Finality ....................................... 499
2. Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata/Double
Jeopardy ..................................... 501
L Punishment ........................................ 507
1. Sentencing ................................... 507
2. Forfeitures ................................... 510
3. R estitution ................................... 513
a. Application of the Statute ................. 513
b. Juvenile Restitution ....................... 514
J. Death Penalty Review ............................... 518
1. The Maryland Death Penalty Statute .......... 518
2. Interpreting the Statute ...................... 519
a. Admissibility of Evidence-Sentencing
Proceeding ................................ 519
b. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 523
c. Constitutionality-Proportionality Review ... 527
d. Defining the Pool of Similar Cases ........ 528
e. Jury Instructions .......................... 529
3. Other Death Penalty Issues ................... 530
a. Double Jeopardy .......................... 530
b. Voir Dire Examination .................... 531
K Other Developments ................................ 532
1. Conflict of Interest ........................... 532
2. Anim al Cruelty ............................... 534
VII. FAMILY LAw .......................................... 536
A. Overview of the Family Law Article ................... 536
1. Introduction ................................. 536
2. Stylistic Changes ............................. 537
3. Stylistic Changes that Make Substantive
C hanges ..................................... 537
4. Deletion of Unconstitutional Provisions ....... 538
5. Unconstitutional Provisions That Were Not
D eleted ...................................... 539
6. Substantive Changes Made by Incorporation of
1984 Legislative Session Laws ................ 540
7. Ambiguous and Conflicting Sections .......... 542
8. Conclusion ................................... 543
B. M arital Property ................................... 543
1. G eneral ...................................... 543
2. Monetary Awards ............................. 547
3. Pensions ..................................... 548
258 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:254
C . D ivorce ........................................... 553
1. Separation Agreements ....................... 553
2. "Divisible" Divorce ........................... 554
3. Antenuptial Agreements in Contemplation of
D ivorce ...................................... 555
D . Paternity .......................................... 557
1. Statute of Limitations ........................ 557
2. Admissibility of Affirmative Blood Test Results 561
3. Weight of Blood Test Result Evidence ........ 562
E . A doption .......................................... 563
F. Child Custody ...................................... 564
G. Child Neglect/Child Abuse .......................... 565
H. Other Developments ................................ 569
V III. H EALTH CARE ........................................ 571
A. Health Services Cost Review Commission .............. 571
B. Health Claims Arbitration System .................... 574
C. Health Care Providers .............................. 579
D. Wrongful Birth .................................... 584
E . A bortion .......................................... 586
F. Statutory Developments .............................. 589
IX . PROPERTY ............................................. 593
A. Testamentary Disposition ............................ 593
1. Use of Extraneous Evidence to Determine
Testamentary Nature of Documents ........... 593
2. Waiver of Conditions Precedent to Testamen-
tary Requests ................................. 595
3. Mandatory Time Limit on Filing Caveats to
W ills ......................................... 597
4. Limitation of Rights of Residuary Beneficiary
of Testamentary Trust ........................ 600
B. Eminent Domain ................................... 602
1. Interest Payable in Quick-Take Condemnation
Proceedings .................................. 602
2. Compensable Damages ....................... 605
C. Procedural Issues ................................... 609
1. Proper Party to Open and Close at Condem-
nation T rials ................................. 609
2. Foreclosure of Equity of Redemption at Tax
S ale .......................................... 6 11
3. Time for Appeal in Summary Ejectment
A ctions ....................................... 6 12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D. Tenancy by the Entireties ............................ 613
1. Termination of Lease by Lessors Who Hold as
Tenants by the Entireties ..................... 613
2. Characterization of Ownership of Check
Drawn to Multiple Parties .................... 614
3. Subrogation for Mortgage Payments Made by
Children on Parental Request ................ 615
E . Zoning ........................................... 6 17
F. O ther ............................................. 622
1. Rights of Receivers of Real Property .......... 622
2. Redemption of Leased Premises .............. 624
3. Interest Payable in Mortgage Foreclosures .... 626
4. Scope of Judicial Review ...................... 627
5. Liability Associated With Removal of Aban-
doned Vehicles ............................... 628
G. Legislative Developments ............................ 630
1. Maryland Real Estate Timing-Sharing Act ..... 630
a. Documentation, Registration, and Bonding
Requirem ents ............................. 633
b. Consumer Protections .................... 635
2. Modifications to the Maryland Condominium
A ct ........................................... 6 36
a. Development and Conversion ............. 637
b. M anagem ent .............................. 638
3. Housing Discrimination ...................... 639
4. Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Assistance
Program ..................................... 639
5. Home and Housing Rehabilitation Financing,
Interest on Loans ............................ 641
6. Title to Street or Highway .................... 642
7. Release of Mortgage and Release of Lien ..... 642
8. Mechanics' Liens, Streets ..................... 644
9. Validity of Certain Deeds of Maryland
Corporations ................................. 644
X . T AXATION ............................................. 646
A. Sales Tax: Computer Software ....................... 646
B. Unitary Business ................................... 650
C. D om icile .......................................... 653
D. Real Estate Taxation ............................... 656
1. Auxiliary Farm Structures .................... 656
2. Recordation Taxes ........................... 657
2591985]
260 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:254
E. Statutory Changes .................................. 658
1. Tax Amnesty Program ........................ 658
2. Estate Tax-Qualified Terminable Interest
Property Election ............................. 658
F. Other Developments ................................. 660
1. Retaliatory Tax ............................... 660
2. County Tax Rates for Personal and Real
Property ..................................... 662
3. Repeal of the Definition of "Homestead" ...... 663
X I. TO RTS ............................................... 665
A. Negligence ......................................... 665
1. D uty ......................................... 665
2. Contributory Negligence ..................... 665
3. Last Clear Chance ............................ 666
B. Invasion of Privacy ................................. 667
C. Defamation ........................................ 669
1. Private Figure ................................ 669
2. Public Figure ................................. 672
3. Newspaper Privilege .......................... 674
D. Loss of Consortium ................................. 675
E. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process ............ 675
F. Legal M alpractice .................................. 680
G. Accrual of an Action ............................... 681
H . Agency ........................................... 684
I. Interspousal Immunity ............................... 686
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Environmental Law
1. Legislation.-In 1984, the Maryland General Assembly ex-
panded the Occupational Safety Subtitle of the Division of Labor
and Industry Article of the Maryland Code' to include various provi-
sions relating to worker exposure to certain types of hazardous and
toxic chemicals.2 In furtherance of the declared legislative purpose
of assuring safe and healthful working conditions,3 the new provi-
sions require employers to compile and maintain information re-
garding the hazardous and toxic materials with which their
employees come in contact, to provide such information to govern-
mental agencies charged with fire protection, and to educate their
employees with regard to appropriate safety procedures and the
dangers associated with the toxic substances with which they work.4
The new provisions apply to employers who use or store haz-
ardous chemicals, to persons who import or sell such chemicals, and
to those who repackage or manufacture such chemicals in the state
of Maryland. 5 "Hazardous chemical" is carefully defined to include
substances with certain flammable or explosive qualities as well as
substances identified as health hazards by the United States Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration.6 Employers are required
to compile and maintain a "chemical information list" containing
specified information for each hazardous chemical handled,7 and to
develop or obtain a "material safety data sheet" or the equivalent
for each hazardous chemical identified on their information list.'
This information must be supplied to the Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene,' and, if requested, to the local fire de-
partment. 0 In addition, employees or their designated representa-
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28-49D (1979 & Supp. 1984).
2. Act of May 15, 1984, chs. 364, 463, 1984 Md. Laws 2328, 2539 (codified at id.
§§ 32A-32N).
3. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 28(c) (1984). See also Kettler Bros., Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Licensing & Regulation, 39 Md. App. 597, 598, 387 A.2d 1145, 1146 (1978)
(purpose of occupational safety law is "to assure safe and healthful working conditions
for the citizens of the State of Maryland").
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 28(c)(13)-(15) (Supp. 1984).
5. Id. § 32B(a).
6. Id. §§ 32C, 32D.
7. Id. § 32E.
8. Id. § 32F.
9. Id. § 32H.
10. Id. § 321.
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tive may request access to this information."1  With certain
exceptions, employers are not required to disclose trade secrets or
confidential business information. 12
The new provisions require that all containers of hazardous
chemicals be appropriately labeled.' They also require employers
to implement an employee training and education program
designed to inform employees of the nature of the hazardous chemi-
cals with which they work, to teach them appropriate safety proce-
dures for handling such chemicals, and to apprise them of their
legal rights under the new law. 4 All provisions of the new law must
be complied with no later than May 25, 1986. t5
2. Case Law.-In United Steelworkers, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., '6 the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed two issues: the
relationship of industry custom and practice to the precautions re-
quired under the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act
(MOSHA) general duty clause;17 and the content of an agency deci-
sion necessary to facilitate judicial review.' 8
The action originated when two Bethlehem Steel Corporation
employees died after suffering heat stroke in separate furnace areas
of the employer's Sparrows Point mill.' 9 The Commissioner of La-
bor and Industry's safety and health staff (MOSH) investigated the
incident and cited Bethlehem for a serious and willful violation of
the MOSHA general duty clause, giving them three days to correct
the alleged violation.2" Bethelehem contested the citation, and after
thirteen days of hearings, the Commissioner's examiner 2' found
11. Id. § 32L.
12. Id. § 32N.
13. Id. § 32G.
14. Id. § 32M.
15. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 364, § 4, ch. 463, § 4, 1984 Md. Laws 2328, 2539.
Chemical information lists and material safety data sheets should have been compiled
and made available to the appropriate persons as of December 31, 1984. 1984 Md.
Laws ch. 364, § 2, 463, § 2.
16. 298 Md. 665, 472 A.2d 62 (1984).
17. Id. at 671-73, 472 A.2d at 65-66.
18. Id. at 673-81, 472 A.2d at 66-70.
19. Id. at 667-68, 472 A.2d at 63.
20. Id. at 668, 472 A.2d at 63-64. The MOSHA general duty clause requires each
employer to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are safe and healthful as well as free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees .... ." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 89, § 32(a)(1) (1979). MOSH relied upon the general duty clause because no
standards for occupational exposures to hot environments had been established by the
Commissioner. 298 Md. at 668, 472 A.2d at 64.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 37(c) (1979 & Supp. 1984) provides an employer who
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that MOSH had not met its burden of showing that precautions
taken by Bethlehem were unreasonable in the absence of a recog-
nized heat standard,22 and he vacated the citation.23 United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO Local 2610 filed exceptions, and the
Commissioner reversed the determination 24 and imposed a $1000
penalty. 25
Bethlehem appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
which found the charge was not supported by substantial evidence
and reversed the Commissioner's order.26 The Court of Special Ap-
peals affirmed. 27 It determined that there were no existing stan-
dards for occupational exposures to hot environments,28 that the
precautions taken by Bethlehem were consistent with those taken by
other employers in the industry, 29 and that none of the additional
precautions suggested in the hearings before the Commissioner's
examiner had been mentioned to Bethlehem in any of more than
130 previous MOSH inspections, 30 and concluded that the imposi-
tion of higher standards of conduct on Bethlehem would be arbi-
trary and unreasonable. 3 1 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
to consider whether the precautions required under the MOSHA
general duty clause are limited to industry custom and practice, and
whether the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
The Court of Appeals accepted United Steelworkers' argument
wishes to contest a citation with an opportunity for a hearing. Id. § 37(d) provides for
the appointment of a hearing examiner who will prepare an official record, including
testimony and exhibits, and prepare a written report of his determinations. The hearing
examiner's report shall be the final decision of the Commissioner, unless any affected
employer, employee, or employee representative requests a review by the Commissioner
within fifteen working days after the report is prepared, or the hearing officer or Com-
missioner orders a review of the proceedings.
22. 298 Md. at 669, 472 A.2d at 64.
23. Id.
24. Id. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 37(e) (1979 & Supp. 1984) allows the Commis-
sioner, after a review of the proceedings, to affirm, modify or vacate the citation or pro-
posed penalty.
25. The Commissioner modified the degree of violation from "willful" to "serious."
One thousand dollars is the maximum penalty permitted by MOSHA for a "serious"
violation. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 40(b) (1979).
26. 298 Md. at 670, 472 A.2d at 64.
27. United Steelworkers, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 53 Md. App. 366,
378, 454 A.2d 850, 856 (1983).
28. Id. at 376-77, 454 A.2d at 855.
29. Id. at 377, 454 A.2d at 856.
30. Id. at 375, 454 A.2d at 855.
31. Id. at 378, 454 A.2d at 856.
32. 298 Md. at 670, 472 A.2d at 65.
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that industry custom and practice should not be a per se limitation
on precautions required by the general duty clause.33 Finding that
the MOSHA general duty clause requires those precautions that a
"reasonable person who is familiar with the practices of the subject
industry" would take,34 the court held that this standard is not lim-
ited to current industry practice 35 because that limitation would not
" 'prevent an industry, which fails to take sufficient precautionary
measures against hazardous conditions, from subverting the under-
lying purposes of the [the Act].' "36 Industry custom and practice
does play a role, however, in determining what is reasonable. 7
The court did not reach the issue of whether the Commis-
sioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence, because it
found the administrative record so inadequate as to preclude judi-
cial review.3 ' It found that the Commissioner's decision failed to
resolve significant conflicts of fact,3 9 failed to identify the act or
omission which constituted the violation,40 and failed to suggest
ways for Bethlehem to avoid future citations. 4 1 The court noted
that judicial review of agency action looks to agency findings and
statements of reasons to see if the action was justified.42 When, as
here, the agency does not adequately disclose the reasons for its de-
cision, the court's function cannot be performed. 43  "'We must
know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
33. Id. at 671, 472 A.2d at 65.
34. Id. The court adopted the test employed by many federal appellate circuits when
reviewing agency actions taken under generally worded OSHA standards. See, e.g., L.R.
Willson & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 698 F.2d 507, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Tri-State Roofing
& Sheet Metal, Inc. v. OSHRC, 685 F.2d 878, 880 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Donovan
v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1981).
35. 298 Md. at 672, 472 A.2d at 66.
36. Id. (quoting Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717, 723 (4th Cir.
1979)).
37. Id. at 672-73, 472 A.2d at 66.
38. Id. at 673, 472 A.2d at 66.
39. Id. at 674, 472 A.2d at 67.
40. Id. at 667, 472 A.2d at 63.
41. Id. at 680, 472 A.2d at 70.
42. Id. at 679, 472 A.2d at 69. See also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962) (Since the court defers to the agency, it is important that
the agency make findings that support its decision, and those findings must be sup-
ported by substantial evidence.).
43. The court refused to "search the subject record for evidence sufficient to support
any one or more of the theories advanced by Steelworkers or by MOSH, and then to
decide if that theory constitutes a violation of the general duty clause ...... 298 Md. at
680, 472 A.2d at 69-70.
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whether it is right or wrong.' ,,"'
The court reasoned that it is especially important for the Com-
missioner to substantiate his decisions when, as here, the violation
does not involve an express safety standard.4 5 When the violation
concerns the general duty clause, the decision must " 'specify the
particular steps a cited employer should have taken to avoid cita-
tion, and . . .demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those
measures.' "46 Due to the many inadequacies of the Commis-
sioner's decision, the court found it necessary to remand the case
for further proceedings.4 7
Maryland courts in other recent decisions have either expanded
or maintained the already substantial power exercised by agencies.4 8
These decisions have recognized the importance of agency proceed-
ings by: (1) giving administrative agencies sufficient autonomy to es-
tablish and interpret agency bylaws;4 (2) requiring parties to
exhaust all administrative remedies and await a final agency decision
before resorting to the courts;5" and (3) narrowly focusing the scope
ofjudicial review of agency action.5 ' In United Steelworkers, however,
the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to uphold a decision by the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry because it failed to specify the
omission that constituted the MOSHA violation and failed to in-
struct the offending party as to how to avoid future violations.5 2
This decision indicates that, although administrative agencies enjoy
substantial autonomy and discretion, the courts will not permit
agencies to abuse their discretion by ignoring statutorily prescribed
44. Id. at 679, 472 A.2d at 69 (quoting United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.&P.R. Co.,
294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935)).
45. Id. at 680, 472 A.2d at 70.
46. Id. (quoting National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
47. Id. at 680-81, 472 A.2d at 70.
48. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Waeldner, 298 Md. 354, 470 A.2d 332 (1984) (recog-
nizing power in State Board of Education to set aside decisions of county boards); Mary-
land Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 296 Md. 46, 459 A.2d
205 (1983) (defining final administrative action entitling party to judicial review); Mary-
land Comm'n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586, 457 A.2d
1146 (1983) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required in cases involving interpre-
tation of an agency rule); McIntyre v. Board of Educ., 55 Md. App. 219, 461 A.2d 63
(1983) (State Board of Education empowered to interpret the language of the regular
teachers' contract used by county boards).
49. McIntyre, 55 Md. App. at 224, 461 A.2d at 66.
50. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 296 Md. at 59, 459 A.2d at 213; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295
Md. at 595-96, 457 A.2d at 1151.
51. Vaeldner, 298 Md. at 362-64, 470 A.2d 336-37.
52. 298 Md. at 680-81, 472 A.2d at 70.
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procedures.53 Such procedures must be followed carefully and
completely by the agencies to avoid infringing on the rights of those
parties whose activities are affected.54
B. Education
Recently, each level of Maryland's appellate system had an op-
portunity to consider issues involving the scope of the Maryland
State Board of Education's power and autonomy. Their decisions
leave the State Board a wide area within which to operate and exert
its substantial, but not unchecked, power.
In McIntyre v. Board of Education,55 the Court of Special Appeals
was called upon to decide whether the Maryland State Board of Ed-
ucation was empowered to interpret the language of the teacher's
contract that the State Board compels the county boards to use.5 6
The action originated when three Kent County school administra-
tors were transferred to lower-paying positions. 57 Their contract
prohibited reductions in pay for the remainder of the year when
transfers were made "during a school year."58 The administrators
petitioned the State Board of Education for a determination of the
meaning of "school year."'59 The State Board granted the request
53. In United Steelworkers, the Commissioner failed to comply with the Maryland Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which provides in part: "A final decision shall include find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the un-
derlying facts supporting the findings." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 254 (1982).
54. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
55. 55 Md. App. 219, 461 A.2d 63 (1983).
56. Id. at 220, 461 A.2d at 64. The contract at issue is a standard form contract that
the State Board requires county boards to use. The contract is one of the bylaws of the
State Board set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 13A.07.02.01B (1974). The Kent
County Board of Education conceded that the State Board has authority to compel the
use of the form contract. 55 Md. App. at 221-22, 461 A.2d at 65.
57. 55 Md. App. at 220, 461 A.2d at 64.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 221, 461 A.2d at 65. The administrators petitioned pursuant to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 250 (1982) (repealed 1984, incorpo-
rated into MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-304 to -305 (1984)), which provides:
On petition of any interested person, the agency may issue a declaratory ruling
with respect to the applicability of any rule, order, or statute enforceable by it
to any person, property or statement of facts. If issued a declaratory ruling is
binding between the agency and the petitioner on the state of facts alleged.
Such a ruling is subject to review in the circuit court of the county in the man-
ner hereinafter provided for the review of decisions in contested cases. Each
agency shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and the procedure for
their submission, consideration, and disposition.
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and issued a declaratory ruling on the question. 60  The County
Board appealed to the Circuit Court for Kent County, contending
that the State Board had no jurisdiction to interpret a contract to
which it was not a party. 6' The circuit court agreed with this
62contention.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed.63 Characterizing the
State Board's authority as "awesome ' 64 and citing a need for uni-
formity throughout the state,65 the court held that the State Board
did have authority to interpret the prescribed contract:66
There would be little purpose in permitting the State
Board authority to compel by rule, regulation or bylaw the
use of a precisely worded contract, without deviation, then
say that despite its unprecedented authority to interpret
the meaning of its own school laws, the same authority did
not apply to the interpretation of its prescribed contracts.67
The Court of Special Appeals decision in McIntyre is indicative
of that court's desire to afford the State Board substantial autonomy
in establishing the educational policies of this state.68 The Court of
Appeals evidently favors the same policy. In Board of Education v.
Waeldner,69 the Court of Appeals recognized considerable authority
in the State Board to review and set aside decisions of the county
60. 55 Md. App. at 222, 461 A.2d at 65.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 222-23, 461 A.2d at 65.
63. Id. at 226, 461 A.2d at 67. The court stressed that the contract was a required
contract, not a recommended one. Id.
64. Id. at 225, 461 A.2d at 66. The Court of Special Appeals indicated that even if
the language of the contract were less ambiguous or the parties had agreed to its mean-
ing, a conflicting interpretation by the State Board of Education would control. Id.
65. Id.
66. The State Board's authority to interpret the contract comes not only from article
41, § 250, but from MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(c) (1978) (The State Board is di-
rected to adopt bylaws, rules and regulations, having the force of law, for the adminis-
tration of public schools.), and id. § 2-205(e) (The State Board is empowered and
directed to interpret those bylaws, rules and regulations, to explain the true intent and
meaning of the school law, and to decide all controversies and disputes that arise under
it, with the decision being final.). Id. at 224-25, 461 A.2d at 66.
67. 55 Md. App. at 224, 461 A.2d at 63.
68. The State Board's broad powers do not include the right to appeal from a rever-
sal of its own decision, however. In McIntyre, the State Board of Education had joined
the individual appellants in appealing the decision of the circuit court. The Court of
Special Appeals dismissed the State Board's appeal, stating that it "fail[ed] to see how
the agency, having functioned in a quasi-judicial capacity, can appeal from a reversal of
its own decision .... " Id. at 226, 461 A.2d at 67.
69. 298 Md. 354, 470 A.2d 332 (1984).
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boards,7" while emphasizing that judicial review of State Board ac-
tion remains narrowly focused. 7'
In Waeldner, a Prince George's County public school teacher
appealed his dismissal by the County Board to the State Board of
Education.7 2 The County Board had found the teacher guilty of
misconduct in office and incompetency and dismissed him;7" the
State Board modified the sanction from dismissal to suspension."
The County Board appealed that modification to the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County, maintaining that the State Board had
exceeded its statutory authority when it modified the disciplinary
sanction. 75 Both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the State Board's decision.76
The Maryland Court of Appeals likewise affirmed.77 The court
concluded that the State Board did not exceed its authority when it
conducted an independent evaluation of the record and replaced
the County Board's sanction with what it believed to be a more ap-
propriate remedy. 78 The Court of Appeals stressed that the State
Board's authority to modify disciplinary sanctions imposed by
the County Boards must be examined in the light of the broad do-
minion over public education 79 granted to the State Board by the
legislature 0 and recognized by the court itself in prior deci-
70. Id. at 361-62, 470 A.2d at 335-36.
71. Id. at 361-63, 470 A.2d at 335-36.
72. Id. at 356, 470 A.2d at 333. MD. EDuC. CODE ANN. § 6-202 (a) (1985) authorizes a
county board to dismiss a teacher. Section 6-202(a)(4) authorizes an appeal from the
decision of the county board to the State Board.
73. 298 Md. at 357-58, 470 A.2d at 333-34.
74. Id. at 359, 470 A.2d at 334.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 356, 470 A.2d at 333.
77. Id. at 364, 470 A.2d at 337.
78. Id. at 362, 470 A.2d at 336. The County Board had contended "that the State
Board's authority on appeal under [MD. EDUC. CODE ANN.] § 6-202(a)(4) 'is limited to
determinations of whether the County Board's actions were irregular or an abuse of
authority and whether there is adequate evidence to justify the statutory grounds for
dismissal relied upon by the County Board.' " Id. at 359, 470 A.2d at 334.
79. Id. at 361, 470 A.2d at 335.
80. Id. at 360, 470 A.2d at 335. Under MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(g)(2) (1985),
the State Board is directed to "exercise general control and supervision over the public
schools and educational interests of this State." Section 2-205(b) empowers the State
Board to "[d]etermine the elementary and secondary educational policies of this State";
section 2-205(c) directs the State Board to "adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations for the
administration of the public schools." Section 2-205(e) provides that the State Board
"shall explain the true intent and meaning of the provisions of... [the Education Arti-
cle] . . . within its jurisdiction"; the same subsection mandates that the State Board
"shall decide all controversies and disputes under these provisions" and further states
that "[tihe decision of the Board is final." Id.
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sions. 8 ' Accordingly, the court stated:
[W]e think it evident from the statutory scheme of the Edu-
cation Article, and the allocation of power between the
State and County Boards, that the legislature intended that
the State Board would exercise its independent judgment
on the record before it in determining whether disciplinary
infractions, as charged, had been established and, if so,
whether the sanction imposed was too severe under the
circumstances.82
The court then conducted its own review of the State Board's
action. 83 Emphasizing that judicial review of agency decisions is
"narrowly focused" and limited chiefly to a determination of
whether the agency's action was arbitrary or capricious, 8 4 the court
noted that "[t]he test to be applied in making this determination is
limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached
the factual conclusion the agency reached.8 5 . . .[A] court upon ju-
dicial review of a decision of an administrative agency will not sub-
stitute its judgment on the facts for that of the agency."8 6 Utilizing
this standard, the court upheld the action of the State Board, con-
cluding that its action was not arbitrary or capricious.8 7
The court's decision in Waeldner represents the final step in es-
tablishing in the State Board a power hinted at in an earlier Court of
Appeals decision, Resetar v. State Board of Education8 and clearly ex-
pressed in Board of Education v. McCrumb s9 a recent decision by the
Court of Special Appeals. In Resetar, the State Board had upheld the
County Board's decision to dismiss a teacher for misconduct in of-
fice. The Court of Appeals implied, however, that the State Board
81. See, e.g., Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 556, 399 A.2d 225, 235
(State Board invested with last word on any matter concerning educational policy or
administration of the school system), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); Zeitschel v. Board
of Educ., 274 Md. 69, 81, 332 A.2d 906, 912 (1975) (State Board authorized to superin-
tend the activities of the local boards of education to keep them within the legitimate
sphere of their operations); Wilson v. Board of Educ., 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A.2d 67,
70 (1964) (mere fact that the solution is initially within the scope of the County Board's
authority does not negate power of the State Board to review it and set it aside).
82. 298 Md. at 361, 470 A.2d at 335.
83. Id. at 363-64, 470 A.2d at 336-37.
84. Id. at 362, 470 A.2d at 336.
85. Id. at 363, 470 A.2d at 336 (citing Resetar, 284 Md. at 554, 399 A.2d at 225).
86. Id. (citing Zeitschel, 274 Md. at 82, 332 A.2d at 913).
87. Id. at 364, 470 A.2d at 337. The State Board had considered the teacher's excel-
lent record, his concern for the students in his care, and the fact that no children had
been hurt. Id.
88. 284 Md. 537, 399 A.2d 225, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979).
89. 52 Md. App. 507, 450 A.2d 919 (1982).
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had the authority to impose a lesser sanction. 90 In McCrumb, the
Court of Special Appeals found modification of a penalty imposed
on personnel by a local board of education clearly within the power
of the State Board of Education." In Waeldner, the Maryland Court
of Appeals has undoubtedly decided to invest the State Board of
Education with the last word in matters concerning teacher disci-
pline.92 The result of this decision may be uniformity at the cost of
efficiency.
93
In Elprin v. Howard County Board of Education,94 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals considered the scope of judicial review of another kind
of school board decision. The court indicated that Maryland State
Board of Education decisions reviewing local board of education de-
cisions about the closing and consolidating of public schools may
not be subject to judicial review.95 The court held that the State
Board's approval of a decision by the Howard County Board of Edu-
cation to close two elementary schools could not be appealed to the
circuit court9 6 under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act
97
because the appeal did not involve a "contested case." 98
90. 284 Md. at 562, 399 A.2d at 238.
91. 52 Md. App. at 514, 450 A.2d at 924.
92. 298 Md. at 361, 470 A.2d at 335-36. "[U]nder its visitorial power, the last word
or final decision rests with the State Board as to any dispute concerning the administra-
tion of the public school system, including whether, under § 6-202(a), teacher miscon-
duct warrants dismissal or a lesser sanction." Id.
93. The court's decision could lead to a duplication of effort by the State Board and
various county boards of education.
94. 57 Md. App. 458, 470 A.2d 833, cert. denied, 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984).
95. Id. at 464-67, 470 A.2d at 836-37. Courts generally afford great deference to
actions of state and local school boards, even when judicial review is allowed. See, e.g.,
Bernstein v. Board of Educ., 245 Md. 464, 470-75, 226 A.2d 243, 247-50 (1967) (court
would not review substance of local board of education decision transferring students,
as local board is not a state agency under Maryland Administrative Procedure Act; court
would review charges of procedural unfairness using arbitrary and capricious standard);
see also supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
96. The appellants and other concerned citizens requested that the Maryland State
Board of Education review the Howard County Board of Education's decision to close
the two schools and transfer the students involved to other nearby schools. See MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205 (1978); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13.A.02.09 (1974). The
State Board granted review but upheld the County Board's decision. Thereafter, the
appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County but that court dismissed
their appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the proceeding before
the State Board did not involve a "contested case" under the Maryland Administrative
Procedure Act, MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -706 (1984). 57 Md. App. at
463, 470 A.2d at 835.
97. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -706 (1984).
98. Section 10-215 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] party who
is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the
decision as provided in this section." Id. § 10-215(a) (emphasis added). Section 10-201
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The court noted that a decision by a state administrative agency
is a "contested case" subject to judicial review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act "only when that decision determines the legal
rights, duties or privileges of specific parties, which have been deter-
mined by the state agency after a hearing required by law or consti-
tutional right."99  The court concluded that the State Board's
decision did not meet this standard for a number of reasons. First,
the State Board's action did not in any way affect legal rights, enti-
tlements or privileges, since Maryland law recognizes no legal right
or privilege to attend a particular school.' 0 In addition, because
the Board's decision did not adjudicate the rights of any specific
person but instead affected the children, parents and community as
a whole, the Board's review was quasi-legislative in nature and not
an adversary proceeding.' 0 ' Finally, the State Board was not obli-
gated to entertain the appeal from the County Board's decision,10 2
and thus the State Board proceeding was not a required hearing.10 3
This decision affirms the long-standing position of the Mary-
land courts that disputes between school systems and parents are
most properly resolved by boards of education and not by the
courts. 10 4 Although the court did not foreclose the possibility of
judicial review of school closing decisions,'0 5 it made such a possi-
of the Act defines "contested case" as "a proceeding before an agency to determine: (1)
a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by law to be
determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing .... ." Id. § 10-201(e).
99. 57 Md. App. at 463, 470 A.2d at 835. See MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-
215(a), -201(c)(1) (1984).
100. 57 Md. App. at 464, 470 A.2d at 836. See Bernstein v. Board of Educ., 245 Md.
464, 472, 226 A.2d 243, 248 (1967); see also Welch v. Board of Educ., 477 F. Supp. 959,
966 (D. Md. 1979) (residents of school district have no liberty or property interest in
school in their district remaining "as is").
101. 57 Md. App. at 463, 470 A.2d at 836. See Bernstein, 245 Md. at 472-73, 226 A.2d
at 248-49.
102. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 13.A.02.09.03A (1974).
103. 57 Md. App. at 465, 470 A.2d at 836-37. The court also held that the State
Board's decision was not a declaratory ruling so as to be a "contested case" under MD.
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 250 (1978), and that the County Board's decision was not one by a
County superintendent so as to be appealable as a matter of right under MD. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 4-205(c)(4) (1978). 55 Md. App. at 465-66, 470 A.2d at 837.
104. See, e.g., Bernstein, 245 Md. at 476, 226 A.2d at 250-51 (quoting Wiley v. Board of
County School Comm'rs, 51 Md. 401, 406 (1879): "If every dispute . . . between the
functionaries and the patrons or pupils of the schools, offered an occasion for a resort to
the courts for settlement, the working of the system would . . . be greatly embarrassed
and obstructed .... ").
105. The court implies that, if the parents had asked for and been given a declaratory
ruling under § 250 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the decision would then have
been reviewable. 57 Md. App. at 465-66, 470 A.2d at 837.
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bility unlikely. 10 6
C. Worker's Compensation
Maryland courts considered a number of cases dealing with the
administration of the worker's compensation system. Issues consid-
ered included the reach of provisions authorizing special benefits to
fire fighters, whether there can be dual recovery, and what consti-
tutes a compensable activity.
1. Benefits.-The state legislature, recognizing the valuable
service rendered to the community by fire fighters, has attempted to
alleviate the consequences of the hazardous nature of their employ-
ment through special legislation allowing for increased worker's
compensation benefits. Section 64A of article 101 of the Maryland
Code provides for increased benefits to fire fighters in two ways.
First, it provides that fire fighters may receive payments from a pen-
sion fund without a reduction in worker's compensation benefits.1
0 7
Second, when a benefit claim has been filed, it allows for a statutory
presumption of compensability for any health problem caused by
lung or heart diseases or hypertension. 0 8 In two recent cases, the
106. Related Developments:
In Koontz v. Association of Classified Employees, 297 Md. 521, 467 A.2d 753
(1983) the court avoided consideration of a complaint by members of a school employ-
ees' union alleging unfairness in the internal dealings of the union. Several delays in the
trial resulted in the case being disposed of for mootness, since the employment agree-
ment between the union and the school board, in which the complaining members alleg-
edly had not had a voice, had already been implemented according to statute. The court
noted, however, that the MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-511 (1978) (republished without
change in 1985) allows the school board to make the final determination as to the specif-
ics of an employment agreement in the event of budgetary constraints, as in this case,
and that such determination could be implemented even if union ratification were inva-
lid. The court did imply, however, that it could direct the board to consider the interests
of certain employees prior to the implementation of the plan, but it remains to be seen
whether the court will choose to adopt this dictum in a future case.
107.
Any paid fire fighter or fire fighting instructor whose compensable claim results
from a condition or impairment of health caused by lung diseases, heart dis-
eases or hypertension . . . shall receive such benefits as are provided for in this
article in addition to such benefits as he may be entitled to under the retirement system in
which said fire fighter . . . was a participant at the time of his claim.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 64A(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
108.
Any condition or impairment of health of any paid municipal . . . fire fighter
. . . caused by lung diseases, heart diseases, or hypertension . . . resulting in
total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to be compensable under




Court of Appeals considered problems regarding interpretation of
section 64A.
In Lovellette v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore"°9 the Court of
Appeals examined the applicability of the statutory presumption of
section 64A to a fire fighter who had retired following a heart attack.
The issue was whether the statute could be construed to support a
finding of occupational disease, even when the particular manifesta-
tion of heart disease would normally be characterized as an acciden-
tal injury. 1 ' The fire fighter had suffered a disabling myocardial
infarction while lifting an overhead door at the scene of a fire."'
Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals admitted that,
absent the presumption, such disability as the direct result of imme-
diate sudden strenuous activity, with no prior manifestation of heart
disease, would be characterized as an accidental injury." 2 The
lower court assumed such a finding would take the disability out of
the reach of the presumption, but the Court of Appeals interpreted
the legislative intent to permit a finding of occupational disease, and
allowed the higher recovery. 113
Lovellette thus precludes any finding of accidental injury when
heart or lung disease or hypertension manifests itself in a fire
fighter, even if the manifestation is of a type that would ordinarily be
compensable only as an accidental personal injury.' Although the
court characterized the section 64A presumption as a "rebuttable
presumption of fact," ' 1 5 it is difficult to conceive of a case involving
heart or lung disease where accidental injury could be found. For
all practical purposes, the presumption that such occupational dis-
ease was "suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employ-
ment" 16 is irrebuttable. However, the question still remained after
Lovellette as to the force to be given to the presumption.
In Montgomery County Fire Board v. Fisher,"7 the Court of Appeals
Id. § 64A(a).
109. 297 Md. 271, 465 A.2d 1141 (1983).
110. Worker's compensation law defines "accident" to be broader than just trauma
and to include strokes and heart attacks. See, e.g., Lord Baltimore Hotel v. Doyle, 192
Md. 507, 509, 64 A.2d 557, 558, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 817 (1949); see also Rieger v. Wash-
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 211 Md. 214, 216, 126 A.2d 598, 599 (1956) (injury
only accidental when it results from unusual strain in condition of employment).
111. 297 Md. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1143.
112. Id. at 284, 465 A.2d at 1148.
113. Id. at 283-84, 465 A.2d at 1148.
114. Id. at 283, 465 A.2d at 1148.
115. Id. at 285, 465 A.2d at 1148.
116. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 64A(a) (1979).
117. 298 Md. 245, 468 A.2d 625 (1983).
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determined that this presumption existed throughout the case as af-
firmative evidence, the burden of proof remaining on the em-
ployer."' In this case, a fire fighter had a pre-existing heart
condition and suffered two disabling incidents-the first, a heart at-
tack while off-duty, and the second, a prolonged angina attack in the
course of employment-and the court held that the section 64A pre-
sumption had been successfully rebutted as to the first incident but
not as to the second incident." 9 The court expressly rejected the
Thayer-Wigmore ("bursting bubble") theory of presumptions,
under which the presumption would have remained in effect only
until the employer produced some evidence to rebut it, at which time
the burden of proof would shift back to the claimant. The court
reasoned that the legislature's intent to give preferential treatment
to fire fighters would be rendered impotent by such an easily rebut-
table presumption. Thus the presumption was determined to be in
the Morgan ("affirmative evidence") tradition.
Fisher and Lovellette together make it very likely that a fire fighter
who suffers a heart attack during any job-related activity will be
found to be entitled to compensation under section 64A. This is
undoubtedly in accordance with the purpose of the statute. The
costs of allowing additional recovery to possibly undeserving indi-
viduals may be offset by the ease of applicability of the rule and the
resulting decrease in litigation costs.
2. Dual Recovery.-In Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2 ' the
Court of Appeals for the first time allowed actual dependents who
were not lawfully related to a decedent employee to receive worker's
compensation benefits after a total compensation award had been
made to the decedent's lawful family by another court. Decedent,
employed in Maryland, was killed in the course of employment in
Virginia. He had two sets of dependents at the time of his death: a
lawful wife and daughter who resided in Florida and were partially
dependent, and a second family in Maryland who were actually fully
dependent.' 2 ' Based on a presumption of total dependency under
Virginia law, the lawful family was awarded total compensation. 22
Both families filed claims in Maryland, where awards are based on
actual dependency regardless of legal relationship. 23
118. Id. at 259, 468 A.2d at 632.
119. Id. at 260, 468 A.2d at 632-33.
120. 296 Md. 528, 463 A.2d 850 (1983).
121. Id. at 529, 463 A.2d at 852.
122. Id. at 532, 463 A.2d at 853.
123. Id. at 532 n.4, 463 A.2d at 853 n.4.
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In upholding the Commission's decision awarding total com-
pensation to the Maryland family and denying compensation to the
Florida family, the court interpreted for the first time the scope of
article 101, section 21 (c)(4) of the Maryland Code. 124 The court de-
termined that the purpose of the statute was to prevent a dependent
or employee who had received an award in a different state from
receiving an additional award in Maryland. Thus the statute did not
apply to the Maryland dependents since they were not the same depen-
dents who had received an award in Virginia. However, the statute
did bar the lawful Florida family from receiving a Maryland award,
since they had already received a total reward from the Virginia
court. 125
The decision resulted in a kind of double recovery. Each set of
dependants received an award of total compensation, obligating the
employer to provide more dollars in benefits than the amount im-
posed by each state's statutory maximum. The court used a balanc-
ing test in determining that the interests of the state and employer
in preventing double recovery were outweighed by the overwhelm-
ing possibility that those persons the law was designed to protect
would be denied protection as a result of irregularities in the law
from state to state.' 26 Since the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution does not require a state to subordinate
its own compensation policies to those of another state, 127 a conflict
between the compensation policies of two states may result, as it did
here, in an employer being forced to honor two separate total
awards for the same death or injury. 128 Presumably the unusual set
of facts required to create such a conflict will rarely arise.
3. Compensable Activities.-In City of Salisbury v. Parks, 129 the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals considered whether a cardiac rescue
technician injured while participating in a voluntary training pro-
124. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 21(c)(4) (1979) states in pertinent part: "If an em-
ployee or the dependents of an employee shall receive compensation or damages under
the laws of any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit a
total compensation for the same injury greater than is provided for in this article."
125. 296 Md. at 539-40, 463 A.2d at 857.
126. Id. at 538-39, 463 A.2d at 856-57.
127. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Crider v. Zurich, 380
U.S. 39 (1965); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
128. The court made it clear that employees having more than one set of dependents
could be entitled to awards for each set. 296 Md. at 539-40, 463 A.2d at 857.




gram130 was entitled to worker's compensation. The court affirmed
the jury's determination that the injury arose out of and in the
course of employment.' 3 ' The court upheld the trial judge's in-
struction to the jury, which was based on the five-part test from
Moore's Case.'3 2 This test is usually applied in cases involving inju-
ries occurring during employer-sponsored social or recreational ac-
tivities.' 3 3 By extending the test to training program injuries, the
court seems to be suggesting that all injuries that occur other than
during regular working hours should be judged by the same stan-
dard when determining whether they were sustained within the
scope of a worker's employment. 134
130. The plaintiffs employer, the City of Salisbury, encouraged the plaintiff and other
cardiac rescue technicians to participate in various rescue training programs offered by
the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute. The plaintiff was injured while participating in
such a course held after normal working hours but on city property. 57 Md. App. at
298-99, 469 A.2d at 1277.
131. Id. at 300-01, 469 A.2d at 1277-78. Only injuries "arising out of and in the
course of employment" are compensable under the Maryland Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 § 67(6) (1979 & Supp. 1984).
132. 330 Mass. 1, 4-5, 110 N.E.2d 764, 766-67 (1953). In Sica v. Retail Credit Co.,
245 Md. 606, 227 A.2d 33 (1967), the Maryland Court of Appeals considered the follow-
ing five factors in determining that an employee injured during an employer-sponsored
Christmas dance was not injured during an activity within the scope of her employment:
(1) [t]he customary nature of the activity;
(2) [t]he employer's encouragement or subsidization of the activity;
(3) [t]he extent to which the employer managed or directed the recrea-
tional enterprise;
(4) [t]he presence of substantial pressure or actual compulsion upon the
employee to attend or participate; and
(5) [t]he fact that the employer expected or received a benefit from the
employee's participation in the activity.
Id. at 614-15, 227 A.2d at 37-38 (quoting Moore's Case, 330 Mass. 1, 4-5, 110 N.E.2d
764, 766-67 (1953).
133. 57 Md. App. at 301, 469 A.2d at 1278.
134. Related Developments:
In Safeway Stores v. Altman, 296 Md. 486, 463 A.2d 829 (1983), the Court of
Appeals held that a court may not enforce a proposed worker's compensation agree-
ment when the claimant sought to withdraw from the agreement prior to Commission
approval. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 52 (1979), claimants and employers may
enter into agreements that provide for final settlement of claims. The court interpreted
§ 52 to require Commission approval for the settlement to become effective, and found
that, under traditional common law principles, a contract had never been made. Thus,
even though the Commission had made a belated finding that the proposed settlement
was "fair and reasonable," the claimant's withdrawal from the agreement rendered it
void.
In Continental Group v. Coppage, 58 Md. App. 184, 472 A.2d 1014 (1984), the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the basic notion that there is no special form or lan-
guage in which the trial judge should instruct the jury on the issue of proximate cause in
a worker's compensation case. Id. at 192, 472 A.2d at 1018. See also Bethlehem-Spar-
rows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 382, 50 A.2d 256, 260 (1946); Larkin
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D. Employment Discrimination
In Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,' 35 a case involving an age discrimination claim,' 3 6 the Mary-
land Court of Appeals held that statutorily prescribed administrative
and judicial remedies must be exhausted in cases involving the in-
terpretation of an agency rule.' 3 7 The court had previously re-
quired the exhaustion of statutorily prescribed administrative and
judicial remedies in cases involving the interpretation of statutory
language,' 38 and it considered the exhaustion requirement equally
appropriate with regard to interpretation of agency rules, since it
would allow for the application of agency expertise.'
3 9
v. Smith, 183 Md. 274, 284, 37 A.2d 340, 344 (1944). Noting that the probable cause
standard is more liberal in worker's compensation cases than in ordinary tort cases, 58
Md. App. at 190, 472 A.2d at 1017 (citing Paul Constr. Co. v. Powell, 200 Md. 168, 186,
88 A.2d 837, 846 (1952)), the court held that any instruction conveying the following
idea is sufficient: "[T]he evidence must, at a minimum, establish beyond mere conjec-
ture or guess that the injury could have caused the consequence and that there was no
other intervening cause." Id. at 192, 472 A.2d at 1018. See also Montgomery County v.
Athey, 227 Md. 312, 314, 176 A.2d 766, 767 (1962); Reeves Motor Co. v. Reeves, 204
Md. 576, 581, 105 A.2d 236, 239 (1954). Moreover, failure to include the words "prob-
able" or "reasonably probable" is not reversible error. 58 Md. App. at 192, 472 A.2d at
1018.
In Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 57 Md. App. 135, 469 A.2d 466, cert. denied,
299 Md. 656, 474 A.2d 1345 (1984), the Court of Special Appeals rejected an attempt to
make an employer liable under worker's compensation for an employee's injuries on
public streets, when the employer has provided security patrols in recognition of a
known risk. Id. at 142, 469 A.2d at 469. The court noted that no employer would pro-
vide security for its employees in a high crime area, if by so doing it would increase its
liability. Petitioner based her argument on the "proximity rule," which allows for recov-
ery where injuries are sustained as the result of a "special hazard" incident to travelling
to and from work. But the court held that, since employees and non-employees alike
were exposed to the same risks on public streets, there was no "special hazard" incident
to petitioner's employment. Id. at 141-42, 469 A.2d at 469.
135. 295 Md. 586, 457 A.2d 1146 (1983).
136. The case involved an age discrimination complaint filed by an employee who
alleged that he was forced to retire at age 65 and that this constituted age discrimina-
tion. The Maryland Human Relations Commission investigated the complaint and is-
sued a finding that there was no probable cause to believe Bethlehem had discriminated
against the plaintiff. Id. at 587-88, 457 A.2d at 1147. The employee's complaint was
dismissed, a reconsideration request was denied, an appeal to the circuit court was dis-
missed, and the plaintiff then requested reconsideration of the initial dismissal. Id. at
588, 457 A.2d at 1147-48.
137. Id. at 594, 457 A.2d at 1150.
138. See, e.g., Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 294
Md. 225, 233, 499 A.2d 385, 389 (1982).
139. 295 Md. at 592, 457 A.2d at 1149.
[A]gency rules are designed to serve the specific needs of the agency, are
promulgated by the agency, and are utilized on a day-to-day basis by the
agency. A question concerning the interpretation of an agency's rule is as cen-
tral to its operation as an interpretation of the agency's governing statute. Be-
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The agency rule in question gave a party complaining of dis-
criminatory treatment an opportunity to apply for reconsideration
within thirty days of an adverse agency finding.1 40 The petitioner in
this case, the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, had
granted an application for reconsideration nearly one year after its
finding that there was no probable cause to believe respondent
Bethlehem had engaged in an illegal employment practice. 41 In
doing so, the Commission must have decided that the thirty-day re-
quirement in the rule was directory rather than mandatory. 142 Upon
reconsideration of the complaint, the Commission amended its find-
ing to state that there was probable cause to believe Bethlehem had
discriminated against complainant.' 43 Before the complaint could
be heard by a hearing examiner, Bethlehem sought judicial review,
claiming the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction and violated
its rules. 144
Bethlehem maintained that it was not required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before seeking judicial review,' 45 arguing that
cause the agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating a regulation,
the agency's expertise is more pertinent to the interpretation of an agency's
rule than to the interpretation of its governing statute.
Id. at 593, 457 A.2d at 1150.
140. The rule provides in relevant part:
If the findings conclude that there is no probable cause to believe that a dis-
criminatory act has been or is being committed, the complainant shall be given
the opportunity to apply to the Commission's Executive Director for reconsid-
eration of the administrative dismissal of the complaint. These applications
shall be in writing, with notice to the respondent, shall state specifically the
grounds upon which it is based, and shall be filed within 30 days from the date
on which those findings were mailed or delivered to the complainant. When
this application is made, the Executive Director shall review the entire file, and,
in his discretion, shall grant or deny the application for reconsideration.
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.03.01.05B (1974).
141. 295 Md. at 588-89, 457 A.2d at 1147-48.
142. Id., 457 A.2d at 1147-48. The Executive Director inferred from the regulations
that he had the discretion to reconsider the initial decision.
143. Id., 457 A.2d at 1148.
144. Id. The Maryland Commission on Human Relations sought dismissal because
Bethlehem's action prevented completion of the administrative proceedings. Id.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 10, 11 (1979 & Supp. 1984) establish that, if the
Commission's staff finds probable cause to believe that a discriminatory act or acts have
been committed, and if no agreement is reached for the elimination of the alleged dis-
criminatory acts, a case is to be set for a hearing before a hearing examiner who is to
render a decision. Article 49B, § 3(d) establishes that a party affected by a hearing ex-
aminer's decision may appeal to an "appellate panel of commissioners." Finally, article
49B, § 12(a) and article 41, § 255(a) establish that either the Commission or an ag-
grieved party may file an action for judicial review. Maryland Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions v. Mass Transit Admin., 294 Md. 225, 230, 449 A.2d 385, 387 (1982).
145. 295 Md. at 594-95, 457 A.2d at 1150-51.
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this case fell within the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine. 146 The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding
that, when the interpretation of an agency rule is at issue, none of
the limited exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies ap-
plies. 147 "Such a question ordinarily is and should be finally deter-
mined by the agency before recourse to the courts."'' 48
It is apparent from this decision that, even when a party to an
administrative proceeding believes the agency has abused its discre-
tion, that party must await final administrative action before re-
course to the courts. But how is a party to know that there has been
final administrative action entitling him to judicial review? In Mary-
land Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. 149
the Maryland Court of Appeals for the first time defined "final ad-
ministrative action."
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., the Appeal Board for the Mary-
land Commission on Human Relations determined that the Balti-
more Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) had engaged in a
discriminatory practice when it refused to hire the spouse of an em-
ployee.'° The Appeal Board remanded the case to a hearing exam-
iner, however, to decide if business necessity justified the refusal to
hire.15i Before the hearing examiner could initiate further proceed-
ings, BG&E filed a successful appeal to the Baltimore City Court
(now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City),' 52 which remanded the
146. Bethlehem contended that two of the exceptions discussed in Prince George's
County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1185 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083
(1981) were applicable. 295 Md. at 594-95, 457 A.2d at 1150-51.
Blumberg suggested that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is inapplicable
when the issues presented do not require application of agency expertise or when the
agency requires a party to follow an unauthorized procedure. 288 Md. at 285, 418 A.2d
at 1161.
Bethlehem maintained that questions of agency jurisdiction do not require appli-
cation of agency expertise and that the Commission's misinterpretation of its rule
caused Bethlehem to engage in an unauthorized procedure. 295 Md. at 594-95, 457
A.2d at 1150-51.
147. 295 Md. at 596, 457 A.2d at 1151.
148. Id. at 595-96, 457 A.2d at 1151.
149. 296 Md. 46, 459 A.2d 205 (1983).
150. Id. at 49, 459 A.2d at 208.
151. Id.
152. Id. BG&E alleged that the Commission had violated MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 14.03.01.09A(2)(d) (1974), which requires a complaint to be authorized by four com-
missioners. Id. The Commission moved to dismiss BG&E's appeal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. 296 Md. at 49-50, 459 A.2d at 208. The trial court denied the
Commission's motion and went on to find that the Commission did violate MD. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 14, § 14.03.01.09A(2)(d) (1974). The Commission filed an appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals. 296 Md. at 50, 459 A.2d at 208.
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case to the Commisssion. The Commission appealed that remand,
and certiorari was granted by the Court of Appeals before the Court
of Special Appeals considered the matter. The issue before the
Court of Appeals was whether the Appeal Board's order remanding
the case to the hearing examiner constituted a "final decision" enti-
tling BG&E to immediate judicial review.15 3
The court once again stressed the importance of exhausting
statutorily prescribed administrative and judicial remedies," 5 but
recognized that prior Maryland decisions had not adequately de-
scribed the characteristics of final administrative action.' 55 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has on numerous occasions
discussed the essential characteristics of final agency action. 56 The
Maryland Court of Appeals looked to those decisions, as well as to
its own decisions defining what constitutes the final order of a
court,15 7 to develop an appropriate test. The court concluded that:
[O]rdinarily the action of an administrative agency, like the
order of a court, is final if it determines or concludes the
rights of the parties, or if it denies the parties means of
further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests
in the subject matter in proceedings before the agency,
thus leaving nothing further for the agency to do.
158
Applying the newly enunciated test to the facts in Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co., the court held that the order remanding the case to a
hearing examiner was not a final administrative action.' 59
153. 296 Md. at 47, 52, 459 A.2d at 207, 209.
154. Id. at 50, 459 A.2d at 208.
The decisions of an administrative agency are often of a discretionary nature,
and frequently require an expertise which the agency can bring to bear in sift-
ing the information presented to it. The agency should be afforded the initial
opportunity to exercise that discretion and to apply that expertise. Further-
more, to permit interruption for purposes of judicial intervention at various
stages of the administrative process might well undermine the very efficiency
which the legislature intended to achieve in the first instance. Lastly, the courts
might be called upon to decide issues which perhaps would never arise if the
prescribed administrative remedies were followed.
Id. at 51, 459 A.2d at 209 (quoting Soley v. State of Md. Comm'n on Human Relations,
277 Md. 521, 526, 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976)).
155. 296 Md. at 53-54, 459 A.2d at 210.
156. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980);
Port of Boston, Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62,
71 (1970); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1948); United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10
(1927).
157. 296 Md. at 52-56, 459 A.2d at 209-11.
158. Id. at 56, 459 A.2d at 211.
159. Id. at 58, 459 A.2d at 212.
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[T]he Appeal Board's order did not command Baltimore
Gas & Electric to do or refrain from doing anything; did
not grant or deny any benefit to which Baltimore Gas &
Electric was entitled under the law; did not subject Balti-
more Gas & Electric to any liability, civil or criminal; and
did not change Baltimore Gas & Electric's existing or fu-
ture status. Indeed, no legal consequence of any kind
flowed from the Appeal Board's order. In short, the Ap-
peal Board's order did not determine or conclude Balti-
more Gas & Electric's rights and obligations. Those rights
and obligations will not be determined until there has been
further agency action.160
Accordingly, BG&E was not entitled to immediate judicial review.' 61
E. Public Information
The Maryland Public Information Act' 6 2 gives the public a
broad right of access to government information. The statute enti-
tles the public to information regarding governmental affairs and
"official acts of public officials and employees."' 63 Like its federal
counterpart, the Freedom of Information Act"6 (FOIA), the Public
Information Act requires an agency to release public records' 65 to a
160. Id. at 57-58, 459 A.2d at 212.
161. Id. at 58, 459 A.2d at 212.
162. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, §§ 1-6 (1980). The Act was repealed and recodified in
the revised State Government Article of the Code. Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 284, 1984
Md. Laws 979 (codified at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-611 to -628 (1984)).
There appear to be no significant substantive changes in the new legislation, although
different language obviously may lead to different interpretations of the statute.
163. Id. § 10-612(a).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
165. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-611 (1984) defines "public record" as:
(1) the original or any copy of any documentary material that:
(i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the state government or of a
political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection
with the transaction of public business; and
(ii) is in any form, including:
1. a card;
2. a computerized record;
3. correspondence;
4. a drawing;
5. film or microfilm;
6. a form;
7. a map;
8. a photograph or photostat;
9. a recording; or
10. a tape.
(2) "Public record" includes a document that lists the salary of an employee of
a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision.
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requesting party, unless the requested records are protected by a
statutory exemption. 16 6 The Act, like FOIA, is intended to enhance
government accountability and to foster an informed citizenry as a
check against government corruption. 67 In two recent cases, the
Court of Appeals interpreted several sections of the Act to deter-
mine when an agency is subject to its disclosure requirements and
when one of the statutory exemptions protects against disclosure.
In a third case, the Court of Special Appeals looked at one aspect of
the scope of the Act.
In A. S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 168 the Court of Appeals
held that a quasi-public agency, the Maryland Insurance Guaranty
Association' 69 (MIGA), is a state agency whose records are subject
to public access under the Public Information Act.' 7 ' A reporter for
The Evening Sun, owned by the appellant, A.S. Abell Publishing
Company, had submitted a written request to inspect certain
records'7' of MIGA, pursuant to the Public Information Act. Mez-
zanote, Chairman of the Board of MIGA, denied access to the
records, claiming that MIGA's status as a "non-profit unincorpo-
The definition of "public record" in § 10-611(f)(1)(ii) and (f)(2) differs slightly
from that of the earlier statute: "unit or instrumentality of the State government" now
replaces "agency or instrumentality of the State". MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A § l(b)
(1980).
166. The current exemptions under the Act are found in MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 10-615 to -619 (1984). There are a number of categories of exemptions and three
levels of exemptions; that is, there are records that a custodian must deny access to, may
deny access to, or may deny access to on a temporary basis.
167. See A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071
(1983); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). In Faulk
v. States Attorney, 299 Md. 493, 505-06, 474 A.2d 880, 886-87 (1984) the court cites
Robbins and notes that the purpose of the Public Information Act and FOIA are the
same.
168. 297 Md. 26, 464 A.2d 1068 (1983).
169. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 504-519 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
170. 297 Md. at 39, 464 A.2d at 1074.
171. The requested records, as indicated in the February 24, 1982 letter, were:
(a) MIGA budget and payroll data from the agency's inception, about
1971, to the present. These data should include a list of all employees, by
name, with salary.
(b) All correspondence and memoranda between MIGA and the state
insurance division, 1975 to the present.
(c) MIGA's selection of a claims adjusting firm and payments to that (or
those) firms, since 1971. Included should be records related to the Free State
adjusting company.
(d) Companies and individuals hired by MIGA since 1971, including
consultants and attorneys. MIGA payments to these persons and firms should
be included.
297 Md. at 29 n.2, 464 A.2d at 1069 n.2.
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rated legal entity"' t7 2 rendered it beyond the purview of the Act. 173
The trial court granted defendant's summary judgment motion,
concluding that MIGA was not a state agency or instrumentality
within the scope of the Act.' 74 The Court of Appeals granted peti-
tioner's writ of certiorari before consideration by the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals. 1
75
The Court of Appeals began by stating that the term "state
agency" should be liberally construed "in order to effectuate the
Public Information Act's broad remedial purpose."' 176 The court
then examined the statutory provisions establishing MIGA. 177 The
purpose of the MIGA is to protect the public by providing "a mech-
anism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain in-
surance policies" 178 and by "avoid[ing] financial loss to claimants or
policyholders because of the insolvency of [the] insurer."' 1 79
MIGA's autonomy is illustrated by its authority to issue a plan of
operation for its administration,'" hire employees, borrow money,
sue or be sued, enter into contracts, and perform other acts neces-
sary to effectuate its purposes."' l MIGA is, however, partially con-
trolled by the state through the actions of the State Insurance
Commissioner of Maryland. The Commissioner appoints MIGA's
Board of Directors, 182 approves the delegation of the Board's pow-
ers, t8 3 must approve the Board's plan of operation,1 84 and may ap-
prove or revoke the Board's designation of a member insurer as a
servicing facility. 85 MIGA is exempt from all state and local taxes
except property taxes,' 86 and from liability from any action taken in
172. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 506 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
173. Mezzanote claimed exemption under two sections of the Act. First, that MIGA
was not "a unit or instrumentality of the state," MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-
611(0 (i), and in any case that the records were confidential and therefore exempt, id.
§ 10-615(1).
174. 297 Md. at 31, 464 A.2d at 1070.
175. Id. at 32, 464 A.2d at 1071.
176. Id. See Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 589, 420 A.2d 261, 266 (1980);James v.
Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 335, 418 A.2d 1173, 1184 (1980).
177. Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 703, 1971 Md. Laws 1496 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, §§ 504-519 (1979 & Supp. 1984)).
178. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 504(a). The scope of MIGA "shall apply to all kinds
of direct insurance, except life insurance, health insurance, and annuities." Id. § 504(b).
179. Id. § 504(a).
180. Id. § 509(a)(1).
181. Id. § 508(b)(l)-(5).
182. Id. § 507(a).
183. Id. § 509(d).
184. Id. § 509(a)(1).
185. Id. § 510(b)(3).
186. Id. § 515.
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performance of its powers and duties."17
The court rejected MIGA's contention that the determinative
factor for state agency status is the presence or absence of complete
control by the state.' 88 The court noted that previous decisions had
established that no single factor could serve as the sole criterion in
such a determination,' 89 and that Moberly v. Herboldsheimer'90 had
shown that other factors besides degree of state control are impor-
tant, including public purpose and immunity from tort liability.i"
The court concluded that MIGA is a state agency for purposes
of the Public Information Act. 192 The court based this holding on
the entire relationship between MIGA and the state, including the
degree of control exercised by the state, MIGA's public purpose,
and MIGA's special tax and liability status. 93 The opinion in Mezza-
note emphasizes that any quasi-public body is likely to be subject to
the disclosure requirements of the Act.
In Faulk v. State's Attorney,l 94 the Court of Appeals was required
to decide whether a defendant was entitled to disclosure of investi-
gatory police reports compiled for law enforcement purposes. As
initially enacted, the Public Information Act stated that the
mandatory disclosure requirements did not apply to such investiga-
tory records. 95 In the 1978 amendments, the restriction against
187. Id. § 517.
188. 297 Md. at 34-37, 464 A.2d at 1072-74.
189. Id. at 35, 464 A.2d at 1072 (citing Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 510, 397 A.2d 1027, 1031 (1979) (relationship between state
and governmental body must be examined in order to determine status as either a state
agency or county or municipal agency for purposes of sovereign immunity); O&B, Inc. v.
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 279 Md. 459, 462, 369 A.2d 553, 555
(1977) (no single test exists for determining whether a governmental body is a state
agency for purposes of sovereign immunity, but rather, it is necessary to examine the
relationship between the state and the governmental entity to determine its status as
either a state agency or a county or municipal agency); Board of Trustees v. John K.
Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 587, 366 A.2d 360, 364 (1976).
190. 276 Md. 211, 345 A.2d 855 (1975).
191. Id. at 214-16, 225, 345 A.2d at 857-58, 862-63. Moberly involved the question of
whether a particular hospital was a municipal agency within the scope of the Act. At the
time, MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 1(a) (1975) defined "public records" to include records
made by municipalities as well as other political subdivisions. That section was amended
by Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 1006, 1978 Md. Laws 2887 to read "agency or instrumental-
ity of the State, or of a political subdivision." The most recent recodification has further
changed the definition to read "unit or instrumentality of the State government, or of a
political subdivision." MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-611 (f)(i) (1984).
192. 297 Md. at 37-39, 464 A.2d at 1074-75.
193. Id.
194. 299 Md. 493, 474 A.2d 880 (1984).
195. Id. at 507, 474 A.2d at 887 (quoting MD. CODE ANN. art. 76A, § 3(b)(i) (1969 &
Supp. 1970)).
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disclosure was eased; the exemption became applicable "only to the
extent that the production of investigatory records would. . . inter-
fere with valid and proper law enforcement proceedings."' 9 6 In
Faulk, the court was given its first opportunity to interpret this
amended exemption. In doing so, the court adopted the federal
test, holding that a generic determination of interference may be
made whenever a defendant in an ongoing criminal proceeding
seeks access to investigatory police reports relating to that
proceeding. 197
Following his grand jury indictment for burglary, petitioner
Faulk filed a request for discovery for production of the investiga-
tory police reports made of his alleged criminal offenses.' When
his request was denied, Faulk sought access to the reports under the
provisions of the Public Information Act.' 99 The State's refusal to
comply was upheld by the trial court, which dismissed Faulk's re-
quest despite the State's failure to present at a hearing any specific
evidence that disclosure of the reports would interfere with the then
pending criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeals granted peti-
tioner's writ of certiorari 20 0 to consider whether, as petitioner con-
196. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 1006, 1978 Md. Laws 2887 (then codified at MD. CODE
ANN. art. 76A, § 3(b)(i)(A) (1980)). In addition to § 3(b)(i)(A) ("interfere with valid and
proper law-enforcement proceedings,"), id. § 3(b)(i)(B)-(G) provide that the right to in-
spect the records may be denied
only to the extent that the production of them would. . .(B) deprive another
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confi-
dential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, (F) preju-
dice any investigation, or (G) endanger the life or physical safety of any person.
Subsections (3)(b)(i)(A)-(G) now appear, in substantially the same form, at MD. STATE
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-618(f)(2)(i)-(vii) (1984).
197. 299 Md. at 511, 474 A.2d at 889-90.
198. Id. at 497, 474 A.2d at 882. MD. R.P. 741(b)(5) states in pertinent part: "Upon
the request of the defendant, the State shall . . .[p]roduce and permit the defendant to
inspect and copy any books, papers, documents, recordings, or photographs which the
State intends to use at the hearing or trial .... "
199. 299 Md. at 497, 474 A.2d at 882. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § IA (1980) provided
in pertinent part: "[A1l persons are entitled to information regarding the affairs of gov-
ernment and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employ-
ees. To this end, the provisions of this act shall be construed in every instance with the
view toward public access ...... This section now appears, in substantially the same
form, at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-612(a), (b) (1984).
200. 299 Md. at 498, 474 A.2d at 883. Under the Public Information Act, an individ-
ual denied access is entitled to expedited judicial review. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A,
§ 5(b)(3) (1980) provides: "Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance
proceedings before the court, as authorized by this section, and appeals therefrom shall
take precedence on the docket over all other cases and shall be heard at the earliest
practicable date and expedited in every way." Subsections 5(b)(l) and (b)(3) now ap-
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tended, the State must present particularized evidence showing that
the disclosure of such reports would interfere with the pending
criminal proceedings, or whether, as the State contended, a generic
determination of interference can be made when a defendant in an
ongoing criminal proceeding seeks access to investigatory police re-
ports relating to that proceeding. 20'
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts, the Court of Ap-
peals looked to the interpretation of the federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,20 2 because its language and purpose parallel those of
the Public Information Act.20 3
The United States Supreme Court interpreted FOIA's exemp-
tion in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 20 4 by balancing FOIA's
basic policy in favor of disclosure against the potential harm that
might result from premature disclosure of information affecting a
pending proceeding. 2 5 The Court of Appeals in Faulk applied a
similar balancing test. The court determined that disclosure of in-
vestigatory police reports would interfere with law enforcement pro-
ceedings, by giving a defendant earlier or more extensive access to
the State's case than he would otherwise have under normal discov-
ery rules. 20 6 Moreover, disclosure would create a substantial likeli-
hood of delay in the adjudication of criminal proceedings, due to
pear, in substantially the same form, at MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-623(a)-(c)
(1984).
201. 299 Md. at 498, 474 A.2d at 883.
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
203. The statutory exemptions of FOIA and the Act developed similarly. Like the
Act, FOIA contained an original exemption providing that the otherwise mandatory dis-
closure requirements did not apply to investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 1965-69); that exemption was later limited by a
requirement that investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes could
only be withheld to "the extent that the production of such records would ... interfere
with enforcement proceedings." Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (1974)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1980 & Supp. 1984)).
204. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
205. The Court determined that disclosure of witnesses' statements during the pen-
dency of an unfair labor practice proceeding would substantially alter the National La-
bor Relations Board's substantive discovery rules and cause substantial delays in the
adjudication of unfair labor practice charges. The Supreme Court concluded that be-
cause the disclosure necessarily would interfere with a pending proceeding, 437 U.S. at
236-38, and because FOIA's purpose would not be defeated by deferring disclosure un-
til completion of the proceeding, id. at 241, the NLRB was not required to present par-
ticularized evidence showing interference. Rather, a generic determination could be
made in place of a case-by-case showing. Id. at 242-43.
206. 299 Md. at 509, 474 A.2d at 889. The Supreme Court in Robbins had reached a
similar conclusion:
[P]rehearing disclosure of witnesses' statements would involve the kind of harm
that Congress believed would constitute an "interference" with NLRB enforce-
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the special provision allowing for immediate review of the denial of
a Public Information Act request.
20 7
The court noted that the Act's purpose would not be defeated
by deferring disclosure until the completion of the criminal pro-
ceeding and concluded that "the strong presumption in favor of a
disclosure under [the Act] is outweighed by the likelihood that the
disclosure of investigatory police reports to a defendant in a pend-
ing criminal proceeding would disturb the existing balance of rela-
tions in criminal proceedings." 20 8  Consequently, the court held
that a generic determination of interference can be made whenever
a defendant in an ongoing criminal proceeding seeks access to in-
vestigatory police reports relating to that pending process.20 9
In Kline v. Fuller,2 10 the Court of Special Appeals held that pub-
lic records2 1 l in the hands of a state official, regardless of whether
the records pertain to matters within that official's jurisdiction, are
subject to the access provisions of the Public Information Act, even
if, in the hands of local officials, the records may also be subject to
the County Freedom of Information Act 2 12 (a public local law).2 13
The court further held that an action for judicial review of an
agency's denial of a request for records may be brought within two
ment proceedings: that of giving a party litigant earlier and greater access to
the Board's case than he would otherwise have.
437 U.S. at 241.
207. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 5(b)(3) (1980) (now codified at MD. STATE Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 10-623(c) (1984)) allows a public official's denial of a Public Information
Act request to be immediately reviewed by a circuit court and, if desired, appealed. This
provision is in marked contrast to ordinary discovery rulings which, because of their
interlocutory nature, are not appealable until there is a final judgment.
The court noted that
the instant case is itself illustrative of the delay resulting from the utilization of
the Maryland Public Information Act to obtain disclosure of information for
use in a pending criminal proceeding. In this case, criminal proceedings were
instituted against Faulk on April 7, 1981. Faulk's complaint that the State had
denied him the right to inspect and copy the investigatory police reports was
filed in the Circuit Court for Harford County on April 24, 1981. The criminal
proceedings instituted on April 7, 1981 are still pending.
299 Md. at 510 n.7, 474 A.2d at 889 n.7.
208. 299 Md. at 510-11, 474 A.2d at 889.
209. Id. at 511, 474 A.2d at 889.
210. 56 Md. App. 294, 467 A.2d 786 (1983).
211. For the definition of public records used by the court, see MD. ANN. CODE art.
76A, § 1(b) (1980) (repealed and recodified with stylistic changes not pertinent to the
issue in Kline at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-61 l(f) (1984)).
212. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 6 (1980) (repealed and recodified with stylistic
changes not pertinent to the issue in Kline at MD. ANN. CODE art. 24, § 5-101 (Supp.
1984)).




The action originated when Kline, a disgruntled employee of
the Charles County sheriff's office, requested permission of the
sheriff to inspect and copy various categories of documents.215 The
sheriff permitted access to only a portion of the requested records.
Approximately four months later, Kline sought an order to produce
records pertaining to promotion methods and correspondence be-
tween the sheriff and the local lodge of the Fraternal Order of Po-
lice.216 Moving to dismiss, the sheriff argued that the Charles
County Freedom of Information Act was the applicable law,21 7 and
that this Act specifies administrative remedies which must be ex-
hausted before judicial review is available. The court agreed and
granted the sheriff's motion to dismiss.2 I s
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the circuit court
had erred in not applying the Public Information Act.2 l9 It was not
necessary for Kline to exhaust the additional administrative reme-
dies required by the Charles County Freedom of Information Act
before seeking judicial review. 220
The court further held that Kline's petition for judicial review
was timely filed even though it was filed more than thirty days after
final denial of his request.22 ' Recognizing an apparent conflict be-
tween two applicable provisions, 22 the court considered whether
section 5-110 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which
allows two years, was applicable to actions brought solely for pro-
duction of documents without an accompanying request for money
damages,2 or whether such an action would be governed only by
Maryland Rule B4a.2 2 4 The court found that "it would be anoma-
lous . . . to impose different time requirements depending on
whether the applicant seeks"-225 monetary relief in addition to pro-
214. Id. at 309, 467 A.2d at 794.
215. Kline made his request "pursuant to Art. 76A of the Anno. Code." Id. at 302,
467 A.2d at 790.
216. Id. at 302-03, 467 A.2d at 790-91.




221. Id. at 309, 467 A.2d at 794.
222. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-110 (1984) (two-year statute of limita-
tions for such actions); MD. R.P. B4(a) (requiring appeals from final administrative ac-
tions to be brought within 30 days).
223. 56 Md. App. at 308-09, 467 A.2d at 793-94.
224. Id. at 308, 467 A.2d at 793.
225. Id. at 309, 467 A.2d at 794.
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duction of the documents. "Such a construction would, in fact, lead
to the mischievous result of encouraging applicants to seek money
damages against government officials and agencies when all they
really want are the documents. ' 226 The court therefore held that
section 5-110 is applicable to an action to compel production of
documents.227
F. Government Contracts
Maryland courts addressed several issues in cases involving
government contracts. The Court of Appeals in State v. Roger E.
Holtman & Assocs.,228 considered whether the sovereign immunity
defense was available to the State, when it had entered into a letter
agreement with an architect after the effective date of a statute waiv-
ing sovereign immunity in contract actions.2 29 The outcome de-
pended on whether the written agreement between the State and
the architect constituted a separate contractual undertaking in-
dependent of earlier, but related, agreements between the two par-
ties, which were effected prior to the abrogation of sovereign
immunity. The court held that the letter agreement was a separate
contract, and that, therefore, the statutory waiver of sovereign im-
munity applied. 230
The original written agreement between Holtman and the state
was executed and performed by both parties in 1971.2" In 1972
the state requested Holtman to do additional work, which was also
completed and paid for. The request was made in a letter. After
state legislation prohibiting state governmental entities from claim-
ing sovereign immunity in written contract actions became effective
in July 1, 1976, the state again, by letter, asked Holtman to perform
further work. When the work was completed, a dispute arose as to
the amount of compensation and a contract action was initiated. 32
226. Id.
227. Id. at 308, 467 A.2d at 793-94.
228. 296 Md. 403, 463 A.2d 803 (1983).
229. Id. at 411, 463 A.2d at 807. Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180
was codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 7-101 to -104 (1981), and prohibited, inter
alia, the State of Maryland, from asserting the sovereign immunity defense "in an action
in contract based upon a written contract executed on behalf of the State." Section 7-
101 of the statute provides that the statute "shall not apply to any action based on a
contract entered into or executed prior to the effective date of this Act," i.e., July 1,
1976. Sections 7-101 to -164 have been recodifed without substantive change at MD.
STATE GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 12-201 to -204 (1984).
230. 296 Md. at 410-11, 463 A.2d at 807.
231. Id. at 405-06, 463 A.2d at 806.
232. Id. at 406-08, 463 A.2d at 805-06.
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The trial court dismissed Holtman's complaint on sovereign immu-
nity grounds; that dismissal was reversed by the Court of Special
Appeals.2 3 3
Utilizing standard contract law principles, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.23 4 It rejected
the State's contention that each of the latter two services performed
by Holtman was merely an "extension" of the original agreement,
and that therefore all laws governing state contracts at the forma-
tion of the parent contract applied to those subsequent agreements.
The court reasoned that the "extensions" would be separate con-
tracts if, under the initial agreement, the parties had no contractual
responsibility to undertake any additional work.2 5 Because both
prior agreements had been completed, neither party had any legal
obligation to the other as of the date of the third agreement, and the
third agreement thus constituted a separate contract. Because the
commencement date of the contract was November 5, 1976, the
contract fell within the prospective application 23 6 of theJuly 1, 1976
statute waiving sovereign immunity as a defense in contract actions.
The Court of Special Appeals explored at some length the func-
tioning of Maryland procurement law in Kennedy Temporaries v. Comp-
troller of the Treasury.23 7  In Kennedy, the court held that an
unsuccessful bidder on a state contract who had failed to comply
with the statutory and regulatory requirements of bid proposals
lacked standing to challenge the award to the successful bidder. 3 1
In reaching that determination, the court explained the functioning
of the bid procurement process and the remedies available to an
unsuccessful bidder.
Plaintiff Kennedy Temporaries (Kennedy) submitted a bid for a
state contract to provide temporary personnel to process tax returns
over a six-month period. Kennedy furnished the required bid secur-
233. Id. at 408, 463 A.2d at 806.
234. Id. at 411, 463 A.2d at 807.
235. Id. at 410,463 A.2d at 807. The court also looked to the fact that the earliest and
latest agreements involved different parties. Roger Holtman was the contractor in the
earliest agreement with the state. His subsequent incorporation under the business
name of Roger E. Holtman & Associates, Ltd. was not reflected in any of the later con-
tractual agreements with the state. Id. at 407, 410, 463 A.2d at 805, 807.
236. The court had previously determined that the legislature intended that the stat-
ute be given a purely prospective application, "measured by the commencement date of
the contract sued upon, determined as a matter of fact." John McShain, Inc. v. State,
287 Md. 297, 301, 411 A.2d 1048, 1050 (1980).
237. 57 Md. App. 22, 468 A.2d 1026 (1984).
238. Id. at 37-39, 468 A.2d 1033-34.
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ity 239 in the form of a bank letter guaranteeing collateral against
performance. 240  Kennedy was underbid on the contract by Bay
Services, Inc., whose bid security, although in proper form, was
slightly less than the required five percent of its bid.24' Kennedy
filed a complaint, alleging that the contract was improperly awarded
to Bay Services; that complaint was heard by the procurement of-
ficer of the Board of Public Works, 24 2 the Board of Contract Ap-
239. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-504(a) (1981 & Supp. 1983) provides: "Each bidder
or offeror shall give a bid bond if the contract price is estimated by the procurement
officer to exceed $25,000." Kennedy's bid was $621,502. 57 Md. App. at 30, 468 A.2d
at 1030. The Code's 1984 Supplement sets forth subsequent amendments to § 3-504,
which raise the amount required and make other additions not relevant to the issues in
Kennedy.
240. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-504(a) (1981 & Supp. 1983) provides: "[B]id bonds
shall be provided by a surety company authorized to do business in this State, or the
equivalent in cash, or in a form satisfactory to the procurement officer." MD. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 21, § 21.06.07.O1B(l)-(3) (1981) further states that the form of the bid security
shall be limited to
(1) A bond in a form satisfactory to the State underwritten by a com-
pany licensed to issue bonds in this State;
(2) A bank certified check, bank cashier's check, bank treasurer's check,
cash, or a trust account; or
(3) Pledge of securities backed by full faith and credit of the United
States government or bonds issued by the State of Maryland.
The memorandum accompanying the invitation to bid, which included the above statu-
tory and regulatory guidelines, stipolated that "[f]ailure to provide an acceptable bid security
with the bid when rquired shall result in the bid being reected" (emphasis in the original), quoted
in 57 Md. App. at 30, 468 A.2d at 1029.
241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-504(b) (1981 & Supp. 1983) provides: "The bid
bond shall be in an amount equal to at least 5 percent of the amount of the bid or price
proposal." Bay Services, Inc. underbid Kennedy by approximately $13,000. Its bid was
accompanied by a bid bond in the amount of $30,000, which was $407.95 short of five
percent of its bid. 57 Md. App. at 30, 468 A.2d at 1029-30.
242. The procurement officer upheld the award to Bay Services on the basis of MD.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 21.06.07.02B(2) (1981). This regulation permits the failure to
comply with bid security requirements to be considered "nonsubstantial" when "[t]he
amount of the bid security submitted, though less than the amount required by the invi-
tation for bids, is equal to or greater than the difference in the price stated in the next
higher acceptable bid ....... Because the $30,000 bid bond filed by Bay Services was
greater in amount than the $13,000 difference between its bid of $608,159 and that of
Kennedy at $621,502, the procurement officer concluded that the deficiency was "non-
substantial" and would therefore be excused altogether. 57 Md. App. at 32, 468 A.2d at
1030.
Ordinarily the procurement officer's decision to award a contract is sufficient.
However, in service contracts involving over $100,000, the procurement officer's deci-
sion serves only as a recommendation to the Board of Public Works, which retains ulti-
mate approval authority on such contracts. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 21.01.02.03
- .07 (1981). In this case, the officer's recommendation to the Board of Public Works to
award the contract to Bay Services was subsequently approved, despite Kennedy's argu-
ments before the Board. 57 Md. App. at 33, 468 A.2d at 1031.
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peals, and the Baltimore City Circuit Court 2 4 3 before reaching the
Court of Special Appeals.
The court applied a "clean hands doctrine" in reaching its deci-
sion, stating: "If a disappointed bidder expects to hold the state to
strict and literal compliance with all of the procedural requirements
of the procurement law, he too must comply with the law." '24 4 In
this case, the court judged that Kennedy had not complied with the
law in two fundamental respects: (1) he had not submitted a satisfac-
tory instrument as bid security; and (2) he had failed to pursue his
administrative remedy in conformance with the statutory provisions
governing procurement dispute resolution. 245
The court determined that the bank letter accompanying Ken-
nedy's bid did not qualify as proper bid security because the pledge
of collateral was against "performance" rather than loss by virtue of
default, and because it was not backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States or the State of Maryland. 246 The court concluded
that if, as Kennedy contended, the procurement officer lacked the
authority to waive the deficiency of the Bay Services' bid bond, he
similarly lacked the authority to waive the inadequacy of Kennedy's
letter as a proper bid bond. 47
The court also found that Kennedy had not acted within the
seven-day regulatory time limit for protesting an award to a success-
ful bidder, 24 ' and that the seven-day requirement could not have
been waived by the procurement officer. The requirement was
more than an internal agency procedure; in triggering the dispute
resolution process, it had substantial impact on the other parties
243. The circuit court determined that MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 21.06.07.02(B)
(1981), see supra note 242, was an improper extension of the procurement officer's ad-
ministrative authority, and was thus null and void. 57 Md. App. at 36, 468 A.2d at 1032-
33. The Court of Special Appeals refused to address the validity of the regulation, pre-
ferring instead to base its decision on Kennedy's lack of standing as a nonresponsive
bidder. The question of Kennedy's standing was raised but not decided in the circuit
court. Id. at 37 n.4, 468 A.2d at 1033 n.4.
244. 57 Md. App. at 37, 468 A.2d at 1033.
245. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 7-201 (1981).
246. 57 Md. App. at 39, 468 A.2d at 1034. As a very limited kind of performance
bond, a bid bond is designed to assure only that a bidder, if successful, will in fact enter
into the contract he has bid on, and to provide a secure fund to compensate the state if
the bidder defaults in executing the contract. The pledge of collateral in the bank letter
was against performance should Kennedy's bid be accepted, not specifically against loss
occurring by virtue of a default in entering into the contract.
247. 57 Md. App. at 39, 468 A.2d at 1034.
248. Id. at 40, 468 A.2d at 1034-35.
249. The dispute resolution process in procurement law involves four steps: (1) re-
view by the procurement officer; (2) review of the procurement officer's decision by the
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as well, particularly upon the would-be successful bidder. More-
over, the requirement was externally imposed by other agencies
pursuant to clear statutory authority. Accordingly, the court found
that there was no legal authority for the officer to waive the
250requirement.
Kennedy had also failed to adhere to the statutory time limits
and to proper procedures for appealing his case to the Board of
Contract Appeals; 25' this inaction amounted to a waiver of his right
to an appeal.252 Consequently, the court held that Kennedy's ap-
peal to the Board of Contract Appeals should have been
dismissed. 253
G. State and Local Government
In State v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,254 the Court of Ap-
peals held the City of Baltimore liable to the clerk of the Criminal
Court (now Circuit Court) of Baltimore and to the State of Maryland
for court costs incurred in criminal proceedings in which the
charges are disposed of in the accused's favor or the accused is con-
victed but is indigent.255
The State and the clerk brought this action in the Superior
Court (now Circuit Court) of Baltimore City when the city refused
to pay a total of more than two million dollars in such criminal court
costs billed to it over a period of approximately five years. 256 The
State argued that article 38, section 4A of the Maryland Code,25 7 as
agency head; (3) appeal to the Board of Contract Appeals; and (4) judicial review of the
decision of the Board of Contract Appeals. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 7-201(a)-(d), -
203 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
250. 57 Md. App. at 41, 468 A.2d at 1035.
251. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 7-201(d) (1981) requires an appeal to be taken within
15 days of receipt of notice of final action; Kennedy did not meet that deadline.
252. 57 Md. App. at 42, 468 A.2d at 1035-36.
253. Id. at 43, 468 A.2d at 1036.
254. 296 Md. 67, 459 A.2d 585 (1983).
255. Id. at 78, 459 A.2d at 590.
256. Id. at 69, 459 A.2d at 586.
257. MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4A (1979) provides:
No person who may be prosecuted for any misdemeanor or offense and dis-
charged by the court on submission, or fined not exceeding fifteen cents, or
prosecuted for any crime and acquitted on trial by jury, shall be burdened with
the payment of any costs or fees accruing on such prosecution, but all such
costs and fees, with the legal costs of the party accused, shall be paid by the
county; and no person taken upon any warrant or capias on presentment where
no bill of indictment is found shall be liable to pay or give security for costs, but
such costs shall be paid by the county. The mayor and city council of Baltimore
shall not, however, be liable in any cases tried in the Criminal Court of Balti-
more for the appearance fees allowed by law to the attorney of the traverser.
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well as the common law,258 required the city to pay the costs and
fees at issue. The city denied liability and sought an order requiring
the State to pay $119,490 admittedly owed the city but withheld by
the State Comptroller. 259 The trial court held that the city was not
liable and ordered the State to pay the $1 19,490.260
The Court of Appeals reversed, 26 1 relying on Maryland Code
article 38, section 4A, the present codification of a statute enacted in
262 sauerlee h1781 and substantially unchanged since. This statute relieves the
accused of the burden of paying costs and fees incurred in criminal
proceedings when the charges are disposed of in his favor, and
places that burden on the county holding the trial. Baltimore City's
liability for such costs and fees was recognized in the 1920 case of
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Pattison.263 Pattison also recog-
nized the liability of the city, under Maryland common law, to pay
criminal court costs and fees when the defendant is convicted but is
indigent.2 64
The city had successfully argued in the trial court that section 7-
202(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article2 65 exempted
the city from liability, 266 and that section 2-504 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article 267 abrogates both article 38, section 4A
and the Pattison common law rule.268
Rejecting both arguments, the Court of Appeals held that the
258. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Pattison, 136 Md. 64, 110 A. 106 (1920)
(imposing liability on the city); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. O'Conor, 147 Md.
639, 128 A. 759 (1925) (holding unconstitutional ch. 576 of the Acts of 1924, an act
designed to change the Patison rule as it applied to Baltimore City only).
259. 296 Md. at 69, 459 A.2d at 586. The Comptroller had withheld the money,
which was owed to the city in connection with other matters, as a result of the city's
refusal to reimburse the State for the criminal court costs. Id.
260. Id.. at 69-70, 459 A.2d at 586.
261. Id.. at 78, 459 A.2d at 590. The State and the clerk appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals granted certiorari before argument in the
Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 70, 459 A.2d at 586.
262. MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4A (1979) is the present codification of ch. 11 of the
Acts of 1781.
263. 136 Md. 64, 66, 110 A. 106, 107 (1920).
264. Id. at 68, 110 A. at 108.
265. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 7-202(b) (1984) provides: "The clerk may
not charge any county or Baltimore City any fee provided by this subtitle, unless the
county or Baltimore city first gives its consent."
266. 296 Md. at 73-74, 459 A.2d at 588.
267. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-504(c) (1984).
268. 296 Md. at 76-77, 459 A.2d at 589. The trial court found that § 2-504(c)(2) (re-
pealed in 1982), which specified that in the event of a deficiency the deficiency is to be
paid from funds provided in the state budget, is inconsistent with article 38, § 4A, which
imposes liability on the city and counties. Id.
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exemption embodied in section 7-202(b) applies only when the city
or counties are parties to the proceedings.2 69 The court also held
that there is no inconsistency between section 2-504 and article 38,
section 4A or Pattison, stating: "The two statutes are concerned with
totally different issues relating to fees and costs. '270 The court re-
fused to overrule Pattison, a decision that has "remained undis-
turbed for over fifty years."271
The Court of Special Appeals also reviewed a case involving the
issue of public expenditures for court costs. In Bowling v. Brown,2 72
the court considered whether a local government may pay for legal
expenses incurred by government employees in defending against
criminal charges arising from actions outside the scope of their au-
thority or employment. Finding that a resolution by municipal offi-
cials approving such reimbursement of two municipal employees
was an ultra vires act,273 the court held the defendant municipal offi-
cials personally liable for the money spent.274
In reaching this decision, the court first considered whether the
expenditure had been made for a public purpose.2 75 Defining a
public purpose as one that promotes "public health, safety, morals,
general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the in-
habitants or residents within the municipal corporation, "276 the
court found that the expenditure was not for such a purpose be-
cause the public at large did not enjoy the benefit of the expendi-
ture.2 7 7 Although reimbursement for legal expenses arising from
charges based upon acts that occur in the performance of official
public duties are expenditures for a public purpose, 278 the charges
269. 296 Md. at 74-75, 459 A.2d at 588-89.
270. Id. at 77, 459 A.2d at 589.
271. Id. at 77-78, 459 A.2d at 590.
272. 57 Md. App. 248, 469 A.2d 896 (1984).
273. Id. at 262, 469 A.2d at 903. The two defendants, councilmen for the town of
LaPlata in Charles County, approved a resolution to reimburse two town employees for
legal expenses incurred in their defense of charges of criminal misconduct stemming
from their use of a town secretary for personal business matters. All parties conceded
that the two town employees acted beyond the scope of their employment. Id. at 253-
55, 469 A.2d at 898-900.
274. Id. at 267, 469 A.2d at 906.
275. Id. at 258, 469 A.2d at 901.
276. Id. at 259, 469 A.2d at 902 (citing City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 16,
136 A.2d 852, 855-56 (1957) (to qualify as a public purpose an expenditure must be
made for the good of the government and must benefit the community so as to bear a
substantial relationship to the public welfare); Sommers v. City of Flint, 355 Mich. 622,
96 N.W.2d 119 (1959)).
277. Id.
278. See Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 438-39, 456 A.2d 380, 385
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in this case arose from acts outside the scope of employment, and
consequently there was no benefit to the public in paying for the
employee's defense.
Because the expenditures were not made for a public purpose,
the court held that the defendants had the burden of proving they
should not be personally liable for the amounts expended. 279 De-
fendants argued they should not be personally liable, based on the
defenses of immunity for discretionary acts 28 0 and good faith. The
court found that the immunity defense would not apply because the
act in question was ultra vires and thus not a discretionary act within
the scope of defendants' employment.28 '
As for the argument that the defendants had acted in good
faith, the court found that the case of Gloyd v. Talbott 28 2 had estab-
lished a standard of strict liability for such conduct, and the court
declined to consider the adoption of a good faith standard because
the defendants had failed to present sufficient evidence of good
faith to raise the issue.283 A careful reading of Gloyd, however,
reveals no express language establishing a strict liability stan-
dard.284 Moreover, subsequent cases citing Gloyd have not articu-
(1983) (a statute that authorized payment of legal expenses incurred by certain public
safety officials who successfully defended criminal or administrative charges arising from
the performance of their duties was valid since it served a public purpose).
279. 57 Md. App. at 261, 469 A.2d at 903.
280. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 1B(a) (1981) states that: "Officials of a municipal
corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the
scope of their employment or authority shall be immune as officials or individuals from
any civil liability for the performance of such actions."
281. 57 Md. App. at 261-63, 469 A.2d at 903.
282. 221 Md. 179, 156 A.2d 665 (1959).
283. 57 Md. App. at 264, 469 A.2d at 904. The court found insufficient evidence of
good faith despite the fact that the defendants apparently consulted an attorney regard-
ing the propriety of reimbursing the two town employees for the legal expenses, and
even went so far as to cite in the authorized legislation the cases they considered to be
legal precedent for their actions. Id. at 265, 469 A.2d at 904-05.
284. The Court of Special Appeals may have drawn its conclusion from the following
pasage from Gloyd:
The chancellor held that neither limitations nor laches would bar recovery in the
instant case. Her reasoning was that the council believed "honestly but mistakenly"
that the resolution was valid, and that they "discovered" the mistake when the
resolution was rescinded. Her conclusion was that the three-year Statute of
Limitations (Code (1957), Art. 57, sec. 1), although applicable, did not begin to
run until this "discovery", which was about four months prior to the filing of
suit. We think the conclusion was in error.
221 Md. at 185, 156 A.2d at 668 (emphasis added). Careful consideration of the entire
passage reveals that the question of "good faith" here concerned the time at which the




lated such a standard.28 5 If the strict liability standard is a correct
statement of the Maryland law, the court should clarify the deriva-
tion of the standard.
H. Other Developments
1. Election Procedures.-In Burroughs v. Raynor,28 6 the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals interpreted for the first time the present
version of the statute granting authority to the Board of Supervisors
of Elections of each county and Baltimore City to determine the suf-
ficiency of a candidate's nominating petition.287 The effect of the
decision is to validate the expanded authority granted by the statute.
The court held that the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Balti-
more City has the power not only to count the number of names on
a candidate's nominating petition, but to determine whether those
names are in fact the names of registered voters eligible to vote for
the candidate submitting the petition, and to keep the candidate's
name off the ballot if the petition is not signed by the requisite
number of registered voters.288
The appellants, 28 9 relying upon Tawney v. Board of Supervisors of
285. See, e.g., Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, 277 Md. 626, 629,
356 A.2d 555, 557 (1976) (citing Gloyd for the proposition that the statute of limitations
will run in a derivative action brought by a taxpayer of a municipality against town offi-
cials); Goldberg v. Howard County Welfare Bd., 260 Md. 351, 357, 272 A.2d 397, 400
(1971) (citing Gloyd to support the proposition that statute of limitations may be inter-
posed in a derivative suit brought by a taxpayer to recover an illegal diversion of public
funds).
Other Developments:
The 1984 session of the General Assembly recodified the law pertaining to state
and local government. See MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. (1984). Discussion of the
recodification is beyond the scope of this survey.
286. 56 Md. App. 432, 468 A.2d 141 (1983).
287. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 7-1 (1983 & Supp. 1984). The statute requires nomi-
nating petitions to be "signed by not less than three percent of the registered voters who
are eligible to vote for the office for which the nomination by petition is sought." Id.
§ 7-l(b)(2). The statute further provides that "[t]he board shall verify all legitimate sig-
natures of persons who are registered voters and who have signed a [nominating] peti-
tion." Id. § 7-(g)(1). See also id. § 7-1(g)(3). "If the required number of signatures is
not properly appended to a petition. . . it shall be declared insufficient, and the name
of the proposed candidate may not be placed on the ballot." Id. § 7-1(1). See id. § 7-1
(Supp. 1984) (minor amendments to other parts of § 7-1).
288. 56 Md. App. at 440-41, 468 A.2d at 145.
289. Appellants Leo W. Burroughs,Jr. and Rommani M. Amenu-EI sought election to
the Baltimore City Council as independant candidates from the Fifth Councilmanic Dis-
trict. In an effort to have their names placed on the ballot, each filed a nominating
petition with the Board of Supervisors of Elections. After verifying the names of the
voters signing the appellants' petitions, the Board concluded that neither contained the
required number of signatures of voters registered to vote in the Fifth District. Appel-
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Elections,290 argued that the Board's authority is limited to counting
the number of names on a nominating petition and, accordingly,
that the Board is required to certify any petition that contains the
minimum number of names, without considering whether the per-
sons signing the petition are actually registered voters.291 In re-
jecting this contention, the court noted that the present statute
confers far greater authority upon the Board than its predecessor,
considered in Tawney. 29 2 The court found the present wording of
the statute to be unambiguous 293 and concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the statute expressly allows the Board to verify the regis-
tered voter status of those persons signing a nominating petition. 294
In so doing, the court essentially adopted an earlier interpretation
of the statute by the Maryland Attorney General.295
The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the legis-
lature had unconstitutionally vested a judicial function in the execu-
tive branch by delegating to the Board the power to verify petition
signatures. 296 The court reaffirmed the basic principle that delega-
tion of a fact-finding function to an administrative body, even
lants then filed a petition for mandamus, requesting that their names be placed on the
ballot. The petition was denied by the circuit court. Id. at 434-35, 468 A.2d at 142.
290. 198 Md. 120, 81 A.2d 209 (1951).
291. The Court of Appeals in Tawney, interpreting an earlier version of the same stat-
ute involved in Burroughs, concluded that the Board of Election Supervisors' function is
limited to examining nominating petitions
to see if they are regular on their face and contain the requisite number of
names. Beyond that, they have no authority to go. Their duties are entirely
ministerial, and when they find the requisite number of names on a petition
which is in all respects regular, their duty is to place the name of the candidate
so nominated on the ballot.
Id. at 128, 81 A.2d at 213.
292. 56 Md. App. at 436-38, 468 A.2d at 143. Under former article 33, the Board's
authority was limited to having "printed on the ballots the name of every candidate
whose name has been certified to or filed with the proper officers" (§ 62) accompanied
by the signatures of the required number of voters "residing in the political division in
and for which the officer is to be elected" (§ 39). MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 39, 62
(Supp. 1947) (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 7-1 (1983 & Supp.
1984)).
293. 56 Md. App. at 438, 468 A.2d at 144.
294. Id. at 438-39, 468 A.2d at 143-44. See, e.g., Blum v. Blum, 295 Md. 135, 140, 453
A.2d 824, 827 (1983) ("Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, it should be
given effect in accordance with the clear meaning of the words.").
295. 56 Md. App. at 439, 468 A.2d at 144. The Attorney General concluded that
signature verification requires three basic substantive determinations . . . (1) is
the person a registered voter of the appropriate jurisdiction; (2) has the person
signed more than once for the same nominee; and (3) has the person signed
petitions on behalf of more than one nominee for the same office.
58 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 313, 314 (1973).
296. 56 Md. App. at 441, 468 A.2d at 145. The Court of Appeals in Tawney had sug-
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297though the function is possibly quasi-judicial in nature, is not an
unconstitutional usurpation of judicial powers, when, as in this in-
stance, the administrative action is subject to judicial review.298
2. Professional Standards.-The Court of Appeals considered a
number of cases relating to membership in the Bar. Most of the
cases involved disciplinary actions against existing members of the
bar for misconduct and required interpretation of a number of pro-
visions of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.299  One case, however, dealt with the question of
whether someone previously convicted of a number of felonies cur-
rently possesses the moral character necessary for admission to the
Bar of Maryland. In In re Application ofJames G. ,o the court affirmed
the notion that evidence of present good moral character can over-
come evidence of prior criminal conduct to allow admission of an
applicant to the Maryland Bar, even when the applicant's prior acts
were crimes of deceit.
The applicant in this case had been a member of the District of
Columbia Bar for two years without incident, and presented numer-
ous letters in support of his application. His criminal record con-
sisted of convictions of forgery and uttering and assault, as well as
indictments for other crimes."0 ' These events had occurred within a
short period of time, sixteen years prior to his application. The
gested that verifying nominating petition signatures is essentially a judicial function.
198 Md. at 129, 81 A.2d at 213-14.
297. Cf White v. Laird, 127 Md. 120, 123, 96 A. 318, 319 (1915) (power of election
board to conduct recount and to determine whether particular ballots should or should
not be counted is quasi-judicial in nature).
298. 56 Md. App. at 441, 468 A.2d at 145. See, e.g., Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45
A.2d 73 (1945).
299. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Howard, 299 Md. 731, 475 A.2d 466
(1984) (misappropriation of funds, neglecting a legal matter and other misconduct war-
rant disbarment); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sinclair, 299 Md. 644, 474 A.2d 1338
(1984) (neglecting legal matters warrants public reprimand); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Woodward, 299 Md. 429, 474 A.2d 208 (1984) (conviction for willfully fail-
ing to file state income tax return warrants disbarment); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Willemain, 297 Md. 386, 466 A.2d 1271 (1983) (misconduct resulting from alcoholism
warrants suspension); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sherman, 297 Md. 318, 465 A.2d
1161 (1983) (misrepresentation to client and other malfeasance warrants disbarment
when attorney previously had been suspended).
300. 296 Md. 310, 462 A.2d 1198 (1983).
301. Applicant received a suspended sentence after pleading nolo contendere to a
charge of conspiracy to commit forgery. He was found guilty of six counts of forgery
and uttering, and received a sentence of twenty months to five years. He was also ar-
rested in connection with the death of his first wife, but charges were dismissed. He was
found not guilty on charges of homicide and assault resulting from the stabbing of a gas
station attendant by one of his companions. He received a suspended sentence after
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court, looking to the standard established in earlier decisions, °3 2 de-
termined that the evidence of present good moral character was
clear and convincing, and therefore held that the applicant was com-
pletely rehabilitated.
In a forceful dissent, Judge Smith, joined by Judge Rodowsky,
distinguished the instant case as involving crimes of deceit. 303 The
dissent would have held that conviction for crimes of deceit is evi-
dence that the applicant does not have the requisite moral character,
reasoning that lawyers are presented with constant opportunities for
crimes of deceit, posing a danger that the past conduct would
recur.
3 04
3. Law Enforcement.-Between June 1983 and March 1984, the
Court of Special Appeals considered four cases relating to the Law
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR), °5 which protects a
police officer's procedural rights in the event of an unwarranted pu-
nitive action. In one of these cases, Mayor of Ocean City v. Johnson, °6
the court held that, when administrative approval is necessary as a
condition precedent to the valid adoption of regulations, such ap-
proval may not be given tacitly through inaction, but instead re-
quires some affirmative act by the approving body."0 7 This holding
may produce repercussions in other administrative agencies.3 0 8
In Johnson, a police officer had been dismissed for violating reg-
ulations adopted by the police chief of Ocean City, under the au-
pleading nolo contendere to a charge of simple assault. Id. at 312, 462 A.2d at 1199-
1200.
302. See, e.g., In re Application of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 (1982) (admis-
sion to bar granted when applicant had pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery 10
years before but now offered convincing evidence of his full rehabilitation); In re Appli-
cation of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 434 A.2d 541 (1981) (admission to bar denied when evi-
dence did not unequivocally demonstrate applicant's full and complete rehabilitation).
But cf In re Application of George B., 297 Md. 421, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (application
for admission to Maryland Bar denied because conviction of armed robbery involving
exchange of gunfire requires complete evidence of rehabilitation; 6 years is not a suffi-
cient rehabilitative period considering gravity of offense committed).
303. 296 Md. 310 at 324, 462 A.2d at 1205 (Smith, J., joined by Rodowsky, J.,
dissenting).
304. Id.
305. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-734D (1982 & Supp. 1983).
306. 57 Md. App. 502, 470 A.2d 1308 (1984).
307. Id. at 514-15, 470 A.2d at 1314.
308. The implications of the Johnson decision are that substantive regulations, i.e.,
those affecting the actions of regulatees and having substantial impact on the general
public, must undergo the "affirmative act" type of approval required of the police de-
partment regulations; internal administrative regulations, on the other hand, need not.
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thority vested in him by the city's code.3 0 9 The regulations,
however, were subject to the approval of the mayor and city council.
Recognizing that "approval" was susceptible of various meanings,
the court nonetheless reasoned that, because the regulations at is-
sue were not limited to routine internal operations of the police de-
partment but also had substantial impact on the public at large,31 0
some overt, affirmative action by the mayor and city council was nec-
essary as part of the approval process. Although a meeting to adopt
officially the regulations was held, it did not take place until after the
dismissal.31 Consequently, the court held that the police officer
could not be discharged for failure to comply with the regulations
because they lacked the requisite timely approval by the mayor and
city council. 2
In two other cases, the Court of Special Appeals considered
what constitutes an "investigation . . .for any reason which could
lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal ' 31 3 such as to trig-
ger the protections afforded by the LEOBR. In Chief, Baltimore
County Police Department v. Marchsteiner, 4 the court held that the
transfer of a police officer was not punitive in nature and did not
trigger LEOBR protections because the transfer was not based on
the complaints that had been made against him. 5 The opinion in
Marchsteiner also reiterated that an aggrieved officer need not pursue
administrative remedies31 6 before taking advantage of his statutory
right to judicial review. 3 17 In Leibe v. Police Department,31 8 the court
held that tracking of an officer's use of sick leave is not an investiga-
tion that will trigger LEOBR rights.
3 19
Lastly, inJacocks v. Montgomery County,3 20 the court held that the
presence of a witness in the hearing room during another witness's
testimony in an LEOBR investigation was not prejudicial error.3 2 '
The defendant officer had requested that witnesses be sequestered;
309. OCEAN CITY, MD., CODE § 15-1 (1972).
310. 57 Md. App. at 514, 470 A.2d at 1314.
311. Id. at 515, 470 A.2d at 1314.
312. Id.
313. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983).
314. 55 Md. App. 108, 461 A.2d 28 (1983).
315. Id. at 117, 461 A.2d at 33.
316. Id. at 116, 461 A.2d at 32.
317. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 734 (Supp. 1983).
318. 57 Md. App. 317, 469 A.2d 1287 (1984).
319. Id. at 323, 469 A.2d 1290.
320. 58 Md. App. 95, 472 A.2d 485 (1984).
321. Id. at 109, 472 A.2d at 492.
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however, the disobedient witness had already testified and therefore
his testimony could not be affected by remaining in the courtroom.
4. Motor Vehicle Administration.-In Department of Transportation
v. Armacost,32 2 the Court of Appeals held that the statutory provision
expressly permitting the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) to
create and adopt regulations to implement the Vehicle Emissions
Testing Program3 23 implicitly authorizes the MVA to amend the
rules that it has adopted.3 24 The court adopted the widely held rule
that "an agency with expressly granted rulemaking power has im-
plied authority to amend and repeal the regulations it has
adopted. '3 25 The court reasoned that any other interpretation of
the statute would lead to an "absurd result" '26 which would frus-
trate the legislature's intent. By rejecting the challenge to the
MVA's authority, the court confirmed a practice which was hereto-
fore assumed to be valid.
5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. -In McGee v. Criminal In-
juries Compensation Board,327 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board's sua sponte
action in reviewing a single board member's determination of a
claimant's eligibility to compensation was premature, because the
degree of the claimant's financial hardship had not yet been deter-
mined by that board member.3 28 The court construed section 9 of
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act3 2 9 to require that both the
322. 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984).
323. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 23-207(a) (1984).
324. 299 Md. at 423-24, 474 A.2d at 206-07. The court also rejected a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Vehicle Emissions Testing Program. See infra CONSTIru-
TIONAL LAw notes 152-78 and accompanying text.
325. 299 Md. at 424, 474 A.2d at 207.
326. Id.
327. 57 Md. App. 143, 469 A.2d 470 (1984).
328. Id. at 153-54, 469 A.2d at 475. The claimant, Ja-Wan McGee, was shot 3 times
by an off-duty police officer who mistakenly thought that he was about to commit a
crime. McGee, who was permanently paralyzed as a result of the incident, filed a claim
for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. MD. ANN. CODE art.
26A (1981). To be eligible for an award under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate,
inter alia, (1) that he was a victim of a crime for which he was not responsible, and (2)
that he will suffer serious financial hardship. Id. §§ 5(b), 12(0)(i). The Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board member to whom the case was assigned determined that McGee
had been the victim of a crime, and a hearing on the issue of financial hardship was
scheduled, but before the hearing occurred the full board reviewed the single board
member's decision sua sponte and reversed his finding of eligibility. 57 Md. App. at
147-50, 469 A.2d at 472-73.
329. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A (1981).
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eligibility for an award and the degree of hardship must be deter-
mined by the single board member to which the case is assigned,
before the full board can review the member's decision on either of
those issues.3 3 0
The court also generally discussed the process by which a single
board member's initial decision can be reviewed by the full board.
In particular, the court noted that the full board cannot hear addi-
tional evidence nor draw inferences from the available evidence
contrary to those originally found.3 3 ' The court explained that, if
additional evidence needs to be examined, the full board should re-





330. 57 Md. App. at 153-54, 469 A.2d at 475. Under § 8 of the Act, a claim is first
assigned to a single member of the three-member board; this member must investigate
the validity of the claim and make a written report setting forth the reasons for either
granting or denying the claim. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 8 (1981). Section 9 allows
the full board, upon application by the claimant or on its own motion, to "review the
record and affirm or modify the decision of the Board member to whom the claim was
assigned." Id. § 9(b).
331. 57 Md. App. at 154-55, 469 A.2d at 475-76.
332. Id. at 155, 469 A.2d at 476.
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II. CIVIL PROCEDURE*
A. In Personam Jurisdiction - Minimum Contacts Analysis
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp. ' arose from an
alleged breach of contract by Toshiba, a Japanese manufacturer of
photocopying machines. 2 Toshiba sold its copiers FOB Japan to a
wholly owned New York subsidiary, which then sold copiers to
Maryland dealers.' The suit raised the question whether the exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction over Toshiba, the Japanese defend-
ant, under subsection (b)(1) of the Maryland long arm statute4
comported with the requirements of due process. In resolving this
question, the court relied on a formulation of minimum contacts
analysis used by the Ninth Circuit.5
The court began by noting that the power of a federal court to
assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant de-
pends upon (1) whether the state long arm statute applies to the
facts of the case, and (2) whether the exercise of in personam juris-
diction meets the requirements of due process.6 The court noted
that the Maryland Court of Appeals had determined that the legisla-
ture intended the Maryland long arm statute to expand the exercise
of personal jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause, thus
merging the statutory question into the due process analysis.'
* The most significant recent development in this area was the adoption of the new
Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure by the Court of Appeals of Maryland on April 6,
1984. The new Rules have been extensively reviewed elsewhere. See P. NIEMEYER,
MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY (1984); Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil
Procedure, 43 MD. L. REV. 669 (1984).
1. 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983).
2. Id. at 315.
3. Id. at 316.
4. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(1) (1984) ("A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or indirectly or by an agent . . .
[t]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State.
5. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
6. 576 F. Supp. at 318. See Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 135
(D. Md. 1981). Only where minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum
exist may a court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (defendant's contacts with the
forum state must be such that the assertion of in personam jurisdiction does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
7. 576 F. Supp. at 318 (citing Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 136). See also Mohamed v.
Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657, 370 A.2d 551, 553 (1977); Geelhoed v.Jensen, 277 Md. 220,
224, 352 A.2d 818, 821 (1976). Though subsection (b)(l) is coterminous with due pro-
cess, subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) are more restrictive. Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 401 F.2d
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In setting forth the due process standard for in personamjuris-
diction applicable to this case, the court began by citing the United
States Supreme Court's dictum in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson 8 that a defendant may have sufficient contacts with a forum
to be subject to personal jurisdiction if it directly or indirectly serves
a market in the forum state by placing its products in a stream of
commerce expecting that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum state.9 The court noted that other courts have applied
this dictum in asserting jurisdiction over alien manufacturers serv-
ing a United States market.' 0 As a general organizing principle for
its due process analysis, the district court adopted the three-part test
used by the Ninth Circuit in Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co.. Under this
Ninth Circuit test, federal courts may exercise their jurisdictional
power when (1) the nonresident defendant avails itself of the bene-
fits and protections of the forum's laws, (2) the claim arises out of
defendant's forum-related activity, and (3) the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is reasonable.' 2 With regard to the third part of the test, rea-
157, 159-61 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969); Craig v. General Fin.
Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1033, 1036, 1037 (D. Md. 1980).
8. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9. 576 F. Supp. at 317 (citing 444 U.S. at 297-98). The Court in World-Wide Volk-
swagen focused its due process inquiry on whether the nonresident defendant had suffi-
cient contacts with the forum state such that the defendant "should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297.
10. 576 F. Supp. at 317-18 (citing Nelson v. Park Indus., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir.
1983); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983); Noel v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982)).
11. 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983). This test can be traced to the Ninth Circuit case
of L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773-74 n.12 (9th Cir.
1959) (quoting Note,Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Corporations Based on a Single Act: A New
Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEO. L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958)). It appears that the three-
part test is intended to synthesize the leading cases of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 320 (1957),
and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See L.D. Reeder, 265 F.2d at 773-74 n.12.
12. 715 F.2d at 1358. Part one of the Hedrick test can be traced to the Supreme
Court's standard set forth in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958): There are suffi-
cient contacts to satisfy due process when "defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Id. at 253. Part two of the test
derives from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, which stresses obligations that may be
sued upon that "arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state." 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Finally, part three of the test (reasonableness of requiring defend-
ant to defend a suit in a foreign forum) also derives from International Shoe, which re-
quires that defendant's forum activities be sufficiently substantial that exercising
jurisdiction does not "lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation." Id.
at 317.
The Ninth Circuit has noted that this test does not apply to cases in which de-
fendant's activities are so "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" that jurisdiction
may be exercised even though the cause of action is unrelated to defendant's forum
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sonableness, the court looked to Insurance Co. of North America v.
Marina Salina Cruz,' 3 in which the Ninth Circuit compiled a non-ex-
haustive list of relevant factors drawn from various Supreme Court
cases:
(A) the extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum
state,. . . (B) the burden on the defendant of defending in
the forum, ... (C) the extent of conflict with the sover-
eignty of defendant's state, .... (D) the forum state's inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute, ... (E) the most efficient
judicial resolution of the controversy, . . . (F) the impor-
tance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and
effective relief, . . . and (G) the existence of an alternative
forum. 14
Applying the Ninth Circuit tests to the case at hand, the district
court determined that exercising in personam jurisdiction over
Toshiba comported with due process. The court found that
Toshiba had performed a forum-related act when it manufactured
copiers, knowing they were destined for sale in the United States,'
5
and made direct product shipments to more than half of the United
States, including Maryland. 6 The court also found that the cause of
action arose out of the alleged unsatisfactory performance of de-
fendant's copiers within the state.' 7 Moreover, according to the
court, Toshiba's marketing method evidenced an intent to serve the
United States market and therefore Toshiba "should reasonably an-
ticipate being haled into court in those states where sale of [its]
goods ultimately causes damage."' 8 Based on these facts, the court
activities. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.
1977) (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952)).
13. 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 1270 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee, 355 U.S. 320
(1957); International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
15. 576 F. Supp. at 319.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 320. The court stressed the World-Wide Volkswagen dictum stating that de-
fendant need not directly serve the forum market in order to subject itself to jurisdic-
tion. It suffices that defendant intended to serve a particular market, even though
through a wholly owned subsidiary. Id. Cf Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th
Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction asserted over a Japanese manufacturer who sold goods to K-
Mart, knowing it to be a nationwide marketing company); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein
v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Proprietary Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sell-
ing to separate, distinct importer did not insulate Australian manufacturer from jurisdic-
tion); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (Japanese manufacturer's sale
to separate importer did not insulate manufacturer from jurisdiction.)
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found that the first two elements of the Hedrick test were satisfied:
The cause of action had arisen out of Toshiba's forum-related activi-
ties, and Toshiba had purposely availed itself of the benefits and
protections of Maryland law.' 9
The court proceeded to analyze the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant under the Ninth Circuit's seven-fac-
tor formula.2" First, the court reasoned Toshiba's purposeful inter-
jection of goods into the forum state was evidenced by (1) the
substantial volume of the allegedly defective copiers in the state;2 '
(2) the fact that Toshiba did not totally abandon its products upon
sale, but expected further contact with them; (3) the limited war-
ranty on the copiers, which indicated that inquiry concerning the
warranty could be made to either the manufacturer or to a Toshiba
dealer; and (4) use of the manufacturer's trademark by its subsidiar-
ies, which demonstrated an expectation and hope by the manufac-
turer of customer identification and recognition of a Toshiba-
manufactured product. 2 Second, defendant's burden of defending
in the forum, though not minimal, would be less than the burden on
plaintiff, a local Maryland dealer, of suing in Japan.23 Third,
Toshiba had not shown that any conflict with sovereign interests of
Japan would be involved if jurisdiction were exercised in this case.24
Fourth, Maryland had an interest in proceeding with the cause in its
forum in order to protect its residents from economic injury caused
by nonresidents. 25 Fifth, since the claim arose out of the sale of
copiers within Maryland, and many of the witnesses were in the fo-
rum, Maryland appeared to be the most convenient and effective
forum for resolving the dispute. 26 Finally, although the court recog-
nized that a Japanese forum might be available, it decided that this
was not a practical alternative for the plaintiff.27 The court con-
cluded that a balancing of all of the above factors indicated that the
19. 576 F. Supp. at 320.
20. Id. at 320-2 1.
21. Id. at 320. Plaintiff received a half million dollars worth of defendant's goods.
Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court noted that Toshiba is represented by the same counsel as its
wholly owned New York subsidiary, that Toshiba is a corporation set up to do business
internationally, and finally that modern methods of transportation and communication
diminish the burden of defending a lawsuit in a distant forum. Id. at 320-21.
24. Id. at 321.
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exercise of jurisdiction over Toshiba was reasonable and proper.28
28. Id. Another aspect of the Toshiba case relating to the due process standard for in
personam jurisdiction involved the court's application of the fiduciary shield doctrine to
Ronald Sid Reisch, an individually named defendant corporate officer. Under the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine, the acts of a corporate officer or employee performed in his corpo-
rate capacity generally do not form the basis for jurisdiction over him in his individual
capacity. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y.
1981). The doctrine is an equitable one based on notions of fairness and is not to be
applied mechanically. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.
1981). The doctrine is not a constitutional principle but is based upon judicial inference
as to the intended scope of the state long arm statute. Id. at 902 n.3. The doctrine has
been applied in Maryland by the Court of Special Appeals in Umans v. PWP Serv., Inc.,
50 Md. App. 414, 420, 439 A.2d 21, 25 (1982), wherein jurisdiction was asserted under
subsections (b)(l), (3) and (4) of the Maryland long arm statute. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 6-103 (b)(1), (3), (4) (1984).
In a South Carolina case, Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 713 F.2d
1052 (4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit formulated rules limiting the application of the
fiduciary shield doctrine. The court was concerned about the anomaly noted in Marine
Midland, 664 F.2d at 902, that, under the doctrine, a corporate officer could shield him-
self from jurisdiction by contending that he had acted solely in his corporate capacity,
even though that fact might not suffice to excuse him from substantive liability. 713
F.2d at 1064. To prevent such an anomaly, the court in Columbia Briargate adopted the
following rules: (1) The fiduciary shield doctrine does not apply, and therefore, the of-
ficer of the nonresident corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction, when he is sued
for a tort committed in his corporate capacity in the forum state, and the forum's long
arm statute is coextensive with due process. (2) The fiduciary shield doctrine applies,
and therefore, defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction, if his connection with
the commission of the tort occurred outside the forum state. Id. at 1064-65. The Colum-
bia Briargate test thus focuses on whether defendant committed the tort within or without
the forum state.
The district court in Toshiba misinterpreted the Columbia Briargate rules by hold-
ing that the fiduciary shield doctrine applies if the state long arm statute does not extend
to the limits of due process, and does not apply where the long arm statute is cotermi-
nous with due process. 576 F. Supp. at 328-29. The court thus elevated what in Colum-
bia Biargate had been merely a necessary condition to asserting jurisdiction
(cotermination of the long arm statute with due process) to controlling status, and ig-
nored the more crucial factor of place of commission. The court incorrectly reasoned
that, since Columbia Briargate required cotermination for the assertion ofjurisdiction, the
lack of cotermination would automatically support application of the fiduciary shield
doctrine. Id. at 329 ("Under a statute whose reach does not extend to the limits of Due
Process . . . the fiduciary shield doctrine can be applied without contradiction to the
conclusions reached by the Fourth Circuit in Columbia Briargate .... ").
Based on this reasoning, the court in Toshiba applied the fiduciary shield doctrine
to the assertion of jurisdiction over defendant Reisch under subsection (b)(3) of the
Maryland long arm statute, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(3) (1984) ("A
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent . . .
causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State .... "). The court
reasoned that the doctrine should apply because this subsection has been interpreted as
not extending to the limits of due process. 576 F. Supp. at 328-29 (citing Snyder v.
Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 136 (D. Md. 1981)). On the other hand, the
Toshiba court rejected application of the doctrine to the assertion of jurisdiction over
Reisch under subsection (b)(1), since this subsection extends to the limits of due pro-
cess. Id. at 329 (citing Carter v. Massey, 436 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Md. 1977)). Jurisdic-
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B. Finality and Appealability of Judgments
1. Order Quashing Service of Process. - In Mooring v. Kaufman 29 the
Court of Appeals held that an order quashing service of process is a
final judgment for purposes of appeal when the plaintiff "effec-
tively" has no alternative means of prosecuting a case due to the
practical impossibility of locating the defendant."0 After failing to
achieve personal service in-state, plaintiff twice unsuccessfully at-
tempted service by certified mail at an out-of-state address believed
to belong to the defendant.31 Plaintiff then obtained an order au-
thorizing substituted service under former Maryland Rule 107
(a)(3) 3' and delivered the appropriate papers to defendant's last
known address. However, the service was quashed upon objection
by defendant's insurer because the place at which service was made
no longer had any apparent connection with the defendant.
33
tion was not exercised over Reisch under this subsection, however, because of
insufficiency of contacts. See id. at 329-30. The court failed to inquire into the place
where Reisch had committed acts relevant to jurisdiction and thus failed to correctly
apply the rules announced in Columbia Briargate.
29. 297 Md. 342, 466 A.2d 872 (1983).
30. Id. at 349, 466 A.2d at 875.
31. Id. at 344, 466 A.2d at 872-73. The parties were involved in an automobile colli-
sion that occurred in Maryland. Plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained as the result of defendant's negligence. Personal service was at-
tempted at a Cecil County address listed on the accident report as that of the defendant.
However, the writ was returned non est by the Cecil County sheriff, who reported that
defendant had moved to an address in Florida. Suit papers sent by certified mail to that
address under former Maryland Rule 107(a)(2) were returned with the notation
"Moved." The postal service subsequently advised plaintiff of a change of address to a
second location in Florida. Papers sent to the latter address by certified mail were re-
turned with the notation that the addressee had moved and left no forwarding address.
Id. at 343-44, 466 A.2d at 872-73.
32. Former Maryland Rule 107(a)(3) dealt with service of process outside of Mary-
land by means other than personal delivery or registered mail, when a defendant has
acted to evade service. It incorporated the manner of service outlined in former Mary-
land Rule 104(h)(1), which provided that service could be made "by mailing a copy of
the summons together with a copy of the original pleading to the defendant at his last
known residence," and by "delivering a copy of each to a person of suitable age and
discretion at the place of business, dwelling house or usual place of abode of the defend-
ant." Md. R.P. 104(h)(l) (1977). The language of new Maryland Rule 2-121 (b) is iden-
tical in all relevant respects. See infra note 46.
33. 297 Md. at 344-47, 466 A.2d at 873-74. Plaintiff complied with the first require-
ment of former Maryland Rule 104(h)(l), incorporated in former rule 107(a)(3), by
mailing the appropriate papers to defendant's last known address in Florida (at which
address service by certified mail had previously been attempted). Plaintiff then hired a
private process server in Florida, who was informed by defendant's former landlord that
the defendant had been a tenant but had moved, leaving no forwarding address. Service
was then made on the current resident at defendant's former address, who accepted the
papers (not knowing what else to do) but who apparently had no connection with the
defendant. The circuit court quashed the service of process upon preliminary objection
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In ruling that because defendant's "trail" had "run out ' 3 4 the
order quashing service was an appealable final order, the court
looked to earlier Maryland decisions holding that an order is final if
"[t]he effect of the court's ruling was to put the plaintiff out of court
"135and deny her the means of further prosecuting her case ....
Previous cases have established that the test of finality is met if it is
impossible to remedy the defect in service.36 In Mooring, however,
perfection of service remained at least theoretically possible because
the defendant still could conceivably be located. The effect of this
decision, therefore, is to expand previous doctrine to the extent that
practical impossibility is now regarded as sufficient evidence of final-
ity for purposes of appeal. 7
Having determined that the order quashing service was appeal-
able, the court addressed the particular facts of this case 38 and
found that the lower court had properly quashed service because
by defendant's insurer, with whom plaintiff had established communications at some
earlier point. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari sua sponte prior to consideration
of plaintiffls appeal by the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
34. Id. at 349, 466 A.2d at 875.
35. Id. at 347, 466 A.2d at 874 (quoting McCormick v. St. Francis De Sales Church,
219 Md. 422, 426-27, 149 A.2d 768, 771 (1959)). See also Sharpless Separator Co. v.
Brilhart, 129 Md. 82, 88, 98 A. 484, 487 (1916) ("[T]his Court has consistently enter-
tained appeals from orders quashing writs of summons and the returns thereon, when
the result of the rulings of the lower Court was to put the parties out of Court.") The
court also relied on Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923) for
the rule that such an order, "although in form an order to quash the summons and not a
dismissal of the suit, is a final judgment ...... Id. at 517, quoted in 297 Md. at 348, 466
A.2d at 875.
36. See, e.g., Hunt v. Tague, 205 Md. 369, 109 A.2d 80 (1954) (delivery to defend-
ant's wife quashed because defendant died before attempt at service); State ex rel. Bickel
v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 123 Md. 212, 91 A. 136 (1914) (service on a Maryland corpo-
ration as agent of a foreign corporation allegedly doing business in Maryland quashed
when court determined that the foreign corporation was not doing business in Maryland
and that the local entity was not its agent); see also Hillyard Constr. Co. v. Lynch, 256 Md.
375, 379 n.1, 260 A.2d 316, 318 n.l (1970) (dictum) (appeal will lie from an order
quashing service of summons); cf Davidson Transfer & Storage Co. v. Christian, 197
Md. 392, 79 A.2d 541 (1951) (appeal from the quashing of a writ of summons for want
of venue is not premature). Similarly, the court on numerous occasions has implicitly
recognized that orders quashing service on nonresident defendants for want of mini-
mum contacts are final for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md.
653, 370 A.2d 551 (1977); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976);
Harris v. Arlen Properties, Inc., 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969).
37. Although new MD. R.P. 2-121(c) provides that, when substituted service under
rule 2-121(b) is "impracticable, the court may order any other means of service that it
deems appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably calculated to give actual notice,"
it is unlikely to displace the notion of practical impossibility as grounds for appeal, for
the simple reason that if defendant's trail has truly "run out," no alternative means of
service could be devised.
38. See supra note 33.
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plaintiff had not complied with a prescribed method of service and
therefore the lower court did not acquire in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant. 39 The court held that substituted service is not
accomplished by delivery at a location having no present connection
with the defendant. 40 Emphasizing that the delivery element of the
rule is intended, in part, to fulfill a notice function, 4 1 the court inter-
preted former Maryland Rule 107(a)(3) 42 to require that the place of
delivery in fact be the defendant's "place of business, dwelling house
or usual place of abode" at the time service is attempted, not merely
the last address known to the plaintiff as a previous residence of the
defendant.4 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied exten-
sively on New York decisions interpreting New York Civil Practice
Law Section 308,44 after which former Maryland Rule 107(a)(3) was
39. 297 Md. at 355, 466 A.2d at 878.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 354-55, 466 A.2d at 878.
42. See supra note 32.
43. 297 Md. at 349-55, 466 A.2d at 875-78.
44. Id. at 352-54, 466 A.2d at 876-78. At the time former Maryland Rule 107(a)(3)
was adopted, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 308 (McKinney 1963) provided, in relevant part,
that substituted service may be accomplished by mailing the summons to the person to
be served at his last known residence and either affixing the summons to the door of his
place of business, dwelling house or usual place of abode within the state or delivering
the summons within the state to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of
business, dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be served. Id.
The court observed that although the New York statute contained alternative
methods of substituted service, known as "leave and mail" and "nail and mail," New
York decisions have uniformly held that delivery in either form "must be made at a
location which is in fact the place of business, dwelling house or usual place of abode of
the defendant at the time service is attempted." 297 Md. at 352, 466 A.2d at 877 (citing
Entwistle v. Stone, 53 Misc. 2d 227, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1967) (delivery at a location which
was both last known place of residence and last known place of business insufficient,
even though plaintiff made diligent efforts to effect personal service); Polansky v.
Paugh, 23 A.D.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1965) (whereabouts of defendant unknown
but substituted service at former residence insufficient); Zeinick v. Bartlik, 46 Misc. 2d
1043, 261 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1965) (service on defendant's estranged wife at defendant's
former residence insufficient); Jauk v. Mello, 45 Misc. 2d 307, 256 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1964)
(delivery at premises where process server was advised defendant was no longer residing
is insufficient)).
The court also noted that when the New York statute was revised in 1970, the
word "actual" was added immediately preceding "place of business, dwelling place or
usual place of abode" in both subsections in which that phrase appeared, id. at 353, 466
A.2d at 877, and that the Court of Appeals of New York has subsequently refused to
abandon the distinction between "dwelling place" and "last known residence," on the
grounds that the statute was intended to provide for actual notice to potential defend-
ants, id. at 354, 466 A.2d at 878 (citing Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 397
N.E.2d 1161, 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d 356, 359 (1979) (delivery at defendant's last known
residence was insufficient even though actual notice was effected as a result of defend-
ant's father's forwarding of the papers)).
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modeled, and which provides a closely analogous form of substi-
tuted service.45 This holding remains significant despite the recent
replacement of rule 107(a)(3) with the new rule 2-121(b), which is
identical in all relevant respects.46
2. In Banc Appeals. - Article IV, section 22 of the Maryland
Constitution establishes an in banc appeals procedure for the circuit
courts and provides that the decision of an in banc court is conclu-
sive against the party who moved to reserve questions for the con-
sideration of the in banc court and that further appeal by the
moving party after decision by the in banc court on the points re-
served is prohibited.4 7 The case law in Maryland indicates that the
proscription against further appeal is applicable only where there
45. The court indicated that although FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l) also served as a model
for former Md. R.P. 107(a)(3) (1977), cases interpreting the federal rule seem to turn on
whether actual receipt is effected, rather than on a consistent interpretation of the
phrase "dwelling house or usual place of abode" contained therein. The court did note,
however, that none of the various meanings attached to that phrase in the federal rule
could be applied to the facts of the present case. 297 Md. at 350-51, 466 A.2d at 876.
The court gave more weight to the New York decisions because the federal rule, unlike
the New York and Maryland rules, provides a method of personal service alternative to
personal delivery to the defendant, rather than a form of substituted service permissible
when attempts at personal service have proved unproductive. Id. at 351, 466 A.2d at
876.
46. MD. R.P. 2-121(b) states:
When proof is made by affidavit that a defendant has acted to evade service, the
court may order that service be made by mailing a copy of the summons, com-
plaint, and all other papers filed with it to the defendant at defendant's last
known residence and delivering a copy of each to a person of suitable age and
discretion at the place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of abode of
the defendant.
47.
Where any Term is held, or trial conducted by less than the whole number of
said Circuit Judges, upon the decision or determination of any point, or ques-
tion, by the Court, it shall be competent to the party, against whom the ruling
or decision is made, upon motion, to have the point, or question reserved for
the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit, who shall constitute a court
in banc for such purpose; and the motion for such reservation shall be entered
of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made; and the sev-
eral Circuit Courts shall regulate, by rules, the mode and manner of presenting
such points, or questions to the Court in banc, and the decision of the said
Court in banc shall be the effective decision in the premises, and conclusive, as
against the party, at whose motion said points, or questions were reserved; but
such decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or writ of error to
the adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal, or writ of
error to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law. The right of having
questions reserved shall not, however, apply to trials of Appeals from judg-
ments of the District Court, nor to criminal cases below the grade of felony,
except when the punishment is confinement in the Penitentiary; and this Sec-
tion shall be subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law.
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has been an actual decision by the in banc court on the points re-
served.4" In Merritts v. Merritts,49 the Court of Appeals held that is-
sues related to the subject matter decided by an in banc court but
not themselves decided may be appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals. 50
The Court of Appeals emphasized that the issues which it held
were appealable to the Court of Special Appeals arose after, and
partially as a result of, the decision by the in banc court, and thus
could not have been the subject of in banc appeal.5 ' It is unclear
whether the same result would obtain if the issues were such that
they could have been raised before and decided by the in banc
court. If such issues were appealable, a dual appeals process would
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22. For a complete discussion of the in banc appeal procedure,
see Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979).
48. See Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979); State
Roads Comm'n v. Smith, 224 Md. 537, 168 A.2d 705 (1961) (in banc appeal dismissed
without prejudice before any decision was rendered on the points reserved).
49. 299 Md. 521, 474 A.2d 894 (1984).
50. Id. at 521, 474 A.2d at 895. The court in Merritts cited both State Roads Comm'n
and Washabaugh for their conclusion that "generally there must be an in banc decision
on the point reserved" before the proscription against further appeal by the moving
party is triggered. Id. at 527, 474 A.2d at 897. It should be noted that these two cases
do not go as far as Merritts. For example, in State Roads Comm 'n, the appellant initiated an
in banc appeal but abandoned the process before a decision was reached by the in banc
court. In such a case, the moving party is not precluded from following the traditional
appeals process. The court in State Roads Comm'n stated, "It is the decision of the Court
in banc which is given conclusive effect by [art. IV, § 22] . . . ; the initiation of proceed-
ings looking to such review is not stated to have any such effect." 224 Md. at 544, 168
A.2d at 708. In contrast, Merritts presented a situation in which the in banc court had
rendered a decision on the points reserved and the appeal was based on related issues
not decided by the in banc court. 299 Md. at 523, 474 A.2d at 895.
The Court of Special Appeals had dismissed the Mertts appeal after the in banc
court's decision on the ground that
[w]hen appellant submits her grievances to the in banc court and that court
assumes jurisdiction and acts, further appeal [to the Court of Special Appeals]
on the same subject matter in the same proceeding is foreclosed to the party
who moved to have the points or questions reserved for consideration of the
court in banc. Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-302 (d).
Merritts v. Merritts, 55 Md. App. 200, 203, 461 A.2d 54, 56 (1983). The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals expressly stated that the issue of whether the proscription against further
appeals by the moving party in an in banc appeal applied to a later "peripheral proceed-
ing not the subject matter of the in banc appeal" was not before it. Id. at 205, 461 A.2d
at 57.
51. 299 Md. at 526-27, 474 A.2d at 897-98. The case arose from a divorce decree
entered by the circuit court for Prince George's County. Id. at 523, 474 A.2d at 895.
Appellant reserved ten points for consideration by the in banc court:
1) Was it an error for the Court to designate the property located at 509
A Street, S.E. in Washington, D.C., as Marital Property?
2) Was the Court in error in determining that the parties (a) each had
equal ownership in the property in Washington, D.C., known as 509 A Street,
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exist, rendering the proscription against further appeal by the mov-
ing party a virtual nullity. This would contravene the principle of
judicial economy by allowing two appeals on the same subject mat-
ter. Once the in banc court assumes jurisdiction, it is more efficient
to allow the in banc court to handle all issues arising out of the sub-
ject matter of the initial appeal.
3. Interlocutory Orders for the Payment of Money. - In Anthony
Plumbing v. Attorney General,52 the Court of Appeals held that section
12-303(c) (5) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,53 which
S.E. and (b) that the Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant was not required to par-
ticipate in the mortgage payments on said premises?
3) Was the Court in error in finding from the evidence presented that
two-thirds of the value of the St. Mary's property was not Marital Property?
4) Was it an error for the Court to fail to make a finding as to present
value of the civil service annuity based upon the testimony of an expert when
there is no testimony to controvert such testimony because the Court did not
agree with the expert's finding and because the Court did not think the expert
witness went about it the right way?
5) Was it an error for the Court not to grant a monetary award to the
Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff based upon the amount of entitlement she
would have in the civil service annuity and a judgment based upon that amount
pending the date the Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant retires?
6) Was it error for the Court to (a) award no more than $650 per month
alimony and (b) reduce the alimony payment after two years to $450 per month
with no evidence that she would need less alimony in two years?
7) Was it error for the Court to order the alimony award to be termi-
nated when the Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff commenced receiving a 38.86
per cent share of the monthly U.S. Civil Service annuity payments of the Plain-
tiff and Counter-Defendant.
8) Was it error for the Court to order the Plaintiff and Counter-Defend-
ant to pay the three medical bills?
9) Was it error for the Court to refuse to permit the Plaintiff and
Counter-Defendant to give testimony concerning the marriage relationship
prior to the most recent events? (Withdrawn)
10) Was it error for the Court to deny the Defendant and Counter-
Plaintiff's motion for reasonable costs under Rule 421, § a through e of the
Maryland Rules?
Id. at 524-25, n.2, 474 A.2d at 896 n.2. Appellant sought to raise two issues before the
Court of Special Appeals:
(1) Did the Chancellor err in denying out of hand the request for coun-
sel fees and transcript expenses; and
(2) Did the Chancellor err in holding that the order of November 23,
1981 was final and thus could not be modified with regard to the credits to be
considered in determining the monetary award.
Id. at 527, 474 A.2d at 897. The Court of Appeals found that "neither of these points
could have been the subject of in banc review, simply because the issues were generated
after the in banc order." Id.
52. 298 Md. 11,467 A.2d 504 (1983).
53. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 12-303(c)(5) (1984).
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authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory order "for the . . . pay-
ment of money. . . unless the . . . payment is directed to be made
to a receiver appointed by the court," 4 only applies in equity.55
The court derived this construction from the history of the statute.56
Based on its interpretation of Sectionl2-303(c)(5), the court held
that no appeal would lie from an interlocutory order for civil penal-
ties, award of costs, and deposit of money with the clerk for costs
associated with master's proceedings, since these items are not equi-
table in nature.
The court traced the history of Section 12-303(c)(5) back to
Chapter 11 of the Acts of 184 1,58 which authorized an appeal from
certain interlocutory orders in equity, including an order for "the
payment of money."' 59 It was not until 1962 that an appeal was au-
thorized from an interlocutory order of a court of law,6" and even
then appeals could not be taken from an order concerning the pay-
ment of money.6' The 1973 enactment of Section 12-303 combined
into one section the existing code provisions regarding interlocu-
tory appeals. 62 According to the Revisor's Note, the change ren-
dered by Section 12-303 was merely intended to recognize that
certain types of traditional equity orders, such as injunctions, could
also be issued by a court of law. 63 Thus, there was no intent to make
substantive alterations in the kinds of interlocutory orders that were
54. Id.
55. 298 Md. at 20, 467 A.2d at 509. This holding remains significant despite the
adoption of Maryland Rule 2-301, which abolishes the distinction between law and eq-
uity in pleading. MD. R.P. 2-301. The Rules Committee indicated that the substantive
and procedural differences between law and equity would remain unaffected. Minutes,
Mar. 7-8, 1980, at 33. See generally Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure,
43 MD. L. REV. 669, 742-43 (1984).
56. 298 Md. at 18-20, 467 A.2d at 507-08.
57. Id. at 21-23, 467 A.2d at 509-10. The court also held, in accordance with prior
cases, that an order referring matters to a master is not appealable. Id. at 16, 467 A.2d
at 506 (citing Waters v. Smith, 277 Md. 189, 194-95, 352 A.2d 793, 796 (1976); Matter
of Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 102-03, 321 A.2d 516, 525-26 (1974) (master's findings do
not finally dispose of litigation; the findings are not binding until confirmed by a trial
court), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975)).
58. Act ofJan. 15, 1842, ch. 11, 1841-1842 Md. Laws.
59. Id. For a discussion of the history of interlocutory appeals, see Della Ratta v.
Dixon, 47 Md. App. 270, 278-85, 422 A.2d 409, 413-17 (1980).
60. See Act of Mar. 23, 1962, ch. 36, § 5, 1962 Md. Laws 91.
61. See id.
62. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-303 (1984).
63. See Act of Aug. 22, 1973, ch. 2, § 1 (1st Sp. Sess.), 1973 Md. Laws 4 ("Although
most of the actions mentioned are in equity, some relief, like an injunction, may also be
obtained at law; hence no distinction is made between law and equity.").
1985]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
appealable prior to final judgment. 64
Having thus construed section 12-303(c)(5), the court went on
to hold that no interlocutory appeal would lie from the order in this
case for payment of civil penalties, costs of the action, and costs of
master's proceedings, because these items are legal rather than eq-
uitable in nature. 65 The court stated that an order that assesses civil
penalties merely creates a debt recoverable at law,6 6 whereas an eq-
uitable order for payment of money is immediately enforceable
against an individual.67 The court held that the award of costs is
also legal in nature since it is analogous to civil damages.68 Finally,
the court held that the direction to pay money into court to cover
the cost of a master's proceeding is also legal in nature because it is
essentially an award of CoStS.
6 9
4. Law of the Case. - In Loveday v. State,70 a criminal case in-
volving plea bargaining issues,7 ' the Court of Appeals held that a
64. 298 Md. at 20, 467 A.2d at 508. See also Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 284, 422 A.2d
at 416 (where orders "had been immediately appealable for more than a century-it
should make no difference whether they emanated from a law court or an equity court").
65. 298 Md. at 21-23, 467 A.2d at 509-10.
66. Id. at 21, 467 A.2d at 509 (citing Ordway v. Central Nat'l Bank, 47 Md. 217, 242
(1877)).
67. Id. at 20, 467 A.2d at 508-09. The court cited examples of orders for the "pay-
ment of money" that had traditionally been rendered in equity and from which interloc-
utory appeals had been allowed, including orders for alimony and child support. See id.,
467 A.2d at 508 (citing Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 413 A.2d 549 (1980); Chappell
v. Chappell, 86 Md. 532, 39 A. 984 (1898); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 50 Md. App. 240, 437
A.2d 247 (1981); Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. 270, 422 A.2d 409 (1980)). The court noted
that a traditional equity order for the payment of money is an order for a specific sum of
money, which " 'proceeds directly to the person,' and for which that individual is 'di-
rectly and personally answerable to the court in the event of noncompliance' " (emphasis
in original). Id. (quoting Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 285, 422 A.2d at 417). Contrasting
an equity order with a typical judgment at law for the payment of money, the court
stated that the latter is " 'not immediately enforceable' " and " 'does not purport to
order anyone to do anything.' " Id., 467 A.2d at 508-09 (quoting Della Ratta, 47 Md.
App. at 285-86, 422 A.2d at 417).
68. Id. at 22, 467 A.2d at 510, (citing Reese v. Mandel, 244 Md. 121, 130, 167 A.2d
111, 116 (1961)).
69. Id. at 23, 467 A.2d at 510. The money remains to be apportioned at the close of
the proceedings. Id. An order of an equity court directing money to be paid into court
pending further disposition of an action has been held not to be appealable under MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-303(c)(5) (1984), or as a final order, id. (citing Dillon
v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44 Md. 386, 394-96 (1876)).
70. 296 Md. 226, 462 A.2d 58 (1983). For a thorough analysis of Loveday, see Note,
An Alternative Analysis of Law of the Case - Rethinking Loveday v. State, 44 MD. L. REV. 178
(1985).
71. Harry Loveday was found guilty of robbery and related offenses by a jury after he
had rejected initial plea bargaining. The State had offered to make no recommendation
concerning sentencing if Loveday would plead guilty to robbery. Defense counsel ad-
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litigant's failure to petition for writ of certiorari after the first of two
decisions by the Court of Special Appeals in the same case does not
preclude the Court of Appeals, upon granting the writ after the
Court of Special Appeals' second decision, from reviewing the en-
tire record of the case.72 The Court of Appeals thought that to hold
otherwise "would thwart the purpose of. . .§ 12-201 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article which grants power to [the Court of
Appeals] to review judgments of the Court of Special Appeals." 73
In limiting the application of the law of the case doctrine in Mary-
land to courts of coordinate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals may
have impaired the efficiency of Maryland's appellate procedure.
Now a litigant may choose to wait until the Court of Special Appeals
issues a decision without a remand order before petitioning to the
Court of Appeals.7"
vised Loveday that the sentence would probably be ten years. At sentencing, the State
sought a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 643B(c) (1982), which requires a mandatory sentence of no less than twenty-five years
for persons who have been convicted of two violent crimes and have been incarcerated
for at least one of those crimes. The trial court, reasoning it was unfair to impose the
mandatory sentence since the State had not notified Loveday of its intention during the
original plea bargaining, imposed a ten-year sentence. 296 Md. at 228, 462 A.2d at 58-
59.
On appeal by the State, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentence and
held that the provisions of art. 27, § 643B(c) were mandatory and that Loveday's due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment were not violated by the State's failure
to give Loveday notice of its intent to seek the mandatory sentence. Id. at 228-29, 462
A.2d at 59. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. Loveday did not petition the Court of Appeals for certiorari.
On remand, the trial court imposed the twenty-five year sentence. Loveday appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that imposing the mandatory sentence under the
facts of his case violated his due process rights under the Maryland Constitution. The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court sentencing and rejected Loveday's
argument. They concluded that the argument" 'was essentially the same argument pre-
viously raised in State v. Loveday . . . ' and that 'Appellant's attempt to circumvent the
"law of the case" as it was declared in State v. Loveday, by relying on the due process
provisions . . .of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, rather than the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' was without merit." Id. at 229, 462 A.2d at 59.
Loveday petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals and the writ was granted. Id.
72. 296 Md. at 234, 462 A.2d at 61-62.
73. Id., 462 A.2d at 61 (citation and footnote omitted) (citing MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 12-201 (1984)).
74. See Note, supra note 70, at 204. Addressing the merits of the case, the court held
that Loveday's state and federal due process rights had not been violated by imposing
the mandatory sentence following the collapse of plea negotiations. 296 Md. at 241, 462
A.2d at 65. Loveday had argued that fairness required the State to notify him during
plea bargaining of its intent to seek the mandatory sentence, and that seeking the
mandatory sentence after collapse of negotiations constituted prosecutorial vindictive-
ness and denial of due process. Id. at 236, 462 A.2d at 62. The court cited Graham v.
West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), that the State is not constitutionally required to
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5. Partial Summary Judgment. - The case of Robert v. Robert75
required the Court of Special Appeals to interpret and apply former
Maryland Rule 605(a),76 the predecessor to rule 2-602, 7 7 which pro-
vides for the entry of a final, appealable judgment on fewer than all
the claims involved in a multiple claim action. The action was a
shareholder's derivative suit in which plaintiff prayed for various
types of relief, including an order requiring defendant to allow in-
spection of its books and records.7 In response to plaintiffs mo-
inform the defendant that it intends to seek the mandatory sentence. 296 Md. at 238-39,
462 A.2d at 64 (citing 224 U.S. at 627). The court also held there was not evidence in
the record to suggest that the State was improperly motivated in seeking the mandatory
sentence. Id. at 240, 462 A.2d at 65. The court noted that "the Supreme Court has
made it clear that 'a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the pro-
phylactic rule' of presuming all increased sentences as violative of a defendant's consti-
tutional rights." Id. at 239, 462 A.2d at 64, (quoting U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384
(1982)).
75. 56 Md. App. 317, 467 A.2d 798 (1983).
76.
Where more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, ... the court
may direct the entry of final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the
claims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order. . . which adjudicates less than all
the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims ....
Md. R.P. 605(a) (1977).
77. MD. R.P. 2-602 now provides that:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, including a con-
solidated action, whether by original claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, or when partial judgment is
sought pursuant to Rule 2-501 (e) [Motion for Summary Judgment - Entry of
Judgment], the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all the claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of judg-
ment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties and is subject to revision at any time
before the entry ofjudgment that adjudicates all the claims and the rights and
liabilties of all the parties.
The language of MD. R.P. 2-602 is nearly identical to that of former rule 605(a),
with the addition of express references to multiple parties, consolidated actions, and
partial summary judgments. For further discussion of former rule 605(a) and rule 2-
602, see Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 820-22.
78. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, misappropriation of corporate funds, illegal withhold-
ing of earned compensation, and wasting of corporate assets. 56 Md. App. at 320, 467
A.2d at 799.
In addition to requesting the inspection order, plaintiff prayed the court to 1) im-
mediately and temporarily enjoin further transfer of defendant's company's property
and assets, 2) order an accounting, 3) order defendant to reimburse the corporation for
the value of all misappropriated corporate assets and to pay punitive and exemplary
damages, 4) declare null and void the purported issuance of 31,000 shares to defendant
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tion for partial summary judgment, the court ordered defendant to
make its books available for plaintiffs inspection.79 The last line of
the order read as follows: "This is certified as a final order pursuant
to Maryland Rule 605(a)." 8 Defendant appealed the inspection or-
der. Because the order for inspection disposed of only one of at
least six specific prayers for relief, all of which were direct rather
than ancillary parts of the claim, the partial summary judgment
could only be final and appealable by virtue of rule 605(a). 8 l
The court declared that rule 605(a) "carefully and precisely ex-
plicates the procedure that must be followed" in appealing from a
partial summary judgment:82 "Not only must the direction for entry
of judgment be explicit, but also the determination that there is no
just reason for delay must be explicit."8 The circuit court had
merely certified the order as final pursuant to rule 605(a) without
making the express determination.84 The Court of Special Appeals
concluded that "[t]he use of [this] short form adaptation of the rule
is not acceptable." 85 This conclusion is in keeping with the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of the rule. 86 The same construction should
be applicable to current rule 2-602 as well.87
The Court of Special Appeals went on to consider whether the
order in this case could have been made final and appealable assum-
ing the circuit court had made an express determination and direc-
in May 1981, 5) order full payment to all former employees of all compensation and
bonuses, 6) order the reimbursement to plaintiff of cost and attorneys' fees, and 7) grant
"such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper." Id. at 320, 467 A.2d
at 799-800.
79. Id. at 321, 467 A.2d at 800. The order was made pursuant to MD. CORPS. &
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-512 (1975) (stockholder's right of inspection) and id. § 2-513
(additional right of inspection for stockholders of 5% of stock).
80. 56 Md. App. at 321, 467 A.2d at 800.
81. Final judgment is necessary for the right to appeal under MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1984). 56 Md. App. at 321, 467 A.2d at 800.
82. 56 Md. App. at 321-22, 467 A.2d at 800.
83. Id. at 322, 467 A.2d at 800.
84. Id. at 321, 467 A.2d at 800.
85. Id. at 322, 467 A.2d at 800.
86. See Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355, 359-60, 373 A.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1977) ("No
finding under Maryland Rule 605a was made that there was 'no just reason for delay'
and there was no 'express direction for the entry ofjudgment.' "); Parish v. Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 97-98, 242 A.2d 512, 553 (1967), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971). ("[I]t is required by Rule 605a that the trial court may direct a final
judgment upon one or less than all the claims, but only upon (a) an express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay and (b) upon an express direction for the entry
ofjudgment.").
87. Both rules call for an express determination of no just reason for delay and an
express direction for the entering ofjudgment. See Md. R.P. 605(a) (1977); MD. R.P. 2-
602, supra notes 76-77, respectively.
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tion. The Court of Special Appeals noted that the rule only applies
to the disposition of a single, separate claim in a multiple claim suit
and not to the disposition ofjust part of a single claim.88 The court
concluded that Robert contained only one claim comprised of several
elements of damage.8 9 It reasoned that, although the shareholder's
right to inspection is a separate statutory right,9 ° in this case it was
used to discover support for other allegations.9' The court likened
the inspection order to one for discovery,92 which would not be ap-
pealable. 3 Since the order did not dispose of a separate claim in a
multiple claim suit, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit
court had no authority to make its decision final and appealable
under rule 605(a). 4 The effect of Robert is to prevent appeals from
inspection orders in shareholder's derivative suits, at least when the
88. 56 Md. App. at 323, 467 A.2d at 801. "Where more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, . . . the court may direct the entry of final judgment upon one or
more but less than all the claims .... " Md. R.P. 605(a) (1977). See also Diener Enters.
v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 554-55, 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972) (interpreting former rule
605(a) based on federal cases interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), upon which rule 605(a)
was modelled). The Court of Appeals has variously defined a "claim" within the context
of rule 605a as a set of facts "upon which there can be but a single recovery," Diener
Enters., 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d at 474, and as a "substantive cause of action,"
Suitland Dev. Corp. v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 254 Md. 43, 54, 254 A.2d 359, 365
(1969). The Court of Appeals has held that a number of legal theories based upon the
same facts or transaction leading to but a single recovery constitute a single claim, not
multiple claims. Diener Enters., 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d at 473.
89. 56 Md. App. at 324, 467 A.2d at 801. This conclusion makes sense in light of the
Court of Appeals' definition of "claim" as a number of legal theories based on the same
facts leading to but a single recovery, Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 295, 402 A.2d
71, 74 (1979), because all plaintiffs claims were based upon the same facts concerning
defendant's breach of his fiduciary duties to the corporation and to plaintiff, a minority
shareholder.
90. See supra note 79.
91. 56 Md. App. at 323-24, 467 A.2d at 801. The court said that the purpose of
inspection "must have been in the nature of discovering support for the other allega-
tions and relief sought in the Bill of Complaint. Such purpose was apparent to the judge
who delayed the order's effect until the other pending suit had been concluded." Id.
92. Id. at 323, 467 A.2d at 801.
93. See Hallman v. Gross, 190 Md. 563, 577-78, 59 A.2d 304, 310 (1947).
94. 56 Md. App. at 324, 467 A.2d at 802.
Another case relating to finality and appealability of judgments was Sigma Re-
productive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483 (1983), in which the
Court of Appeals held that an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum
in a pending case is ordinarily not an appealable final order. 297 Md. at 475, 467 A.2d
at 490. Debra Braun, a defendant in a criminal trespass case, had served a subpoena
duces tecum on Sigma Reproductive Health Center (Sigma) seeking production of
records relating to abortions performed at Sigma. Id. at 662-63, 467 A.2d at 484. Sigma
appealed the denial of its motion to quash, arguing that the order of denial was appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine established in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 297 Md. at 667, 467 A.2d at 486. The court held that this
case did not meet the three requirements of the doctrine as enunciated in United States
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apparent purpose of the inspection is to discover support for other
allegations in the same case.
C. Trial Court Powers Pending Appeal
It is the rule in Maryland that an interlocutory injunction is dis-
solved by operation of law upon entry of a final, appealable judg-
ment on the merits (or its equivalent).95 In General Motors Corp. v.
Miller Buick, Inc.,9 6 the Court of Special Appeals applied this rule
even though the injunction in question, as interpreted by the trial
court, purported to extend beyond entry of judgment.9 7 In reach-
ing this result, the court relied on the definition of "interlocutory
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 815
(1981):
As applied to criminal pretrial orders [the Cohen] rationale confers appellate
jurisdiction when:
1. The pretrial order fully disposed of the appellant's claim;
2. The appellant's claim is collateral to, and separable from, the princi-
pal issue of guilt or innocence; and
3. The order involves an important right that would be lost if review had
to await final judgment.
Id. at 1250-51. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the order in this case was not sepa-
rable from the merits of the case since enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum may turn
on the determination of factual issues. 297 Md. at 670-71, 467 A.2d at 488. Further, the
court reasoned that the order did not fully dispose of Sigma's claim, and that Sigma
would not lose its right to the privacy of its records if appeal were denied, because Sigma
had the option of refusing to comply with the order. Citation of Sigma for contempt for
refusing to comply would constitute a final order. Id. at 671, 467 A.2d at 488.
For a discussion of other issues in Sigma, see infra, Criminal Law notes 61-78 and
accompanying text.
95. See Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd., 268 Md. 32, 67-68, 300 A.2d 367, 388
(1973); Musgrave v. Staylor, 36 Md. 123, 128 (1872). The rationale behind the rule is
that the only purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo until a
court has addressed the merits of the case. Musgrave, 36 Md. at 128 (1872) (The pur-
pose of an interlocutory injunction is to prevent disposition "which would defeat or
embarrass the passage of a final decree under which the complainant's right could be
effectively secured and enforced. It [serves] its whole office and purpose by being
obeyed until final decree.").
96. 56 Md. App. 374, 467 A.2d 1064 (1983).
97. Id. at 390, 467 A.2d at 1072. The interlocutory injunction was to expire "at such
time as the issues joined [had] been fully and finally adjudicated." Id. at 381, 467 A.2d
at 1067. The trial court interpreted this language to extend the injunction beyond a
final, appealable judgment:
Now that, of course, is a pretty broad statement as to what is meant by fully and
finally adjudicated. . . . I don't know whether that means by a Court at the
trial level or subsequent to a finding on appeal.
I would think at least it would encompass the passage of thirty day[s']
time following which an appeal had not been entered, I think that would proba-
bly be a final adjudication, at least as to that issue.
Id. at 382, 467 A.2d at 1068. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with this interpreta-
tion, holding that, by its terms at least, the interlocutory injunction did not expire for at
19851
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injunction" in Maryland Rule BB70(c), 98  and on Maryland
precedent. 99
In dicta, the court suggested that the trial court is not without
power to prolong injunctive relief, but indicated that the correct
procedure for doing so is to issue a new injunction.' The court
said the standard, drawn from federal ca3es, for issuing this new in-
junction should be a "strong showing [that the applicant] is likely to
prevail on the merits of its appeal."' 0 ' The court would be required
to weigh the factors relevant to granting an injunction as of that point
in time when an applicant notifies the court of an intention to ap-
peal.1 0 2 The necessity for this new determination is what renders a
least thirty days after entry ofjudgment absolute in the event of an appeal. Id. at 384-85,
467 A.2d at 1068.
98. Id. at 386, 467 A.2d at 1070. An interlocutory injunction is one granted "after an
adversary hearing on the propriety thereof, but before a determination on the merits of the
action" (emphasis added). MD. R.P. BB70(c). The court reasoned that since an interloc-
utory injunction cannot be granted after a determination on the merits of an action,
neither can it be continued, "that being the office of a 'final injunction.' " 56 Md. App.
at 386, 467 A.2d at 1070.
99. 56 Md. App. at 386, 467 A.2d at 1070 (citing Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State
Bd., 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973); Diedel v. Diedel, 133 Md. 286, 105 A. 271
(1918); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 77 Md. 189, 26 A. 284 (1893); Musgrave v. Staylor, 36
Md. 123 (1872); Keerl v. Keerl, 28 Md. 157 (1868)). Appellee pointed out that these
cases were in equity, but the court found this irrelevant. Id. at 387, 467 A.2d at 1070.
100. Id. The Court of Special Appeals asserted that the trial court possessed the
power to issue a new injunction based on analogy to the federal courts, citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 62:
When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory injunction or final judgment
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the
appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the
security of the rights of the adverse party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c). Though Maryland does not have a counterpart to this rule, the
court said that the federal rule is a "manifestation of the inherent and 'long established
right of the trial court, after an appeal, to make orders appropriate to preserve the status
quo while the case is pending in the appellate court.' " 56 Md. App. at 389, 467 A.2d at
1071-72 (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1962);
United States v. EI-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62, 79 (9th Cir. 1951); Lang v. Cat-
terton, 267 Md. 268, 282, 297 A.2d 735, 743 (1972); Bullock v. Director of Patuxent
Inst., 231 Md. 629, 633, 190 A.2d 789, 792 (1963)).
101. Virginia Petro. Job Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (emphasis added), quoted in 56 Md. App. at 389, 467 A.2d at 1071. Accord Adams
v. Walker, 488 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1973); Mittenberger v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
450 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1971); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 395 F.2d 685
(5th Cir. 1968).
102. 56 Md. App. at 390, 467 A.2d at 1072. The four factors to be considered in
ruling on a motion for an interlocutory injunction are (1) "the likelihood that the [appli-
cant] will succeed on the merits," (2) "the balance of convenience," (3) "irreparable
injury," and (4) "the public interest." Id. at 380, 467 A.2d at 1067. See also Federal
Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 650 F.2d 495, 499 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding
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mere continuance of the interlocutory injunction inadequate.10 3
D. Statutes of Limitations
In Johnson v. Nadwodny'0 4 the Court of Special Appeals strongly
suggested, in dictum, that after Poffenberger v. Rissert ° 5 (which
adopted the "discovery" rule for determining when a cause of ac-
tion accrues)106 the accrual date of a cause of action should be con-
sidered a question of fact, evidence of which must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, upon a motion for directed ver-
dict.' 0 7 Decisions prior to Poffenberger expressly stated that the appli-
that the test under Maryland and federal law is essentially the same); State Dep't of
Health & Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554, 383 A.2d 51, 55
(1977); Rowe v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 56 Md. App. 23, 30,466 A.2d 538, 542
(1983).
103. 56 Md. App. at 387-88, 466 A.2d at 1070-71. Another case involving trial court
powers pending appeal was Taylor v. Benjamin, 55 Md. App. 597, 465 A.2d 1171
(1983), in which the Court of Special Appeals held that no evidence of danger to assets
that are the subject matter of a case is necessary in order for the trial court to order
transfer of the assets to the custody of the clerk of the court pending appeal. Id. at 602,
465 A.2d at 1174. The court noted, simply, that "the trial court could take judicial cog-
nizance that the funds held by appellant could be lost in various ways." Id.
However, the Taylor court's statements that "the turnover order did not relate 'to
the subject matter of, or [affect] the proceedings,' " but rather "was based on the neces-
sity to protect and preserve the subject matter of the appeal," id. at 603, 465 A.2d at
1174, seem contradictory. An order intended to preserve the subject matter of an ap-
peal must be considered to relate to that same subject matter. The confusion may de-
rive from the statement found in Bullock v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 231 Md. 629, 633,
190 A.2d 789, 792 (1963) and reiterated in Lang v. Catterton, 267 Md. 268, 282, 297
A.2d 735, 743 (1972) and Eisenbeiss v.Jarrell, 52 Md. App. 677, 685,451 A.2d 940, 944
(1982), that:
The trial court may act with reference to matters not relating to the subject
matter of, or affecting, the proceeding; make such orders and decrees as may be
necessary for the protection and preservation of the subject matter of the ap-
peal; and it may do anything that may be necessary for the presentation of the
case in this Court, or in furtherance of the appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals appears to have read this language to generally restrict the
trial court to actions not relating to the subject matter of an appeal. It would make more
sense to interpret Bullock as describing three areas in which the trial court may act, one
of those areas being matters not related to the subject matter, and another being action
related to the subject matter which is necessary to preserve it for appeal. Such an inter-
pretation would not have required a different conclusion in Taylor, but would have made
the court's reasoning more clear.
104. 55 Md. App. 227, 461 A.2d 67 (1983).
105. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
106. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680. See generally Note, Poffenberger v. Risser - The Dis-
covery Principle is the Rule, Not the Exception, 41 MD. L. REV. 451 (1982).
107. 55 Md. App. at 230-33, 461 A.2d at 69-70 (dictum). In Johnson a directed verdict
had been granted for the defendants on the ground that the action was not commenced
within the statutory three-year limitations period. However, on appeal it was not neces-
sary to decide whether the accrual date of a cause of action is a question of law or a
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cation of limitations constitutes a purely legal question, and that the
relevant facts must be judicially determined.'0 8 Furthermore, these
cases noted that the "most favorable light" test does not apply to
legal questions such as limitations of actions.' 0 9 However, the court
in Johnson v. Nadwodny suggested that these decisions were predi-
cated on the pre-Poffenberger rule that, for purposes of limitations, a
cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of the alleged wrong
and not its discovery."
0
In Poffenberger, the "discovery" rule was substituted for the oc-
currence-of-the-wrong rule in all actions,' 1 ' and consequently a
cause of action now accrues when the claimant in fact knew, or rea-
sonably should have known, of the wrong." 2 The Court of Special
Appeals suggested that, after Poffenberger, the accrual date should be
considered a question of fact, and therefore viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, on motion for directed verdict.' i3 The
court reasoned that, since the "discovery" rule looks to whether
plaintiff had knowledge of circumstances "which ought to have put a
person of ordinary prudence on inquiry," ''"4 the rule "brings into
play all of the insights required of and reserved for a factfinder.' '5
In support, the court drew on an analogy between the "discovery"
rule and the equitable principle embodied in section 5-203 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code: "If a party is kept
in ignorance of a cause of action by the fraud of an adverse party,
the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time when the
party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should
have discovered the fraud." '' 6 The court suggested that "[t]he stat-
utory test of 'ordinary diligence' parallels the Poffenberger implied
knowledge test of 'ordinary prudence,' "' 17 and noted that in cases
properly falling under the statute, the question of due diligence was
question of fact because the court found that plaintiff had admitted discovery, leaving no
question of fact. Id. at 233, 461 A.2d at 71.
108. See Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 211,422 A.2d 389, 394 (1980); Moy v. Bell,
46 Md. App. 364, 370, 416 A.2d 289, 293-94 (1980).
109. See Decker, 47 Md. App. at 211,422 A.2d at 394; Moy, 46 Md. App. at 369-70, 416
A.2d at 294.
110. 55 Md. App. at 231, 461 A.2d at 70.
111. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634, 636, 431 A.2d at 679, 680.
112. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
113. 55 Md. App. at 230-33, 461 A.2d at 69-71.
114. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681.
115. 55 Md. App. at 232, 461 A.2d at 70.
116. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1980). See also Piper v. Jenkins, 207
Md. 308, 318, 113 A.2d 919, 923-24 (1955); Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257, 267-68
(1877).
117. 55 Md. App. at 232, 461 A.2d at 70.
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ordinarily left to the trier of fact.'
The court's conclusion is reasonable and should be adopted
when a proper case arises. While the occurrence-of-the-wrong rule
required a court to make only minimal findings of fact, the "discov-
ery" rule involves a more complex inquiry. The factors involved in
determining when discovery occurred, or should have occurred, in-
clude the nature and cause of the injury, whether the plaintiff had
knowledge of the essential elements of the cause of action, the point
at which damages were substantial enough to constitute a cause of
action, and the level of the plaintiff's skill in ascertaining the in-
jury." 9 Inquiries such as these are more appropriately viewed as
questions of fact. 120
E. Jury Preudice-Exposure to Extraneous Matter
In Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., l21 the Court of Appeals
adopted a new rule concerning the effect of exposure of the jury to
potentially prejudicial extraneous matter. A personal injury action
had been submitted to the jury on special interrogatories, the core
of the jury's function being to determine proximate cause on several
liability issues.' 2 2 When verdicts were returned for the plaintiffs,
the defendants moved for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct on
the ground that a dictionary had been utilized during delibera-
tions.' 23 More specifically, defendants claimed that the jury had
118. Id. (citing Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 295 A.2d 876 (1972)).
119. See Note, supra note 106, at 461-62 n.71.
120. The court also held that, when the moving party fails to bring a pending motion
to the attention of the court for ruling prior to the conclusion of trial, that party is
regarded as having waived the point, and the motion will not be reconsidered on appeal.
In effect, the appellate court will not assume a "de facto" overruling in the absence of a
"de jure" overruling by the trial court. 55 Md. App. at 238, 461 A.2d at 73. In so
holding, the court relied on White v. State, 23 Md. App. 151, 156, 326 A.2d 219, 222
(1974). However, it should be noted that the ruling in White was at least partly in re-
sponse to appellant's extreme negligence in failing to resubmit a pending motion de-
spite numerous opportunities to do so. Id. at 158, 326 A.2d at 223-24. Johnson would
seem to extend this rule to far less extreme cases of neglect.
121. 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984).
122. Id. at 409, 470 A.2d at 803-04.
123. Id. at 408, 470 A.2d at 803. Evidence in support of this allegation consisted of:
(1) jurors' affidavits stating that the foreman had obtained a dictionary and read aloud
from it, causing at least one juror to change his vote; (2) the affidavit of a bystander
describing a conversation between jury members after the verdict had been returned;
(3) testimony of the court bailiff that he had provided thejury foreman with a dictionary;
and (4) certain writings made during the jury's deliberations, including a note to the
judge requesting clarification of the term "proximate," a note to the bailiff requesting a
dictionary, and a definition of the term "legal cause" copied from the dictionary pro-
vided by the bailiff, Id. at 410-11, 413-14, 470 A.2d at 804-06. The Court of Appeals
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transposed a misleading dictionary definition of the word "legal" to
the term "legal cause," which was used by the judge in explaining
the concept of proximate cause.' 24
Although it is the "near universal consensus" in other states
that the mere use of a dictionary during jury deliberations is not
automatic grounds for a new trial, but rather that a further determi-
nation of prejudice to the complaining party is required,125 the
courts differ on their approach to that determination. 26  Some
courts require that the complaining party essentially prove preju-
dice in fact. Absent such proof, the new trial is denied. 27 Other
courts have presumed prejudice under these circumstances, with the
burden on the party opposing a new trial to rebut. Under the latter
decisions, the court may award a new trial without proof of the pur-
pose for which the dictionary was consulted.' 2  The Court of Ap-
ruled that neither the juror affidavits nor the bystander affidavit were admissible for the
reason that both fell within the well established prohibition against a juror impeaching
his verdict. Id. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 804-05. Cf Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,
101, 447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982) (a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict, whether
the jury conduct objected to is misbehavior or mistake). By contrast, the notes were
held admissible, because, as documents generated during the jury's deliberations, they
did not "suffer the taint of possible post-verdict importuning." 298 Md. at 413, 470
A.2d at 805. The testimony of the bailiff was also held admissible, apparently because it
was based on his first-hand knowledge of the event, and therefore did not violate the
rule that a juror may not be heard to impeach his verdict. Id. With respect to the bai-
liff's testimony, the court relied on Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 150 A.2d 918 (1959),
in which it was held that the affidavit of the court clerk regarding a question asked him
by the jury forewoman during deliberations was admissible to impeach thejury's verdict,
"because it emanates from one not a member of the jury panel and is based on his own
knowledge." Id. at 642, 150 A.2d at 926.
124. The definition allegedly used by the jury equated "legal cause" with the notion
of "having a formal status derived from law often without basis in actual fact." 298 Md.
at 414, 470 A.2d at 806. As a result, the jury apparently decided that "proximate cause"
meant "could it be possible." Id. at 411 n.l, 470 A.2d at 804 n.1.
The Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County declined to order a new trial, but the
Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis of the
evidence described supra note 123.
125. 298 Md. at 414-15, 470 A.2d at 806. See cases cited infra notes 127-28.
126. 298 Md. at 415, 420 A.2d at 806.
127. Id. (citing Dulaney v. Bums, 218 Ala. 493, 119 So. 21 (1928); Lane v. Mathews,
74 Ariz. 201, 245 P.2d 1025, rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 75 Ariz. 1, 251 P.2d 303
(1952); People v. Jedlicka, 84 Il. App. 3d 483, 405 N.E.2d 844 (1980); In re Estate of
Cory, 169 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969); State v. Duncan, 3 Kan. App. 2d 271, 593 P.2d 427
(1979); Kaufman v. Miller, 405 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967); Wright v. Clark, 50 Vt. 130 (1877); Rocky Mountain
Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959)).
128. Id. at 415-16, 470 A.2d at 807 (citing Grissinger v. Griffin, 186 So.2d 58 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Daniels v. Barker, 89 N.H. 416, 200 A. 410 (1938); State v.




peals rejected both of these approaches for the reason that it would
rarely be possible either to prove prejudice in fact or to rebut a pre-
sumption of prejudice under the stringently applied Maryland rule
prohibiting the use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict.' 2 9
The court characterized the problem in Wernsing as one of bal-
ancing "the right to a fair trial with the policy prohibiting impeach-
ment by a juror of a verdict," 130 holding that:
Where, as here, the precise extraneous matter is known but
direct evidence as to its effect on the deliberations is not
permitted, a sound balance is struck by a rule which looks
to the probability of prejudice from the face of the extrane-
ous matter in relation to the circumstances of the particular
case.
13 1
In formulating this rule, the court looked to decisions of other states
which also prohibit impeachment of a verdict by a juror and found
that they have employed similar tests. 13 2
129. Id. at 416-18, 470 A.2d at 807-08; see supra note 123. The court also noted that
although some courts permit the use of juror affidavits for the purpose of sustaining a
verdict, this is not an acceptable solution since it would then require, as a matter of
fairness, that the opposing party be provided an opportunity to cross-examine or intro-
duce countervailing juror affidavits. 298 Md. at 416, 470 A.2d at 807.
130. 298 Md. at 419, 470 A.2d at 809.
131. Id. at 419-20, 470 A.2d at 809.
132. Id. at 418-19, 470 A.2d at 808-09. In Gertz v. Bass, 59 Ill. App. 2d 180, 208
N.E.2d 113 (1965), for example, comparison of key terms contained in instructions to
the jury with the same terms as defined in a dictionary requested during deliberations
showed substantial differences, and therefore, potential for abuse. The court remanded
for a new trial, holding that "[i]t is reasonable to infer from the fact that the jury specifi-
cally requested the dictionary, that they made use of the volume in determining the
meaning of the crucial terms and were influenced thereby to the prejudice of the plain-
tiffs." Id. at 185, 208 N.E.2d at 116. Similarly, in State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691, 331
N.W.2d 629 (Wis. App. 1983), the court remanded for a new trial when the jury consid-
ered a dictionary definition which was determined to be considerably broader than that
contained in the court's charge, because "the probable effect upon a hypothetical aver-
age jury would be prejudicial." Id. at 696, 331 N.W.2d at 632. Ott presented an unusual
variation on the problem because the exact dictionary definition used could not be as-
certained from the record. The court therefore looked to the definitions contained in a
number of standard dictionaries before reaching the conclusion that the "probable ef-
fect" was prejudicial. Id. at 696, 331 N.W.2d at 632.
Perhaps the clearest statement of this type of approach to evaluating potential
prejudice where juror impeachment of a verdict is prohibited is that of then New Jersey
Superior Court Judge William Brennan, in Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 NJ. Super. 266, 77
A.2d 183 (1950), stating that:
[Tihe test whether a new trial will be granted is whether the extraneous matter
could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner
inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge. If the extraneous
matter had that tendency on the face of it, a new trial should be granted without
further inquiry as to its actual effect.
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The court concluded that, when ruling on a motion for a new
trial, the trial court should evaluate the degree of probable preju-
dice from the face of the extraneous matter and determine whether
it justifies a new trial.' 33 Absent an abuse of discretion the decision
of the trial court should not be disturbed.1 3 4 In the present case,
however, the court found that, if the jury had in fact utilized the
misleading dictionary definition in reaching its conclusions, all other
evidence presented at trial would have been disregarded.135 The
court held, therefore, that the degree of probable prejudice to the
defendants was so great that the denial of a new trial was an abuse of
discretion. 36
The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals in Wernsing is the
most reasonable solution to the problem ofjury exposure to extra-
neous material where introduction of direct evidence of the effect of
exposure upon deliberations is prohibited. To require proof of
prejudice is to place an unreasonable burden on the complaining
party, and represents the elevation of one fundamental policy- the
privacy of the jury rooml17_to a position of priority over the
equally fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. On the other hand, a
Id. at 271, 77 A.2d at 185.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals distinguished Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v.
Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court, de-
spite a general prohibition against the use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict, ap-
plied a rule requiring proof of prejudice in fact for the award of a new trial when the jury
had been furnished with a dictionary. In that case there was no proof that the dictionary
had actually been used during deliberations, whereas in Wernsing and the three cases
cited above, there was admissible evidence that the jury had relied on a dictionary in
reaching its verdict. 298 Md. at 415, 470 A.2d at 806-07.




137. The rationale of this policy was explained by the Court of Appeals in Brinsfield v.
Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 73 A. 289 (1909):
Such evidence is forbidden by public policy, since it would disclose the secrets
of the jury room and afford an opportunity for fraud and perjury. It would
open such a door for tampering with weak and indiscreet men that it would
render all verdicts insecure; and therefore, the law has wisely guarded against
all such testimony and has considered it unworthy of notice. It would be a most
pernicious practice, and in its consequences dangerous to this much valued
mode of trial, to permit a verdict, openly and solemnly declared in the Court, to
be subverted by going behind it and inquiring into the secrets of the jury room.
Id. at 530-31, 73 A. at 294. See also Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860
(1982) (in a medical malpractice action the rule against juror impeachment would not be
relaxed even when there was evidence of jury misconduct that was independent of the
jurors themselves); Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954) (reviewing au-
thorities in Maryland and other jurisdictions on the issue of juror impeachment of a
verdict).
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presumption of prejudice in such cases would be both an inefficient
use of judicial resources, since such verdicts would be routinely
overturned due to the practical impossibility of rebutting the pre-
sumption, and an unreasonable burden on the resisting party. The
approach adopted in Wernsing, however, avoids the excesses of these
alternatives. By directing that a court look to the face of the extra-
neous matter in order to assess the probability of prejudice to the
complaining party, the Court of Appeals has preserved the confi-
dentiality of jury deliberations, while assuring that possible jury
prejudice will be assessed objectively.
F. Class Actions
In Kirkpatrick v. Gilchrist,'38 plaintiffs sought class status in an
action to enjoin the conversion of an apartment complex into con-
dominiums."' Before ruling on the motion for class certification,
however, the lower court dismissed for failure to join certain neces-
sary parties.' 40 The Court of Special Appeals remanded, holding
that the lower court should have ruled on the question of class certi-
fication prior to, or concurrently with, its ruling on necessary par-
ties. 41 The court reasoned that "[a] party clearly has the right to
expect the determination of any pending motions which may affect
the outcome of the case prior to a decision."' t42
The court stressed that class certification should be granted
138. 56 Md. App. 242, 467 A.2d 562 (1983).
139. Plaintiffs were tenants of the apartment complex subject to conversion. They
sought a judgment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County declaring that the
County Executive had improperly approved an incomplete property report in connec-
tion with the condominium conversion, and an order enjoining conversion, at least until
proper approval of the complete report was obtained. Plaintiffs also sought class action
status pursuant to former Md. R.P. 209 (1977) (now replaced by MD. R.P. 2-231). A
demurrer to the original bill was sustained, striking the tenants' association as a party
plaintiff. The circuit court expressly found it unnecessary at that time to decide whether
the action was properly a class action. Plaintiffs filed an amended bill and again raised
the question of class status. 56 Md. App. at 245-46, 467 A.2d at 564.
140. 56 Md. App. at 246, 467 A.2d at 564. The action was dismissed with prejudice,
upon preliminary motion, for want of interested parties pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-405(a) (1984). Id. The necessary parties cited by the lower court
numbered over 500, and included contract purchasers of the apartment units and those
with a mortgage interest in the condominium regime. Id. at 250, 467 A.2d at 566. The
circuit court noted that no effort had been made to join those parties. There was no
indication in the record that the court addressed plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
Id. at 246, 467 A.2d at 564.
141. 56 Md. App. at 250, 467 A.2d at 566.
142. Id. The court relied on Bender v. Secretary, Dep't of Personnel, 290 Md. 345,
430 A.2d 66 (1981), in which the Court of Appeals held that the 350 persons with an
interest in a declaratory judgment action were necessary parties to the action, but re-
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only when appropriate, 4 3 but suggested that if such were the find-
ing of the lower court on remand, plaintiffs' timely and repeated
requests for certification would alleviate their failure to join all
members of the "class." 144 If, on the other hand, class certification
were found inappropriate, the court suggested that the failure of the
lower court to rule on the pending motion might similarly suffice to
excuse plaintiffs' neglect, and that the missing parties might be ad-
ded by amendment.' 4 5
The court's conclusion that the trial court must rule on all
pending motions that might affect the outcome of a case prior to
rendering a decision is particularly appropriate with respect to re-
quests for class certification because the primary purpose of the
Maryland rule governing class actions is to provide an alternative to
"overtly cumbersome joinder requirements" in cases in which for-
mal joinder is impracticable.' 46 This purpose would be frustrated if
the trial court were permitted to dismiss an action for want of inter-
ested parties without first ruling on a pending motion for class certi-
fication. Moreover, as the class action is essentially a procedural
amelioration of the impracticalities of joinder,'4 7 mere failure to
choose the correct method of proceeding does not warrant dismissal
manded "with instructions to permit either an amendment adding the necessary parties,
or, if appropriate, a class action under Md. Rule 209." Id. at 356, 430 A.2d at 72-73.
The court in Kirkpatrick noted that, in the absence of a ruling on a pending mo-
tion, the parties may not assume that it was implicitly granted, as plaintiffs had argued
on appeal. 56 Md. App. at 250 n.5, 467 A.2d at 566 n.5.
143. 56 Md. App. at 250, 467 A.2d at 566-67.
144. Id. at 250-51, 467 A.2d at 567.
145. Id. at 251, 467 A.2d at 567.
146. Id. at 249, 467 A.2d at 566. Former Md. R.P. 209(a) provided that:
When there is a question of law or fact common to persons of a numerous class
whosejoinder is impracticable, one or more of them whose claims or defenses are
representative of the claims or defenses of all and who will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interest of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all (emphasis
added).
Md. R.P. 209(a) (1977).
Current MD. R.P. 2-231(a), which is derived from FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and for-
mer rule 209(a), is very similar:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class (emphasis added).
MD. R.P. 2-231(a).
147. In the course of reviewing the Maryland class action rule, the court concluded
that, despite "[ilts popularity as a public interest device," the rule is "by its very nature
procedural." 56 Md. App. at 248, 467 A.2d at 565.
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with prejudice. In Kirkpatrick, were class action status for some rea-
son inappropriate, plaintiffs should have been granted the opportu-
nity to include the necessary parties prior to dismissal and thereby
proceed with their claim on the merits.
G. Standing
In National Electrical Industry Fund v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 148 the
Court of Appeals held that various trusts,' 4 9 created to receive
funds from employers for the benefit of union members, had stand-
ing to assert mechanics' liens on behalf of individual union mem-
bers under the Maryland Mechanics' Liens Statute' 50 against a
contractor who failed to remit payments to the trusts pursuant to a
contract of employment. t5 ' The court reasoned that the trusts op-
148. 296 Md. 541, 463 A.2d 858 (1983).
149. The trusts involved in this consolidated action were the National Employees
Benefit Board, the Maryland Electrical Industry Health & Welfare Fund, the Maryland
Electrical Industry Pension Fund, the Maryland Electrical Industry Severance & Annuity
Fund, the National Electrical Contractors Association Local and International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers Union Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust fund, and
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union Vacation and Holiday Fund.
Id. at 543-44, 463 A.2d at 859.
150. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to -113 (1981).
151. 296 Md. at 552, 463 A.2d at 863. In the contract of employment, the contractor
had bound itself to comply with the collective bargaining agreement entered into be-
tween the National Electrical Contractors Association and Local Union No. 24 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Appellants contended that they were
"subcontractors" under the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore entitled to
assert mechanics' liens. The court rejected this contention, finding that the collective
bargaining agreement was not a "contract" for purposes of imposing a lien under MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a) (1981), which requires that such contracts be for do-
ing work "for or about a building." 296 Md. at 545-46, 463 A.2d 860. However, the
court determined that the individual workers, having individual contracts with the prin-
cipal contractor to perform work at a designated site, were "subcontractors" within the
meaning of the act. Id. at 546-48, 463 A.2d at 860-61 (citing Diener v. Cubbage, 259
Md. 555, 270 A.2d 471 (1970) (holding that a statutory predecessor to the Act included
individuals who rendered labor only)). Whether these contracts involved work "for or
about a building" was not an issue on appeal. 296 Md. at 545 n. 1, 463 A.2d at 860 n. 1.
The court also held that the Union had standing to assert a claim for recovery of
union dues payments withheld by the contractor. 296 Md. at 552, 463 A.2d 863. This
ruling was mandated by the fact that the union was an assignee of the employees under
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4), which "permits payments by an employer to a labor organization
of monies deducted from employees' wages in payment of membership dues, subject to
the proviso that 'the employer has received from each employee, on whose account such
deductions are made, a written assignment ...... (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4)
(1982)).
The National Electrical Industry Fund also sought to assert a mechanics' lien on
behalf of the employees for unpaid contributions, alleging that members of the Union
were participants in and beneficiaries of the fund. In light of these allegations, the court
held that the petition of the Industry Fund was sufficient to withstand demurrer and, for
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erated for the benefit of the employees, and that payments by the
contractor to the trust funds are recognized as beneficial to the em-
ployees under federal labor law.' 52 The court described the rela-
tionship between the trustees and the employees as analogous to
that of assignment. 153 Although this holding is a significant expan-
sion of the law in Maryland, the court found support in numerous
federal and out-of-state decisions. 154
PATRICIA M. HAMILL
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purposes of pleading, should be treated similarly to those of the trusts. Id. at 553, 463
A.2d at 864. However, the court noted that final determination of the standing of the
Industry Fund would have to await further factual development in the trial court. Id.
The court's hesitation with respect to the Industry Fund was prompted by questions
raised in the course of antitrust litigation pending in the federal courts regarding
whether the Industry Fund was in fact operated for the benefit of the employees. Id. at
552-53, 463 A.2d at 863-64 (citing National Constructors Ass'n v. National Electrical
Contractors Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1980), afd as modified, 678 F.2d 492 (4th
Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983)).
152. 296 Md. at 552, 463 A.2d at 863 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 86(a) (1982)).
153. Id. at 548-50, 463 A.2d at 861-62. The court relied on United States v. Carter,
353 U.S. 210 (1957) as holding that such trustees have standing to sue on the rationale
that:
the trustees' relationship to the employees, as established by the master labor
agreements and the trust agreement, is closely analogous to that of an assign-
ment [and] . . .
Moreover, the trustees of the fund have an even better right to sue...
than does the usual assignee since they are not seeking to recover on their own
account [but] for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries of the fund.
United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. at 219-20, quoted in 296 Md. at 548-49, 463 A.2d at 861-
62.
154. 296 Md. at 549-50, 463 A.2d at 862 (citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Arizona State Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 120 Ariz. 79, 80-81, 584 P.2d
60, 61-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), Bernard v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 479,
487, 329 P.2d 57, 63 (1958), Trustees, Florida West Coast Trowel Trades Pension Fund
v. Quality Concrete Co., 385 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), Hawaii
Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Aloe Development Corp., 63 Haw. 566, 568 n. 1, 633 P.2d
1106, 1108 n.l (1981), Dobbs v. Knudson, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Iowa 1980),
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 576 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978), Martin v. William Casey & Sons, 5 A.D.2d 185, 170 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1958),
afjd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 728, 167 N.E.2d 646, 201 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1960), and Crabtree v.
Lewis, 86 Wash. 2d 282, 544 P.2d 10 (1975)).
The court distinguished Ridge Erection Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
37 Colo. App. 477, 549 P.2d 408 (1976) on the grounds that the Colorado mechanics'
lien statute contained an exhaustive list of persons entitled to claim a lien that did not
include trustees claiming for unpaid contributions to employee trusts. 296 Md. at 550-
51, 463 A.2d at 862.
The court also discussed the formalities necessary in filing a notice of intent to
claim a mechanics' lien. Although the general rule is that notice "should definitely state
the intention of the claimant to claim the lien, and also fully and specifically state the
particulars of the claim and the nature and kind of work done or materials furnished, the
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time when done or furnished, and the amount of the claim," Himelfarb v. B & M Weld-
ing & Iron Works, 254 Md. 37, 41, 253 A.2d 842, 844 (1969), the court noted that this
rule was developed in cases in which the party claiming the lien did so in his own right as
the person who had furnished materials or labor. 296 Md. at 554, 463 A.2d at 864. The
court held that notices were sufficiently specific if they identified each individual em-
ployee and stated the total debt claimed as payable to each claimant. Id. The court
reasoned that it was not necessary to require separate calculations for individual em-
ployees, because payment would not be made to the employees individually, and that
specification of the time the work was performed was necessary only insofar as the act
requires 90-day notice. Id. at 554-55, 463 A.2d at 864-65.
III. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Arbitration
In Gold Coast Mall v. Lamar Corp.,' the Court of Appeals articu-
lated the legislative policy favoring arbitration agreements by hold-
ing that an arbitrator, rather than a court, should initially determine
whether the subject matter of a dispute is within the scope of an
arbitration agreement.2 The court also held that the party against
whom a claim is asserted and who is not seeking relief does not
waive the right to arbitrate by failing to initiate arbitration.3
The Court of Appeals outlined the scope of a court's powers to
determine when issues are arbitrable by referring to the Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act.4 The court has previously construed this
Act to embody a legislative policy favoring the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. 5 In light of this policy, in a suit to compel arbi-
tration, the court will only decide whether the arbitration agreement
encompasses the subject matter of the particular dispute.6 The
court, though, has never articulated a test for determining when a
matter is arbitrable. Rather, when it is clear from the language of
the arbitration agreement that the dispute is within the scope of the
agreement, the court will compel arbitration.7 When it is clear from
the language of the agreement that the dispute is outside the scope
of the agreement, the court will not compel arbitration.8
The Gold Coast court addressed itself to the issue of who should
determine whether an issue is within the scope of an arbitration
agreement when the answer is not clear from the language of the
agreement. The Gold Coast court held that this issue is initially for
the arbitrator to decide.' This holding is consistent with prior
Maryland law,O and finds strong support in decisions of several
1. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
2. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
3. Id. at 114, 468 A.2d at 100.
4. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984).
5. See 298 Md. at 103, 468 A.2d at 95 (citing Charles J. Frank Inc. v. Associated
Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 448, 450 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 409, 421, 445 A.2d 14, 19
(1982)).
6. Id. at 103-04, 468 A.2d at 95.
7. Id. at 104, 468 A.2d at 95.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
10. See Bel Pre Medical Center v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307, 321, 320
A.2d 558, 566 (1974), modified on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
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other jurisdictions." The rationale underlying these holdings ap-
pears to lie in the legislative policy favoring arbitration and the phi-
losophy that "the court should not deprive the party seeking
arbitration of the arbitrator's skilled judgment by attempting to re-
solve the ambiguity."12
The Gold Coast court also determined that a party against whom
a claim is being asserted and who is not seeking relief does not
waive the right to arbitrate by failing to initiate arbitration within the
time constraints of the agreement.' 3 The court found support for
this holding in the law of other jurisdictions and in the general rules
governing arbitration.4 Absent express language in the agreement,
the party asserting the claim is responsible for initiating arbitra-
tion.' 5 A party who sues instead of seeking arbitration "is in es-
sence refusing to arbitrate and is itself in default of the arbitration
agreement."' 6 Since the party against whom a claim is asserted is
not required to initiate arbitration, that party is also not deemed to
have waived the right to arbitration by failing to do so. 7
In Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co. ,8 the Court of Appeals con-
strued the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act's9 exclusion of arbi-
tration agreements between employers and employees 20 to apply
only to collective bargaining agreements. An arbitration agreement
between an employer and an individual employee, therefore, is
11. See cases cited in 298 Md. at 105-06, 468 A.2d at 96.
12. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
13. Id. at 114, 468 A.2d at 100. Earlier in this decision, the court held that an arbi-
tration clause, like any other clause in a contract, can be waived if the intent to waive is
clearly established. Id. at 109, 468 A.2d at 98.
14. Id. at 109-13, 468 A.2d at 98-100.
15. Id. See also cases cited in id. at 109-10, 468 A.2d at 98-99.
16. Id. at 114, 468 A.2d at 100.
17. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that a party against whom a claim is as-
serted may waive the right to arbitrate by participating in a judicial proceeding without
making a motion to compel arbitration. Id. n.5 (citing CharlesJ. Frank Inc. v. Associated
Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 450, 450 A.2d 1304, 1307 (1982)
(party against whom a claim was asserted had waived its right to arbitrate those issues
raised and decided in a previous court proceeding in which that party had not filed a
motion to compel arbitration)).
18. 298 Md. 66, 467 A.2d 1025 (1983).
19. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984).
20. Id. § 3-206(b) states: "This subtitle does not apply to an arbitration agreement
between employers and employees or between their respective representatives unless it
is expressly provided in the agreement that this subtitle shall apply."
The court's references to § 3-206(b) in the Wilson decision as an "exclusion" of
arbitration agreements between employers and employees from the provisions of the
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act are a bit misleading. It would be more accurate to
refer to the section as an exclusion only if the arbitration agreement does not expressly
provide that the Act will apply.
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enforceable under the Act.21
The legal status of arbitration agreements has undergone a dra-
matic shift in recent times. Under the common law, an agreement to
submit future disputes to arbitration was generally unenforceable.22
The Uniform Arbitration Act altered this rule by allowing a party to
an arbitration agreement to petition a court to order arbitration.23
Maryland's version of the Act, however, does not apply to agree-
ments between employers and employees unless expressly provided
in the agreement.24
The Court of Appeals referred to linguistic, historical, and pol-
icy arguments in holding that the exclusion does not cover individu-
als' employment agreements. First, the court found significance in
the statute's plural usage, "employers and employees," thereby rea-
soning that this section was only intended to exclude collective bar-
gaining agreements.2 5 Acknowledging, however, that the language
was ambiguous on this point,26 the court then referred to legislative
history, which indicated that Maryland had altered the uniform ver-
sion of the Act in this regard because of opposition from labor
21. See 298 Md. at 78, 467 A.2d at 1031.
22. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Dille, 147 Md. 161, 127 A. 746 (1925). This rule was
based on the idea that such agreements ousted the courts ofjurisdiction and were there-
fore contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins., 54
Md. 55, 70 (1866). For a discussion of Maryland's treatment of specific types of arbitra-
tion prior to the Uniform Arbitration Act, see generally Mullen, Arbitration Under Mary-
land Law, 2 MD. L. REV. 326 (1938).
23. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 2, 7 U.L.A. 23 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (codified in
Maryland as MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234. (1984)). The Uniform
Arbitration Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners in 1955. It
has since been adopted in Alaska (1968), Arizona (1962), Arkansas (1969), Colorado
(1975), Delaware (1972), District of Columbia (1977), Idaho (1975), Illinois (1961), In-
diana (1969), Kansas (1973), Maine (1967), Massachusetts (1960), Michigan (1961),
Minnesota (1957), Nevada (1969), New Mexico (1971), North Carolina (1973),
Oklahoma (1978), South Dakota (1971), Texas (1965), and Wyoming (1959). 7 U.L.A.
(1978 & Supp. 1985). The Uniform Arbitration Act was adopted in Maryland by Act of
June 1, 1965, ch. 231, 1965 Md. Laws 243.
24. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(b) (1984). See supra note 20. The
uniform version provides the opposite: namely, that the Act applies to employment
agreements unless the agreement states otherwise. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7
U.L.A. 4 (1978 & Supp. 1984). Of the 22 states that have adopted the Act, ten have
excluded labor agreements to varying degrees. See generally 7 U.L.A. 5-6 (describing
states' non-uniform amendments to this section). Some of these statutes explictly refer
to collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West
1959 & Supp. 1984). Others use language similar to the language of the Maryland stat-
ute. See, e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (1983). But a comparison between the Maryland
version and that of other states yields no clear inferences. Jurisdictions with provisions
similar to Maryland's have not yet dealt with the scope of the exclusion.





Moreover, the Court of Appeals asserted that a contrary con-
struction would violate the policy expressed in the Act's uniformity
clause. 28 The court characterized a broad reading of the exclusion
as "enlarg[ing] the conflict between the Uniform Arbitration Act
and section 3-206(b) of the Maryland version" since it would ex-
clude all employer-employee agreements, not just collective bar-
gaining agreements, from the Act.2 9 The court held that the Act's
uniformity clause required that differences between Maryland's ver-
sion and the uniform version be construed as narrowly as possible.3 0
Finally, the court noted that, prior to the adoption of the Act, there
had been a statute allowing for enforcement of certain employer-
employee arbitration agreements. 3 ' The Court of Appeals asserted
that this statute could not have applied to collective bargaining
agreements, since unions were illegal at the time of its adoption.
3 2
Though the statute was repealed by the Uniform Arbitration Act,3 3
the court concluded that the statute expressed a legislative policy
that disputes between an employer and an individual employee be
arbitrable; the court refused to construe the Act as reversing this
policy.3 4 Despite the somewhat tortuous arguments advanced by
the court in this case, the holding appears sound in light of the Act's
legislative history.
B. Attachments
In Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County National Savings
27. See the committee report referring to § 3-206(b) as "an exclusion for labor dis-
putes," LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1965, at
920 (1964), and stating that the section was included "at the specific request of labor
union representatives," id. at 1, cited in 298 Md. at 73-74, 467 A.2d at 1028-29. Appar-
ently unions felt that the Act's procedures were not sufficiently flexible for labor negoti-
ations. See 298 Md. at 73-74, 467 A.2d at 1028-29.
28. 298 Md. at 71-72, 467 A.2d at 1027-28. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-232 (1984) which states: "This subtitle shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it."
29. 298 Md. at 72, 467 A.2d at 1028.
30. Id. This argument is questionable. The uniformity clause merely directs the
court to construe the Act's provisions in a manner consistent with the judicial decisions
of other jurisdictions regarding the same provisions. It does not apply to provisions
where the legislature has clearly chosen a different policy than that of the uniform
version.
31. Id. at 77, 467 A.2d at 1030. See Act of Apr. 1, 1878, ch. 379, 1878 Md. Laws 584.
32. 298 Md. at 77,467 A.2d at 1030. Unions were made legal by Act of Apr. 8, 1884,
ch. 266, 1884 Md. Laws 366.
33. Act of June 1, 1965, ch. 231, 1965 Md. Laws 243.




Bank,35 the Court of Appeals held that a check payable to a debtor
from a retirement trust but still in the possession of the debtor's
employer was not subject to attachment by a judgment creditor of
the debtor, under Maryland garnishment law.36 Attachment would
extend, however, to undrawn commissions owed to a debtor by his
former employer, the garnishee.37
Washington County National Savings Bank was a holder of two
promissory notes issued by McSherry, a former employee of Hoff-
man Chevrolet.3 8 Upon McSherry's default, the bank entered con-
fessed judgments on the notes, and caused an attachment to be
issued on all credits of McSherry that were in the hands of Hoffman
Chevrolet. 9 At the time, Hoffman held some unpaid commissions
owed McSherry, as well as a retirement trust check payable to
McSherry.4 ° Hoffman refused to surrender the commissions and
pension check, claiming that McSherry was indebted to Hoffman in
an amount in excess of the funds held.4 '
Under Maryland law, a court may issue an attachment against a
debtor's property or credit.42 The court first defined "credit" as a
monetary obligation that a garnishee owes to a debtor.43 Under that
definition, the commission owed to the debtor by Hoffman was
clearly an attachable "credit". 44 The pension check, on the other
hand, was not an attachable "credit" because it did not represent an
obligation that the garnishee, Hoffman, owed to the debtor.45
Rather, the check was an obligation owed to the debtor, McSherry,
by the retirement trust.
46
In addition, the court concluded that the retirement check was
35. 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983).
36. Id. at 702, 467 A.2d at 764.
37. Id. at 697, 467 A.2d at 762.
38. Id. at 694, 467 A.2d at 760.
39. Id. The writ commanded Hoffman to "attach, seize, take and safekeep, the lands,
tenements, goods, chattels, and credits" of McSherry. Id.
40. Id. at 695, 467 A.2d at 760.
41. Id. at 694, 467 A.2d at 760.
42. "An attachment may be issued against any property or credit, matured or unma-
tured, which belong to a debtor." MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (1984).
43. 297 Md. at 697-98, 467 A.2d at 761-62. In deriving this definition, the court
examined other cases in which the attachment of credits had been discussed. See, e.g.,
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 298 A.2d 1 (1972).
44. 297 Md. at 697, 467 A.2d at 762.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 697-98, 467 A.2d at 762. The court cited Morse v. Stevens, 95 Vt. 465, 115
A. 697 (1922) and Hancock v. Colyer, 99 Mass. 187 (1868) as support for its conclusion.
297 Md. at 698, 467 A.2d at 762.
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not attachable as "property" of the debtor.4 7 Although a check, a
type of chose in action,48 is considered property under Maryland
attachment law,49 the court noted that a check cannot be considered
property of the person in question until it has been actually or con-
structively delivered to that person.50 Accordingly, since the retire-
ment check was still in Hoffman's possession, it was not yet
"property" of McSherry and could not, therefore, be attached by
the bank.
The court also held that the check was not attachable because it
was issued from a spendthrift trust that prohibited the asserted at-
tachment.5 Since Maryland generally recognizes the validity of
spendthrift trust provisions, 52 the court determined that the trust
could legally insulate the retirement benefits from attachment.5 3
The court held that the retirement check could not be subject to the
bank's claim until it was actually in McSherry's hands.54
After apparently deciding the case according to Maryland law,
47. 297 Md. at 702, 467 A.2d at 764.
48. Id. at 700, 467 A.2d at 763. Although Maryland law had not previously defined
checks as among tangible choses in action, this finding is consistent with the law in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tarrant Am. Says. Bank v. Smokeless Fuel Co., 233 Ala. 507, 172
So. 603 (1937); State v. Taushcer, 227 Or. 1, 360 P.2d 764 (1961); 63 AM. JUR. 2D
Property § 27 (1972 & Supp. 1983); 10 CJ.S. Bills & Notes § 5 (1938 & Supp. 1984).
49. 297 Md. at 701, 467 A.2d at 764. See Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297 (1852).
50. 297 Md. at 700, 467 A.2d at 764. See Morgenthau v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 94
F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (check not property until received); City Nat'l Bank v. Wer-
nick, 368 So. 2d 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (payee acquires no ights in a negotiable
instrument prior to its delivery); Caviness v. Andes & Roberts Bros. Constr. Co., 508
S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (delivery to payee's estranged wife constituted delivery
to payor's own agent and not delivery and acceptance by payee).
51. See 297 Md. at 705, 467 A.2d at 766 for the spendthrift trust provision affording
such protection.
52. Id. at 706, 467 A.2d at 766 (citing Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson, 192
Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Independent Brewing Assoc.,
127 Md. 463, 96 A. 617 (1916); Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 (1888)). The
court decided that the rules announced in these cases logically support a spendthrift
trust's protection of retirement benefits. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 707, 467 A.2d at 767. See also Hildreth Press Employees Fed. Credit Union
v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 30 Conn. Supp. 513, 295 A.2d 54, cert. denied, 163
Conn. 643, 295 A.2d 669 (1972). Maryland law does recognize the dry or passive trust
theory. A trust whose purpose has ceased and whose trustees have no function left to
perform cannot continue to afford the protection afforded by its provisions. See Burn-
ham v. Gas & Electric Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A.2d 80 (1958); Owens v. Crow, 62 Md.
491 (1884). The court concluded, however, that the retirement trust in question would
not become dry or passive until the benefits were actually received by the beneficiary.
Therefore, Maryland law provided the full protection afforded by the spendthrift provi-
sion. 297 Md. at 708, 467 A.2d at 767.
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the court then considered the effect of ERISA,"5 noting that the leg-
islative history and provisions of ERISA mandate that it shall super-
sede conflicting state law.56 ERISA section 1056(d)(1) indicates that
benefits provided under a qualified pension plan may not be "as-
signed or alienated."57 There is a split of authority whether this
provision precludes garnishment and other involuntary execu-
tions,5" but the court followed those decisions holding that the pro-
vision does preclude involuntary as well as voluntary assignments
and alienations of qualified59 pension plans. 60 Therefore, even if
Maryland law did permit attaching the pension plan benefits, the
provisions of ERISA would preclude such an attachment.
C. Banks and Banking
In Rezapolvi v. First National Bank,61 the Court of Appeals held
that a bank could not dishonor its cashier's check simply because the
check used to purchase it lacked an authorized signature.62
Although the court expressly rejected the suggestion that a bank
may never dishonor its cashier's check, its decision effectively lim-
ited the nature of such an exception.
The court noted policy reasons which support the general rule
that a bank cannot dishonor its own cashier's check. A cashier's
check circulates as the equivalent of cash in the business
55. Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1381 (1982).
56. 297 Md. at 711, 467 A.2d at 769. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), which the court
cited, provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title."
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
58. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.3D 711 (1979) for cases supporting both sides of the argu-
ment. Contrary to the court's decision in Hoffman, some courts hold that ERISA
§ 1056(d)(1) was not intended to bar enforcement of money judgments by application of
legal process. See, e.g., National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local No. 3, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 752, 397
N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979).
59. The pension plan must specifically provide that the benefits may not be assigned
or alienated. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982).
60. 297 Md. at 710-11, 467 A.2d at 768-69.
61. 296 Md. 1, 459 A.2d 183 (1983).
62. Rezapolvi obtained a check from Columbia Marketing, which was signed by an
unauthorized person. He then sought to cash the check at First National Bank where
Columbia Marketing had an account. Under an agreement between the bank and Co-
lumbia Marketing, the bank could only accept checks which contained an "authorized
signature" as indicated on a signature card. Although First National accepted the check
and issued Rezapolvi a cashier's check, it later stopped payment on the cashier's check
upon discovering the original check was unauthorized. Id. at 3-5, 459 A.2d at 184-86.
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environment.63 It " 'stands on its own foundation as an independ-
ent, unconditional and primary obligation of the Bank.' "64
Despite this vital role in the economy, the court recognized that
a bank may dishonor its cashier's check6 5 "under very limited cir-
cumstances.''66 These "limited conditions" are where "the holder
has dealt with the bank in connection with the transaction or is not a
holder in due course, and where the cashier's check was obtained by
fraud upon the bank, or under certain circumstances, where there
was no consideration for the instrument."-
67
The court rejected First National's argument that the unauthor-
ized signature on the check rendered it "not properly payable" and
consequently offered no consideration for the cashier's check.68
First, the court found that the signature was authorized under sec-
tion 1-201(43) of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.69
63. Id. at 7-9, 459 A.2d at 187.
64. Id. at 8, 459 A.2d at 187 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d
395, 400 (5th Cir. 1970)).
65. Id. at 10-11 n.7, 459 A.2d at 188-89 n.7. Several courts, however, have sug-
gested that a bank has no defense when it refuses to pay on its cashier's check. See, e.g.,
Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Able & Assoc., Inc. v.
Orchard Hill Farms, 77 11. App. 3d 375, 395 N.E.2d 1138 (1979); Moon Over the
Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Cir. Ct.
1976). Tojustify this result, some courts have held that, since a cashier's check serves as
an acceptance when issued, a stop payment order comes too late to suspend the bank's
duty to pay once the cashier's check has been issued. Munson, 484 F.2d at 623-24; Kauf-
man, 370 F. Supp. at 278. In addition, these courts have relied on U.C.C. § 4-303 to
hold that a stop order is ineffective if it is received after the bank has accepted or certi-
fied the item. Kaufman, 370 F. Supp. at 278; Able &Assoc., 77 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82, 395
N.E.2d at 1142; Moon Over the Mountain, 87 Misc. 2d at 920, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
Rezapolvi indicates that the reliance on § 4-303 is misplaced. 296 Md. at 10 n.7.,
459 A.2d at 188 n.7. The court considered the section inapplicable to the situation
because "the section concerns a customer's right to place a stop payment order on the
customer's check and does not concern a bank's right to dishonor its own checks." Id.;
see also TPO, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973).
66. 296 Md. at 11,459 A.2d at 189. Other courts have expressed the same view. See,
e.g., Goldstein v. McLean Bank, 552 F.2d 1072, 1078 n.5 (4th Cir. 1977); TPO, 487 F.2d
at 136; Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1970); Banco
Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 523-24 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41, 42 (Del. 1970). See also 9
C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 173, at 382-83 (1938).
67. 296 Md. at 11, 459 A.2d at 189 (emphasis in original). In addition, the court
noted that the bank may only use its own defenses to justify its refusal; it may not rely on
any third party defenses. Id. at 12, 459 A.2d at 189.
68. Id.
69. Id., 459 A.2d at 190. An " "[u]nauthorized signature or endorsement' means one made
without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery." MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 1-201(43) (1984) (emphasis in original). Another Maryland case, citing
§ 1-201(43), acknowledged that a signature is not unauthorized when authority to sign is
1985]
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Second, even if the signature was initially unauthorized, section 3-
404 permits it to become operative if an authorized person subse-
quently ratifies it.7" Finally, under the rule of Price v. Neal 7 as codi-
fied by section 3-417(1)(b), 72 First National could not assert lack of
consideration, even if the signature had not been ratified. 7' This
final analysis severely restricts the consideration exception since " 'a
drawee of a draft is presumed to know the signature of his customer,
the drawer,' ",74 and if the bearer of the drawer's note acts in good
faith, the bank has no defense for withholding payment.
In Wright v. Commercial & Savings Bank,75 the Court of Appeals
held that a bank's removal of a wife's name from a joint checking
account at the direction of her husband constituted a breach of con-
tract by the bank, even though the contract allowed the husband to
withdraw all funds and establish a new account. 76 Writing for a
expressly given or implied based on apparent authority. See Taylor v. Equitable Trust
Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838, 842 (1973). In Rezapolvi, evidence revealed that
the Columbia Marketing check was signed by an individual expressly authorized to sign,
despite the fact that his name did not appear on the bank's signature card.
70. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN., § 3-404 (1975) provides:
(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the per-
son whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it;
but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any per-
son who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
(2) Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this
title. Such ratification does not of itself affect any rights of the person ratifying
against the actual signer.
Evidence indicated that an authorized individual from Columbia Marketing rati-
fied the signature. This individual admitted he had ordered the employee to sign the
check and stated that he fully intended to put the employee's name onto the signature
card. 296 Md. at 5, 459 A.2d at 185.
71. 3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
72. Section 3-417 provides:
(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance ...warrants to a person
who in good faith pays or accepts that ...
(b) He has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unau-
thorized, except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting
in good faith
(i) To a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) To a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether or not
the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) To an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took the draft after
the acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's
signature was unauthorized . ...
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 3-417(l)(b) (1975).
73. 296 Md. at 14, 459 A.2d at 190-91.
74. Id. (quoting MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 3-417 comment 4 (1975)).
75. 297 Md. 148, 464 A.2d 1080 (1983).
76. Id. at 156-57, 464 A.2d at 1085. In addition, the court held that the bank's re-
fusal to give the wife an instrument (in this case, a counter check) was not wrongful
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divided court,77 Judge Cole stated, "[A] depositor has no reason to
believe that the bank . .. will delete his name from the ac-
count. . . When the bank so favors one of its depositors, it
breaches its contract with the other."7"
The decision may be criticized on several grounds. First, as the
dissent pointed out, the court cited no authority for its holding;79
indeed, Maryland appears to be the only jurisdiction to adopt this
position.80 Second, the court takes an unnecessarily formalistic ap-
proach to this banking transaction. The husband's right to with-
draw all funds effectively included the right to delete his wife's name
from the account. 8 ' The difference between these two procedures is
a technicality that does not affect any of the genuine expectations of
the parties. This formalism seems all the more anomalous in light
of the bank's contention that plaintiff's damages on this claim were
probably minimal.8 2
D. Bankruptcy
In Maryland National Bank v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,8 3
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a trustee in
bankruptcy may not avoid state and local tax liens that accrue subse-
quent to the filing of a debtor's petition in bankruptcy, as long as
the tax liens arise prior to distribution of the foreclosure sale pro-
dishonor. The tort of "wrongful dishonor" requires proof that the bank unjustifiably
refused to pay an actual instrument. Id. at 158, 464 A.2d at 1085.
77. The court was divided 4-3. Chief Judge Murphy andJudge Rodowsky concurred
in Judge Smith's dissenting opinion. See id. at 164, 464 A.2d at 1088 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 156-57, 464 A.2d at 1085.
79. Id. at 161, 464 A.2d at 1087 (Smith, J., dissenting). Both the majority and the
dissent agreed that no Maryland cases were on point. See id. at 156, 464 A.2d at 1085; id.
at 160, 464 A.2d at 1086-87 (Smith, J., dissenting).
80. Compare McEntire v. McEntire, 267 Ark. 169, 590 S.W.2d 241 (1979) (bank may
permit removal of co-owner's name from checking account, since other co-owner could
withdraw all funds); Bealert v. Mitchell, 585 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (same, for a
savings account) with Wright, 297 Md. 148, 464 A.2d 1080. Note, however, that these
cases did not involve the bank's liability for breach of contract, but the co-owner's claim
to the funds in the account as against the estate of the deceased co-owner.
81. This was the holding of the Court of Special Appeals. See Wright v. Commercial
& Says. Bank, 51 Md. App. 398, 407, 445 A.2d 30, 35 (1982). The dissent advanced a
similar, though more formalistic, argument: namely, that the husband's written order to
the bank was essentially a check withdrawing all funds. 297 Md. at 159-64, 464 A.2d at
1086-88 (Smith, J., dissenting).
82. 297 Md. at 157, 464 A.2d at 1085. The bank contended that the wife suffered no
damages, since the husband could and would have withdrawn the funds anyway. See
Brief for Appellee at 13, id.
83. 723 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1983).
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ceeds.84 The court concluded that such a tax lien takes priority over
a mortgagee's prior perfected security interest.8 5
Maryland National Bank (the "Bank") held a six million dollar
security interest in the real property of a corporation (the
"debtor"). 6 This interest was evidenced by two deeds of trust,
which were dated October 20, 1978, and recorded on October 26,
1978.87 The debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy on October 31,
1979.88 On June 18, 1981, a foreclosure sale brought in $2.5
million.8 9
At the time of the petition, Baltimore City taxes for 1979-1980
were due and in arrears.9" The bank conceded the superiority of
these taxes91 and paid those obligations that were perfected before
the date of the petition.92 The Bank, however, contested the City's
claim for payment of the debtor's real estate taxes for 1980-1981.93
These taxes did not become due and payable until July 1, 1980,
eight months after the bankruptcy petition was filed.94 The Bank de-
nied liability, relying upon section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which permits a trustee to avoid a statutory lien that is "not per-
fected or enforceable on the date of filing of the petition." 95
The court discarded this argument 96 by instead looking to
84. Id. at 1142-43.
85. Id. at 1141-43.
86. Id. at 1140.
87. Id.
88. Id. The debtor originally filed for reorganization under chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982), and on April 23,1981, converted
the case to a Chapter VII liquidation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982).
89. 723 F.2d at 1140. The sale was delayed due to an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (1982), which had delayed foreclosure since October 31, 1979. The stay was
lifted on February 23, 1981. 723 F.2d at 1140.
90. 723 F.2d at 1140.
91. Id. at 1141. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 48(c), 70(a) (1980) (paramount lien
attaches on day taxes are due).
92. 723 F.2d at 1141.
93. At issue were state and city real estate taxes totalling $75,200.59, as well as
$86,914.88 for water rents, sewer charges and fire protection. Id. at 1140. Since the
debtor's estate apparently would not suffice to meet these taxes, the issue in effect was
not from whom the City would recover, but whether it would at all. See id. at 1141 n.2.
94. Id. at 1140. The trustee initiated an adversary proceeding to resolve this matter.
Id. at 1140-41. An order from the Bankruptcy Court directed the trustee to sell the
property "free and clear of liens" and to establish an escrow account from the proceeds.
Id. In accordance with this order, the City of Baltimore transferred its interest in the
real property to the escrow account. Id. at 1141. The district court reversed the bank-
ruptcy court order and held the 1980-81 tax lien was not "perfected or enforceable" on
October 31, 1979. Id.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. Writing for the court, Judge Murnaghan wrote:
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section 546(b), which subjects the avoidance powers of section 545
"to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest
in property to be effective . . . before the date of such perfection. ' 7
The court found this "generally applicable law" in two sections of
article 81 of the Maryland Annotated Code. Section 202(b)"8 was
held to provide that when a trustee sells the property "the proceeds
must be applied in satisfaction of any taxes due and payable by a
corporate owner at the time distribution is made."9 9 Thus, under
Maryland law, as long as the taxes are due and payable when distri-
bution occurs, it does not matter if the taxes were not due at the
time of foreclosure or sale.' 00 The decision also noted section 70,
which provides that unpaid taxes that accrued before the date of sale
constitute a lien on the property which a purchaser of real property
cannot avoid. 01 Viewing these two sections together, the court
found that the state retained "first application" right to receive pay-
ment for taxes due and payable from the proceeds. 10 2 This right
One may admire the beautiful simplicity of the Bank's position. The secured
lien status of the mortgage came into being prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The lien under Maryland law of the City and the State for 1980-81
taxes imposed on the real property which was the mortgage security only arose
later, on July 1, 1980, after the bankruptcy petition had been filed, according to
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 70. The post-petition lien under Article 81 § 70 was
"not perfected or enforceable on the date of the filing of the petition .... "
and so could be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 545. Q.E.D., the mortgagee
need contribute none of the foreclosure proceeds to satisfaction of the bill for
1980-81 real estate taxes.
It all sounds logical as far as it goes. However, it entirely overlooks a
matter of controlling importance. The avoidance powers of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy are subject to the provisions of § 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
763 F.2d at 1143 (citations omitted).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 202(b) (1980).
99. 723 F.2d at 1142. Section 202(b) provides:
Whenever a sale of either real or personal property of a corporation, from
which State taxes, are due and payable, shall be made by any sheriff, constable,
trustee, receiver or other ministerial officer, under judicial process or other-
wise, all sums due and in arrears for State taxes from the corporation whose
property is sold shall be first paid and satisfied, after the necessary expenses
incident to the sale; and the officer or person selling said property shall pay the
same to the person whose duty it is to collect or receive said taxes, under the
laws of this State.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 202(b) (1980).
100. 723 F.2d at 1142. See also Vermont Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Wicomico County,
263 Md. 178, 186-87, 283 A.2d 384, 389 (1971) (same result in case involving corporate,
personal, and real property taxes). In the present case, the Fourth Circuit noted that it
dealt only with taxes on property subject to the mortgage and not with, e.g., personal
property taxes. 723 F.2d at 1142 n.9.
101. 723 F.2d at 1142. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 70 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
102. 723 F.2d at 1142.
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was "immediately perfected, if not enforceable until the sale actually
occurs, at the very moment an interest in the real estate - such as
the Bank's mortgage .. .arises."'
10 3
E. Commercial Torts
The Court of Special Appeals recently applied an interesting
twist in determining the time of conversion. In Kalb v. Vega,'1 4 the
court held that subsequent wrongful acts after the initial conversion
may constitute additional conversions for which the plaintiff may
bring suit.
Kalb v. Vega involved a sale of stock between two corporate di-
rectors. The defendant, Vega, misrepresented the stock's value and
succeeded in obtaining the stock for less than its true value.' 0 5
Upon learning of this fraud, the plaintiff, Kalb, demanded return of
the stock and, when the defendant refused, Kalb sued for rescission
of the contract."0 6 The defendant sold the disputed stock for
$59,000 to a bona fide purchaser before the trial commenced. 0 7
The trial court concluded that conversion occurred at the time
of the misrepresentation.'0 8 Kalb was awarded only nominal dam-
ages because he failed to prove the stock's value at the time of
misrepresentation. ' 9
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the finding of misrepre-
sentation" 0 but reversed the award of nominal damages."' The
court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted three sepa-
rate conversions, instead of only one." 2 These three conversions
occurred upon the fraudulent acquisition of the stock, upon the re-
fusal to return the stock, and also upon the subsequent sale to the
bona fide purchaser. "' The plaintiff was permitted to sue for the
103. Id.
104. 56 Md. App. 653, 468 A.2d 676 (1983).
105. Id. at 659-60, 468 A.2d at 679-80.
106. Id. at 664, 468 A.2d at 682.
107. Id. at 656, 468 A.2d at 678.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 663, 468 A.2d at 681.
111. Id. at 667, 468 A.2d at 683.
112. Id. at 666, 468 A.2d at 683. Conversion is "not necessarily the manner of acqui-
sition of the property by the defendant but rather his wrongful exercise of dominion
over it." Id. (citations omitted). This "wrongful exercise of dominion" has been found
to occur not only when property is withheld from its rightful owner but also when the
person in possession destroys, changes, or sells the property. Id. See also Saunders v.
Mullinex, 195 Md. 235, 239, 72 A.2d 720, 722 (1950).
113. 56 Md. App. at 666, 468 A.2d at 683.
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final conversion, even though he may have been able to treat the
first two acts as actionable conversions. 114 Thus, by allowing the
plaintiff to sue on the final conversion, which occurred when the
stock was sold to the bona fide purchaser, the stock's value was read-
ily ascertained." 15
Although the court did not indicate how it arrived at this con-
clusion, there is some old case law which supports the result."
16
The court apparently overlooked a more appropriate theory pro-
vided by Maryland law. In the 1932 case of Fisher v. Dinneen," 7 the
Court of Appeals explicitly adopted a fluctuating value rule to deter-
mine damages in stock conversion cases."8 The court applied the
"New York rule" 1 19 which held that the measure of damages should
be "the highest intermediate value of the stock between the time of
conversion and a reasonable time after the owner has received no-
tice of it." 2' Use of this precedent could have produced the same
result reached in Kalb without resort to the continuing or repeated
conversion theories.
In Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors,' 2 1 the Court of Appeals
defined the types of damages which may be recovered for the torts
114. Id.
115. The $59,000 value was the stock's contract price when sold by Vega to the bona
fide purchaser. Damages were fixed in this case by subtracting the $6,000 paid by Vega
to Kalb at the first conversion. Id. at 666-67, 468 A.2d at 683.
116. See Loeb & Brother v. Flash Bros., 65 Ala. 526 (1880) (every moment chattel is
detained is itselfa conversion, thus giving flexibility in fixing the precise point of conver-
sion); see also R. BOWERS, THE LAW OF CONVERSION, § 327 (1917) (acknowledging that
two conversions occur when defendant takes property and then refuses to return it upon
demand).
A similar theory holds that a conversion continues while the plaintiff is deprived
of possession. The plaintiff's cause of action is of a continuing nature, he is not required
to sue for the initial conversion; he may sue for a subsequent conversion. See De Vries v.
Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 349 P.2d 532 (1960) (conversion is a continuing tort and
does not end when original wrongdoer transfers property to another wrongdoer); Final
v. Baskus, 18 Mich. 218 (1869) (treat entire period of wrongful possession as "period of
conversion" and plaintiff may elect the precise time of conversion accordingly); see gener-
ally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.34 (1956) (discussion on continued
or repeated conversion); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 89 (1959) (discussion of conversion
as affected by retention or disposal of property).
117. 161 Md. 605, 158 A. 9 (1932).
118. This case involved a conversion which resulted when a broker sold his client's
stock without permission. The court determined that the normal measure of damages
(value of property at time of conversion) was an inadequate remedy where property of
fluctuating value is involved. Id. at 612-14, 158 A. at 11-12.
119. This rule was first applied by the New York courts to remedy the situation where
a stock's value rose after conversion. See Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N.Y. 442, 117 N.E. 948
(1917).
120. 161 Md. at 613-14, 158 A. at 12.
121. 298 Md. 611, 471 A.2d 735 (1984).
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of interference with contract and slander of title.'22 Though these
torts have long been recognized as actionable in Maryland,1 23 the
precise issue of the measure of damages was a question of first
impression.
Expressly adopting section 774A of Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 12 4 the court held that, in an action for interference with con-
tract, a plaintiff may recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages, proxi-
mate consequential damages, and punitive damages, if the tort is
committed with actual malice. 25 The court noted three lines of
cases on this issue.' 26 The first line follows a contract measure of
damages, so that damages are limited to the lost benefit of the bar-
gain made under the contract.' 2 7 The second line of cases applies
what may be called a negligent tort standard, awarding damages
which are "the direct and proximate result of the wrongful act." ' 121
These decisions disallow the more remote or speculative kinds of
damages, such as mental suffering or harm to reputation. The third
122. The Court of Appeals' review of this case was limited to determining the proper
measure of damages. See 297 Md. 318, 465 A.2d 1161 (1983) (granting certiorari). The
court below defined interference with contract as a wrongful, unjustified interference
with a contract between two or more parties, to the detriment of one or more of the
parties. Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 55 Md. App. 171, 181, 461 A.2d 725,
730-31 (1983).
The Court of Special Appeals did not discuss the slander of title claim, but the
tort has been defined as "publication of matter derogatory to the plaintiff's title to his
property, or its quality, or to his business in general . . . of a kind calculated to prevent
others from dealing with him, or otherwise to interfere with his relations with others to
his disadvantage." Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 607-08, 291 A.2d 37, 49 (1972)
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 919-20 (4th ed.
1971)). The tort is increasingly becoming known as "injurious falsehood." See W. PROS-
SER, supra, at 915.
123. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405
(1908) (tort of interference recognized); Gent v. Lynch, 23 Md. 58 (1865) (tort of slan-
der of title recognized).
124. 298 Md. at 621, 471 A.2d at 740. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A
(1977).
125. The court stated:
"[S]uch damages as would reasonably flow from a tortious contractual interfer-
ence" may include the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract, conse-
quential losses for which the tortious act is the legal cause, emotional distress
and actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be expected to result
from the tortious act, and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive damages.
298 Md. at 621-22, 471 A.2d at 740 (quoting Lake Shore, 55 Md. App. at 182, 461 A.2d at
731). See generally H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975)
(discussion of punitive damages and malice in Maryland law).
126. 298 Md. at 619, 471 A.2d at 739 (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 948-49).
127. See, e.g., McNutt Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966 (1955);
Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
128. See, e.g., Anderson v. Moskovitz, 260 Mass. 523, 527, 157 N.E. 601, 603 (1927).
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line applies an intentional tort standard, allowing these more re-
mote damages, and even punitive damages.' 29 Arguments in favor
of the contract measure generally point out the anomaly of holding
the interfering party hable for more than the party who is in breach
of the contract.' 30 Moreover, it is said that a contrary rule would
discourage efficient breach.' 3 1 The court, however, reasoned that
interference with contract is an intentional tort, and therefore the
most liberal measure of damages should be allowed.
13 2
The court also held that, in an action for slander of title, dam-
ages may include impairment of value of the property,
133 cost of
counteracting the slander (e.g., litigation), and, depending upon the
character of the defamation and the facts of the case, other pecuni-
ary losses, resulting "directly and immediately" from defendant's
actions.' 34 Punitive damages also may be obtained in appropriate
circumstances.'3 3 The court, however, specifically excluded nonpe-
cuniary losses such as emotional distress.' 36 This exclusion may be
criticized as unfairly limiting plaintiff's recovery. For example, a
homeowner who is unable to sell his house because his title has
been slandered may suffer severe, genuine emotional distress.
Nonetheless, there appears to be unanimous authority in support of
129. See, e.g., Westway Trading Corp. v. Rivers Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398
(Iowa 1982); Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., 291 Or. 709, 634 P.2d 1333 (1981).
130. See supra note 127. See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.4,
at 460-61; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 128, at 1004 (5th
ed. 1984).
131. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 130. "Efficient breach" refers to situations
in which it is economically reasonable for a contracting party to "buy out" of the con-
tract by paying full damages.
132. 298 Md. at 620, 471 A.2d at 739-40. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 949;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A comments a, d (1977); D. DOBBS, supra note
130, at 462-63 (relied on heavily by the court). The recent edition of Prosser and Keeton on
Torts has partially abandoned this position, favoring instead the contract measure where
the law would allow the party to the contract to commit efficient breach; i.e., where the
contract need not be specifically performed, the party could "buy out" of contract by
paying damages. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 130, at 1004.
133. The impairment would only be temporary, and, therefore, this type of damages
could only be established where the plaintiff sold the contested property to a third party
at a demonstrably depressed figure (i.e., compared to the price offered by a prospective
buyer before the slander of title occurred). Otherwise, the impairment in value would
presumably be terminated by successful litigation.
134. 298 Md. at 625, 471 A.2d at 742. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633
(1977).
135. 298 Md. at 626, 471 A.2d at 742. The court adopted the same standard for
punitive damages as in interference with contract, see supra note 125 and accompanying
text, except that nominal damages will not suffice, since proof of special damages is an
element of this tort.
136. 298 Md. at 625-26, 471 A.2d at 742.
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the limitation of damages to actual pecuniary loss.' 3 7
F. Consumer Protection Laws
1. Installment Contracts. -In State v. Action TV Rentals, Inc. ,138
the Court of Appeals held that the Retail Installment Sales Act
(RISA)' 39 does not cover rental agreements containing purchase
options for consumer goods if the consumer has an option to termi-
nate the agreement shortly after its inception. 40
The State of Maryland filed suit pursuant to the Consumer Pro-
tection Act against Action TV Rentals, Inc., a retailer that regularly
rented appliances to consumers on a week-to-week or month-to-
month basis. 4 ' Although the consumer was not obligated to rent
the goods past the first month, title would pass to him if the rental
continued and a certain number of payments had been made.' 42
Action's rental forms, however, did not disclose the total number of
payments and the amount required to be paid before the consumer
would obtain title to the rented property. 143 The State alleged that
Action's failure to disclose this information violated the provisions
of the RISA and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).' 4 4 The State
argued that the Action rental agreements were disguised installment
sales and, thus, subject to RISA.'4 5
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633 commentj (1977); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 130, at 976; D. DOBBS, supra note 130, at 504; 50 AM.JUR. 2D Libel &
Slander § 550 (1970). Despite the great weight of this authority, neither the commenta-
tors nor the cases provide much explanation of the reasoning behind this rule. It may be
suggested, though, that the rule serves to protect potential claimants to property from
the threat of excessive, speculative, or open-ended damages in a slander of title action.
The exclusion of damages for mental suffering also appears to be in conformity with the
fundamental nature of slander of title actions: a remedy to protect property interests,
rather than personal tranquility.
138. 297 Md. 531, 467 A.2d 1000 (1983).
139. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -636 (1983).
140. 297 Md. at 555, 467 A.2d at 1012.
141. Id. at 534, 467 A.2d at 1001. The State contended that violations of certain pro-
visions under RISA also constitute violations of the Consumer Protection Act, MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501 (1983 & Supp. 1984). Therefore, the State, through
this claimed nexus and the standing conferred by the CPA on the Consumer Protection
Division, could assert in its name rights conferred on third parties by RISA. The court
accepted the State's assertion for the purpose of considering whether RISA governed
the transactions under discussion. 297 Md. at 539-40, 467 A.2d at 1004.
142. 297 Md. at 539-40, 467 A.2d at 1004.
143. Id. at 536, 467 A.2d at 1003.
144. Id. at 539, 467 A.2d at 1004.
145. Id. at 541, 467 A.2d at 1005. According to the court, the State's contention
rested upon a 1975 revision to the code, in which the definition of a security interest in
RISA, MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 12-601(n) (1983), was derived from § 1-201(37) of
the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Although this U.C.C. definition
COMMERCIAL LAW
The Court of Appeals held that Action's rental leases were not
governed by RISA. First, the leases were found not to come within
the two-part definition of an installment sale agreement in section
12-601(1). 46 The court interpreted the requirement in section 12-
601 (1) that " [piart of all of the price is payable in one or more pay-
ments after the making of the contract"1 4 7 to mean that the buyer
must be obligated to make such payments under the agreement. 48
The Action lessees had no obligation to make payments toward the
purchase price after the first month of the agreements. Further, the
court found that Action's retention of title as owner-lessor did not
secure payment of the entire purchase price, but was intended to
facilitate repossesion for default in rental payments. 149  Accord-
ingly, the agreements failed the second half of the definition-that
the seller must keep a "security interest" in the goods. 50
Finally, the court concluded that the Action leases were not in-
stallment sale agreements within the meaning of section 12-
601(l)(2).151 This subsection includes three other types of transac-
tions as installment sale agreements. The third inclusion, dealing
specifically with the leasing of goods, covers agreements under
which the lessee contracts to pay an amount equal to or greater than
the value of the goods.152 The court stated that "[e]ach of the three
inclusions operates to enlarge the basic definition in section 12-
appeared to cover Action's type of rental agreements, the court held that distinct provi-
sions of RISA's definition of installment sale agreements precluded application of the
U.C.C. security interest test in this context. See 297 Md. at 542, 467 A.2d at 1005-06.
146. See 297 Md. at 534, 467 A.2d at 1001. For Action's rental leases to be governed
by RISA, the contract must be an "installment sale agreement" as defined in MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 12-601(1) (1983):
(1) "Installment sale agreement" means a contract for the retail sale of goods,
negotiated or entered into in this State, under which:
(i) Part or all of the price is payable in one or more payments after
making of the contract; and
(ii) The seller takes collateral security or keeps a security interest in the
goods sold.
147. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-601(l)(1)(i) (1983).
148. 297 Md. at 543, 467 A.2d at 1006.
149. Id. at 547, 467 A.2d at 1008.
150. Id. at 543, 467 A.2d at 1006.
151. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 12-601(l)(2) provides:
(2) "Installment sale agreement" includes:
(i) A prospective installment sale agreement;
(ii) A purchase money security agreement; and
(iii) A contract for the bailment or leasing of goods under which the
bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum that is substantially
equal to or is more than the value of the goods.
152. Id. at § 12-601(I)(2)(iii).
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601(l)(i) and is not set forth merely for purposes of illustration."'' 5 3
Despite this statement, the court used the third inclusion to
narrow the application of section 12-601(1), finding that it did not
apply to the instant case. The court averred that, although the two-
part definition of section 12-601(l)(1) arguably covered Action's
rental leases, the language of section 12-601(l)(2) concerning leases
should have been given greater weight because only in this inclusion
did the legislature "directly and specifically address the problem"
under discussion. 54 As it had done in interpreting section 12
601()(1), the court interpreted the language in section 12-601(l)(2)
to mean that the buyer must be obligated to pay that sum. Accord-
ingly, the rental leases did not fall within RISA.
Although the court is correct that a consideration of the entire
statutory framework requires an obligation on a consumer to pay
the total purchase price for coverage under RISA, the court's inter-
pretive approach was unnecessarily facile. The court's technical
reading of RISA failed to include any authentic examination of the
legislative purpose in enacting the statute, and whether the defini-
tion should be applied in light of this purpose in the face of incon-
clusive statutory language.'
55
After disposing of the State's claim under RISA, the court pro-
vided a degree of protection to consumers by upholding one of the
State's contentions under the CPA. 156 The court concluded that Ac-
tion was engaged in "unfair or deceptive trade practices" 157 and or-
dered Action to disclose in its contracts the total cash price of all
goods under its rental purchase plans.' 58 As a result, consumers
will be able to ascertain easily the total amount payable under the
plan, and will no longer assume that the total cost approximates the
amount charged for an ordinary credit sale.
153. 297 Md. at 545, 467 A.2d at 1007.
154. Id. at 551, 467 A.2d at 1010.
155. As this court and the Maryland federal district court have stated, the legislature
intended RISA to protect unwary buyers from oppressive business practices becoming
apparent with the rising quantity of consumer credit. United States v. Bland, 159 F.
Supp. 395 (D. Md.), afl'd, 261 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1958); Associated Acceptance Corp. v.
Bailey, 226 Md. 550, 174 A.2d 440 (1961).
156. 297 Md. at 555, 467 A.2d at 1012.
157. Id. at 557, 467 A.2d at 1013. Section 13-301(1) of the CPA reads: "Unfair or
deceptive trade practices include any: (1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral
or written statement, visual description, or other representation of any kind which has
the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers." MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 13-301(1) (1983).
158. 297 Md. at 558, 467 A.2d at 1014.
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2. Usury. -In Kramer v. McCormick,' 59 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that a borrower's contention of usury was a cognizable
exception to ratification of a foreclosure sale.' 60 The appellee in
Kramer had given the appellants a second mortgage on his home in
exchange for a $15,000 loan. The appellants required the appellee
to sign an affidavit indicating that the money would be used for
commercial purposes, thereby allowing them to charge interest
without limit. 16 ' Appellants knew, however, that the loan would not
be used for commercial purposes. 162  When the appellee's home
was sold as a result of a subsequent default on the loan payments,
appellee filed exceptions to the ratification of the foreclosure sale.
He alleged that appellant's loan violated the lending laws, subject-
ing them to civil penalties which amounted to more than the debt
owed them by the appellee. 6 3
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the lower court's
findings that the appellants had knowingly violated Maryland usury
law by having procured a false and misleading statement that the
loan was for commercial purposes and that the civil penalties for
this violation more than exceeded the debt owed by the appellee.
The court held that usury should be allowed as an exception to rati-
fication of a foreclosure sale when offsetting penalties due the
debtor for lending violations exceed the amount of the debt it-
self.165 In such a situation, "it would be absurd as well as inequita-
ble to permit a homeowner to lose his home for a debt that was not
159. 59 Md. App. 193, 474 A.2d 1346 (1984).
160. Id. at 203, 474 A.2d at 1351. Previous Maryland cases have held that usury is not
a ground for setting aside a mortgage foreclosure sale since it affects only the account-
ing and distribution of proceeds after ratification of the sale and not the sale itself. Id. at
201, 474 A.2d at 1350 (citing Warfield v. Ross, 38 Md. 85 (1873); Powell v. Hopkins, 38
Md. 1 (1873)).
161. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-103(c)(1) (1983) sets the legal rate of interest on
second mortgages at 18% per annum, but under § 12-103(e) loans to corporations, or
to those borrowing over $5,000 for commercial purposes, may provide for interest at
any rate. In Kramer, appellants had charged the appellee 27% monthly interest for the
12-month term of the loan. 59 Md. App. at 202, 474 A.2d at 1350.
162. 59 Md. App. at 198-99, 474 A.2d at 1349.
163. Id. at 200-01, 474 A.2d at 1350.
164. See id. The court implied that both § 12-106.1, relating to false representations
that a loan is for a commercial purpose, and § 12-413 of the Commercial Law Article,
relating to usurious interest rates, had been violated. The penalties for both violations
are three times the excess interest extracted. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 12-106.1,
-413 (1983). Section 12-106.1 assesses a treble excess interest penalty against any per-
son who wilfully requires a borrower to make a false or misleading statement that a loan
is commercial or who wilfully procures such statement.
165. 59 Md. App. at 202, 474 A.2d at 1351. The court found it significant that all the




In Duckworth v. Bernstein,'67 the Court of Special Appeals ana-
lyzed for the first time the civil penalties available under Maryland's
Secondary Mortgage Loan Law. 168 In Duckworth, a lender allegedly
disguised a secondary mortgage loan as a commercial loan,' 69 and
proceeded to charge usurious interest. 70 The court held that, if the
loan is found to be a secondary mortgage loan, the lender may re-
cover only the principal amount, irrespective of his knowledge of
the violations.'
7 1
The court came to this conclusion because only the treble dam-
ages portion of the civil penalties section expressly imposes a knowl-
edge requirement. 72 The court implied that, if the legislature had
intended for knowledge to be a prerequisite to recovery under the
entire section, such a requirement would have been written into the
statute.' 73 Moreover, the court found its interpretation to be con-
sistent with the protective purpose of the statute: "to guard the fool-
ish or unsophisticated borrower . . . from his own
improvidence." 74 The court's literal interpretation of this statute is
foreclosure sale were decided before civil penalties for usury and other lending viola-
tions could exceed the amount of the loan. Id. at 202, 474 A.2d at 1350.
166. 59 Md. App. at 202, 474 A.2d at 1351.
167. 55 Md. App. 710, 466 A.2d 517 (1983).
168. The Secondary Mortgage Law limits the interest and charges that may be col-
lected on noncommercial second mortgage loans. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 12-401
to -415 (1983). Its provision on damages and civil penalties states:
Except for a bonafide error of computation, if a lender violates any provision of
this subtitle he may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may not
collect any interest, costs, or other charges with respect to the loan. In addi-
tion, a lender who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle also shall for-
feit to the borrower three times the amount of interest and charges collected in
excess of that authorized by law.
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 12-413 (1983) (emphasis added).
169. The court remanded this case for a factual determination of whether the loan was
a secondary mortgage loan or a commercial loan which is not protected by the Secon-
dary Mortgage Loan Law. 55 Md. App. at 726-27, 466 A.2d at 525-26.
170. Under the Secondary Mortgage Loan Law a lender may charge a maximum an-
nual interest rate of 16% on the principal, and is limited to charging 2% of the net
proceeds of the loan for any additional fee or commission. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§§ 12-404(b), -405(a) (1983). The loan at issue in Duckworth was for $9,000 at 22.5%
interest with $3,900 of additional charges. 55 Md. App. at 715-16, 466 A.2d at 520.
171. 55 Md. App. at 724-25, 466 A.2d at 524-25.
172. Id. at 724, 466 A.2d at 524. In addition, the court reaffirmed the well-established
principle that an agent's knowledge may be imputed to the principal, Plitt v. Kellman,
222 Md. 383, 390-91, 160 A.2d 615, 619-20 (1960), and noted that this would permit a
borrower to recover treble damages against a lender who had no actual knowledge. 55
Md. App. at 722-23, 466 A.2d at 523-24.
173. 55 Md. App. at 724, 466 A.2d at 524.
174. Id.
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consistent with prior case law and with Maryland's strong policy
against usury. 175
3. Repossessions. -In DiDomenico v. First National Bank, 176 the
Court of Special Appeals held that default and repossession notices
sent to a debtor by a secured party, which indicated that the debtor's
right to redeem the repossessed collateral would terminate fifteen
days after receipt of the repossession notice, did not amount to
"reasonable notification" as required under the Maryland Commer-
cial Code. 177 The court based its decision upon the interrelation
between code provisions regarding a debtor's right to receive rea-
sonable notice' 78 and his right to redeem the collateral,' 79 as es-
poused by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Maryland National Bank
v. Wathen. '
8 0
In DiDomenico, the debtor had entered into a purchase money
security agreement with the bank in which he authorized reposses-
sion of the collateral, a mobile home, in the event of default.' 8 '
Upon falling behind in payments, the debtor received a notice of
default.'8 2 Subsequently he received a notice of repossession which
stated:
[Y]ou are entitled to redeem the said goods provided that
175. See Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 53 A.2d 673 (1946). No device of a lender will
be permitted to shield him in taking more than legal interest on a loan, but once an
obligation has become affected with usury, the "taint of illegality follows the indebted-
ness as long as it may be traced." Id. at 612, 53 A.2d at 676.
176. 57 Md. App. 62, 468 A.2d 1046 (1984).
177. Id. at 67, 468 A.2d at 1048. See MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 9-504 (Supp. 1984).
178. Section 9-504 states:
Unless the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is
of the type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor ....
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-504(3) (Supp. 1984).
179. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-506 (1975) states:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under § 9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under § 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured party may unless
otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering
fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses
reasonably incurred by the secured party . . ..
180. 288 Md. 119, 414 A.2d 1261 (1980).
181. 57 Md. App. at 64, 468 A.2d at 1047.
182. The notice of default provided that in the event of repossession, "'... your
right to this vehicle will be terminated fifteen days from the date . . . our notice of
repossession is delivered to you . . . ' but that '[p]rior to the expiration of the fifteen
day interval you may redeem the vehicle .... '" Id. at 66, 468 A.2d at 1048.
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within fifteen days from the date of delivery of this notice
you pay . . . $650.39 [the amount then due] . . . If you
do not redeem as aforesaid, the goods will thereafter be
sold at a private sale and if a deficiency arises, you will be
liable ... 183
Seventy-five days later, the bank sold the home. Thereafter, it
brought the action at issue to recover the deficiency. 18 4 The debtor
counterclaimed, seeking damages, 185 contending that he had not re-
ceived "reasonable notice" as required by section 9-504 because the
default and repossession notices were misleading and discouraged
him from attempting to redeem the mobile home pursuant to sec-
tion 9-506.186
Citing the Wathen case and its "interrelation of the provisions"
rule,' 87 the court held that the default and repossession notices
were not "reasonable" under section 9-504 because the debtor was
not informed that he could redeem the collateral at any time prior to
its disposal by tendering fulfillment of all obligations.' 88 The
court's reliance on Wathen is somewhat misplaced, however, since in
that case no notice was given the debtor prior to sale. All that the
court in Wathen held was that the failure to notify the debtor of the
time and place of the sale of the collateral as required by section 9-
504(3) may effectively preclude the debtor from exercising his sec-
tion 9-506 right of redemption.' 89
DiDomenico leaves unclear exactly what a secured party's obliga-
tion is regarding the notice and redemption requirements. The
court did not indicate whether a secured party has an affirmative
obligation to notify a debtor of his right of redemption under
183. Id.
184. Id. at 65, 468 A.2d at 1047.
185. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-507(1) (1975) states:
If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification
or whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to
the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by
a failure to comply with the provisions of this subtitle.
186. 57 Md. App. at 66, 468 A.2d at 1048.
187. The court in Wathen noted that there is an
interrelation of the provisions of the code which were apparently drafted so
that the debtor is afforded a reasonable opportunity to protect his interests.
Section 9-506 of the U.C.C. expressly bestows upon the debtor the opportunity
to redeem the collateral by tendering payment of the balance due. It is mani-
fest that the debtor without notice of the sale can be effectively prevented from
exercising his right of redemption.
288 Md. at 122, 414 A.2d at 1263 (footnote omitted).
188. 57 Md. App. at 67, 468 A.2d at 1048.
189. 288 Md. at 122, 414 A.2d at 1263.
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section 9-506,190 or merely an obligation not to mislead the debtor
as to his right of redemption if the section 9-504(3) notice given to
the debtor discusses this right.'9 1
G. Contracts
1. Insurance. -In Interstate Fire & Casualty v. Pacific Indemnity
Co.,192 the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held that as a matter of law,' 93 the term "injury" in a medical mal-
practice insurance policy includes economic as well as personal inju-
ries.' 94 Although Maryland courts have construed the words
"bodily injury" in an insurance policy,' 95 they have not previously
defined the word "injury" when unmodified by other terms.' 9 6
The dispute in Interstate was between a primary and excess mal-
practice insurance carrier. A family filed a claim against the insured
doctor who had delivered the family's brain-damaged child."' The
claim included $350,000 for physical injury to the infant and
$200,000 for economic injury to the father.'9 8 In its policy the pri-
mary insurer had agreed to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of: . . . injury arising out of the rendering or failure to
render during the period, professional services by the individual in-
sured."19 9 The primary insurer maintained that injury meant "per-
sonal injury" which limited its liability to the claims of the infant.20 0
The excess insurance carrier argued that injury also included eco-
nomic or financial injury which made the primary insurer liable for
the father's claim as well.2 0 '
Finding no Maryland law on point, 20 2 the Interstate court looked
190. Indeed, nowhere does the code expressly require a creditor to notify the debtor
of his redemption rights.
191. This seems to be the better interpretation of the court's holding.
192. 568 F. Supp. 633 (D. Md. 1983).
193. It is well-settled Maryland law that unless the language of an insurance contract
is ambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law for the court. Id. at 637
(citing Government Employees' Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 720, 261 A.2d 747,
749 (1970)).
194. 568 F. Supp. at 639.
195. Id. at 638. See also Travellers Indem. Co. v. Cornelson, 272 Md. 48, 321 A.2d 149
(1974) (loss of consortium is not a bodily injury sustained by a person).
196. See 568 F. Supp. at 636-38.
197. Id. at 634.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 635.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 636.
202. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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to other jurisdictions and found a general trend to construe the
term "injury" broadly. For example, "injury" has been construed to
include a claim for slander, 20 3 and "personal injury" has been con-
strued to include claims for bodily injury, as well as medical ex-
penses, and loss of consortium. 204 Following this trend, the court
found that "injury" is a broader term than "bodily injury" or "per-
sonal injury," and thus also includes economic injury.20 5
Although the holding in Interstate is limited to economic injury,
the court's logic could be used as support for the proposition that
any type of injury, including physical, economic, or emotional, is
covered under a medical malpractice insurance policy in which the
term "injury" is not modified. Thus, if a policy is meant to be lim-
ited to specific types of injuries, the language of the policy should so
specify.
In Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co. 206 the Court of Ap-
peals determined that the term "use of a motorcycle" contained in
an automobile liability policy exclusion clause pertains to a passen-
ger as well as to the actual driver.20 7 In addition, the court held that
an additional insured 20 8 may not receive more benefits than the
named insured.20 9
The case arose when Dejarnette was injured while riding as a
passenger on a motorcycle. The motorcycle was owned and oper-
ated by one Smith (not a party to the suit). Smith's insurance did
not provide personal injury protection.2 t0 Dejarnette, therefore,
203. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d
521 (3d Cir. 1981).
204. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87
(1964) ("personal injuries" include bodily injury, loss of consortium and medical
expenses).
205. 568 F. Supp. at 638. The district court also rejected the primary insurance com-
pany's argument that the father's claim was derivative from that of the infant and that
therefore both claims combined were limited to the policy's $200,000 limit per claim.
The court found that, in Maryland, a parent's cause of action is not derivative from the
child's cause of action when the parent sues to recover for medical expenses incurred
because of negligent injuries to the child. Id. (citing Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521,
529-30, 174 A.2d 339, 343 (1961)).
206. 299 Md. 708, 475 A.2d 454 (1984).
207. Id. at 721-22, 475 A.2d at 461.
208. The additional insured is a person "covered by [the insurance] policy in addition
to the named insured." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 36 (5th ed. 1979). In this case,
Dejarnette was covered under his father-in-law's policy because he was a member of his
household. 299 Md. at 713, 475 A.2d at 456.
209. 299 Md. at 723, 475 A.2d at 462. The named insured is "the person specifically
designated in the [insurance] policy as the one protected." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
922 (5th ed. 1979).
210. 299 Md. at 713, 475 A.2d at 456.
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sought to recover under his father-in-law's automobile liability pol-
icy. 2 1 The policy, however, excluded coverage for injuries "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motorcycle.-
21 2
Dejarnette argued that, as a passenger, he was not using the motor-
cycle within the policy's meaning.21 3 The court, after dealing with
Dejarnette's various arguments, 21 4 concluded that "the term 'use'
usually is construed to include all proper uses of an automo-
bile. . . . Riding a motorcycle is a proper use of a motor
vehicle." '215
In response to Dejarnette's argument, the court also adopted
the rule that "the additional insured [Dejarnette] is subject to the
same policy limitations and exceptions and his rights can be no
greater than the rights of the named insured." '2 16 Thus, since the
father-in-law could not have recovered under the policy if he had
been injured while using a motorcycle,21 7 Dejarnette could not re-
cover either.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 713 n.1, 475 A.2d at 457 n.l.
213. Id. at 714, 475 A.2d at 457.
214. DeJamette argued that the natural meaning of "use" is limited by MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48, § 539(a) (1979 & Supp. 1983) which describes the general insurance cov-
erage required under Maryland law. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the stat-
ute distinguished between "occupying the insured vehicle as a guest or passenger [and]
using it with . . .permission." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 539 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
However, the court concluded that the statutory language pertained only to the insured
vehicle. 299 Md. at 717, 475 A.2d at 458. In this case, Dejarnette had not been using
the insured vehicle when the accident occurred.
Furthermore, since neither "use" nor "occupy" is defined within the statute, the
terms must be given their "'ordinary and natural meaning.' " Id. at 717, 475 A.2d at
459 (quoting Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788, 791 (1979); Mauzy v.
Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92-93, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979)).
The court also noted that, while § 539(a) provides only general coverage re-
quirements, § 545 deals specifically with exclusions permitted under the law. "[I]t is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that specific terms prevail over the general lan-
guage of a statute." Id. at 718, 475 A.2d at 459. Section 545 does not require specific
language to create exclusions and the court found that the wording is left for the insur-
ance company to determine. Id. at 718-19, 475 A.2d at 459.
215. 299 Md. at 721-22, 475 A.2d at 461.
216. Id. at 723, 475 A.2d at 462. This rule has been applied by other courts. See, e.g.,
Tidewater Equip. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Mary-
land law); Wheeler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 438 F.2d 730, 732 (10th Cir. 1971)
(applying Oklahoma law); Ericson v. Hill, 109 Ga. App. 759, 761-62, 137 S.E.2d 374,
376 (1964); Benton v. Canal Ins. Co., 241 Miss. 493, 507, 130 So. 2d 840, 846 (1961).
217. The policy's exclusion clause stated: "This insurance does not apply: (a) to bod-
ily injury sustained by any person. . .(4) arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use




2. Franchising. -The Court of Special Appeals has construed
the Maryland Franchise Registration Act 21 8 to render contracts
made in violation thereof voidable, rather than void ab initio. 2 ,9
Therefore, the right to rescind the contract may be waived by failure
to exercise the right in a timely manner.220
In Bagel Enterprises v. Baskin & Sears,22 1 a national franchisor of
bagel restaurants 22 2 failed to register with Maryland's Securities
Commissioner, as required by the Act, before selling area franchise
rights to a subfranchisor.223  The court held that the franchise
agreement was voidable, not void; 224 therefore the subfranchisor
was required to take timely action to exercise its right to rescind.22 5
Since the subfranchisor, upon learning of the franchisor's failure to
comply with the law, instead tried repeatedly to extract additional
concessions from the franchisor, the court held that it had waived its
right and ratified the contract.226
The court's rationale in determining that the agreement was
voidable, however, was somewhat unclear. The court seemed to ac-
cept, without discussion, the trial court's distinction between con-
tracts with an illegal subject matter, which are void, and illegal
conduct by one party in entering into a contract, which renders the
contract voidable. 2 7 This distinction may be criticized as ignoring
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 345-365D (1983 & Supp. 1984).
219. See Bagel Enter. v. Baskin & Sears, 56 Md. App. 184, 467 A.2d 533, cert. denied,
299 Md. 136, 472 A.2d 999 (1984). This aspect of the case was actually a side issue to a
malpractice claim against the subfranchisor's original attorneys.
220. Id. at 200, 467 A.2d at 541.
221. 56 Md. App. 184, 467 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 299 Md. 136, 472 A.2d 999 (1984).
222. See generally id. at 188 n.l, 467 A.2d at 535 n.1 (Judge Liss' guide to the perplexed
on the subject of bagels and "noshing").
223. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 347(a) (1983). The Act requires, inter alia, that the
franchisor disclose the identity, business experience, and criminal record (if any) of its
officers and affiliates, and provide recent financial statements. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
56, § 349 (1983). See generally Shapiro & Carolan, Franchise Law Compliance: Before the Logo
Hits the Streets, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1980) (analysis of the Act's requirements). For
definitions of "area franchise" and "subfranchisor," see MD. ANN. CODE art. 56,
§ 345(h), (i) (1983).
224. 56 Md. App. at 198-200, 467 A.2d at 540-41; id. at 201 n.5, 467 A.2d at 542 n.5.
225. See id. at 197, 467 A.2d at 540. For other Maryland cases holding that voidable
contracts must be rescinded in a timely manner, see Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of
Sisters of Charity, Inc., 273 Md. 638, 331 A.2d 313 (1975); Michael v. Towers, 253 Md.
114, 251 A.2d 878 (1969); Coopersmith v. Isherwood, 219 Md. 455, 150 A.2d 243
(1959).
226. 56 Md. App. at 200, 467 A.2d at 541. Indeed, the subfranchisor pursued this
course of action even after Maryland's Franchise Administrator advised the sub-
franchisor of its right to rescind and encouraged it to do so. Id. at 192, 467 A.2d at 537.
227. Id. at 196, 467 A.2d at 539. The rule does not appear to be supported by any
Maryland cases. Cases cited by the court, see supra note 225, establish that the right to
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the fundamental question: do public policy and the statutory pur-
pose permit the protected party to waive his right to rescind? 228
Absent from the opinion was any discussion of an amendment
to the Act, adopted after this action was filed, but before the appel-
late decision was rendered, which prohibits a franchisor from re-
quiring a franchisee to assent to a waiver releasing the franchisor
from liability as a condition for the sale of the franchise.229 Though
this provision does not expressly apply to waivers or ratifications by
post-contractual conduct, and does not apply retroactively, it is ar-
guable that it reflects a legislative intent that franchisees be unable
to waive their rights under the Act. Therefore, the court may have
to deal with this issue anew in future litigation.
3. Government Contracts.-In Foster & Kleiser v. Baltimore
County,23° the Court of Special Appeals held that Baltimore County
was not bound by a contract that was subject to approval by the
County Council, until such approval was received.23' In reaching its
decision, the court reaffirmed the rule that an agreement subject to
approval by a third party is not binding until that approval is re-
ceived,232 and for the first time applied the rule to a county
government.
Foster & Kleiser, the appellant, maintained advertising signs on
a parcel of land. 33 Baltimore County entered into a contract with
the landowner for the purchase of that land. 234 The contract stated
that "[i]n the event that this Agreement is not approved by the Balti-
more County Council, this Agreement shall become null and void
... 135 The landowner executed the agreement on February 6,
1981, and then lawfully terminated appellant's agreement, effective
April 12, 198 1.236 The Baltimore County Council approved the
rescind a voidable contract must be exercised or waived; they do not determine when an
illegal contract will be treated as voidable rather than void.
228. Cf 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 173 (1964) ("The question whether the protection
of a statute may be waived by agreement depends largely upon the nature of the statute.
Generally, parties may agree to waive statutory rights unless a question of public policy
is involved.").
229. See Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 635, 1980 Md. Laws 2227 (codified as amended at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 365C (1983)).
230. 57 Md. App. 531, 470 A.2d 1322 (1984).
231. Id. at 538, 470 A.2d at 1326.
232. Id. at 537-39, 470 A.2d 1325-26.
233. Id. at 533, 470 A.2d 1323.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 533-34, 470 A.2d at 1324.
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contract eight days later.237
Appellant maintained that it was entitled to compensation by
the County pursuant to section 12-208 of the Real Property Arti-
cle. 231 Section 12-208 requires public agencies to compensate any-
one having structures on land in which the public agency acquires
an interest.239 The court, however, found that Baltimore County
did not acquire an interest in the land until the contract was ap-
proved by its county council, an event which occurred after the ap-
pellant's right to maintain signs had been terminated.240 Thus, the
appellant had no cause of action against the County.
The court's holding is consistent with the general contract prin-
ciple recognized in Maryland 24 ' and other jurisdictions,242 that a
contract subject to approval by a third party is not binding unless
and until the approval has been received. 43
4. Quantum meruit. -In First National Bank v. Burton, Parsons &
Co. ,244 the Court of Special Appeals denied quantum meruit relief24 5
to an inventor who had an unenforceable "royalty agreement" as
part of his employment contract.246 The court ruled that the
237. Id. at 534, 470 A.2d at 1324.
238. Id. at 533, 470 A.2d at 1323.
239. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-208 (1981).
240. 57 Md. App. at 539, 470 A.2d at 1324.
241. See Maryland Supreme Corp. v. The Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017
(1977).
242. See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ala. 1976), affd in
part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979).
243. See generally I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 22 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 26 (1979).
244. 57 Md. App. 437, 470 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984).
245. Quantum meruit relief means awarding the plaintiff "as much as he deserved" in
return for services performed for the defendant. The relief arises from an implied duty
to pay, rather than from an express agreement between the parties. "Unjust enrich-
ment" (or "restitution") is similar in theory, but the measure of damages is the value of
the benefit received by the defendant, not the value of the services which have been
performed. The term "quasi-contract" is more general than quantum meruit: it includes
all implied-in-law contracts, and may be used to refer to unjust enrichment as well. See
generally Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 773-76, 471 A.2d
1121, 1125-26 (1984) (describing the historical development of quasi-contractual
doctrines).
246. The court held that the royalty clause, which provided that, in addition to a mini-
mal salary, the employee would be paid for the rights to his inventions according to
"factors presently incapable of accurate appraisal," 57 Md. App. at 442, 470 A.2d at 825,
was merely an "agreement to negotiate." Id. at 448, 470 A.2d at 828. Although the
employee did recover unpaid royalties on certain agreements which had been success-
fully negotiated, id. at 458, 470 A.2d at 833, he could not use this "agreement to negoti-
ate" as a basis for claiming royalties on other inventions. As the court stated, "A
factfinder would be required in the instant case to write the royalty agreement before
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existence of the employment contract precluded recovery under
quantum meruit.
2 4 7
It has long been recognized that there can be no implied con-
tract between two parties when there is also an express contract cov-
ering the same subject. 248 In the instant case, the court reasoned
that the compensation for the inventions was covered by the general
employment contract; therefore the employee's recovery was lim-
ited to salary and royalty agreements that had already been success-
fully negotiated.249 As the court stated, "[The employee] may not
have received as much compensation as he deserved, but he re-
ceived that for which he contracted. He cannot use quantum meruit
to obtain more." 250
The Court of Special Appeals denied another quasi-contractual
claim in Mass Transit Administration v. Granite Construction Co. 2 5 1 The
case involved a contractor who submitted a low bid on some subway
work, based on a city official's incorrect opinion that the job did not
include certain gas line relocation. The contractor tried to recover
in unjust enrichment for the value of this extra gas line work.2 52 Af-
ter a scholarly discussion outlining the development of unjust en-
richment, restitution, quantum meruit, and related doctrines,253 the
court held that there was no unjust enrichment because the contrac-
tor had not been justified in relying on the official's opinions.254
The court also suggested that the existence of an
express contract between Baltimore City and the contractor pre-
determining damage for its breach." Id. at 448, 470 A.2d at 828. The court added that,
in light of the multiple factors on which these negotiations would be based, "[s]uch a
task requires more than a mere factfinder; it requires a Houdini or a soothsayer." Id. at
450, 470 A.2d at 829.
In a somewhat unrelated context, however, the court recently held that the term
"good faith settlement negotiations" was not an ambiguous term. The court applied a
"labor law definition of good faith," i.e., genuine participation in negotiations. See
Helferstay v. Creamer, 58 Md. App. 263, 275, 473 A.2d 47, 53 (1984).
247. 57 Md. App. at 451, 470 A.2d at 829.
248. See Hannan v. Lee, 1 H. &J. 131 (Md. 1801).
249. 57 Md. App. at 451-52, 470 A.2d at 829-30.
250. Id. at 452, 470 A.2d at 830.
251. 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).
252. Id. at 771-72, 471 A.2d at 1124.
253. See supra note 245.
254. 57 Md. App. at 779, 471 A.2d at 1128. The official had no authority to make
such representations. Moreover, he told the contractor that he was not sure about the
gas line work; he only ventured the opinion because the contractor pressed him for an
immediate answer. Id. at 771-72, 471 A.2d at 1124. The court also held that sovereign
immunity would bar the action, since, the state has only waived immunity with respect to
claims based on written contracts. Id. at 780, 471 A.2d at 1128. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
21, § 7-101 (1981).
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cluded quasi-contractual relief.255
5. Implied Contracts. -In Lerner v. Ammerman,256 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals considered whether the terms of a written agreement
continued beyond formal expiration of the agreement, where a part-
ner provided management services to his partnership pursuant to a
five-year contract.257 The court held that the terms of the agree-
ment did continue beyond the date of formal expiration since the
partner continued to perform the same services and received the
same compensation he had received under the contract's terms.
258
The court's finding is consistent with prior Maryland decisions
holding that, when performance and acceptance of services continue
after expiration of an express contract, there is a presumption that
the contract continues. 259 This presumption may be rebutted by ev-
idence showing that a change in contract terms was intended, 260 but
255. 57 Md. App. at 781, 471 A.2d at 1129. The rule seems more appropriate in this
case than in First Nat ' Bank v. Burton, Parsons & Co. See supra notes 244-50 and accompa-
nying text. In First National, quantum meruit relief was denied, even though it was clear
that neither party, employee or employer, considered the contract as fixing the entire
amount of the employee's compensation. Both parties understood that the employee
was entitled to additional payments for his inventions. In contrast, both parties in Mass
Transit understood the contract as fixing all the rights and duties of each party with
regard to the subway work. The contractor's mistake as to its duties under the contract
did not entitle it to compensation beyond the contract price.
256. 56 Md. App. 134, 467 A.2d 187 (1983).
257. The partner, Lerner, continued to provide management services after expiration
of the five-year contract and received identical compensation. The partnership subse-
quently decided to terminate the management agreement with Lerner and substitute
another firm. Id. at 137-40, 467 A.2d at 189-90.
Lerner also alleged that this action was a breach of the partner's fiduciary duty
owed to him since it threatened his partnership investment. The court, however, denied
his request for injunctive relief since he failed to allege any present or future harm to his
partnership interest. Id. at 145-46, 467 A.2d at 193. Actual harm is not an essential
requirement, but it must be plain that the acts about to be done constitute a grievous
nuisance resulting in irreparable injury. Leatherbury v. Peters, 24 Md. App. 410, 332
A.2d 41, affd, 276 Md. 367, 347 A.2d 82 (1975); Hamilton Corp. v.Julian, 130 Md. 597,
101 A. 558 (1917). This showing must be especially strong in disputes involving the
internal management of a partnership or corporation. 56 Md. App. at 146, 467 A.2d at
193. See McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940) (apply-
ing Maryland law); Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assoc., 250 Md. 24,
242 A.2d 512 (1968); Eisler v. Eastern States Corp., 182 Md. 329, 35 A.2d 118 (1943).
258. 56 Md. App. at 141, 143, 467 A.2d at 191-92.
259. See Brandenburg v. S.F. & G. Co., 207 Md. 413, 114 A.2d 604 (1955); Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Parker, 92 Md. 22, 47 A. 1042 (1900); Lister's Agricultural Chem. Works v.
Pender, 74 Md. 15, 21 A. 686 (1891); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11
A. 176 (1887). This holding is also consistent with the general rule in other jurisdic-
tions. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2D 384 (1957 & Supp. 1984).
260. Brandenburg, 207 Md. at 419, 114 A.2d at 607 (quoting McCullough Iron, 67 Md. at
560, 11 A. at 179).
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since no such evidence was presented, the court found that the con-
tract remained in effect as written.26'
H. Corporations
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals recently followed the
Court of Appeals' decision in Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc. 26 2 In Mountain Manor Realty v. Buccheri,2 6 3 the court rejected the
argument that directors of a corporation acted in derogation of the
principle of "majority rule ' 264 because they executed a stock trans-
fer to preserve their control of the corporation.2 65 The court noted
that Maryland law, as set forth in Cummings, provides that a transac-
tion authorized by corporate directors which has a legitimate corpo-
rate purpose, is not necessarily invalid simply because one of the
motives involved may be manipulative.266
In Mountain Manor Realty, Buccheri initiated a corporate take-
over by purchasing shares from two of three sharehold-
ers/directors.2 67  These directors resigned their positions and
Buccheri notified the remaining shareholder/director, Conway, of
the transaction and requested a special shareholders' meeting. 268
"In an effort to retain control of the corporation, "269 Conway called
a special directors' meeting without notice to Buccheri or the re-
signed directors. 270 At the meeting, Conway appointed two new di-
rectors and proposed that the new board authorize the issuance of
new shares to be purchased. 2 7' The board approved the offer and
Conway obtained a majority of shares necessary to thwart the take-
over.2 72 At the shareholders' meeting, both Buccheri and Conway
nominated a slate of directors. The final vote and ultimate control
261. 56 Md. App. at 143, 467 A.2d at 192.
262. 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964).
263. 55 Md. App. 185, 461 A.2d 45 (1983).
264. Id. at 195, 461 A.2d at 51.
265. Id. at 198-99, 461 A.2d at 53.
266. Id. at 196-97, 461 A.2d at 52. In 1966, a Maryland case cited Cummings for the
identical proposition. See Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 243 Md. 375, 396, 221 A.2d
370, 383 (1966). More recently, the federal courts have favorably noted Cummings for
this proposition. See Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 633 n.5 (D. Md. 1982).
267. 55 Md. App. at 188, 461 A.2d at 48.
268. Id.
269. Id. Use of this expression indicates the court's awareness that Conway's machi-
nations were performed to maintain control.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 189, 461 A.2d at 48.
272. Id.
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rested upon the validity of the stock issuance.273
The court held that if a "legitimate business purpose" can be
found for the transaction, it will then look to see whether this pur-
pose was primary or whether the main purpose was to manipulate
control.2 7 4 Even if the court determines that manipulation was the
principal motivation for the action, the transaction would not auto-
matically be void. Instead, the court stated only that "the transac-
tion may be invalid.- 275
In this case, the court clearly realized Conway's efforts were
performed solely to retain corporate control.276 The court stated,
however, that "it seems fairly clear that in Maryland stock issuances
which have the effect of consolidating or perpetuating management
control are not necessarily invalid. 21 7 7 Consideration must be given
to the collateral benefits flowing to the corporation.278 If a legiti-
mate corporate purpose for the action can be found, it appears that
the action will be held valid.
In effect, this decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals gives
incumbent directors far-reaching authority to thwart a takeover at-
tempt as long as the directors are imaginative enough to find an
acceptable excuse.
I. Covenants Not to Compete
In Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co. ,279 the Court of Special Appeals
held that a covenant not to compete, 280 extracted from an employee
under threat of discharge, is supported by valid consideration when
273. Id.
274. Id. at 198, 461 A.2d at 53.
275. Id. at 197, 461 A.2d at 52 (quoting Cummings, 237 Md. at 21, 204 A.2d at 805)
(emphasis added).
276. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
277. 55 Md. App. at 198, 461 A.2d at 53.
278. Id. at 198 n.7, 461 A.2d at 53 n.7.
279. 55 Md. App. 561, 464 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 298 Md. 243, 469 A.2d 452 (1983).
280. The general rule in Maryland as to the enforceability of restricive employment
covenants states:
[I]f. . . supported by adequate consideration and. . . ancillary to the employ-
ment contract, an employee's agreement not to compete with his employer...
will be upheld "if the restraint is confined within limits which are no wider as to
area and duration than are reasonably necessary for the protection . . . of the
employer and do not impose undue hardship on the employee or disregard the
interests of the public."
Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) (quoting Ruhl v. Bartlett
Tree Co., 245 Md. 118, 123-24, 225 A.2d 288, 291 (1967)). See also Rosen & Loewy,
Restrictive Covenants in Maryland Employment Agreements: A Guide for Drafting, 11 U. BALT. L.
REV. 377 (1982).
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the employment continues for a "substantial period" after the
agreement.2 8' This holding accords with the majority rule, which
finds consideration for the covenant either in the employer's im-
plicit promise not to fire or in the actual continuation of
employment.28 2
Though the case presented a question of first impression in
Maryland, the court sought guidance from Dahl v. Brunswick Corp. ,283
in which the Court of Appeals held that an employer's severance pay
policy becomes a contractual obligation "when, with knowledge of
[the policy's] existence, employees start or continue to work for the
employer. ' 28 4 The court in Simko reasoned that, if an at-will em-
ployee's continued service could be consideration for the addition
of a severance pay provision to the employment contract, then the
employer's consent not to terminate could support the addition of a
covenant not to compete.285
The court noted the objection of the minority viewpoint 28 6 that
such a rule would allow the employer to force the employee to sign
a restrictive covenant, and then fire him as soon as "the ink is dry
upon the signature. ' 2 7 That is, such a covenant does not bind the
employer to do anything; therefore the consideration is illusory. 88
But the court responded that such bad-faith use of restrictive cove-
nants could be handled according to the facts and circumstances of
each case. Thus, an immediate discharge of the employee without
281. 55 Md. App. at 567, 464 A.2d at 1107.
282. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 229 So. 2d 480 (1969); Roes-
sler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934); Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Serv. Co.,
214 Ga. 832, 108 S.E.2d 328 (1959); Farm Bureau Serv. Co. v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209
(Iowa 1972); Louisville Cycle & Supply Co. v. Baach, 535 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1976); Frier-
son v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963); Reed, Roberts
Assoc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1976); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v.
Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 406 A.2d 1310 (1979); Bettinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co., 278
S.W. 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
283. 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976).
284. Id. at 476, 356 A.2d at 224, quoted in 55 Md. App. at 565, 464 A.2d at 1106.
285. 55 Md. App. at 565, 464 A.2d at 1106.
286. See Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Maintenance Specialties v.
Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974).
287. 55 Md. App. at 566, 464 A.2d at 1107 (quoting Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 163,
29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1944)).
288. See generally Benjamin v. Bruce, 87 Md. 240, 39 A. 810 (1898) (necessity of"mu-
tuality of obligation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 (1979) (defining an
"illusory promise"); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 105 (1964) (necessity of "mutuality of
obligation"). Clearly the employees' promise of continued service in Dahl was not an
illusory consideration, for they did not have the option of quitting and still claiming
severance pay.
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cause would be treated as a failure of consideration.289 Conversely,
if the employment continued "for a substantial period beyond the
threat of discharge," it would serve as sufficient consideration for
the covenant. 9 °
Although the court held that the ten years of continued employ-
ment in the instant case clearly constituted a substantial period, 291
the court provided no other guidance of how long the employment
must continue before the covenant is enforceable. To a certain ex-
tent, the answer depends on whether the agreement is viewed as a
unilateral or bilateral contract.292 Under the first view, the covenant
does not become binding on the employee until the employer "per-
forms" by continuing to employ him for a substantial period.293
Since the consideration is the continuation of employment, the bot-
tom line in defining the substantial period would be the actual dura-
tion of the employment.294 Under a bilateral analysis, on the other
hand, the crucial factor would be the good faith of the employer's
promise not to fire the employee.295 The unilateral analysis seems
preferable, for it would require that the employee receive at least
some benefit before a restrictive covenant may be imposed on him.
Nevertheless, when employment continues for less than ten years,
the requisite extent of that benefit remains unclear.
Another unresolved issue is whether an employer must ex-
pressly threaten to fire the employee if he refuses to sign the cove-
nant. The court's language, "a substantial period beyond the threat
of discharge" suggests that such a threat is necessary if the contin-
ued employment is to be treated as a consideration for the cove-
nant. 296 On the other hand, the court quoted approvingly from
289. 55 Md. App. at 567, 464 A.2d at 1107.
290. Id.
291. Id., 464 A.2d at 1108.
292. See id., 464 A.2d at 1107. Without voicing a preference, the court found that the
facts satisfied the consideration requirement under either of the two accepted tests:
promise not to fire or continuation of employment. See supra note 282 and accompany-
ing text.
293. Note that the doctrine of mutuality of obligation does not apply to unilateral
contracts. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 105 (1964).
294. Cf Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934) (four years sufficient);
Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 378 A.2d 1164 (1977) (over three
years of continued employment held sufficient).
295. This approach is reflected in the court's statement: "Were an employer to dis-
charge an employee without cause in an unconscionably short length of time after ex-
tracting . . . a restrictive covenant . . . there would be a failure of consideration. An
employer who bargains in bad faith would be unable to enforce the restrictive cove-




Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. ,297 in which the employer's mere re-
quest for a restrictive covenant was said to imply a threat of dis-
charge. Moreover, in the instant case the court sought to avoid an
approach which "would merely exalt form over substance. "298
In National Micrographics Systems v. OCE-Industries,299 the Court of
Special Appeals held that, when a manufacturer breached a cove-
nant not to compete with an area distributor, a record of the manu-
facturer's direct sales in the area was sufficient evidence for a jury to
determine lost profits. 300 The court also held that, upon showing
implied malice, one may recover punitive damages for fraud in the




The case concerned a micrographic equipment manufacturer
that breached its agreements with a Baltimore-Washington area dis-
tributor by selling directly to area customers. 30 2 As proof of dam-
ages, the distributor introduced a record of all the manufacturer's
direct sales in the area during the period of the agreements.30 3 The
jury, in a special verdict, found for the distributor.3 0 4 The trial
court, however, entered judgment n.o.v. because the distributor
failed to show that it would have sold to those customers had the
manufacturer not done so; therefore, the distributor had failed to
prove damages. 5
The Court of Special Appeals held that such certainty was not
required. To recover lost profits in a contract action, a plaintiff
must prove that the breach of contract caused the loss, that the loss
was foreseeable, and that the amount of lost profits may be mea-
sured with reasonable certainty. 3° 6 In the instant case, it is clear that
297. 153 N.J. Super. at 37, 378 A.2d at 1164 (1977).
298. 55 Md. App. at 567, 464 A.2d at 1108. The distinction would merely be formal,
so long as the employee perceived the implicit threat. But even under the Hogan rule,
the employee could argue as a factual matter that the threat could not have been in-
ferred from co.duct.
299. 55 Md. App. 526, 465 A.2d 862 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 395, 470 A.2d 353
(1984).
300. Id. at 537, 465 A.2d at 869.
301. Id. at 543, 465 A.2d at 872.
302. A special verdict found that an initial oral agreement prohibited the manufac-
turer from selling to any customers in the area, whereas a subsequent written agreement
prohibited sales to customers with whom the distributor already had commercial rela-
tions. Id. at 534, 465 A.2d at 868.
303. Id. at 530, 465 A.2d 866.
304. See supra note 302.
305. 55 Md. at 534, 465 A.2d at 868.
306. Id. at 532, 465 A.2d at 867. See also Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, Inc., 259
Md. 479, 488-89, 270 A.2d 645, 650 (1970). Four factors have been suggested in
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the manufacturer's direct sales deprived the distributor of custom-
ers; but it would be impossible to determine with reasonable cer-
tainty the number of sales that the distributor would have made if
the manufacturer had not sold to customers directly. Nevertheless,
the court held, "In a case where the principal has wrongfully termi-
nated a sales agent's contract and made sales directly to customers,
it is permissible to use the principal's sales to estimate the agent's
lost profits.-
3 0 7
The court rejected the Fourth Circuit's view on this area of
Maryland law, as stated in Universal Lite Distributors v. Northwest Indus-
tries .308 In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that a distributor of
fluorescent lamp ballasts, whose distributorship agreement had
been breached by the manufacturer, had failed to prove lost profits,
since it produced no substantial evidence showing that customers
would have bought from the distributor but for the manufacturer's
sales.3 0 9 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found the per
curiam decision unpersuasive and lacking in citation of authority. 30
The Maryland court reasoned that the imposition of such a burden
of proof on the plaintiff would defeat the contract law principle of
putting the non-breaching party in the position he would be in if no
determining whether lost profits may be proved with reasonable certainty: (1) whether
the contract provides for such damages; (2) certainty of causation between the breach
and the loss; (3) whether inherent difficulties make calculation of the amount too specu-
lative; and (4) whether a more satisfactory standard of compensation is available. 22 AM.
JUR. 2D Damages § 174 (1964). These "tests" do little, however, to clarify the problem in
the instant case.
307. 55 Md. App. at 537, 465 A.2d 869. Cf John B. Robeson Assoc. v. Gardens of
Faith, Inc., 226 Md. 215, 172 A.2d 529 (1960) (same rule applied, but breach completely
prevented innocent party from making sales). The opinion also states that the manufac-
turer, by its wrongful conduct, was estopped to deny that the distributor would have
made the sales. 55 Md. App. at 538, 465 A.2d at 869-70. It is doubtful, though, that the
court meant to imply that this question should be determined as a matter of law, for
immediately prior to the estoppel argument the opinion states "[a] jury could find that
...NMS would have made the sales .... ." 55 Md. App. at 538, 465 A.2d at 869.
Because of the jury's finding that the written agreement only prevented the manufac-
turer from selling to existing customers of the distributor, see supra note 302, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the award could be based on all of the manufacturer's sales
during the period of the oral contract, but only on the manufacturer's sales to the dis-
tributor's prior customers during the period of the written contract. 55 Md. at 539, 465
A.2d at 870.
308. 602 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
309. Id. at 1175-76.
310. 55 Md. App. at 539, 465 A.2d at 870. Universal Lite cited only one Maryland case,
Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, Inc., 259 Md. 479, 270 A.2d 645 (1970), which held
that lost profits must be proved with reasonable certainty. Id. at 488-89, 270 A.2d at
650. But Macke also stated that a defendant's earnings may be used to estimate a plain-
tiff's lost profits. Id. at 492, 270 A.2d at 652.
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breach had occurred.31 '
The fraud count was based on the allegation that, during the
period that the parties were operating under an oral agreement, the
manufacturer induced the distributor to enter into a written dealer-
ship agreement by promising to continue the noncompetition cove-
nant, which it in fact intended to keep violating.3 12 The court
distinguished between fraud arising out of a contractual relation-
ship, which requires proof of actual malice, i.e., "ill will," to support
punitive damages, and fraud in the inducement to enter into a con-
tract, which only requires implied malice, i.e., "reckless disregard
for another's interest. '3 13 The court held that the manufacturer's
actions could constitute fraud in the inducement "even if the parties
had a prior contractual relationship that is not the subject of the
fraud claim."'31 4 Therefore the distributor need only prove implied
malice.3 5
J. Real Property
1. Guaranty Fund. -In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly
established a Real Estate Guaranty Fund (the "Fund") to be admin-
istered by the Real Estate Commission of Maryland.3 6 The pur-
pose of the Fund is to compensate individuals who suffer a financial
loss "arising out of a real estate transaction" because of the unlaw-
ful acts of a licensed real estate broker or salesperson.317 In Shep-
pard v. Bay County Realty, Inc., 31 the Court of Appeals held that a
licensee's loss-causing conduct may be the basis of a claim against
the Fund only if the conduct arose out of a transaction which
311. 55 Md. App. at 538-39, 465 A.2d at 869-70.
312. Id. at 539, 465 A.2d at 870.
313. Id. at 540-44, 465 A.2d at 870-72. Accord Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278
Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48
(1975); Aeropesca, Ltd. v. Butler Aviation, 44 Md. App. 610, 411 A.2d 1055 (1980); cf.
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977) (defining a tort "aris-
ing out of a contract" as one where there is a "direct nexus" between the tort and the
breach of contract).
314. 55 Md. App. at 543, 465 A.2d at 872.
315. Id.
316. Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 648, 1971 Md. Laws 1361 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 56, § 217A (1983).
317. The requirement that the action must arise out of a real estate transaction was
added to the statute by Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 309, 1976 Md. Laws 872 (codified at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, § 217A(a) (1983)). The Fund compensates individuals for actual
losses caused by theft, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit or violation of the provi-
sions on real estate licensing on the part of the real estate licensee. MD. ANN. CODE art.
56, § 217A(a) (1983).
318. 297 Md. 88, 465 A.2d 857 (1983).
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requires a real estate license.
In Sheppard, a licensed real estate broker sold interests to the
appellants in two limited partnerships formed to develop real es-
tate.320 The broker promised to repurchase the investors' interests
upon request. 32 l Both projects ultimately failed.3 22 Although the
broker acknowledged his promise to repurchase the interests, he
claimed that he was financially unable to do so. 323 Appellants
claimed that the broker misrepresented the investment, and made a
claim to the Real Estate Commission for compensation for their
losses from the Fund. 24
The court held that the Fund could not be used to recover
losses arising out of such a transaction. 25 The court reached its
holding by analyzing the statute's requirement that a claim against
the Fund must "arise out of a real estate transaction. '3 26 The court
reasoned that the Fund was intended to cover transactions which
arise out of the real estate business, and that the real estate business
is one in which the person transacting it is acting in a professional
capacity.3 2 7 The court found that a person is acting in a profes-
sional capacity when conducting a transaction for which a real estate
license is required. 2 Because the sale of interests in limited part-
nerships does not require a real estate license, the appellants' claim
was not within the scope of the Fund. 29
319. Id. at 95, 465 A.2d at 860.
320. Id. at 89-90, 465 A.2d at 858.
321. Id. at 92, 465 A.2d at 859.
322. Id. at 92-93, 465 A.2d at 859-60.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 89-90, 465 A.2d at 858.
325. Id. at 94-95, 465 A.2d at 860.
326. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 217A(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
327. 297 Md. at 96, 465 A.2d at 861.
328. Id. The court's holding effectively limits the Fund to claims arising out of transac-
tions pertaining to the sale or leasing of actual real estate. The court stated that its
limitation on eligible claims was dictated by the legislative history of the Fund and its
limited financial resources. Id. at 95-96, 465 A.2d at 861. Prior to 1971, a real estate
broker had to post a $10,000 corporate bond for the benefit of individuals who might
suffer a loss due to a broker's misconduct. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 217(b) (1968 &
Supp. 1970), repealed by Act of May 4, 1971, ch. 648, 1971 Md. Laws 1361. This proce-
dure was replaced by the Fund in 1971, see supra note 316 and accompanying text, which
now maintains a $250,000 miminum balance. MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A(c) (1983).
329. 297 Md. at 94-98, 465 A.2d at 860-62. The court examined MD. ANN. CODE art.
56, § 212(a) (1983), which defines real estate brokers, to reach this determination. 297
Md. at 95-97, 465 A.2d at 860-61. The court also cited cases in other jurisdictions that
held that the sale of interests in a limited partnership does not require a broker's license.
Id. at 97, 465 A.2d at 861.
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2. Auction. -In Childs v. Ragonese,3 30 the Court of Appeals ap-
plied conflicting standards to reach the conclusion that an auction-
eer who enters into a contract to sell real estate at public auction is
not entitled to a commission when the highest bidder on the prop-
erty subsequently fails to consummate the sale. In Childs, an auc-
tioneer and a vendor entered into an employment contract which
stated that the auctioneer was to receive a commission based on the
amount for which the property sold at auction. 33" ' The highest bid-
der entered into a sales contract for the property, but subsequently
refused to close the transaction. The auctioneer maintained that he
was entitled to the commission under section 14-105 of the Mary-
land Real Property Article, which entitles real estate brokers to a
commission when the contract of sale is signed.332 Alternatively, he
claimed that the words "sell" and "sold" in the employment agree-
ment referred to a contract of sale rather than a consummated sale,
thus entitling him to the commission. 333 The court rejected both
arguments.
The court's analysis of section 14-105 is consistent with prior
cases in which the court has refused to apply the statute to anyone
other than a real estate broker who is the procuring cause of a sale
of real property. 33 4 In view of this refusal to equate auctioneers
with real estate brokers, it is perplexing that the court then chose to
hold auctioneers to the common law consummated sale standard
that had heretofore only applied to real estate brokers. Maryland
law at the very least implies that an auctioneer's sale is complete
"when the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the hammer or in
other customary manner. 3 3 5 Accordingly, in other jurisdictions an
auctioneer is usually entitled to a commission if the auctioneer is the
procuring cause of a sale, even if the sale subsequently falls
through. 36 In essence, the court concluded that auctioneers selling
real estate are not real estate brokers for the purpose of section
330. 296 Md. 130, 460 A.2d 1031 (1983).
331. Id. at 131-32, 460 A.2d at 1032.
332. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-105 (1981).
333. 296 Md. at 134, 460 A.2d at 1032.
334. See Wyard v. Patterson Agency, 271 Md. 617, 319 A.2d 308 (1974) (statute inap-
plicable when real estate agent is not the procuring cause of the sale); Bregel v. Cooper,
161 Md. 416, 157 A. 719 (1931) (statute does not apply to mortgage broker); Wood v.
Standard Wholesale Phosphate Co., 140 Md. 645, 118 A. 179 (1922) (brokerage com-
missions for the sale of personal property are not governed by the statute).
335. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-328(2) (1975). See 296 Md. at 140-42, 460 A.2d at
1036-37 (Cole,J., dissenting). But see id. at 139 n.8, 460 A.2d at 1036 n.8 (in sale of real
estate, legal title passes only when deed is properly executed and delivered).
336. See Linkous v. Harris, 134 Va. 63, 113 S.E. 831 (1922). But see Schanberg v.
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14-105, but are real estate brokers for the purpose of the consum-
mated sale standard.
3. Broker's Commissions. -In Storch v. Ricker,3 37 the Court of
Special Appeals held that, when a provision in a contract of sale pro-
vides that the seller will pay the broker's commission at the time of
"settlement," the broker is not entitled to his commission when the
seller rightfully terminates that agreement. 338
Storch contracted to sell a parcel of land. The contract of sale
provided that the seller would pay a broker commission to Ricker
upon the completion of each of several settlements. If any of the
settlements did not occur by a certain date, either party could termi-
nate the contract.339 Ricker then brokered a second contract in
which the purchaser under the first contract agreed to resell the
property to a third party. 4 °
Some settlements under the first contract were not reached by
the specified date, and Storch terminated the contract.3 4' Storch
and the third party then entered into a new contract for the sale of
the land, excluding Ricker from any further commissions.342 Ricker
sued, maintaining that he was entitled to his commission under the
original contract pursuant to section 14-105 of the Real Property
Article, which states that a broker is entitled to a commission upon
signing the sales contract absent a special agreement to the con-
trary.3"3 Ricker maintained that no special agreement existed and
that he was entitled to a commission because the property was sold
to a third party he had indirectly procured.344
The court denied Ricker's claim under section 14-105 by find-
ing that the brokerage provision in the real estate contract between
the seller and Ricker was a "special agreement" within the meaning
of section 14-105.34' The court found that "[a]s long as the terms
of the special agreement are explicit and unambiguous, they control
Automobile Ins. Co., 285 Mass. 316, 189 N.E. 105 (1934) (auction sale of real estate not
consummated until delivery of deed to purchaser).
337. 57 Md. App. 683, 471 A.2d 1079 (1984).
338. Id. at 699-700, 471 A.2d at 1087.
339. Id. at 687-88, 471 A.2d at 1081.
340. Id. at 688, 471 A.2d at 1081.
341. Id. at 689, 471 A.2d at 1082.
342. Id. at 690-91, 471 A.2d at 1082-83.
343. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-105 (1981).
344. 57 Md. App. at 696-97, 471 A.2d at 1085-86.
345. Id. at 699, 471 A.2d at 1087.
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when the broker is entitled to commissions. ' 4 6
According to the court, Ricker would be entitled to the commis-
sion only if Storch and the third party colluded to deprive him of his
commission. 347 The court thus reaffirmed that a broker's claim that
his customer engaged in bad faith collusion to avoid paying commis-
sion may be negated by a showing of good faith reasons why the
contract was not consummated.348 Because the parties had suffi-
cient good faith reasons to terminate the contract, Ricker was not
entitled to his commission.
K. Uniform Commercial Code
Chapter 693 of the Laws of 1984 amended section 9-301(2) of
the Commercial Law Article 349 to extend the time period from ten
to twenty days in which holders of purchase money security inter-
ests350 may file a financing statement 35' in order to take priority
over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor, which
arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of
filing. 5 2 Chapter 693 also amended section 9-312(4) of the Com-
mercial Law Article 353 by increasing from ten to twenty days the
time period during which the holder of a purchase money security
interest in collateral other than inventory must perfect his or her
security interest in order to take priority over a conflicting security





346. Id.. at 698, 471 A.2d at 1086. See DeFranceaux Realty Corp. v. Leeth, 283 Md.
611, 615-16, 391 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (1978).
347. 57 Md. App. at 702-04, 471 A.2d at 1088-89.
348. Id. at 701, 471 A.2d at 1088. See Development Sales Co. v. McWilliams, 254 Md.
673, 255 A.2d 1 (1969); Hill v. Inglehart, 145 Md. 537, 125 A. 843 (1924).
349. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-301(2) (1975) (current version at id. (Supp.
1984)).
350. A purchase money security interest is one
[t]aken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or [t]aken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
Id. § 9-107 (1975).
351. See id. §§ 9-401 to -403 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
352. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 693, 1984 Md. Laws 3291.
353. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-312(4) (1975) (current version at id, (Supp.
1984)).




In County Commissioners v. Stevens' the Court of Appeals upheld
Charles County Regulation 4(d) that prohibits the disposal in public
landfills of any waste originating outside the county.2 The court re-
versed a Charles County Circuit Court determination that regula-
tion 4(d) discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.3 The Court
of Appeals held that, in banning out of county trash from a publicly
owned and operated landfill, the county was acting as a market par-
ticipant, rather than as a market regulator.4 As a market participant,
the county is exempt from dormant commerce clause restrictions.5
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey6 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a New Jersey statute that made it illegal to dump waste
originating outside New Jersey in any landfill, public or private,
within the state.' In a footnote to its opinion in Philadelphia, how-
ever, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether a similar
statute that applied only to public landfills would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.' The Maryland court was presented with this exact
question in Stevens. 9
1. 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
2. Id. at 222, 473 A.2d at 22. Regulation 4(d) provides: "No garbage, trash, or
refuse collected outside the territorial limits of Charles County shall be disposed of in
any Public Trash Disposal Area of Charles County." Id. at 206, 473 A.2d at 14.
3. Id. at 207, 473 A.2d at 14.
4. Id. at 216, 473 A.2d at 19.
5. Id. at 218-19, 473 A.2d at 20. Although the court discussed the two-part dor-
mant commerce clause analysis developed by the Supreme Court, it correctly pointed
out that the market participant exemption takes a regulation outside the ambit of the
commerce clause, making such analysis irrelevant. Id. at 208, 212, 473 A.2d at 14-16.
6. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
7. Id. at 618, 629. The circuit court relied on Philadelphia, as well as two cases in-
volving Maryland county ordinances, in finding that regulation 4(d) violated dormant
commerce clause restrictions. 299 Md. at 207, 473 A.2d at 14. See Shayne Bros., Inc. v.
Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md. 1983) (holding invalid a county ordi-
nance that prohibited the transportation of waste from outside the state to any landfill,
public or private, within the county); Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County,
292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 (1981) (holding unconstitutional an Anne Arundel County
ordinance that prohibited the disposal in or transportation through the county of any
hazardous waste originating outside the county).
8. 437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
9. Stevens appears to be the first case in the country to address this issue. After the
Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia, there was speculation regarding ways in which
states could make use of openings left by the Court's interpretation to ban the
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Charles County is expressly authorized to construct landfills
and to prescribe regulations governing the matter of their use.' °
The sole landfill in Charles County, the Pisgah facility, is county
owned and operated, and funded primarily from county tax reve-
nues." Albert Stevens, a solid waste hauler, sought a declaration
that regulation 4(d) was unconstitutional and an injunction barring
its enforcement. 2 In rejecting his argument that the regulation vio-
lated the commerce clause, the court based its holding on the fact
that regulation 4(d) applies only to public facilities. 3 Maryland stat-
utes prohibiting the transportation of waste from outside the state
to any landfill within a county have been struck down as violative of
the commerce clause.' 4 In affirming an exemption for public land-
fills, the court first traced the evolution of the market participant
exception to dormant commerce clause analysis.
The Supreme Court first carved out an exemption from dor-
mant commerce clause restrictions for governments acting as mar-
ket participants rather than market regulators in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp. '" The Court distinguished between regulatory measures
that impede free, private trade and those measures that merely
importation of out-of-state waste. See, e.g., Note, Solving New Jersey's Solid Waste Problem
Constitutionally-or-Filling the Great Silences with Garbage, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1979);
Note, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's Options After the Phila-
delphia Decision, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 31 (1979).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 14A (1981).
11. 299 Md. at 206, 473 A.2d at 13. "Commercial haulers must obtain a permit and
pay a fee for using the landfill. Noncommercial trucks and utility trailers are also
charged a fee. Individuals hauling waste in any other vehicle may use the landfill with-
out charge. The landfill's operation is primarily funded from County tax revenues." Id.
The court does not indicate to what extent the commercial haulers' fees cover the cost of
the services provided, nor is there any suggestion that such information would be rele-
vant to its analysis.
12. Stevens operates a solid waste hauling business, which collected trash both
within and outside Charles County. The county suspended one of Stevens' permits for
violation of regulation 4(d). In response, he sought declaratory judgment and an in-
junction, charging that the regulation was unconstitutional under the commerce, equal
protection and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution and under article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial judge concluded that regulation 4(d) vio-
lated the federal commerce clause, relying on Philadelphia. Id. at 206-07, 473 A.2d at 14.
After appeal by the county, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Circuit Court
for Charles County with directions to enter a partial declaratory judgment on the com-
merce clause issue consistent with its opinion, and for further proceedings on the re-
maining constitutional issues raised, but not decided, by the circuit court. Id. at 222-23,
473 A.2d at 22.
13. Id. at 219, 473 A.2d at 20.
14. See Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md.
1983); Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269
(1981).
15. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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restrict the benefits of a government program to the citizens who
funded it.' 6 Applying the same rationale in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,' 7 the
Court held that a state could give a preference to state residents in
allocating cement manufactured at a state-owned cement plant. The
state, as owner of the facility, was itself participating in the market
and could therefore refuse to sell to out-of-state buyers. The Court
stated that "the Commerce Clause responds principally to state
taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the
national marketplace. There is no indication of a constitutional plan
to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the
free market."'"
Applying these distinctions to its own market participant analy-
sis, 19 the Court of Appeals first determined that the relevant market
in Stevens was landfill service, not trash. The court pointed out that
"[t]he County neither buys nor sells refuse deposited in its landfill.
16. Id. at 810. In Alexandria Scrap, the Court upheld a Maryland statute enacted in an
effort to rid the state of abandoned cars. Id. at 796, 814. The statute contained a docu-
mentary scheme that made it easier for Maryland scrap processors to collect bounties for
deliveries of abandoned cars than for out-of-state processors to collect the bounty. Id. at
797. The Court concluded that Maryland had not sought to prohibit the trade in hulks,
though noting that the interstate movement of hulks was in fact reduced. Id. at 803. On
the contrary, the Court found that Maryland had itself entered the market and, through
its bounty, bid up the price in hulks. Id. at 806. It held that nothing in the Constitution
prohibited limiting the benefits of this participation in the market to Maryland residents.
Id. at 808-09.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan expressed his concern that, using this exemption,
states could influence interstate markets free from judicial or congressional scrutiny. Id.
at 817-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
18. Id. at 436-37.
19. The Stevens court also mentioned White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Em-
ployers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a requirement that at
least 50% of the work force on all city-funded construction projects be composed of city
residents).
It is noteworthy, however, that in a recent case, United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984), a different result was
reached on similar facts. In Camden, as in White, the Court found that the city was a
market participant and exempt from commerce clause restrictions, but it remanded the
case for consideration of the privileges and immunities issues. Id. at 1028. This clause,
as it is presently construed, would not seem applicable in the Stevens situation. In Cam-
den, the Court found that the opportunity to seek employment was sufficiently "funda-
mental" to place it within the ambit of the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 1029.
It is doubtful that the rights involved in the Stevens situation are equally fundamental.
Invoking privileges and immunities restrictions in cases like Camden may close some
doors recently opened by the creation of the market participant exemption. For a gen-
eral discussion of the dormant commerce clause, see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425 (1982) (proposing a new model for judicial scrutiny of
state commercial regulation which is "more comfortably embedded" in the privileges
and immunities clause than in the commerce clause).
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Rather, it provides a service to Stevens and the other private waste
haulers ... ."Io Because regulation 4(d) applied to only one par-
ticipant in this market, a public facility, without restricting any pri-
vate landfills that may be constructed, the court concluded that the
regulation fell within the scope of the market participant exemp-
tion."' It also rejected Stevens' contention that, to qualify as a mar-
ket participant, the governmental body must have created the
market in question, noting that an identical argument had been ex-
pressly rejected in Reeves.22
Stevens argued that the market participation exemption, even if
correct, should not apply here because landfills are a natural re-
source and because Reeves created an exception to the market par-
ticipant exemption, prohibiting the hoarding of natural resources.23
The court, rejecting this contention, stated that "[w]hatever the ex-
tent of any natural resources exception to the market participant
rule in Alexandria Scrap, it would not apply here because the Pisgah
facility is not a natural resource." 24 While recognizing that in Reeves
the Supreme Court implied that a natural or acquired monopoly
over state-owned natural resources would disqualify the state from a
market participant exemption,25 the Court of Appeals reasoned that
no such monopoly existed in the Stevens situation. It emphasized
that the county had not prohibited the construction of private land-
fills within its borders, nor was there any showing that the county
possessed unique access to suitable landfill sites.26 Similar factors
were cited by the Supreme Court to uphold the regulation in
Reeves. 27 Thus, based on the evidence before the court, its determi-
nation that no monopoly existed seems well-founded.
The determination that the Pisgah facility is not a natural re-
source seems strained, however. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court strongly suggested that landfills were natural re-
sources.2 8 The Court of Appeals distinguished Stevens by suggesting
that in Philadelphia the Court was considering landfill space, while
20. 299 Md. at 216, 473 A.2d at 19. The court recognized that the determination of
market participation may turn on how narrowly the market is defined. See, for example,
the court's discussion of Smith v. Department of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981), at 299 Md. at 218, 473 A.2d at 19-20.
21. 299 Md. at 216-17, 473 A.2d at 19.
22. Id. at 217, 473 A.2d at 19.
23. Id. at 219, 473 A.2d at 20.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 220, 473 A.2d at 20.
26. Id.
27. 447 U.S. at 444.
28. 437 U.S. at 628-29.
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landfill facilities were at issue in Stevens.2 9 The court used language
from Reeves in stating that the service provided by the Pisgah landfill
"is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical
plant and human labor act on raw materials."30 Yet the cement
plant in Reeves is more clearly a facility, and less a natural resource,
than is the landfill in Stevens. It is not clear that the Supreme Court
would accept the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals, espe-
cially in light of the strong concern expressed in Philadelphia that
states not be allowed to isolate themselves from problems common
to many, like the disposal of waste. 3 ' Thus, the result in Stevens may
not be tenable. Perhaps regulation 4(d) should fall within the natu-
ral resource exception to the market participant exemption.
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Heintz,3 2 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland held unconstitutional a
Maryland law generally prohibiting public utility holding
33companies.
The Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG & E), in an effort
to diversify its operations,34 sought to reorganize under the holding
company structure. BG & E incorporated a prospective holding
company (BGE Corp.) and together with BGE Corp. filed a joint
application with the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) to
transfer all the assets of BG & E by share-for-share exchange to the
holding company.35 The PSC rejected the application 36 pursuant to
article 78, section 24(e) of the Maryland Annotated Code, which
prohibited any stock corporation not already controlling a utility
company of the same class from acquiring more than ten percent of
the stock of a Maryland public utility corporation.3 7
29. 299 Md. at 219, 473 A.2d at 20.
30. Id. at 220, 473 A.2d at 20 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444).
31. 437 U.S. at 628.
32. 582 F. Supp. 675 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1985),petition for
cert. filed July 27, 1985.
33. Id. at 682.
34. BG & E wished to separate its utility and non-utility functions allowing "the com-
pany's non-utility divisions to diversify into activities other than the distribution of gas
and electricity," without being held accountable to the Maryland Public Service Com-
mission. Id. at 677.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 678.
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980) provides:
No public service company shall take, hold, or acquire any part of the capital
stock of any public service company of the same class, organized or existing
under or by virtue of the laws of this State, without prior authorization of the
Commission. No stock corporations of any description (except, with the au-
thorization of the Commission, a company of the same class) shall take, hold, or
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BG & E and BGE Corp. brought this action, seeking to have
section 24(e) declared unconstitutional or in conflict with federal
law. 38 BG & E claimed: (1) that section 24(e) violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution; (2) that its application to
BG & E was a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the United States Constitution, and (3) that section 24(e)
was an unlawful attempt by the state to legislate in an area pre-
empted by federal law.39
Since "a court should hesitate to address the constitutionality
of a challenged statute if other grounds exist which would invalidate
the law or its application," '40 the court first addressed the preemp-
tion issue.41 BG & E argued4" that section 24(e) conflicted with the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 193543 and there-
fore violated the supremacy clause.44 The court cited the test for
determining preemption as " 'whether, under the circumstances of
this particular case, [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' ,14' Applying the test, the court held that the section
24(e) prohibition of certain holding companies did not conflict with
the "purposes and objectives of Congress" embodied in the Act of
1935.46 The PUHCA, like section 24(e), was intended to control
acquire more than ten percent of the total capital stock of any public service
company organized under or by virtue of the laws of this State, unless such
stock is to be taken as collateral security and the Commission approves of its
being so taken; and no such public service company shall be party to the viola-
tion of this subsection. For the purposes of this subsection, a company control-
ling a public service company shall be deemed a public service company of the
same class as the controlled public service company.
38. 582 F. Supp. at 676-77.
39. Id. at 678.
40. Id. at 680 (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193
(1909)).
41. Id. at 680-81.
42. Id. at 680.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 79i(a)(2) (1935). The PUHCA of 1935, section 79i(a)(2) provides:
Unless the acquisition has been approved by the Commission under section 79j
of this title, it shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, to acquire, directly or indirectly, any
security of any public-utility company, if such person is an affiliate under clause
(A) of paragraph (11) of subsection (a) of section 79b of this title, of such com-
pany and any other public utility or holding company, or will by virtue of such
acquisition become such an affiliate.
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
45. 582 F. Supp. at 680 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26
(1977)).
46. Id. at 680.
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and extensively monitor holding companies 47 and in several places
expressly recognizes the coexistence of state regulation.4 8
Next the court addressed BG & E's claim that section 24(e) vio-
lated the commerce clause49 of the United States Constitution.5"
The court determined that section 24(e) burdened interstate com-
merce by "preventing the company from diversifying into areas
outside the control of the PSC, affecting BG & E's ability to secure
financing, [and] prohibiting BG & E's stockholders from exchanging
their shares of BG & E for shares of BGE Corp."51 Admitting that
the burden on interstate commerce may not be overwhelming,5 2 the
court noted that an assessment of whether the commerce clause is
violated required a balancing of the state's interest served by section
24(e) against that section's effect on interstate commerce.53 The
court found that although Maryland had a legitimate interest in reg-
ulating holding companies,54 that interest was not rationally served
by section 24(e)'s outright ban.55 That same interest could be pro-
moted with lesser impact on interstate activities, by allowing forma-
tion of public utility holding companies only upon PSC approval.56
47. Id. at 680-8 1. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 186 F.2d 708, 712
(3d Cir. 1951) (PUHCA is designed to protect the public, investors and consumers).
48. 582 F. Supp. at 681. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 79f(b), 79g(9), 79i(b), 79r(b) (1935). See
also Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 353 F.2d 905, 907
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966) (the purpose of the PUHCA of 1935 is
to supplement state regulation and not to supplant it). The court in Heintz also noted
that the Securities and Exchange Commission had filed an amicus curiae brief maintain-
ing that section 24(e) was not preempted by the PUHCA of 1935. "[T~he construction
of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to deference." 582 F.
Supp. at 681 (citing NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973)).
49. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
50. 582 F. Supp. at 681-82.
51. Id. at 682.
52. Id. The burden was not so overwhelming that the court would prohibit an at-
tempt by the state to prevent formation of public utility holding companies after "thor-
ough study and reasoned decision." Id.
53. Id. at 681.
54. Id. at 679. The PSC justified the prohibition of certain holding companies by
citing various "historical objections" to holding companies such as: (1) they facilitate
stock watering and similar forms of misfinancing; (2) they make corporate accounts un-
available to regulatory agencies and facilitate the manipulation of the various subsidiar-
ies; and (3) through the use of excessive "service charges," they are able to milk the
subsidiaries, causing utilities to show increased expenses and requiring regulatory agen-
cies to raise rates higher. Id.
55. Id. The court indicated that the state's interest was weakened by an exception to
the section 24(e) outright prohibition, which permitted holding companies that already
control utilities of the same class as the target utility to acquire utilities upon approval of
the PSC. "It is difficult to envision how the state interest could be any different with
regard to those holding companies which already own a utility." Id.
56. Id. at 682. The court proposed as a less intrusive alternative a law that requires
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Although the court indicated that an outright ban might save admin-
istrative costs,57 the burden of an outright prohibition was "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 58
It is unclear whether the court found the Maryland statute un-
constitutional per se or merely unconstitutional as applied to BG &
E. In its concluding paragraph, the Heintz court implied that its rul-
ing should be confined to the facts at hand. The court stated "that
the reading of Section 24(e) to constitute an absolute ban on public
utility holding companies, as applied to the plaintiffs in this case, is an
unconstitutional infringement on interstate commerce."-59 Yet the
court made no attempt to distinguish the BG & E situation from any
other circumstance to which section 24(e) might apply.
Assuming the Heintz court did hold the Maryland statute uncon-
stitutional per se, there is likely to be little grief over the demise of
section 24 (e). It appears the section had been inconsistently en-
forced at best.6" The Maryland Public Service Commission may not
have ever known that the section existed.6 '
B. Freedom of Speech
1. Percentage Limitations on Charitable Fund-Raising Expenses.-In
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,6 2 the Supreme Court found
that a professional fund-raising organization had standing to assert
the rights of its charitable clients in an action brought to determine
whether a Maryland statute was overly broad in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments. 63 The Court went on to hold that the
Maryland statute, which imposed a twenty-five percent limit on
PSC approval for the transfer of assets from a regulated utility to a proposed holding
company. Id. at 679-80, 681-82.
57. Id. at 682.
58. Id. at 681 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
59. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
60. The PSC "acknowledged in its answer to the complaint that there have been
some instances in which the acquisition of the stock of a utility company by a holding
company which does not already control a public service company of the same class has
been approved by the Commission." Id. at 678.
61. Lack of awareness by the PSC of the existence of section 24(e) was offered as an
explanation for the approval of acquisitions apparently in violation of that section. Id.
In Heintz, the existence of section 24(e) had been brought to the attention of the PSC
when the office of the Maryland People's Counsel, which represents the interests of con-
sumers in regulatory proceedings and litigation, moved to dismiss BG & E's application
for the transfer of assets. Id. at 677.
62. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
63. Id. at 2848. Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion. Justice Stevens filed a
concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist dissented and filed an opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor joined.
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charitable fund-raising expenses, was unconstitutionally
overbroad.'
Section 103D of article 41 of the Annotated Code of Maryland
provided that a charitable organization "may not pay or agree to pay
as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a total
amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or
received by reason of the fund-raising activity."'65 Joseph H. Mun-
son Company, Inc. (Munson), a professional fund-raising organiza-
tion that regularly charged at least one of its clients in excess of
25% of the gross raised, brought this action in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County seeking to have section 103D declared un-
constitutional in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.66
The Secretary of State of Maryland (Secretary) challenged Munson's
standing, asserting that the statute was aimed at charitable organiza-
tions and only those organizations may question its constitutional-
ity.6 7 Without reaching the standing issue, the circuit court upheld
the statute on the merits.6" The court relied on a provision in sec-
tion 103D, which permitted a waiver of the 25% limitation "in those
instances where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the
charitable organization from raising contributions," '69 to find the
statute "sufficiently flexible to accommodate legitimate First
Amendment interests."7 The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land affirmed.7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Munson had standing to challenge the statute and if
so whether the statute was unconstitutional.72 The Court of Ap-
peals found that Munson had suffered injury as a result of section
103D 713 and therefore had standing to challenge the validity of the
statute.4 Munson was not prevented from asserting the first
64. Id. at 2854.
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a) (1982).
66. 104 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
67. Id. at 2844.
68. Id. at 2845.
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a) (1982).
70. 104 S. Ct. at 2845.
71. Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Secretary of State, 48 Md. App. 273, 287, 426 A.2d
985, 993 (1981).
72. Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Secretary of State, 294 Md. 160, 162, 448 A.2d 935
(1982).
73. Id. at 171, 448 A.2d at 941. At least one of Munson's potential clients had re-
fused to contract with the fundraiser because of the 25% limitation. In addition, the
Secretary of State had threatened to seek prosecution of Munson if it did not comply
with section 103D. Id. at 166, 448 A.2d at 938-39.
74. Id. at 173, 448 A.2d at 942.
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amendment rights of its charitable clients because the statute was
directed "at persons with whom [Munson] has a business or profes-
sional relationship, and impairs [Munson] in that relationship,"75
and because the statute is said to " 'substantially abridge[] the First
Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.' "76
The Court of Appeals went on to conclude that section 103D
was unconstitutional on its face," finding that it denied charities the
constitutional right to choose to allocate an amount in excess of
25% of the gross raised to other than "charitable" purposes, and
"lump[s those charities which do choose to make such an allocation
together] with those engaging in fraud."7 " The "extremely narrow"
waiver provision relied upon by the circuit court and Court of Spe-
cial Appeals did not prevent the statute from "unnecessarily inter-
fering with First Amendment freedoms."79
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
Court of Appeals of Maryland was correct when it determined that
Munson had standing to challenge section 103D and that the statute
was unconstitutional on its face.80
The Court's standing inquiry was two-tiered. It decided that
since Munson had "suffered both threatened and actual injury as a
result of" section 103D,8 1 it satisfied the case or controversy re-
quirement of article III of the United States Constitution. 2 This
alone, however, did not entitle Munson to challenge the statute.8 3
Normally a party " 'must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties.' "84 Here, Munson was not asserting its own first
75. Id. at 171, 448 A.2d at 941.
76. Id. at 172, 448 A.2d at 942 (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 634 (1980)).
77. Id. at 181, 448 A.2d at 947.
78. Id., 448 A.2d at 946.
79. Id. at 180-81, 448 A.2d at 946.
80. 104 S. Ct. at 2846.
81. Id.
82. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
83. "In addition to the limitations on standing imposed by Article III's case or con-
troversy requirement, there are prudential considerations that limit the challenges
courts are willing to hear." 104 S. Ct. at 2846.
84. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (citations omitted)).
The reason for this rule is twofold. The limitation "frees the Court not only
from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from pre-
mature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional applica-
tion might be cloudy," United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. at 22, 80 S. Ct. at 523,
and it assures the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply
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amendment rights but the rights of its charitable clients.8 5
Third party standing has been allowed, on occasion, when the
injured party was somehow prevented from bringing suit on its own
behalf, and the third party both satisfied the case or controversy re-
quirement and was able to effectively present the issues. 86 In Mun-
son, however, there was no reason to believe that a charity could not
come forward and challenge the statute on its own behalf.87 But in a
case like Munson, when a statute is suspected of being overly broad
in violation of the first amendment, denial of third party standing
may result in great social loss. 88 Parties whose rights are directly
affected by the statute in question, such as Munson's charitable cli-
ents, may be available to challenge the statute but hesitate to do so,
opting instead to forego engaging in the constitutionally protected
activity rather than chance punishment under the statute. 89 In such
a situation, the Court, in an effort to avoid the chilling of free
speech, has allowed a third party whose own activities may not be
governed by the statute to assert the first amendment rights of other
parties not before the Court, regardless of the capabilities of those
other parties to assert their own rights.9" The third party will have
standing if it satisfies the case or controversy requirement and is
able to effectively frame the issues. 9 '
The Court found that Munson satisfied both requirements. 92
"The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business
relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson's interests
in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First
Amendment interests of the charities it represents." 93
Satisfied that Munson had standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of section 103D, the Court turned to the merits.94 The
presented. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d
663 (1962).
Id. (footnote omitted).
85. 104 S. Ct. at 2846-47.
86. Id. at 2847. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976) (us tertii
standing).
87. 104 S. Ct. at 2847.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2847-48 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
91. Id. at 2848.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens raised some interesting issues re-
garding the proper scope of the Supreme Court's standing inquiry in a case such as this.
He concluded that the Court "had no business granting certiorari to review the determi-
nation 'that Munson had standing to challenge the validity of § 103D,' " id. at 2857 (Ste-
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Court relied on its 1980 decision in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
Better Environment.95 In Schaumburg, the Court held unconstitutional,
in violation of the first amendment, a municipal ordinance imposing
a percentage limitation on charitable fund-raising expenses substan-
tially similar to the provisions of section 103D.96 The Schaumburg
Court determined that charitable solicitations were entitled to first
amendment protection as they are "characteristically intertwined
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or
social issues."-9 7 In order to survive a constitutional challenge, a re-
striction on protected activity, such as a percentage limitation on
charitable solicitation costs, must "serve a sufficiently strong, subor-
dinating interest that the Village is entitled to protect ' 98 and must
be a "narrowly drawn regulation[ ] designed to serve [the] interest[ ]
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment free-
doms."9 9 The Schaumburg ordinance, like section 103D, was enacted
to prevent fraud.'0 0 The Schaumburg Court found, however, that
while the prevention of fraud was a legitimate interest, the percent-
age limitation on solicitation costs was "too imprecise an instrument
to accomplish that purpose."' 0 '
The ordinance struck down in Schaumburg was substantially sim-
ilar to section 103D, but not precisely the same.'" 2 The Secretary
argued that the differences in the two statutes should have caused
section 103D to survive Munson's constitutional challenge. 0 3 The
Supreme Court did not agree. 10 4 A significant portion of the Secre-
tary's argument concerned the waiver provision present in section
vens, J., concurring), but found "sufficient reasons for finding that Munson's 'third
party' standing is proper as a prudential matter that the writ does not need to be
dismissed as improvidently granted," id. at 2856. Further analysis of the issues raised by
Justice Stevens is beyond the scope of this discussion.
95. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
96. Id. at 639. The ordinance in Schaumburg required charitable organizations desir-
ing to solicit contributions to apply for a permit. To obtain a permit, the organization
had to demonstrate that at least 75% of its solicitation proceeds would be used for chari-
table purposes. Id. at 623-24.
97. Id. at 632.
98. Id. at 636.
99. Id. at 637 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2849, 2852.
101. Id. at 2849. The Schaumburg Court stressed the availability of less intrusive meas-
ures for prohibiting fraud such as penal laws and "efforts to promote disclosure of the
finances of charitable organizations." 444 U.S. at 637-38.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 2850.
103. Id. at 2851-54.
104. Id. at 2851, 2853.
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103D but absent from the Schaumburg ordinance.10 5 Section 103D
provided for a waiver of the 25% limit if such a limitation would
prevent the charity from raising funds. 10 6 The Court found the
scope of the waiver provision too narrow to save the statute.10 7
Only charities that were "effectively prevent[ed]" from raising funds
were entitled to a waiver.' 0 8 Charities whose fund-raising expenses
exceeded 25% of gross receipts because of a decision to disseminate
information during fund-raising activities, those same charities the
Court sought to protect in Schaumburg,'0 9 were not "effectively pre-
vented" from raising funds and therefore not entitled to a waiver. lo
The Secretary further argued that the waiver provision suffi-
ciently reduced "the number of impermissible applications of" sec-
tion 103D to render it no longer "substantially overbroad.""' The
court, therefore, should not have found the statute unconstitutional
on its face but should have required Munson to show that section
103D was unconstitutional as applied to its clients and limited its
holding accordingly." 12 Again, the Court disagreed." 13 If the " 're-
mainder of a statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable
and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct,' "'"' the Court will
not strike down the statute on its face simply because it has potential
unconstitutional applications," 5 but the Court found that section
103D was not such a statute.' 6 The "flaw" in section 103D was not
105. Id. at 2851. The Court in Schaumburg distinguished that village's ordinance from
a similar ordinance that contained a waiver provision and was upheld in National Found.
v. Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). 444 U.S. at
635 n.9.
106. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a) (1982).
107. 104 S. Ct. at 2850-51. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the waiver
provision " 'decrease[s] the number of impermissible applications of the statute'...
[and] any decrease in this number of impermissible applications of the statute is ex-
tremely significant as tending to decrease overbreadth in relation to the statute's legiti-
mate sweep." Id. at 2861 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2853).
108. Id. at 2850.
109. Id. at 2850-51.
110. Id. at 2853.
111. Id. at 2851. " 'Substantial overbreadth' is a criterion the Court has invoked to
avoid striking down a statute on its face simply because of the possibility that it might be
applied in an unconstitutional manner." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2852. Justice Rehnquist's disagreement with this aspect of Justice Black-
mun's opinion was the primary reason for his dissent. Id. at 2857-58. Justice Rehnquist
stressed that in the past the Supreme Court has "insisted that the overbreadth of a
statute be 'substantial' in relation to its legitimate sweep before the statute will be invali-
dated on its face." Id. at 2858. He went on to say that any potential overbreadth was
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its potential to be unconstitutional as applied to a limited number of
parties or situations. Its "flaw" was that it incorrectly equated high
solicitation costs with fraud" 7 and, by imposing a direct restriction
on those solicitation costs, created in all its applications an unneces-
sary risk of chilling free speech."18
The Secretary pointed to several other differences between sec-
tion 103D and the ordinance struck down in Schaumburg: the fact
that section 103D regulated after-the-fact instead of imposing a
prior restraint on the protected activity; 1 9 the fact that section
103D may not have applied to as many organizations as the Schaum-
burg ordinance;' 20 and the fact that section 103D applied to all fund-
raising activities; 12 but the Court remained unpersuaded.
122
The Supreme Court's decision in Munson, although far from
unanimous, when read along with its recent decision in Schaumburg,
clearly indicates that efforts to prevent fraud in charitable activities
that take the form of poorly aimed, arbitrary percentage limitations
on fund-raising costs will not survive constitutional challenge.
Since the Supreme Court has determined that charitable solici-
tations are entitled to first amendment protection, any statute
that affects this activity must be precisely tailored to accomplish a
sufficiently strong state objective "without unnecessarily interfering
sufficiently minimized by what he deemed to be "crucial differences" between section
103D and the Schaumburg ordinance. Id. at 2860. Those differences, when considered
along with the legitimate objectives of the statute, render the use of the overbreadth
doctrine in this case "not merely 'strong medicine' but 'bad medicine.' " Id. at 2857
(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
117. Id. at 2852.
118. Id. at 2853.
119. While "[a]n organization may register as a charity and solicit funds without first
demonstrating that it satisfies § 103D," id. at 2853-54, the Court was not convinced that
section 103D contained no prior restraints to solicitation. Id. at 2854. However, even if
section 103D could be said to regulate only "after-the-fact," the Court would have
found no less interference with first amendment rights. Id.
120. Id. The Court indicated that, although section 103D may have applied to fewer
charities than the ordinance struck down in Schaumburg, that did not "alter the fact that
significant fundraising activity protected by the First Amendment is barred by the per-
centage limitation." Id.
121. Id.
Finally, the fact that the statute regulates all charitable fundraising, and not just
door-to-door solicitation, does not remedy the fact that the statute promotes
the State's interest only peripherally. The distinction made in Schaumburg was
between regulation aimed at fraud and regulation aimed at something else in
the hope that it would sweep fraud in during the process. The statute's aim is
not improved by the fact that it fires at a number of targets.
Id.
122. Id. at 2853.
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with First Amendment freedoms."'' 23 Percentage limitations on so-
licitation costs can never meet this test. High solicitation costs may
be attributed to any one of a number of factors, not all of which are
undesirable. 24 Indiscriminate measures like the one employed in
section 103D prohibit charitable organizations from engaging in
moderately expensive yet desirable activities without insuring that
the risk of fraud is eliminated.' 25
A waiver provision is not the answer, although the four dissent-
ingjustices may disagree.' 26 The narrowly drawn waiver provision
in section 103D was applicable only to those organizations that
could demonstrate financial necessity. To extend the scope of the
waiver provision to provide a state official with discretion to grant
additional exemptions "whenever necessary" would be "only
slightly less troubling."' 127 Perhaps the best solution is to rely on
the existing penalties for fraud, the ability of charitable organiza-
tions to bargain freely with professional fund-raising organizations,
and the remaining sections of the charitable organizations subtitle
of article 41,128 which require charitable organizations to register
with the Secretary of State,' 29 to report financial data13 0 for public
inspection, 13' and require professional fundraisers to post a
bond. 132
2. Public Employees.-In Beeler v. Behan, 3 the Court of Special
Appeals upheld disciplinary action taken against Baltimore County
Police Officer Beeler1 4 for violation of police department rules
123. Id. at 2849.
124. The Court mentioned such factors as the charitable organization's decision to
include educational or information dissemination activities in its fund-raising efforts, id.
at 2853 n. 16, and the possibility that the organization's cause proves unpopular, id. at
2853.
125. The Court stressed that "if an organization indulges in fraud, there is nothing in
the percentage limitation that prevents it from misdirecting funds." Id.
126. Id. at 2861. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 2851 n.12.
Our cases make clear that a statute that requires such a "license" for the dis-
semination of ideas is inherently suspect. By placing discretion in the hands of
an official to grant or deny a license, such a statute creates a threat of censor-
ship that by its very existence chills free speech.
128. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 103A-103L (1982).
129. Id. § 103B.
130. Id.
131. Id. § 103G.
132. Id. § 103F(b).
133. 55 Md. App. 517, 464 A.2d 1091, cert. denied, 298 Md. 243 (1983).
134. A disciplinary Hearing Board of the Baltimore County Police Department found
Officer Beeler guilty of violating police department rules and recommended retraining,
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prohibiting any conduct that undermines the department's good or-
der or discredits its members, and forbidding the public criticism or
ridicule of any member of the department. 135 The court rejected
Beeler's contention that the rules were unconstitutionally vague and
an unconstitutional restriction of his first amendment right of free
speech. '
36
Officer Beeler was a patron at a county night club when fellow
officers arrived at the club to close it down. He approached the of-
ficers in a hostile manner and suggested that the club owner "took
care of" the local police, and that every time a particular lieutenant
worked, the place was "hassled."' 3 7 This conduct was found to vio-
late the departmental rule.
The court's finding that the regulations in question were not
unconstitutionally vague was based on precedent sustaining nonspe-
cific regulations in analogous situations.' 38 The court properly
the loss of two days leave, and the imposition of ten hours extra duty without pay. The
Baltimore County Police Chief concurred in the Board's findings and recommendation.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed the police department's decision. Id.
at 518-19, 464 A.2d at 1092-93.
135. The relevant rules and regulations of the Baltimore County Police Department
provide as follows:
Rule 1-Conduct
Any breach of the peace, neglect of duty, misconduct or any conduct on
the part of any members of the Department, either within or without Baltimore
County, which tends to undermine the good order, efficiency, or discipline of
the Department, or which reflects discredit upon the Department or any mem-
ber thereof, or which is prejudicial to the efficiency and discipline of the De-
partment, even though these offenses may not be specifically enumerated or
laid down, shall be considered conduct unbecoming a member of the Police
Department of Baltimore County, and subject to disciplinary action by the Po-
lice Chief.
Section 11. No member of the Department shall publicly criticize or
ridicule the official action of any member of the Department, public official or
judge.
55 Md. App. at 517-18.
136. Id. at 523, 525, 464 A.2d at 1094, 1096. The court also rejected the contention
that Beeler was not within the scope of the rules because he was off duty. Id. at 525, 464
A.2d at 1096.
137. Id. at 519-20, 464 A.2d at 1093. Beeler never offered any evidence to support his
statements. Id. at 520, 464 A.2d at 1093.
138. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974) (upholding as not unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad a section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
§ 933(1983)) which prohibited "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and a
section (10 U.S.C. § 934(1983)) which prohibited "all disorders and neglects to the prej-
udice of good order and discipline in the armed forces"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 158-64 (1974) (upholding a statute which authorized the removal of a nonproba-
tionary government employee "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the ser-
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decided the case based only on the facts before it,'" 9 by asking
whether the language was so broad that Beeler would not have
known that his behavior would fall within its ambit. The court
stated that "Beeler could have scarcely doubted that his remarks
. . . could be considered, under the regulation, conduct unbecom-
ing a member of the police department. '"140
In addressing the freedom of speech issue raised by Beeler, the
court applied the guidelines developed by the Supreme Court in
Pickering v. Board of Education 4' for balancing a public employee's
interest in his first amendment rights against the interests of the
state as an employer in maintaining efficiency and morale.' 42 The
court's discussion of Beeler's individual interest in freedom of
speech is rather cursory143 -an omission perhaps explained by the
circumstances under which he chose to assert it.' 44 The court
merely queries in passing whether Beeler's unsubstantiated state-
ments were knowingly and recklessly false, and thus outside the am-
bit of first amendment protection.145 Yet the suspicion arises that a
proper evaluation of the contrary interests involved turns in large
part on this issue. Beeler's accusations of bribes and police harass-
ment are by their nature difficult for the police department to dis-
prove, and they may well have been believed by at least some of the
bar's other patrons. Of course, the accusations, even if true, might
vice"); Kannisto v. City & County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 844-45 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (upholding the suspension of a police officer who
made disparaging remarks about a superior officer during morning inspection, when the
suspension was made pursuant to a regulation practically identical to the regulation
challenged in Beeler). But see Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 316-17 (3d Cir. 1977)
(striking as overbroad a regulation which prohibited department members from publicly
criticizing the official action of a superior officer), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978).
139. 55 Md. App. at 525, 464 A.2d at 1095-96. A court will not strike down a statute
on its face simply because it has potential unconstitutional applications. A court can
properly consider whether a regulation on its face is so broad as to create in all its
application an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech. See, e.g., Secretary of State v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2854 (1984) (striking down on its face a Mary-
land statute as unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments).
140. 55 Md. App. at 524, 464 A.2d at 1095.
141. 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (invalidating the dismissal of a public school teacher
who had written a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of Education).
142. 55 Md. App. at 520-21, 464 A.2d at 1093.
143. Id. at 523, 464 A.2d at 1094.
144. The court did not address the issue of whether the bar room setting of Beeler's
comments was in any way relevant to its evaluation of his interest in speaking out on the
matter in question. Perhaps if Beeler had written a letter to a local newspaper making
similar assertions, the Beeler court, like the Pickering Court, would have found an imper-
missible restriction of his constitutional right to free speech.
145. Id. at 523, 464 A.2d at 1094.
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be equally difficult for Beeler to substantiate. Query what would
have been the result if Beeler had been able to document his
assertions?
Instead of performing a bona fide balancing analysis, the Beeler
court concentrated almost exclusively on the state's interest as an
employer. The court distinguished Beeler from Brukiewa v. Police
Commissioner,146 in which the Court of Appeals found a police of-
ficer's statements to be protected by the first amendment. 47 Officer
Brukiewa, who was President of the Baltimore Police Union, had
been suspended from duty for one year for comments made during
a television interview in which he sharply criticized the Police Com-
missioner, as well as department procedures and morale. 14  The
Court of Appeals emphasized that its holding was based on the
State's failure to show that Brukiewa's statement hurt or imperiled
the operation of the police department. 149
The court's comparison of the facts of Beeler with the circum-
stances in Brukiewa was disappointingly brief. Beeler stated only that
the facts were markedly different because Beeler's statements were
directed toward fellow officers as well as superiors and because the
statements had an adverse effect on the relationship between Beeler
and his fellow officers. 150 The court also noted that a finding by the
hearing board that Beeler's statements were demeaning and injuri-
ous to morale was "entitled to considerable deference."''t1 Because
the Beeler court's analysis of the facts was so limited, it is not clear to
what extent the court made its own evaluation of the impact of the
statements when it applied the Pickering balancing test. Overall, the
court's factual analysis was so conclusory that Beeler offers little gui-
dance, except as an example of speech which is not protected when
weighed against a strong showing of contrary state interest.
C. Equal Protection
1. Rational Basis Test.-In Department of Transportation v.
Armacost,152 the Court of Appeals vacated an interlocutory injunc-
tion delaying implementation of Maryland's Vehicle Emission
146. 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970).
147. Id. at 52, 263 A.2d at 218.
148. Id. at 37-42, 263 A.2d at 211-13.
149. Id. at 57, 263 A.2d at 221.
150. 55 Md. App. at 522-23, 464 A.2d at 1094.
151. Id. In Brukiewa's case, a hearing board had found him guilty of violating police
regulations, but had not announced findings of fact or conclusions regarding the ad-
verse effect, if any, of his statements. 257 Md. at 41-42, 263 A.2d at 213.
152. 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984).
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Inspection Program (VEIP) in Carroll County. 153
VEIP was instituted in response to mandates from the federal
government pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' 54 Congress had deter-
mined that inspection programs were best accomplished under state
administration and, in the 1977 amendments to the Act, had taken
the extraordinary action of legislating economic sanctions as a
means of inducing states to adopt such programs. 55
During the years since the Clean Air Act was passed, the courts
have heard a number of challenges to the programs.' 56 These cases
have addressed the authority of the Environmental Protection
Agency to demand implementation of the programs, 5 7 the obliga-
tion of states to enforce the programs, 58 the adequacy of the state
programs, 159 and the use of sanctions by the EPA or the courts to
ensure implementation.' 60 These issues having been resolved gen-
153. Id. at 424, 474 A.2d at 207. In response to mandates from the federal govern-
ment, the Maryland General Assembly authorized the Motor Vehicle Administration to
adopt rules and regulations establishing a vehicle emission inspection program. MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 23-201 to -208 (1984). After several delays, the program was
scheduled to begin on February 1, 1984. 299 Md. at 403, 474 A.2d at 197. Several
Carroll County Commissioners, as individuals and officials, the town of Mt. Airy, and a
county resident sought to have VEIP declared unconstitutional as applied to the county.
Id. at 404, 474 A.2d at 197. The Circuit Court for Carroll County granted petitioners'
request for an interlocutory injunction. Id. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
155. Ostrov, Inspection and Maintenance of Automotive Pollution Controls: A Decade-long
Struggle Among Congress, EPA and the States, 8 HARV. ENvIL. L. REV. 139, 156 (1984).
156. Id. at 163. Ostrov, supra note 155, provides a comprehensive discussion ofjudi-
cial and legislative developments in the area of vehicle emission inspection programs, as
well as an analysis of the success of the programs. See also Battle, Transportation Controls
Under the Clean Air Act-An Experience in (Un)Cooperative Federalism, 15 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1 (1980).
157. In 1977, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments to resolve the legal
uncertainty which was hampering EPA's efforts to implement inspection programs. Os-
trov, supra note 155, at 147-50. States are free to reject the programs, but various forms
of federal aid are conditioned on compliance with Clean Air Act terms. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7506 (1983). See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir.
1980) (upholding enforcement against state where state failed to deny registration to
motorists whose vehicles did not comply with pollution control requirements), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
159. See, e.g., City of Seabrook v. United States Envt'l Protection Agency, 659 F.2d
1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA's determination that Texas plan complied with
Clean Air Act), cert. denied sub. norn Vavra v. United States Envt'l Protection Agency, 459
U.S. 822 (1982).
160. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that EPA sanctions did not constitute an unconstitutional method to coerce the state's
legislature to act), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981).
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erally in favor of the EPA's position,' 6 ' the plaintiffs in Armacost
raised other constitutional challenges to the program.1 62 In vacat-
ing the interlocutory injunction, the court limited its review to a pre-
liminary determination that the plaintiffs had little chance of
prevailing on the merits of their claims.
163
The court determined that tailpipe tests of the type used in the
program did not constitute an unconstitutional search and
seizure. 1 64 The court concluded that insertion of a testing probe
ten inches into the tailpipe of a vehicle was tafitamount to an exami-
nation of the exterior of a car.165 Examination of the exterior of a
car does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and con-
sequently does not come within the scope of the fourth
amendment. 1
6 6
Furthermore, the court concluded that inclusion ofjust one ru-
ral county in the program was not a violation of equal protection
safeguards.' 67 Applying the rational basis test, the court found
there was sufficient reason for including only Carroll County in the
program because it is a nonattainment area for ozone.' 6 8 The court
noted that the exclusion of other "rural" counties in the area was
completely irrelevant because the other "rural" counties had not
been identified as nonattainment areas.
169
The court found a similarly sufficient rational basis to support
the exclusion of nine classes of vehicles otherwise covered by the
inspection program. 170 The court correctly noted that under-
161. See supra notes 156-60.
162. Plaintiffs challenged the program on fourth amendment, equal protection and
due process grounds.
163. 299 Md. at 404, 474 A.2d at 197. The court listed four factors, which were to be
considered before granting an interlocutory injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plain-
tiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the "balance of convenience" determined by whether
greater injury would be done to defendant by granting the injunction than would result
from its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunc-
tion was granted; and (4) the public interest. Id. at 404-05, 474 A.2d at 197. Since the
court concluded that there was little chance of the plaintiffs prevailing on the merits they
did not go on to address the other three factors. Id.
164. Id. at 406, 474 A.2d at 198.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing State v. Burns, 121 Ariz. 471, 475, 591 P.2d 563, 567 (1979) (in which
Arizona court held that the state's vehicle emission program did not violate the fourth
amendment)).
167. Id. at 408-14, 474 A.2d at 199-202.
168. Id. at 409, 474 A.2d at 199.
169. Id. at 410 n.8, 474 A.2d at 200 n.8.
170. Id. at 410-14, 474 A.2d at 200-01. The court rejected the suggestion that the
VEIP impaired the constitutionally protected right to travel and must therefore be re-
viewed under a "heightened scrutiny" analysis. Id. at 410-11, 474 A.2d at 200.
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inclusiveness does not render an otherwise valid law unconstitu-
tional. "We need not be convinced that the reasons for the
distinctions are good ones; that is a question for the legislature."' 7'
Finally, the court concluded that on its face VEIP did not vio-
late either procedural or substantive due process.1 72 "To establish a
violation of procedural due process of law in this case, the aggrieved
party must show that state action has resulted in a deprivation of a
property interest within the meaning of the due process clause."
7 3
The court found that the procedures set forth by VEIP for sending
notice, recording test results, and taking appeal were constitution-
ally sufficient in light of the various property interests involved.
1 74
The possible revocation of a vehicle registration likewise survived
due process scrutiny. Assuming, without deciding, that a vehicle re-
gistration was a property interest, 175 the court reasoned that this in-
terest was less than the interest in a driver's license because even if a
registration is revoked, the owner remains free to drive any other
car. 176 Weighing this limited interest against the state's interest in
eliminating pollution, the court found the revocation procedures
adequate, especially when, as set forth in VEIP, the determinations
are largely automatic and based on scientifically objective stan-
dards.' 7 7 Moreover, the court rejected the argument that revoca-
tions amounted to a taking of property without just compensation
because the owner is not deprived of all beneficial use of his prop-
erty; the car can still be sold.' 78
In vacating the interlocutory injunction, the court affirmed
traditional constitutional tests and rejected a new set of challenges
to the implementation of state inspection programs.
2. Legislative Districting.-Under the Maryland Constitution,
the Governor of Maryland is required after each federal decennial
171. Id. at 413, 474 A.2d at 201.
172. Id. at 420-23, 474 A.2d at 205-06. The court stated that "where, as here, legisla-
tion is sustainable under the equal protection rational basis standard, a substantive due
process challenge to the same law is unlikely to succeed. The standards are the same."
Id. at 422, 474 A.2d at 206.
173. Id. at 416, 474 A.2d at 203.
174. Id. at 414-20, 474 A.2d at 202-05.
175. Id. at 418, 474 A.2d at 204.
176. Id. at 418-19, 474 A.2d at 204.
177. Id., 474 A.2d at 204-05.
178. Id. at 421, 474 A.2d at 205-06. The court admitted that the value of the vehicle
might well be less upon sale inasmuch as the new owner would be required to bring the
vehicle into compliance, but argued that a reduction in value is not per se a taking. Id. at
421-22, 474 A.2d at 206.
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census to prepare a plan setting forth legislative districts for electing
members of the Senate and House of Delegates.' 79 A districting
plan was accordingly prepared and enacted by House Joint Resolu-
tion No. 32 (H.J.R. 32) during the 1982 General Assembly ses-
sion.1 8 0 A number of petitions were filed challenging the plan. 181
After reviewing the findings of a Special Master, '8 2 the Court of Ap-
peals held in In re Legislative Districting8 3 that the plan complied with
state and federal constitutional requirements, and affirmed H.J.R.
32 as enacted.
18 4
The court's opinion, handed down almost two years after its
decision was rendered, 185 is squarely in line with precedent and thus
reflects the limits of current standards. After the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Baker v. Carr,"8 6 holding for the first time that
the issue of apportionment was justiciable,"8 7 the Court established
that fair representation required equal population bases between
districts to ensure one person, one vote.' 8 Given substantial equal-
179. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5.
180. In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 667-68, 475 A.2d 428, 432-33 (1982).
The plan was prepared by an advisory committee, which conducted "numerous" public
hearings throughout the state. The Governor himself held two public hearings, made
several changes, and submitted the plan to the General Assembly. Id.
181. Id. at 668, 475 A.2d at 433. The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to
review legislative districting upon petition filed by any registered voter. After receiving
the first petition challenging the districting, the court appointed a Special Master to
conduct hearings and to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law. By an order
dated March 5, 1982, the court directed that any voter who claimed the plan was invalid
must intervene by March 31, 1982. Ten petitions challenging various aspects of the plan
were filed. Id.
182. The Special Master found no merit in any of the petitions, with one exception:
he concluded that Baltimore City District 44 violated the compactness requirement of
MD. CONST. art. III, § 4, and proposed alterations to remedy the defect. 299 Md. at 671-
72, 475 A.2d at 435. The Court of Appeals sustained the State's exception to this find-
ing. Id. at 672, 475 A.2d at 435. See infra note 210.
183. 299 Md. 658, 475 A.2d 428 (1982).
184. Id. at 672, 475 A.2d at 435.
185. The decision was handed down on June 4, 1982, and the opinion delivered on
May 29, 1984. Id. at 658, 475 A.2d at 428.
186. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
187. Id. at 208-37. The Baker opinion suggested a number of factors used by modern
courts to characterize an issue as a nonjusticiable, political question: the presence of a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; the lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
the issue; the impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. Id. at 217.
188. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-71 (1964). Equal population between
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ity of population in each district, other considerations, such as polit-
ical, natural or historical boundaries, may legitimately be taken into
account. 189
By not imposing rigid, randomly determined mathematical
equality between districts, current standards leave room for sophis-
ticated gerrymandering. The Supreme Court has upheld judicial in-
tervention to remedy racially discriminatory districting, 9 ° but has
imposed a heavy burden on those challenging an apportionment
plan to show not just a discriminatory effect, but that the districts
were conceived or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.' 9 ' The
Court has been reluctant even to address the issue of partisan gerry-
mandering.'9 2 This reluctance is apparently shared by the Court of
Appeals, and the extent to which partisan gerrymandering is suscep-
tible to judicial review remains an open issue. 193
Any legislative districting plan must, of course, conform to the
dictates of both the state and federal constitutions. After an exhaus-
tive discussion of the general principles involved, the Court of Ap-
peals examined those claims alleging violations of federal
constitutional requirements. 194 The court upheld disparities be-
tween subdistricts of + 6.69 and -6.13 from the mean population,
respectively, even though the disparity might have been reduced by
combining the two into a single, two-member district.' 95 These dis-
districts should not be confused with equal representation for any particular group.
The latter can only be achieved by proportional representation. See Grofman & Scarrow,
Current Issues in Reapportionment, 4 LAw & PoLlY Q. 435, 438-39 (1982).
189. 299 Md. at 674, 475 A.2d at 436.. See generally Obee, Constitutional Law and Civil
Rights: State and Federal, 29 WAYNE L. RE,,. 455 (1983) (arguing that currently permissi-
ble deviations from a strict, mathematically precise model have eroded the principles
underlying Baker and Reynolds).
190. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1976) (up-
holding in a plurality opinion New York City district lines drawn to correct alleged
under-representation of black and Puerto Rican minorities). In Carey, the plan had been
challenged by Hasidic Jews whose community had been split between two predomi-
nantly black districts by the redistricting plan. Id. at 152.
191. Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden', 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding in a plurality opin-
ion that a multimember districting plan did not unconstitutionally dilute black voting
strength and suggesting the high standard of proof now imposed to show discriminatory
intent), with Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (affirming district court's finding of
discrimination when evidence of discriminatory intent, as well as impact, was offered).
192. See generally Lee & Herman, Insuring the Right to Equal Representation, 5 U. HAWAII
L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1983) (giving a comprehensive survey of current legal standards gov-
erning legislative districting).
193. See generally Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 665-73 (1982) (discussing the justiciability of gerrymander-
ing questions).
194. 299 Md. at 681-86, 475 A.2d at 440-42.
195. Id. at 682-83, 475 A.2d at 440. The goal underlying the Maryland plan was to
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parities were permissible given "the obvious need to maintain con-
tinuity of territory in order to preserve constituent-representative
communication" in an area complicated by uneven population dis-
tribution and unbridged waters.'
9 6
Eight petitions alleged that the districting plan was invidiously
discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 197 The court found that none of the peti-
tioners met the strong burden imposed upon them to prove, first,
that the plan had a discriminatory effect, and second, that this effect
was intended.'9 8 Thus, the inclusion of Rockville and Gaithersburg
in a single district was not an unconstitutional debasement of voting
strength where consideration was given to municipal boundaries
and the district's population was within 2.56% of the statistical
ideal. ' Similarly, the court upheld the splitting of the unincorpo-
rated town of Columbia between two districts, where Howard
County's total population prohibited a single district and where the
district boundary ran along a major highway. 20 0
The court also rejected the contention that a mere showing that
districts were drawn so as to minimize contests between incumbents
was sufficient to support a finding of invidious discrimination. 20 1 To
support such a finding, the court suggested it would be necessary to
prove "that the districts were unfairly fashioned to favor or hinder
either incumbents or nonincumbents. ' 2 0 2 This rather cryptic dis-
tinction is supported by Supreme Court precedent upholding the
protection of incumbents in similar circumstances. 20 3 The Maryland
court stated: "It is incongruous in our view to profess the virtues of
constituent-representative communication while at the same time
condemning the practice of permitting the voters to decide whether
an incumbent is to continue as an elected representative. "'24 Yet at
some point constituent-representative communication degenerates
have no deviation larger than 10% (±5) from the ideal population-a standard that the
Court of Appeals held to be well within permissible limits. Id. at 682, 475 A.2d at 440.
196. Id. at 682, 475 A.2d at 440.
197. Id. at 683, 475 A.2d at 440.
198. Id. at 683-86, 475 A.2d at 440-42.
199. Id. at 683-84, 475 A.2d at 441.
200. Id. at 684-85, 475 A.2d at 441.
201. Id. at 685, 475 A.2d at 441-42.
202. Id., 475 A.2d at 442.
203. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973) (fact that district may have been
drawn in a way that minimizes number of contests between incumbents does not in and
of itself establish invidiousness); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (poli-
tics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment).
204. 299 Md. at 685, 475 A.2d at 442.
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into locked-in seats. The court failed to provide any meaningful
standard for determining when minimizing contests between incum-
bents becomes impermissible gerrymandering.
Turning to alleged state constitutional violations, the court
stressed that Maryland's compactness requirement 205 is a relative
standard, with compactness only one of several valid considerations
involved in districting. 20 6 Therefore, an affirmative showing of in-
tentional, unfair bias is "ordinarily required" to overcome a district-
ing plan's presumption of validity.2 0 7  Valid considerations
mentioned by the court in rejecting petitioners' claims include con-
stituent-representative communication, 20 8 natural boundaries,209 as
well as legitimate desires to achieve racial balance210 or reduce the
number of contests between incumbents. 21 ' However, the court in-
dicated that the requirement of "due regard" for political bounda-
ries does not encompass "communities of interests. '21 2 The court
argued convincingly that the concept is nebulous, and the number
of such communities is virtually unlimited.21 3
Taken as a whole, the court's opinion exposes the limited pro-
tection against gerrymandering afforded by current standards of re-
view. The court could have faced these limitations more
forthrightly, if only to declare certain issues nonjusticiable.
D. Due Process
1. Summary Procedure.-In Litzenberg v. Litzenberg,214 the Court
of Special Appeals found that the summary procedure used by a trial
205. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 states: "Each legislative district shall consist of adjoining
territory, be compact in form, and of substantially equal population. Due regard shall be
given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions."
206. 299 Md. at 687-88, 475 A.2d at 442-43.
207. Id. at 687-88, 475 A.2d at 443.
208. Id. at 689, 475 A.2d at 444.
209. Id. at 687, 475 A.2d at 442-43.
210. Id. at 691, 475 A.2d at 445. Baltimore City was intentionally districted in an
attempt to assure four white and four black majority districts, with District 44 being a
"swing" district in which the black-white population was substantially equal. Id. at 690,
475 A.2d at 444. The court disagreed with the Special Master's finding that District 44's
odd shape was due to an invidious racial motive because it excluded the precinct con-
taining Morgan State University, and pointed out that this precinct in fact included more
whites than blacks. Id. at 691, 475 A.2d at 444. The Special Master's Report suggested
that perhaps his decision was based more on Morgan State's role as a cultural and polit-
ical center for the black community than on the number of black residents. Report of
the Special Master at 37-39, id.
211. Id. at 691, 475 A.2d at 445.
212. Id. at 692-93, 475 A.2d at 445.
213. Id.
214. 57 Md. App. 303, 469 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 300 Md. 89 (1984).
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judge constituted a denial of due process because a genuine factual
dispute existed and the parties were not given sufficient time to
frame their responses.2 1 5 The dispute involved an attorney's au-
thority to bind his client, Ms. Litzenberg, to a divorce settlement
agreement. Ms. Litzenberg saw the agreement for the first time at a
scheduled hearing and objected that she had not given her attorney
the express authority required to make such an agreement. 2' 6 The
judge immediately held a hearing on the issue in open court. After
receiving sworn testimony from the attorneys, appellant, and her ac-
countant, he granted summary enforcement of the agreement. 21 7
On appeal, the court found that the factual dispute involved war-
ranted an adversarial evidentiary hearing in which Ms. Litzenberg
would have sufficient time to seek new counsel and prepare her re-
sponse.2 18 In its analysis, the court applied the traditional test for
evaluating due process, weighing the interest in a just and speedy
resolution of the dispute against the parties' property or liberty in-
terests and the probable benefits of more extensive procedures. 21 9
2. Right to Counsel and Right to Jury Trial in Civil Contempt.-In
Rutherford v. Rutherford220 the Court of Appeals considered whether
the constitutional right to appointed counsel 221 extends to indigent
persons charged with civil contempt for noncompliance with a child
support order.2 22 The Rutherford court held that denying a defend-
215. Id. at 314, 469 A.2d at 1285.
216. Id. at 308-09, 469 A.2d at 1282. The day before the scheduled hearing, the par-
ties' attorneys had reached what they thought was a settlement, and Ms. Litzenberg's
attorney described it to her in very general terms over the phone. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 314, 469 A.2d at 1285. The court emphasized that summary and plenary
proceedings are at opposite ends of a continuum, and that the formality required de-
pends upon the complexity of the dispute. Id. at 312, 469 A.2d at 1284.
219. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) the Court found that identi-
fication of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
220. 296 Md. 347, 464 A.2d 228 (1983).
221. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), for cases involving the sixth
amendment right to counsel. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981), Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 412 U.S. 778 (1973),
and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), for cases involving the broader right to counsel em-
bodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
222. 296 Md. at 348, 464 A.2d at 229. Rutherford was a consolidation of two civil
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ant the right to appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding
violates both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.223 The court
specifically limited the right of counsel to those instances when ac-
tual incarceration is ordered.224
The right to counsel in Rutherford springs from the fourteenth
amendment and not the sixth amendment because the sixth amend-
ment only, requires appointed counsel in criminal cases involving in-
carceration. 2 2 ' The opinion cited Supreme Court, lower federal
court and state court cases holding that in most situations due pro-
cess requires the appointment of counsel for proceedings that result
in defendant's loss of liberty.2 26 The court primarily relied on two
Supreme Court cases, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services227 and In
Re Gault,228 citing these cases for the proposition that the right to
contempt proceedings involving unemployed defendants who failed to make court-or-
dered child support payments. In January 1982, Mr. Rutherford agreed to make child
support payments as part of a separation settlement agreement. A March, 1982 divorce
decree incorporated the child support provision. In April, Rutherford's ex-wife filed a
petition to hold him in contempt for failing to make the payments under the decree.
After a hearing on the matter in which he represented himself, Rutherford was held in
contempt for nonpayment. Id. at 352-54, 464 A.2d at 231-32. After the sentencing, an
attorney from the Public Defender's Office began repesenting Mr. Rutherford. Id. at
354-55, 464 A.2d at 232.
In the other case, Katzenberger v. Katzenberger, Mr. Katzenberger had been
ordered by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to make child support payments.
After failing to make regular payments, the defendant was brought into court on con-
tempt charges. Representing himself, Mr. Katzenberger was found in contempt for non-
payment. Id. at 349-51, 464 A.2d at 229-30. After sentencing, an attorney from the
Public Defender's Office began to represent the defendant. Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 230.
223. Id. at 363, 464 A.2d at 237.
224. Id. ChiefJudge Murphy concurred in part and dissented in part, criticizing both
the violation of the court's " 'established policy of not deciding constitutional questions
unless necessary,' " id. at 366, 464 A.2d at 238-39 (Murphy, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Mayor & Council of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331,
336, 435 A.2d 425, 428 (1981)), and the majority's conclusion that the state and federal
constitutions compel the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil contempt cases
leading to sentences of incarceration, id. at 365-66, 464 A.2d at 238. He argued that the
right to counsel in civil cases involving loss of liberty is not absolute, but rather depends
on a case-by-case balancing of private and governmental interests and the risk that the
procedures used will lead to an erroneous result. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35
(1976)).
225. Id. at 357-58, 464 A.2d at 234.
226. Id. at 357-61, 464 A.2d at 234-35.
227. 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) ("An indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.").
228. 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (A juvenile sentenced to commitment in a state indus-
trial school as a result of a civil proceeding had a due process right to counsel because
of, among other factors, "the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution.").
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appointed counsel for indigents in civil proceedings generally de-
pends upon the "presence or absence of actual incarceration.- 229
However, neither Lassiter nor Gault held that the right to counsel
pertains in all cases in which incarceration is possible.23 0
With Rutherford, Maryland joined the majority of jurisdictions
that require court appointed counsel for indigents in civil contempt
proceedings involving actual incarceration. 23' The court also ex-
pressly refused to follow the minority of jurisdictions that require
appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings only when "special
circumstances" are present.23 2 The court found that the "special
circumstances" standard was not workable because often the special
circumstances are not apparent unless the defendant is represented
by counsel.233
By restricting the right to appoint counsel to only those in-
stances in which actual incarceration occurs, the court has perpetu-
ated the problem of Scott v. Illinois.234 The requirement that an
indigent defendant be actually incarcerated before he is entitled to
counsel forces a judge to make a decision before the trial begins
regarding whether there is a chance that the defendant may be in-
carcerated at the close of the trial. If the judge determines that the
defendant probably will not be incarcerated and does not order
counsel appointed, he has lost the option to send the defendant to
prison. A judge can only avoid losing the option to incarcerate by
appointing counsel in every case in which there is a potential for
incarceration. Ruling that the right to counsel attaches when there
is a potential for incarceration, rather than when actual incarcera-
tion occurs, would prevent the need for such pretrial determinations
by already overburdened judges.
229. 296 Md. at 362-63, 464 A.2d at 236.
230. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27; Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. Chief Judge Murphy, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part in Rutherford, interpreted Lassiter to mean that "[tihe
due process right of indigents to appointed counsel in civil cases involving an actual loss
of liberty is not absolute but depends upon a balancing of interests, i.e., the private
interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will
lead to an erroneous decision." 296 Md. at 365-66, 464 A.2d at 238 (Murphy, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. See 296 Md. at 358-60, 464 A.2d at 234-35 and cases cited therein.
232. Id. at 360, 464 A.2d at 235. See, e.g., Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 381-82, 249
N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976) (no right to appointed counsel for indigent defendant in civil
contempt proceeding absent special circumstances), reh'g denied, 400 Mich. 952 (1977).
233. 296 Md. at 361, 464 A.2d at 235.
234. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Scott held that as long as an indigent defendant is not sen-
tenced to imprisonment, the state is not required to appoint counsel for him, even if the
offense is one which is punishable by imprisonment. Id. at 373-74.
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The Court of Appeals left open the question of what other
rights are activated by a civil contempt proceeding in which actual
incarceration is ordered. In criminal contempt proceedings the bur-
den of proof is increased, the accused cannot be compelled to testify
against himself, he cannot be put in double jeopardy, and he has a
right to notice and the opportunity to be heard.2" 5 The question
remains whether actual incarceration in civil contempt proceedings
triggers this same panoply of fundamental due process rights.
A part of this question was answered in a subsequent Maryland
Court of Special Appeals decision, Lee v. State,2 36 when the court
held that a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding has no right to
a jury trial.2 7 The court reasoned that criminal contemners only
have a right to a jury trial in cases of "serious" contempt, usually
involving determinate sentences in excess of six months. Civil con-
tempt sanctions, on the other hand, are coercive and may be purged
immediately. Because the sentence in a civil contempt case cannot
be "determinate," it would arguably not be a "serious" offense
which might require a jury trial. 238 This reasoning seems flawed in
light of the fact that, in Lee, the defendant was sentenced to two
years in the Baltimore County jail.239
In addition to this ruling, the Lee court expanded the right to
appointed counsel established in Rutherford to include the right to
presentation of closing arguments by counsel. 24" The court relied
on Spence v. State,24' in which the Court of Appeals held that a de-
fendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to have counsel
make a proper closing argument.2 42 Synthesizing the holdings in
Rutherford and Spence, the Court of Special Appeals held in Lee that a
235. State v. Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 730-31, 298 A.2d 867, 877 (1972).
236. 56 Md. App. 613, 468 A.2d 656 (1983).
237. Id. at 623, 468 A.2d at 661.
238. Id. at 622, 468 A.2d at 660-61.
239. Id. at 618, 468 A.2d at 659.
240. Id. at 615, 468 A.2d at 657. In Lee, at the close of the evidence, defense counsel
requested to be heard. The court ignored the request and proceeded to sentence de-
fendant to two years in jail with the option to purge the contempt. Id. at 618-19, 468
A.2d at 658-59.
241. 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983). See infra CRIMINAL LAW note 318 and accom-
panying text.
242. Id. at 423, 463 A.2d at 811-12. Defendant's counsel was permitted to make clos-
ing argument after the judge in a nonjury trial pronounced a premature verdict, realized
this error, struck his verdict to hear closing argument, and then reinstated his prior
verdict. In Spence, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Yopps v. State, 228 Md.
204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962) that the opportunity for closing argument by defense counsel
in a criminal case prior to verdict in both nonjury and jury trials is a basic constitutional
right guaranteed by article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the sixth
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"defendant in a civil contempt proceeding may not be sentenced to
a period of incarceration unless his counsel is afforded the right to
make a closing argument.
2 43
The Lee result regarding the right to presentation of closing ar-
gument by counsel is sound. Rutherford established the right to
counsel in civil contempt proceedings leading to incarceration. The
right to counsel in such civil contempt cases was based on an anal-
ogy to the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases; incar-
ceration exists in both situations.244 Since the right to counsel in
criminal cases includes the right to make a closing argument, it fol-
lows that the same right should accrue in civil contempt cases when
incarceration results.
E. Maryland Constitutional Law
1. Equal Protection.-In Turner v. State,245 the Court of Appeals
held that the Female Sitters Law,24 6 which made it illegal to employ
women to solicit sales in nightclub-like establishments, was a
violation of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).247 The
defendant employed female dancers to provide entertainment and
to circulate among the patrons to produce sales. She was convicted
of violating the Female Sitters Law.
In considering the constitutionality issue, the court was first
amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. 296 Md. at 419-20, 463 A.2d at 809-10.
243. 56 Md. App. at 624, 468 A.2d at 661. The court held that the right to presenta-
tion of closing argument by counsel accrues under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and under article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The
court further held that failure to object to a trial court's not allowing time for a closing
argument will not prejudice appellant's appeal. 56 Md. App. at 625, 468 A.2d at 662.
244. 296 Md. at 358-61, 464 A.2d at 234-36. "As repeatedly pointed out in criminal
and civil cases, it is the fact of incarceration, and not the label placed upon the proceed-
ing, which requires the appointment of counsel for indigents." Id. at 361, 464 A.2d at
235. However, the analogy of civil contempt cases leading to incarceration to criminal
cases leading to incarceration is not perfect, since civil contempt offers the opportunity
to purge and avoid incarceration. 56 Md. App. at 622, 468 A.2d at 660.
245. 299 Md. 565, 474 A.2d 1297 (1984).
246. Article 27, § 152 of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides:
It shall be unlawful for any proprietor ...of any variety, entertainment or
concert hall. . . to . . .allow any female sitters in . . .said. . . premises; and
all females .. .who shall drink, smoke or partake of any . . .refreshments at
the expense of others, or solicit others to purchase such things. . . upon which
they shall . receive a commission, or . . .salary . . .shall be deemed sitters
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 152 (1982).
247. 299 Md. at 576, 474 A.2d at 1302. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46 (equality
of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex).
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confronted with a standing issue. Ordinarily in a challenge to a
criminal prosecution based on an allegation that a statute is discrim-
inatory, there must be a showing that the defendant's constitutional
rights were adversely affected by the alleged discrimination.248 In
Turner, it was the female sitters' rights that were violated, not the
defendant's rights. However, when the relationship between the lit-
igant and the third person is such that the enjoyment of the third
person's rights is inseparable from the activity the litigant wishes to
pursue, the litigant is very nearly as effective a proponent of the
right as the third person. 2 49 Accordingly, the court in Turner found
that the defendant employer had standing because the success of
her business depended on the employees' activity of soliciting
sales.25 o
After finding that the defendant had standing, the court turned
to the constitutional questions. The Court of Appeals has consist-
ently held that a law that imposes different benefits and different
burdens upon persons based solely upon their sex violates the
Maryland ERA. 25' The Female Sitters Law provided different bene-
fits to, and imposed different burdens upon, men and women.
Under the statute, a man could be employed as a sitter but a woman
could not. As a result, the court held that the Female Sitters Law
was premised upon gender-based discrimination and was, therefore,
unconstitutional.2 52
The court then determined whether the statute should be inval-
idated in its entirety or whether its gender-based discrimination
should be eliminated by severing the word "female," so that the
prohibition against sitters would apply to both sexes. For the sever-
ability issue, the court attempted to predict what the legislative in-
tent would have been if the legislature had known that the statute
248. Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 264-65, 396 A.2d 243, 246, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 858
(1979); State v. Cherry, 224 Md. 144, 155, 167 A.2d 328, 333 (1961); State v. Case, 132
Md. 269, 272, 103 A. 569, 570 (1918).
249. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1976). See, e.g., Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (seller permitted to assert buyer's constitu-
tional rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (distributor permitted to
assert distributee's constitutional rights); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59
(1958) (association permitted to assert its members' constitutional rights); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (owner of private school permitted to assert
potential pupil's constitutional rights).
250. 299 Md. at 573, 474 A.2d at 1301.
251. See, e.g., Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 524, 425 A.2d 1011,
1015 (1981); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 593, 414 A.2d 929, 932 (1980); Rand v.
Rand, 280 Md. 508, 513, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977).
252. 299 Md. at 576, 474 A.2d at 1302.
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could be only partially effective. 25' The legislative history of the Fe-
male Sitters Law unequivocally demonstrated that the General As-
sembly knew that the law was of questionable constitutionality.254
Notwithstanding this knowledge, on six occasions the General As-
sembly failed to delete the word "female" so that the prohibition
would apply to both sexes, and on two occasions it failed to abolish
the prohibition against sitters. Under these circumstances, the court
held that the presumption in favor of severability was not applica-
ble. 255 As a result, the Female Sitters Law was invalidated in its
entirety.
The court's decision not to sever simply the word "female"
from the statute was correct in view of the legislative history. It is
now up to the General Assembly either to enact a constitutionally
permissible sitters statute or to ratify the court's effective abolition
of the prohibition against sitters.
2. Preemption.-Controversy surrounding the location of a
landfill in Montgomery County reached the Court of Appeals in East
v. Gilchrist.256 Pursuant to an order by the Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, Montgomery County was required to
identify a site for a sanitary landfill.257 In response, the county first
selected four possible locations, then narrowed its selection to a site
zoned for residential use, near the town of Laytonsville.258 Mean-
while, citizens initiated a proposed amendment to the county char-
ter prohibiting the expenditure of county funds for any landfill
253. Id.
254. The Maryland ERA was ratified in 1972. Between 1972 and 1974, several bills
were introduced in the General Assembly to remove sex discrimination from the codi-
fied law. Four of these bills-S.B. 121 (1974), S.B. 385 (1973), S.B. 436 (1972), and
H.B. 1464 (1973)-involved the Female Sitters Law. Their purpose was to delete the
word "female" from the statute so that the prohibition against sitters would apply to
both sexes. None of these bills was enacted. Furthermore, in April, 1974, the Gover-
nor's Commission to Study Implementation of the Equal Rights Amendment not only
strongly questioned the constitutionality of the Female Sitters Law, but also recom-
mended that it be abolished. In 1975, S.B. 536 was introduced to abolish the Female
Sitters Law and S.B. 95 was introduced to extend the prohibition against sitters to both
sexes. Neither bill was enacted. In 1976, S.B. 192 was introduced to abolish the Female
Sitters Law, but it was not enacted. Finally, in 1978, S.B. 1066 was introduced to extend
the prohibition against sitters to both sexes, but, like its predecessors, it was not en-
acted. 299 Md. at 577-79, 474 A.2d at 1303-04.
255. Id. at 580, 474 A.2d at 1304.
256. 296 Md. 368, 463 A.2d 285 (1983).
257. Id. at 369, 463 A.2d at 285. The county was also ordered to obtain the permits
required for operation of the landfill. Id. at 369-70, 463 A.2d at 285-86.
258. Id. at 370, 463 A.2d at 286.
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located on land zoned for residential use. 59 This amendment was
approved by the voters in November, 1978, and became article 3,
section 31 LA, of the Montgomery County Charter.2 6' The county
continued to develop plans for the Laytonsville site, however, and
final permits were issued in May, 1979.261 InJune, 1981, the Secre-
tary of Health and Mental Hygiene ordered the county to begin
landfill operations at the Laytonsville site within one year.262
The Court of Appeals found that based on those facts, a conflict
existed between section 31 IA, prohibiting the expenditure of
county funds for landfills in areas zoned for residential use, and sec-
tion 9-214 of the Maryland Annotated Code, Health-Environmental
263Article, requiring a county to raise the funds necessary to comply
with an order of the Secretary.23 4 Noting that under the Maryland
Constitution, 265 when a provision in a county charter conflicts with a
public general law, the public general law prevails, the court held
that section 31 IA could not be given effect in the circumstances
before it. 2 66 The court stressed that its holding was limited to situa-
tions in which an order by the Secretary was outstanding, and thus
the court did not reach the general validity of section 31 IA.2 6 7
259. Id.
260. The amendment was approved on Nov. 7, 1978, by a margin of over two to one.
Brief for Appellant at 6, East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368,463 A.2d 285 (1983). MoNTGoM-
ERY COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 3 § 311A (Supp. 1 1982) provides:
§ 31 IA. Limitations on expenditures for landfills in residential zones.
No expenditure of county funds shall be made or authorized for the
operation of a landfill system of refuse disposal on land zoned for residential
use.
261. 296 Md. at 370, 463 A.2d at 286. The court's opinion does not mention the
county's reasons for continuing plans for the Laytonsville site after the voters' approval
of§ 311A.
262. Id. at 370-71, 463 A.2d at 286. This litigation was initiated by several Montgom-
ery County taxpayers and a former member of the Maryland House of Delegates in Janu-
ary, 1981, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Id. at 371, 463 A.2d at 286.
The circuit court held § 31 IA invalid and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari before
plaintiffs' appeal was heard by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 371-72, 463 A.2d at
287.
263. MD. HEALTH-ENrrL. CODE ANN. § 9-214(a) (1982) provides:
§ 9-214. Funds to comply with order of Secretary.
(a) In general. - The State, or any county, legally constituted public
water, sewerage, or sanitary district, or any municipality served with an order of
the Secretary, through its proper official or department, shall proceed to raise
such funds as may be necessary to comply with the order within the time
specified.
264. 296 Md. at 372-74, 463 A.2d at 287-88.
265. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 1 (charter law is subject "to the Constitution and Public
General Laws of this State").




As framed by the court, Gilchrist is a straightforward application
of Maryland constitutional law. It is not clear, however, that the
court correctly determined that a conflict between section 31 IA and
section 9-214 existed on the facts presented. The state order re-
quiring the county to begin operation at the Laytonsville site was
not issued until June, 1981, almost two years after the voters had
approved section 31 1A. Prior to this date, the county was operating
only under a general mandate to build a landfill. 68 If the county
had chosen another site after the voters had approved section 31 LA,
compliance with both the charter provision and state directives
would have been possible. In blindly choosing to apply the preemp-
tion doctrine rather than remanding the case with a suggestion that
Montgomery County find another landfill site, the Gilchrist court ef-







268. Only permits for the Laytonsville site and an emergency health order had been
issued prior to theJune, 1981 order. Id. at 369-70, 463 A.2d at 286.
269. Other Developments:
1. In Frick v. Maldonado, 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983) the Court of
Appeals struck down a two-year statute of limitations for paternity proceedings as viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 309, 462 A.2d at
1208. For a discussion of Frick, see infra FAMILY LAw notes 213-32 and accompanying
text.
2. The Maryland Court of Appeals held in Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, 297
Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983), that the press has a qualified right of public access to pre-
trial judicial proceedings based on the first and fourteenth amendments and the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights. However, this right must be weighed against probable prej-
udice to the defendant. Id. at 70, 465 A.2d at 427. For a discussion of Buzbee, see infra
CRIMINAL LAW notes 265-98 and accompanying text.
3. In Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (1984), the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals held that a husband was constitutionally prohibited from
enjoining his wife's abortion. Id. at 763, 471 A.2d at 1119. For a discussion of Coleman,
see infra HEALTH LAw notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
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A. Search and Seizure
1. Incident to Arrest.-The Court of Appeals decided two cases
addressing the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest. In Foster v. State ' the court upheld a police officer's search of
an area within a handcuffed arrestee's reach.2 In Stackhouse v. State3
the court declined to approve the warrantless search of an area from
which an arrestee had been removed, absent some exigent circum-
stance threatening the destruction or removal of evidence.4 Both
decisions recognized a physical proximity standard for searches inci-
dent to arrest.
In Foster the police arrested the accused in a small motel room.
At the time of her arrest, Foster was standing approximately two
feet away from a nightstand, the top drawer of which was partially
opened. The arresting officer patted her down, searched for weap-
ons, and then handcuffed her hands behind her back. He then
searched the area immediately around the arrestee, including the
nightstand drawer, for weapons. 5 The officer found no weapon, but
did find money in the drawer. The State later introduced the money
as evidence at Foster's trial. 6
Foster contended that the trial court should have suppressed
the evidence seized incident to her arrest. She asserted that the
nightstand drawer in which the evidence was found was not within
her immediate control because she was handcuffed during the
search.7 The Court of Appeals, noting that other courts had recog-
nized that there is a continuing potential for harm "even after
an arrestee has been handcuffed,"' found it "reasonable for the
1. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 985 (1984).
2. Id. at 220, 464 A.2d at 1001.
3. 298 Md. 203, 468 A.2d 333 (1983).
4. Id. at 217-18, 468 A.2d at 341.
5. It is not clear whether the officer considered the limiting effect of the handcuffs
in determining the extent of his search.
6. 297 Md. at 217-18, 464 A.2d at 1000.
7. Id. at 218, 464 A.2d at 1000. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)
("There is ample justification ... [during a search incident to an arrest] for a search of
the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
8. 297 Md. at 219, 464 A.2d at 1001. The court noted that a number of other
jurisdictions have found that a handcuffed arrestee may still represent a potential for
harm. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Quigley, 631 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1980); United
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arresting officer to search for a weapon in a partially open drawer
located within two feet of the [handcuffed] accused." 9 Because the
nightstand drawer-"a natural place for a weapon to be hidden"-
remained within the arrestee's reach, the search of the drawer was
necessary for the arresting officer's protection.' 0 It is difficult, how-
ever, to imagine an arrestee breaking free of handcuff restraints. In
fact, the arresting officer probably left himself vulnerable to attack
by leaving the arrestee unattended while he searched the drawer.
Under these circumstances, the court's conclusion that the search
and seizure was reasonable because of the possibility of harm to the
officer is suspect.
The Court of Appeals found the search and seizure in Stackhouse
v. State to be illegal. The police arrested Stackhouse, an armed rob-
bery suspect, after discovering him hiding in the attic of his house.
A police officer ordered Stackhouse to crawl out of the attic." After
Stackhouse agreed and came down to the second floor, the officer
handcuffed him. The officer subsequently entered the attic and re-
covered a shotgun barrel located near the place where the accused
had been hiding. The gun barrel served as evidence at Stackhouse's
trial. 12
The Court of Appeals reiterated the rule established by the
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California'3 that, incident to a lawful
arrest, a police officer may "search the area within the arrestee's
reach from where he might grab a weapon or evidence."' 4 The
court held that the warrantless search of the attic incident to the
appellant's arrest was not justified "as within the area of appellant's
reach or grasp" because the police had taken Stackhouse out of the
attic and handcuffed him prior to the search.' 5 The circumstances
were distinguishable from the situation in Foster, where the arrestee
was standing within a few feet of the area being searched. Because
Stackhouse could not possibly have reached anything in the attic,
the search and seizure was not justifiable on that basis.
States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324,
327-28 (Iowa 1977); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 97, 257 S.E.2d 551, 558 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). But see, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1062
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berengues, 562 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977).
9. 297 Md. at 220, 464 A.2d at 1001.
10. Id.
11. The only access to the attic was through a small hatchway in the ceiling of the
second floor.
12. 298 Md. at 208, 468 A.2d at 336.
13. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
14. 298 Md. at 209, 468 A.2d at 336.
15. Id. at 217-18, 468 A.2d at 341.
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The State, however, contended that an exigent circumstance 6
justified the warrantless search. Stackhouse's foster sister was pres-
ent in the house at the time the police arrived to arrest him.' 7 The
State argued that her presence constituted an exigency "because
she could have destroyed or removed the evidence."'" In rejecting
the State's argument, the Court of Appeals noted that the mere
presence of third persons who could possibly destroy or remove evi-
dence is not an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search
of a home.' 9 Moreover, a mere belief that an article sought is con-
cealed in a dwelling house is insufficient justification for a warrant-
less search of that house.20 The court refused to recognize a mere
possibility as an exigent circumstance; instead, the court required
actual knowledge of both the presence of evidence and the third
person's intent to destroy or remove it. In the absence of such
knowledge, there is not an "urgent and compelling need for police
action.' Because the search and seizure in Stackhouse failed to sat-
isfy the appropriate criteria, it violated the fourth amendment.
2. Plain View.-In Norwood v. State 2 2 the Court of Special Ap-
peals clarified the meaning of "inadvertence" and "immediately ap-
parent" with regard to the seizure of items under the plain view
doctrine. While executing a search of the defendant's apartment
pursuant to a warrant, a police officer found and seized keys and a
16. Chimel requires a showing that the warrantless search was made because exigen-
cies made such a search imperative. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761. The Court of Appeals in
Stackhouse considered the nature of exigent circumstances in a warrantless search con-
text. 298 Md. at 211-13, 468 A.2d at 338. It determined that "[u]pholding warrantless
searches based upon exigent circumstances involves two principal categories of cases:
'hot pursuit,' and destruction or removal of evidence." Id. at 213, 468 A.2d at 338. See
also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (destruction of evidence); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (hot pursuit); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-
41 (1963); see generally Thompson v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 409, 410-11 (1984) (noting
that warrantless searches are valid only if they fall within narrow and specifically deline-
ated exceptions to the warrant requirement).
17. The police took the foster sister out of the house during the time the officers
were searching for Stackhouse. 298 Md. at 208, 468 A.2d at 336.
18. Id. at 219, 468 A.2d at 341. The State argued that such an exigency was particu-
larly compelling with respect to the foster sister because she had lied to the police on
two previous occasions that evening. Id. The two dissenting judges found that argu-
ment persuasive. Id. at 222, 468 A.2d at 343 (Smith, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 219, 468 A.2d at 342.
20. Id. This is consistent with the court's view that the dwelling house "always has
been accorded the highest degree of fourth amendment protection." Id. at 211, 468
A.2d at 337.
21. Id. at 220, 468 A.2d at 342.
22. 55 Md. App. 503, 462 A.2d 93 (1983).
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key blank that were not mentioned in the warrant.23 The defendant
contended that the evidentiary significance of these items was not
"immediately apparent" to the officer as required for a valid plain
view seizure.24 Since the officer admitted that he had previously
suspected that entrance might have been made to the victim's apart-
ment using a pass key, the defendant further argued that these items
were not discovered inadvertently.25 Referring to Texas v. Brown,26 a
recent Supreme Court decision, the Court of Special Appeals con-
cluded that the "inadvertence" requirement precludes a police of-
ficer's knowing in advance the location of specific evidence and
seizing it under the cloak of the plain view doctrine. 27 The "imme-
diately apparent" requirement means only that there must be prob-
able cause to associate the items with criminal activity.28 The Court
of Special Appeals determined that both the "inadvertence" and
"immediately apparent" requirements of the plain view doctrine
were met in this case.29
3. Wiretap.-In Sanders v. State"3 the Court of Special Appeals
held that federal officials conducting a federal investigation can in-
troduce electronic surveillance evidence they collected, if those offi-
cials comply with both state and federal standards for acquiring such
evidence. This is true even when the person initiating the surveil-
lance is authorized by federal, but not by state, statute to use elec-
tronic surveillance. 31
23. Id at 508, 462 A.2d at 96.
24. Id. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the plurality stated that
the evidentiary significance of an item seized without a warrant under the "plain view"
exception to the fourth amendment must be "immediately apparent" to the officer seiz-
ing the item. Id. at 466.
25. 55 Md. App. at 508, 462 A.2d at 96.
26. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
27. 55 Md. App. at 508, 462 A.2d at 96. In Texas v. Brown Justice Rehnquist, with
whom Justices O'Connor and White concurred, found that the "inadvertence" require-
ment was met in a seizure of a balloon filled with narcotics when the seizing officers had
only a generalized expectation that the vehicle might contain narcotics and had no rea-
son to believe that any particular object would be in the owner's automobile. 460 U.S at
744. The Court of Special Appeals, citing Texas v. Brown, stated that inadvertence re-
quires only that the officer not " 'know' in advance the location of specific evidence," 55
Md. App. at 508, 462 A.2d at 96. This seems to be an expansive reading, if in fact the
court meant that an officer, expecting to find a key but not knowing where he would find
it, could call the finding "inadvertent."
28. 55 Md. App. at 508, 462 A.2d at 96.
29. Id. at 509, 462 A.2d at 96.
30. 57 Md. App. 156, 469 A.2d 476 (1984). For a discussion of another issue in
Sanders, see infra CRIMINAL LAw notes 469-74 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 171, 469 A.2d at 484.
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The defendant was arrested for contracting with one Smithson
to murder an IRS agent whom the defendant thought was overzeal-
ous in an audit of the defendant's accountant.3 2 By chance, Smith-
son was arrested for shoplifting. To avoid being prosecuted for this
matter, he revealed the murder scheme and agreed to cooperate
with an IRS criminal investigator.3 3  Smithson consented to be
wired for sound in order to obtain damaging evidence of the de-
fendant's murder scheme. 34 The IRS agent's superior received ap-
proval to use a wiretap, in accordance with federal administrative
procedures. 5 Smithson met the defendant and damaging evidence
was obtained.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the issue raised was whether
a federal IRS agent comes within the definition of an "investigative
or law enforcement officer" who is permitted by Maryland statute to
intercept wire or oral communications. 6 The Maryland wiretap
statute defines an "investigative or law enforcement officer" as "any
officer of this State. ' '37 If the IRS agents do not come within this
definition, the defendant argued, then they did not comply with the
statute and the wiretap evidence should not have been introduced
into evidence.3 8
In responding to this argument, the court noted that the federal
agents complied with federal statutes that authorize them to inter-
cept wire or oral communications.3 ' Further, the court reasoned
that the supremacy clause mandates that when there is a conflict be-
tween state and federal laws, the federal law shall govern. 40 The
32. Id. at 161-62, 469 A.2d at 479.
33. Id. at 161, 469 A.2d at 479.
34. Id. at 162, 469 A.2d at 479.
35. Id. at 166, 469 A.2d at 481.
36. Id. at 163-65, 469 A.2d at 480. See MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. ANN. § 10-401(c)(2)
(1984).
37. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(6) (1984) states:
"Investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of this State or a
political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investiga-
tions of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this subtitle, and any
attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of
such offenses ....
38. 57 Md. App. at 163, 469 A.2d at 480.
39. Id. at 166,469 A.2d at 481. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1982) provides: "It shall not
be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire
or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception" (emphasis
added). 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (1982) defines "person" to include "any employee, or
agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof."
40. 57 Md. App. at 167, 469 A.2d 482. For a comparison of the Maryland and
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court noted that while the federal wiretap statute permits states to
set stricter standards for state law enforcement officers to protect
personal privacy rights, the statute does not empower the states to
make stricter standards for federal officials. 4 '
The court emphasized that the defendant was accorded every
privacy protection under both the federal and the stricter Maryland
statute and it was unwilling to reverse simply because the IRS
agents, who acted lawfully, were not Maryland investigative or law
enforcement officers. 42 Noting that the function and purpose of the
law had been satisfied, the court concluded that so long as federal
officials follow with both the state and federal procedures, then a
"suppression of the fruits of their investigation [would be]
unwarranted."
43
4. Other.-In Hughes v. State,44 a case of first impression in
Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals held that the surgical extrac-
tion of incriminating evidence from a defendant's body, pursuant to
a court order, was proper and not violative of appellant's fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights.45
Defendant committed an armed robbery during which he fatally
shot the victim, but was himself shot five times. After emergency
surgery to repair extensive internal damage, three bullets remained
lodged beneath defendant's skin. 46 The State was granted a search
warrant to compel removal of the three bullets.47 These bullets
proved to be crucial to the State's case because the positive compar-
ison of the bullets with the pistol used by the victim provided the
federal wiretap acts, see Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection and Prognosis of Maryland's Surveil-
lance Law, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1979).
41. 57 Md. App. at 168, 469 A.2d at 482. The court observed that the former wire-
tap statute specifically stated that the "subtitle [does] not apply to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or to any other federal investigating agency" and argued that the Maryland
General Assembly was aware that it could not impose stricter standards for federal offi-
cials. Id. (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-407(a) (1973) (repealed
1977)).
42. 57 Md. App. at 167, 469 A.2d at 482. The court unambiguously rejected an
argument for reversal on such a ground. Id.
43. Id. at 171, 469 A.2d at 484. In 1983, the Maryland General Assembly amended
§ 10-407 to include federal agents who comply with the Maryland statute among those
who can lawfully disclose the contents of a communication. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 10-407(f) (1984).
44. 56 Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d 533 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 394, 470 A.2d 353
(1984).
45. Id. at 18, 466 A.2d at 535-36.
46. Id. at 17, 466 A.2d at 535-36.
47. Id. at 19, 466 A.2d at 536.
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only substantive evidence linking the defendant to the shooting of
the victim.
In assessing whether the removal of the bullets was constitu-
tional, the court embraced the four-factor test elaborated in United
States v. Crowder.48 As a prerequisite to the admission of evidence
obtained by surgical methods, the following factors must exist:
(1) the evidence is relevant, can be obtained in no other
way, and there is probable cause to believe that the pro-
posed operation will produce it;
(2) the operation is a minor one, to be performed by a
skilled surgeon, with every possible precaution taken to
guard against any surgical complications, so that the risk of
permanent injury is minimal;
(3) prior to the operation, the individual is afforded a full
adversary hearing at which he is represented by counsel;
(4) before the operation the individual is afforded the op-
portunity for appellate review.
41
The Court concluded that the test had been met because: the only
evidence linking the defendant to the crime was the bullets in his
body; the surgery would be simple because the bullets were lodged
just beneath the skin's surface; the defendant had been represented
by both a public defender and a private attorney at the hearing
before the operation; and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
had affirmed the lower court's decision to permit extraction. 50
It is unclear whether this decision will pass constitutional mus-
ter after the recent Supreme Court decision on this matter. In Win-
ston v. Lee, 5 the Supreme Court held that police could not require a
suspect to undergo surgery for the removal of a bullet. The Court
concluded that the operation, which would have required general
anesthesia, would have endangered the suspect's life or health. Fur-
ther, the State could not show a compelling need for the evidence
because it was obtainable in other ways. The Winston balancing test
will give state courts a uniform standard by which to analyze this
issue and thus may bring a uniformity to this issue.52
48. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
49. Id. at 316.
50. 56 Md. App. at 19, 466 A.2d at 536. The court noted that although it had been
appropriate to consider defendant's fourth and fourteenth amendment arguments on
the search and seizure question, the trial court's action had been dictated by the full
faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, in light of the prior adjudication of the
matter in the District of Columbia court. 56 Md. App. at 20, 466 A.2d at 536-37.
51. 53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1985) (No. 83-1334).




In Straughn v. State5" the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the defendant's mug
shot-police identification photograph-as substantive evidence of
a prior identification.54 The Court of Appeals noted that, for this
use of police identification photographs, a trial court must balance
the probative value of the mug shot against its prejudicial impact on
the defendant because the photographs may imply that the defend-
ant has a prior criminal record.55 The Court of Appeals declined to
adopt the three-prong test set forth in United States v. Harington56 as
a rigid standard for admissibility of mug shots,57 but the court
accepted the Harrington test as a useful guide to trial courts.58 Fol-
U.S. 935 (1974) (court-ordered surgical removal of bullet from suspect's body was un-
reasonable), with Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (trial court prop-
erly ordered removal of bullet from accused's body where there was probable cause that
bullet was in accused's body and that it was connected with homicides, and where ac-
cused would not be harmed by removal).
53. 297 Md. 329, 465 A.2d 1166 (1983).
54. Id. at 336, 465 A.2d at 1170. A police officer who observed the storehouse
breaking for which the defendant was on trial selected the defendant's photograph from
an array of ten mug shots prior to trial. Id. at 331, 465 A.2d at 1168. After the police
officer made a positive in-court identification of the defendant and testified about the
pretrial photographic identification, id., the trial court admitted the entire photo array
into evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial identification, id. at 332, 465 A.2d at 1168.
55. Id. at 333-34, 465 A.2d at 1169. In considering use of the mug shots, the court
also affirmed that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts may not be used to prove
his guilt of the offense for which he is on trial, id. at 333, 465 A.2d at 1168, and con-
firmed that such evidence may be admissible if relevant to prove motive, intent, absence
of mistake, a common scheme or plan related to the commission of two or more closely
related crimes, and the identity of the defendant, id. at 333 n.3, 465 A.2d at 1169 n.3. A
decision to use the prior crime evidence for one of these purposes is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge.
56. 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that in order to be admissible:
1. The Government must have a demonstrable need to introduce the photo-
graphs; and
2. The photographs themselves, if shown to the jury, must not imply that the
defendant has a prior criminal record; and
3. The manner of introduction at trial must be such that it does not draw
particular attention to the source or implications of the photographs.
Id. at 494.
57. 297 Md. at 336, 465 A.2d at 1170. The Straughn court observed that application
of the Harrington test as a rigid standard would limit the trial court's discretion.
Subsequent decisions interpreting Harnington view the test "as a series of factors
to be balanced and applied in light of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 335, 465
A.2d at 1170. But see United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978) (applying
Harrington as a rigid test so that the failure to meet any one of the prerequisites pre-
cludes the use of the mug shots).
58. 297 Md. at 336, 465 A.2d at 1170.
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lowing the Fourth Circuit's approach in United States v. Johnson,59 the
Court of Appeals weighed all of the factors that might prejudice the
defendant.6" The court found that the need for the evidence-to
corroborate an in-court identification-was real, the photographs'
origin was masked, and the fact that the jury might recognize them
as mug shots and infer that the defendant had been arrested was
insufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error.6' Straughn
thus affirms earlier rulings allowing use of police identification pho-
tographs62 and further refines the test for admissibility.
In Roberts v. State,6" the Court of Appeals held, inter alia,64 that
evidence of the tracking by a dog of the scent of a suspected crimi-
nal is not per se inadmissible for identification purposes65 and that
the lineup from which the identification was made was not prejudi-
cial.6 6 The dog, after sniffing a ski cap worn by the assailant, identi-
fied the defendant from a group of police officers with whom the
dog had some familiarity.62
The court reviewed the trial court's application of the test for
admitting dog tracking evidence laid down in Terrell v. State.68 Not-
59. 623 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1981). In that case, the
Fourth Circuit seemed to consider essentially the same factors embodied in the Harring-
ton analysis, but Johnson did not preclude courts from considering other factors as well.
60. 297 Md. at 336-37, 465 A.2d at 1170.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Bowman, Brooks & Harris v. State, 16 Md. App. 384, 297 A.2d 323
(1972), cert. denied, 268 Md. 749 (1973); Austin v. State, 3 Md. App. 231, 238 A.2d 569
(1968), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Md. 313, 252 A.2d 797 (1969).
63. 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442 (1983).
64. The Court in Roberts also held: (1) that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny defendant's motion for a continuance in order to obtain certain test
evidence where the defendant had failed to show that the evidence in question was com-
petent and material, id. at 277-78, 469 A.2d at 449-50, and (2) that the defendant's mo-
tion to compel discovery was properly denied because former Maryland Rule 741 (now
MD. R.P. 4-263) did not require the State to produce more than the report it obtained
from the FBI and that the State was not required to go back to the FBI for more infor-
mation concerning the basis for the report, id. at 279, 469 A.2d at 450.
65. Id. at 270, 469 A.2d at 446.
66. Id. at 274-75, 469 A.2d at 448.
67. Id. at 267, 274-75, 469 A.2d at 444-45, 448. The tracking dog identified the
defendant twice. First, the defendant was placed in the middle of a line of four police
officers, one of which was in civilian clothes. The ski cap was then placed on the ground
some distance from the line. The dog was given the scent and the trailing command.
The dog indicated the defendant by sitting at his feet as he had been trained. The line-
up order was then rearranged with the defendant on the end. The procedure was re-
peated, and the dog again identified the defendant. Id. at 267, 469 A.2d 444-45.
68. Id. at 269-70, 469 A.2d at 445-46. Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 239 A.2d 128
(1968) held that dog tracking evidence could be admitted after a proper foundation had
been laid to show that a police officer had adequate probable cause to make a warrant-
less arrest.
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ing that the defendant did not question the trial court's threshold
determination that an adequate foundation had been laid,69 the
court then turned to the issue of whether dog tracking evidence is
admissible for identification purposes.70 In a majority of jurisdic-
tions use of such evidence is permissible; a few jurisdictions exclude
it as unreliable. 7' To determine if this particular evidence should be
admitted, the court reviewed the general literature and the training
history of the dog in question, finding that the dog was trained only
to follow the scent and that there was no evidence indicating that
this or any other trained dog would pick out a person simply be-
cause it was unfamiliar with that person. 72 Concluding that all track-
ing evidence involves, essentially, a lineup situation because the dog
is required to distinguish one particular scent from many, 73 the
court allowed the evidence to be admitted. 74 Thus, the court in Rob-
erts joined the majority of jurisdictions that admit dog tracking evi-
dence for identification purposes, but declined to establish a test for
evidentiary foundation.
In Colvin v. State75 the Court of Appeals approved for the first
time the threefold test for fingerprint evidence enunciated by the
Court of Special Appeals in Lawless v. State.76 The Court of Appeals
had stated previously that fingerprint evidence found at the scene of
a crime may be used to support an inference of criminal agency if it
is "coupled with evidence of other circumstances tending to reason-
ably exclude the hypothesis that the print was impressed at a time
other than that of the crime." 77 Lawless construed "other circum-
stances" to include "circumstances such as the location of the print,
69. 298 Md. at 269, 469 A.2d at 445.
70. Id. at 269-70, 469 A.2d at 445-46.
71. Id. The court found that 29 jurisidictions have held that such evidence is admis-
sible and that five jurisdictions exclude dog tracking evidence for identification alto-
gether as being too unreliable. Id. (citing Annot., 18 A.L.R.3D 1221 (1968 & Supp.
1983)). The court noted in particular a recent Connecticut decision that allowed dog
tracking evidence when a proper foundation is laid. See State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481,
488, 429 A.2d 931, 935 (1980).
72. 298 Md. at 270-73, 269 A.2d at 446-47. The court observed that the dog was
trained to follow scents and that it had a 99% success rate in practice training and an
85% success rate in actual cases. The court agreed with the trial court that the dog was
reliable and the trainer competent to interpret the dog's responses. Id. at 274, 469 A.2d
at 448.
73. Id. at 270, 469 A.2d at 446. The court noted that under the present circum-
stances it was unnecessary to lay down any test for foundation and questioned whether it
was even possible to create a "hard and fast test for all cases." Id.
74. Id. at 274, 469 A.2d at 447-48.
75. 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 226 (1984).
76. 3 Md. App. 652, 241 A.2d 155 (1968).
77. McNeil v. State, 227 Md. 298, 300, 176 A.2d 338, 339 (1961).
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the character of the place or premises where it was found, and the
accessibility of the general public to the object on which the print
was impressed." 78 The Court of Appeals in Colvin placed its impri-
matur on that threefold test.79
C. Hearsay*
1. Admission of a Party.-In Finke v. State"° the Court of Special
Appeals was faced with significant questions regarding the admissi-
bility of several different types of evidence at the defendant's crimi-
nal trial. Among these was the admissibility of an inculpatory
statement made by the defendant during questioning by police,
which was later received into evidence by the trial court."1 The de-
fendant contended on appeal that the statement was not given vol-
untarily but was improperly induced by the police in violation of
state nonconstitutional confession law."2 One of the inducements
cited by the defendant was a statement made by the detective, which
78. 3 Md. App. at 659, 241 A.2d at 159-60.
79. 299 Md. at 110-11, 472 A.2d at 964. Applying the threefold test to the Colvin
facts, the court found evidence of other circumstances sufficient to exclude the possibil-
ity that Colvin's fingerprints were impressed at the scene of the crime at a time other
than that of the crime. Id. at 111, 472 A.2d at 964-65.
* Related Development:
In Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822 (1983), the Court
of Appeals reaffirmed the well-settled rule in Maryland that a criminal conviction is
inadmissible in a civil case as evidence of the facts upon which it is based. Id. at 452, 463
A.2d at 826. The Maryland court's position is contrary to FED. R. EVID. 803(22), which
provides that convictions of "crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year" are admissible "to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment," but is in
accordance with the rule in a number of state courts. See cases cited in Kuhl, 296 Md. at
451, 463 A.2d at 825. But see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 895 (3d ed. 1984)
(trend is toward broader admissibility). The court also considered whether the
statements made by the defendant driver/insured to the police were admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Reviewing a number of exceptions, including state of
mind, business records, admission of party-opponent, and declaration against interest,
the court found that none of them was applicable, and upheld the exclusion of the
evidence. 296 Md. at 453-58; 463 A.2d at 826-29.
80. 56 Md. App. 450, 468 A.2d 353 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218
(1984).
81. Id. at 481-82, 468 A.2d at 369.
82. Id., 468 A.2d at 369-70. Defendant contended that the statement was illegally
induced in three ways: a promise that if a statement were made it would be to his advan-
tage, id. at 483, 468 A.2d at 371, a threat to use a three-year-old to identify him, which
would cause emotional harm to the three-year-old, id. at 484, 468 A.2d at 371, and a
threat to let "the aggrieved widower take the law into his own hands," id. at 486, 468
A.2d at 372. The court dismissed all three arguments, finding there had been no
improper promise by the police, no threatened harm against the defendant's cousin, and
no threat against the defendant.
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the defendant maintained was a threat of physical violence. 83 Rely-
ing on the defendant's calm reaction to the statement, the Court of
Special Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the detec-
tive's statement was a threat of physical violence.84 The Court of
Special Appeals concluded that "[s]uch an ambiguous statement
could only be a threat if appellant perceived it to be one. '"85 Thus,
the Court of Special Appeals determined that the defendant's state-
ment had not been induced by any violation of state nonconstitu-
tional law.86
The court also considered whether the statement had been in-
duced in violation of constitutional due process requirements. Re-
viewing eleven factors established in Leuschner v. State,87 the court
found that there was nothing to indicate a violation of due process.
Further arguments by the defendant, that the detective had lied to
him about other evidence and that religious arguments were used to
persuade him, were also not found to invalidate the statement on
due process grounds.88
The Finke court also considered whether the defendant's testi-
mony from his first trial could be read into evidence at his second
trial.89 The defendant had testified to counteract the effects of the
statements, introduced into evidence, that he had made to the po-
lice.9 ° The defendant's felony-murder conviction from the first trial
subsequently was reversed because the trial court had failed to make
a preliminary decision on the voluntariness of those statements
83. Id. In Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 121 A.2d 242 (1956), the Court of Appeals
stated that the threat of physical violence automatically invalidates confessions. Id. at
395, 121 A.2d at 244.
84. 56 Md. App. at 487, 468 A.2d at 372.
85. Id. The court accepted the rule established in Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390,
395, 121 A.2d 242, 244 (1956), that the effect of a threat on the will of an individual
need not be shown to invalidate a confession as involuntary. However, the court found
the effect on the individual to be relevant to the determination of whether a statement
was a threat. 56 Md. App. at 486-87, 468 A.2d at 372.
86. 56 Md. App. at 487, 468 A.2d at 372.
87. 45 Md. App. 323, 351, 413 A.2d 227, 243 (1980). The factors are: the age of the
accused, his character (timid or impressionable), his record, his education, his intelli-
gence, the legality of the arrest, conditions of incarceration, delay in presentment, re-
moval to a distant jail, prolongation of interrogation, and failure to give Miranda
warnings. 56 Md. App. at 488-89, 468 A.2d at 373. The court also relied on Leuschner in
holding tht the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of Finke's prior, unrelated
arrest and polygraph test on the issue of the voluntariness of his statements to police.
Id. at 503-04, 468 A.2d at 381.
88. 56 Md. App. at 490, 468 A.2d at 374.
89. Id. at 494-97, 468 A.2d at 376-77.
90. Id. at 494, 468 A.2d at 376.
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before they were introduced into evidence.9 On retrial it was de-
termined that the defendant's statements had been made volunta-
rily9 2 and the State read into evidence the defendant's testimony
from the first trial.93
Citing Harrison v. State,9 4 Finke argued on appeal that his testi-
mony at the first trial was inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous
tree" because it had been impelled by the improperly admitted
statements to the police.95 The court rejected this argument, hold-
ing Finke's testimony admissible "because, as it was eventually de-
termined, the tree was not poisonous."96 In so holding, the Court
of Special Appeals emphasized that the Harrison doctrine was inap-
plicable because the illegality that rendered Finke's confession inad-
missible was not its illegal acquisition, but the trial court's failure to
render a preliminary determination of voluntariness.97 Thus, the
Court of Special Appeals concluded that Harrison was applicable
only to cases involving substantive rather than procedural illegali-
ties. Such procedural illegalities can subsequently be cured, while
substantive illegalities such as the illegal acquisition of confessions,
cannot.
The Court of Special Appeals also upheld the trial court's re-
fusal to allow a defense psychiatric expert to give his opinion of the
voluntariness of Finke's admission.9" Finke sought to introduce the
91. Id. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a
trial court must provide procedures which are "fully adequate to insure a reliable and
clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession." Id. at 391. The
Supreme Court further stated that a determination of the voluntariness of a confession
prior to its admission into evidence was both practical and desirable. Id. at 395.
92. 56 Md. App. at 497, 468 A.2d at 377.
93. Id. at 494, 468 A.2d at 376.
94. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
95. 56 Md. App. at 494, 468 A.2d at 376. In Harrison the defendant's murder convic-
tion was reversed on the ground that confessions admitted into evidence had been ille-
gally obtained. 392 U.S. at 220. On retrial the prosecution read into evidence
testimony given by the defendant at the first trial following the admission of the confes-
sions. Id. at 221. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's testimony at the first
trial was inadmissible at the second trial because it was "fruit" of the illegally obtained
confessions. Id. at 223.
96. 56 Md. App. at 497, 468 A.2d at 377.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 502, 468 A.2d at 380. The psychiatrist had been permitted to testify at the
suppression hearing. Finke contended on appeal that this required the trial court to
allow him to testify at trial, citing Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 399, 76 A.2d 729, 736
(1950), in which it was stated that "the jury is entitled to have before it all of the evi-
dence which affects the voluntary character of the document, and which the court passed
upon in admitting it." The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that this language in
Day was dicta, which merely described a generally accepted procedure in Maryland, but
which did not create a new rule of evidence. 56 Md. App. at 500-01, 468 A.2d at 379.
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expert testimony to show that the statements he gave to the police
were not given voluntarily.9" In the first Maryland case to address
the issue of the admissibility of psychiatric testimony relating to vol-
untariness, the Court of Special Appeals determined that such testi-
mony was relevant.1°° However, the Court of Special Appeals held
that the trial judge's conclusion-that the jury would not receive ap-
preciable help from the expert's reply to a hypothetical question-
was not an abuse of discretion.'0°
The Court of Special Appeals also approved the trial court's
admission of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness'
testimony that had been impeached on cross-examination.' 0 2 The
court found it irrelevant that the attack was on the memory of the
witness rather than on his veracity. 03
2. Additional Exceptions.-In Foster v. State'0 4 the Court of Ap-
peals held that application of the hearsay rule to exclude exculpa-
tory testimony in a capital punishment case constituted a due
process violation.'0 5 At Foster's murder trial, the prosecution and
the defense presented conflicting versions of the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime. Testifying for the State, the accused's husband
and daughter implicated Foster as the murderer.' 0 6  Foster,
however, testified that her husband and daughter had killed the
victim. 107
99. 56 Md. App. at 497, 468 A.2d at 377.
100. Id. at 499, 468 A.2d at 378.
101. Id. at 502, 468 A.2d at 380. The fact that the psychiatric expert had never ex-
amined the accused was an important factor in the trial judge's decision to exclude the
psychiatric expert's testimony. Id. at 501-02, 468 A.2d at 380.
102. Id. at 494, 468 A.2d at 376. Two elements must exist in order for an out-of-court
statement to be admissible as a prior consistent statement: 1) the witness whose prior
statement is offered must have been impeached so as to indicate that his present testi-
mony is a fabrication, and 2) the prior statement must have been made before the time
of probable fabrication. Id. at 492, 468 A.2d at 375. In Finke the court determined that
the State's cross-examination of Blevins amounted to an attempt to show fabrication
because if Blevins was shown to not accurately remember the facts to which he testified,
he was fabricating his testimony. Id. at 493, 468 A.2d at 376.
103. Id. at 493-94, 468 A.2d at 375-76. In the present case, the cross-examination of
Blevins, a witness for the State, concentrated on the difficulty of remembering what one
did at a specific time on a particular day many years ago. Id. at 493, 468 A.2d at 375. In
Boone v. State, 33 Md. App. 1, 363 A.2d 550 (1976), the Court of Special Appeals up-
held the introduction of prior statements to rehabilitate testimony that was impeached
by an expert witness' opinion that the memories of two witnesses at the time of trial may
have been impaired by drug abuse. Id. at 6, 363 A.2d at 554.
104. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 985 (1984).
105. Id. at 212, 464 A.2d at 997.
106. Id. at 194-95, 464 A.2d at 988.
107. Id. at 195, 464 A.2d at 988.
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In an effort to impeach the testimony of the accused's husband,
the defense sought to call the victim's friend as a witness.' 0 8 The
friend was to testify about a conversation in which the victim stated
that the accused's husband had threatened to kill the victim.' 0 9 The
court noted that, in refusing to admit the proffered hearsay testi-
mony, the trial judge found "that there was a 'necessity for it,' but
that it was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted."" 0
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment with
respect to the hearsay testimony, in light of the Supreme Court's
holdings in Chambers v. Mississippil"' and Green v. Georgia.112 In Cham-
bers the Supreme Court held that, in circumstances "where constitu-
tional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends of justice."' " The Chambers Court set forth certain
indicia of reliability to serve as guidelines in determining whether
hearsay testimony could be admitted, including: whether the state-
ment was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance; whether the
statement was corroborated by some other evidence; and whether
the statement was against interest." 4 Green established that a single
rule of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, could not be applied if its
application resulted in the exclusion of evidence "relevant to a criti-
cal issue.""' 5 In both Chambers and Green, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that its decision rested upon the "unique circumstances"
of the case. "1
6
The Court of Appeals in Foster ruled that the excluded testi-
mony of the victim's friend constituted "a critical additional piece of
evidence" tending to support Foster's account of the murder." 7
Such testimony was "highly relevant" to a central issue, the credibil-
ity of the three primary witnesses."' The court also found "suffi-
108. Id. at 200, 464 A.2d at 991.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 201, 464 A.2d at 992.
111. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
112. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
113. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
114. Id. at 300-01. The Chambers discussion was in the context of hearsay testimony
concerning a confession by one other than the accused. Green also involved the confes-
sion of one other than the accused. The three dissenting judges in Foster found those
two cases inapplicable on that basis. 297 Md. at 222, 464 A.2d at 1002 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
115. Green, 442 U.S. at 97.
116. Id.; see Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03.
117. 297 Md. at 211,464 A.2d at 996.
118. Id., 464 A.2d at 997.
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cient indicia of reliability .. .to assure the proffered testimony's
trustworthiness.""' 9 The husband's threat was made spontaneously
during an argument with the victim and was a statement against in-
terest. The victim's extrajudicial statement was also made spontane-
ously, to a close acquaintance, and under circumstances in which
she had no reason to lie. Both the accused's husband's threat and
the victim's reporting of that threat to her friend were corroborated
by other evidence.' 20 The Court of Appeals concluded that the ex-
clusion of the hearsay testimony violated the appellant's right to due
process.
D. Circumstantial Evidence
In Hourie v. State, 2 ' the Court of Appeals addressed Maryland's
application of the two-witness rule 22 to perjury. The court held
that evidence showing that the defendant had fraudulently applied
for food stamps and welfare was sufficient to support conviction,
even though it consisted only of circumstantial evidence and the tes-
timony of one witness. This is in accord with prior Maryland cases
where circumstantial evidence was allowed to take the place of a
"living Witness."1 2 3
In Finke v. State1 24 the Court of Special Appeals addressed the
level of proof required to support a conviction of felony murder1
25
based on circumstantial evidence. The court reiterated the well-set-
tled proposition that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction 12 6 and noted that the inquiry is " 'whether, after
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 298 Md. 50, 467 A.2d 1016 (1983).
122. A conviction for perjury should not be obtained solely on the evidence of a sin-
gle witness. The falsity of evidence relied on for conviction of perjury must be estab-
lished by the evidence of two independent witnesses or by that of one witness and
corroborating circumstances. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 523 (3d ed. 1982).
123. Brown v. State, 225 Md. 610, 617, 171 A.2d 456, 459 (1961) (sufficient evidence
of perjury to submit the question to the jury despite the fact that no direct testimony was
offered relevant to the falsity of the defendant's statements); see State v. Devers, 260 Md.
360, 372, 272 A.2d 794, 800 (1971) ("It is enough that there is testimony of one witness
and other independent corroborative evidence is of such a nature so as to be of equal
weight to that of at least a second witness .... .
124. 56 Md. App. 450, 468 A.2d 353 (1983).
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1982) provides that felony murder includes mur-
der committed in the perpetration of daytime housebreaking. The definition of daytime
housebreaking contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(b) (1982) includes breaking a
dwelling house with intent to commit murder.




viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' "127
In Finke the court also held that because there was circumstan-
tial evidence that the defendant entered the victim's house with
trespassory intent and murdered the victim, the jury could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the requisite intent element un-
derlying the felony of daytime housebreaking with intent to mur-
der. 128 The court reasoned that, in the absence of other evidence of
intent, the best evidence of what the defendant intended to do is
what he did. 129 Thus, an intent to murder may be inferred from the
murder itself. The court held that this inference satisfied both fed-
eral and state tests.1
3 0
E. Character and Reputation
1. Witness Impeachment.-Prior Bad Acts.-In State v. Cox,' 3 1 the
Court of Appeals examined the rule .allowing impeachment by use
of a prior conviction and prior misconduct. In considering what evi-
dence may be used in a cross-examination to impeach a witness, the
court appears to have substantially relaxed the limits on impeach-
ment evidence. The court held that the trial court improperly
denied defense counsel the opportunity to impeach on cross-exami-
nation the testimony of a prosecuting witness in a rape case. 132 At
127. Id. at 466, 468 A.2d at 361 (quotingJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(emphasis in original)). This constitutional standard of review was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia and followed by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 240, 424 A.2d 720, 727-28 (1981), Maryland courts had taken the
position that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence need not be excluded for a con-
viction based solely on circumstancial evidence to stand. Young v. State, 14 Md. App.
538, 558, 288 A.2d 198, 210 (1972); Graham v. State, 13 Md. App. 171, 178, 282 A.2d
162, 166-67 (1971).
128. 56 Md. App. at 480, 468 A.2d at 369.
129. Id. at 480-81, 468 A.2d at 369. In Felkner v. State, 218 Md. 300, 307, 146 A.2d
424, 429 (1958), the Court of Appeals determined that the commission of a larceny was
evidence that the breaking was with the intent to steal. Since nothing was stolen from
the victim in Finke, the court was unable to find that the defendant had an intent to steal.
56 Md. App. at 480, 468 A.2d at 368.
130. 56 Md. App. at 481, 468 A.2d at 369. The court noted that a conviction of felony
murder based upon an underlying felony of housebreaking with intent to murder would
be inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty of premeditated murder. 56 Md. App. at
481 n.8, 468 A.2d at 369 n.8. However, a conviction on one count need not be vacated
because of an inconsistent acquittal on another count. Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528,
541, 209 A.2d 765, 771 (1965); Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 293, 100 A.2d 789, 793
(1953).
131. 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983).
132. Id. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324. Defense counsel sought to impeach the testimony of
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trial, defense counsel was precluded from impeaching the credibility
of the prosecuting witness by establishing that she had previously
accused another of criminal assault under oath and later recanted
that testimony on cross-examination.1 33 Finding the trial court's re-
fusal to allow the cross-examination to be reversible error, the court
noted that the inquiry would have been highly probative and rele-
vant to the witness' credibility because the prior misconduct con-
sisted of lying under oath in a similar situation. 134 The court stated
that the "proffered question would have gone to the very heart of
the witness' credibility."'' 35 Thus, the court would have allowed the
use of one prior bad act, not resulting in a conviction, to impeach
the testimony of a witness.
The general rule in Maryland is that witnesses may be cross-
examined on matters and facts affecting their credibility, as long as
such facts are not immaterial or irrelevant to the issue being
tried. 3 6 In practice, courts have allowed the admission of extrinsic
evidence regarding a prior conviction of a witness for impeachment
purposes137 but have not allowed the use of mere accusations of
crime or acts of misconduct for this purpose. 3 8 Although cross-
examination of a witness about prior bad acts that were relevant to
the witness' credibility was allowed in at least one old case,' 3 9 the
rule was clearly stated recently that evidence concerning specific
acts of misconduct, other than criminal convictions, is inadmissible
for impeachment purposes. 140 Yet the court in Cox ignored this
statement of the rule and allowed the use of evidence concerning
the witness's prior falsification of testimony to impeach her
credibility.
Cox thus establishes a new rule that a witness may be cross-ex-
amined about prior bad acts that are relevant to an evaluation of her
the witness because her identification of the defendant was the only direct evidence link-
ing the defendant to the crime: Id. at 177, 468 A.2d at 321.
133. Id. at 176-77, 468 A.2d at 320-2 1. The trial judge suggested that defense coun-
sel needed to show multiple acts of misconduct rather than one isolated instance in
order to impeach the witness. Id. at 177, 468 A.2d at 320-21.
134. Id. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324.
135. Id.
136. E.g., Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664 (1958).
137. See Taylor v. State, 226 Md. 561, 567, 174 A.2d 573, 576 (1961): Linkins v. State,
202 Md. 212, 220-21, 96 A.2d 246, 250 (1953).
138. See Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 340, 439 A.2d 534, 541
(1982).
139. See, e.g., Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 380, 191 A. 575, 579 (1937) (proper to ask
defendant in automobile accident case whether he lied on his chauffeur's license applica-
tion, as such act reflects on his credibility).
140. See Martens Chevrolet, 292 Md. at 340, 439 A.2d at 541, and cases cited therein.
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credibility, even when there is no conviction for those bad acts.
However, the court stated that before allowing cross-examination
about prior misconduct, the trial judge must be "satisfied that there
is a reasonable basis for the question, that the primary purpose of
the inquiry is not to harass or embarrass the witness, and that there
is little likelihood of obscuring the issue on trial."'' Since these
elements were satisfied in Cox, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing defense counsel to
cross-examine as proffered. 1
42
The Court of Appeals decided Robinson v. State143 the day after
it decided State v. Cox. Robinson also concerned the admissibility of
evidence of prior misconduct for impeachment purposes. In Robin-
son, defense counsel in a murder trial attempted to impeach a key
witness who was a long-term resident of a mental hospital.' 44 The
trial court precluded inquiry into certain incidents involving the wit-
ness's conduct while a patient at the mental hospital.' 4 5 The Court
of Appeals agreed that the acts in question did not logically relate to
credibility and found no error in the decision to exclude. 146 In
reaching this decision, the court stated a new principle: In assessing
a witness' credibility, "[t]he probative value of acts committed while
a person is mentally incapacitated is negligible."'
' 47
In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged its decision in Cox that a witness may be cross-examined
141. 298 Md. at 179, 468 A.2d at 322. The court also emphasized that the cross-
examiner is bound by the witness's denial of prior misconduct, and may not prove the
discrediting acts by extrinsic evidence. Id. at 183, 468 A.2d at 322. Cf. Smith v. State,
273 Md. 152, 157, 328 A.2d 274, 277 (extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent state-
ments on collateral or irrelevant issues may not be used to impeach witness's
credibility).
142. 298 Md. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324.
143. 298 Md. 193, 468 A.2d 328 (1983).
144. Id. at 195, 468 A.2d at 329-30. Although the witness had been found not guilty
by reason of insanity of another crime, a doctor testified that the witness was able to
comprehend his obligation to tell the truth and could accurately relate past events. Id.,
468 A.2d at 330.
145. Id. at 195-96, 468 A.2d at 330. These incidents involved an attack upon a fellow
patient, the setting of fires, possession of a contraband cigarette lighter, the planning of
an escape, and leaving the mental hospital in violation of a court order.
146. Id. at 198, 468 A.2d at 331. The court indicated that the proffered incidents
suggest character traits related to "violence, pyromania, and a desire to escape confine-
ment" rather than credibility. Id.
147. Id. Once a person has been determined to be insane, he "is presumed to remain
in that state of mental incapacity for the duration of confinement." Id. Because the
witness's mental condition precluded his conviction, the court determined that acts
committed by the witness while he was mentally incapacitated had very little relevance to
his credibility.
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about prior bad acts for which there was no conviction when the acts
are relevant to assessing credibility.' 48 In the absence of a convic-
tion, however, the court cautioned that the trial judge must be espe-
cially careful in determining the proper scope of cross-examination
relating to bad acts.' 4 9 The Court of Appeals anticipated that trial
judges would permit cross-examination of a witness with respect to
prior bad acts only if there were a close nexus between the acts and
the witness's credibility and a showing of a firm basis for believing
that the conduct actually occurred.' 5 °
2. Reputation of Witness.-Barnes v. State15 ' represents the first
time that a Maryland court has approved the admission of a charac-
ter witness's opinion of the reputation of another witness. Section
9-115 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Mary-
land Code15 2 permits a witness to express an opinion regarding the
general character of another witness provided that the opinion is
"relevant" and has "an adequate basis." In prior cases, Maryland
courts have held such character evidence to be inadmissible for lack
of an adequate basis.' 53 For example, in Durkin v. State,'54 the Court
of Appeals stated that "a brief and limited encounter with the wit-
ness" could not provide a character witness with an adequate ba-
sis. 155 In Barnes, however, the fact that the witness offering the
opinion, a police chief, had interviewed the other witness three or
four times over a two-year period, and had been "faintly ac-
148. Id. at 197, 468 A.2d at 331.
149. Id. at 200, 468 A.2d at 332. In exercising this discretion, the trial judge must
weigh the probative value of the proffered "bad act" evidence against the potential prej-
udice to the witness. Id. at 201, 468 A.2d at 332. Cross-examination about prior bad
acts not resulting in convictions may be disallowed even though the same questioning
would be permitted if there was a conviction. This is so because conviction provides
greater certainty that the bad act or acts did in fact occur. Id., 468 A.2d at 332-33.
150. Id., 468 A.2d at 333. This statement by the Court of Appeals serves to clarify the
Cox holding.
151. 57 Md. App. 50, 468 A.2d 1040, cert. denied, 299 Md. 655, 474 A.2d 1344 (1984).
152. MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-115 (1984). This section was initially en-
acted in 1971 as MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 13C (repealed and recodified 1973). The
legislature's purpose in enacting the statute was "to abrogate the common law rule
which limited a character witness' testimony to the defendant's reputation." Kelley v.
State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980).
153. See Chadderton v. State, 54 Md. App. 86, 96,456 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1983); Kelley
v. State, 288 Md. 298, 303, 418 A.2d 217, 220 (1980); Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453-
54, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979).
154. 284 Md. 445, 397 A.2d 600 (1979).
155. Id. at 453, 397 A.2d at 605. In that case, the trial court had excluded proffered
veracity testimony about a witness which was based solely on an allegedly false larceny
report made by the witness on one occasion. Id. at 447, 397 A.2d at 602.
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quainted" with her for several years prior to this two-year period'56
constituted an adequate basis for the admission of opinion testi-
mony.' 57 Thus, Barnes serves to clarify the amount of contact neces-
sary to satisfy the adequate basis requirement of section 9-115.58
F. Documentary Evidence
In In re Robert G. 159 the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial
court's determination that a prosecutor may review court records of
a defendant when deciding whether to seek the death penalty.'
60
Maryland law prohibits disclosure of the contents of a juvenile rec-
ord "except by order of the court upon good cause shown. ' 161 The
court, interpreting the statute for the first time, upheld the trial
court's ruling that good cause existed for divulging the records.' 62
In reaching its determination that a prosecutor's need for all
pertinent information in making a decision about seeking the death
penalty could constitute the requisite good cause, the court looked
to the traditional definition of good cause 163 and exhaustively re-
viewed case law in Maryland and elsewhere that interpreted the
concept of good cause in other contexts. 1 64 Finding that a trial
156. 57 Md. App. at 57, 468 A.2d at 1043.
157. Id. at 59, 468 A.2d at 1044.
158. In Barnes the Court of Special Appeals also upheld the trial court's admission of a
supervisor's testimony as to his worker's non-smoking habits in a criminal prosecution
for arson. Id. at 60, 468 A.2d at 1045. This decision affirms the well-settled principle in
Maryland that testimony regarding a person's habitual response to a repeated specific
situation may be received to show that a person acted in accordance with his habits on a
particular occasion. See, e.g., Leaman v. League Lumber Co., 239 Md. 258, 262-63, 211
A.2d 296, 298 (1965) (evidence of prior dealings between parties admissible in action on
lost note to prove manner in which defendant normally signed), cited in Barnes, 57 Md.
App. at 60, 468 A.2d at 1045.
159. 296 Md. 175, 461 A.2d 1 (1983).
160. Robert G. was charged with first degree murder, first degree sex offense and
related offenses arising from a single incident. Id. at 177, 461 A.2d at 2.
161. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-828(b) (1984).
162. 296 Md. at 188, 461 A.2d at 7.
163. Id. at 179, 461 A.2d at 3. The court adopted the definition of "good cause"
found in BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 623 (5th ed. 1979):
Substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally sufficient ground or
reason. Phrase "good cause" depends upon circumstances of individual case,
and finding of its existence lies largely in discretion of officer or court to which
decision is committed. . . . Good cause is a relative and highly abstract term,
and its meaning must be determined not only by verbal context of statute in
which term is employed but also by context of action and procedures involved
in type of case presented.
164. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 390-91, 456 A.2d 29, 37, cert. denied,
461 U.S. 948 (1983) (good cause for exclusion of proffered alibi evidence not disclosed
prior to trial); Mathias v. State, 284 Md. 22, 25-27, 394 A.2d 292, 294-95 (1978), cert.
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judge's good cause determination should be reviewed ony for abuse
of discretion, 6 5 the court in Robert G. held that determination to be
valid.'6 6 In doing so, the court affirmed that the good cause stan-
dard in the statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile records
simply requires a judge to make a reasonable weighing of the re-
spective interests involved.
G. Enhanced Testimony
In State v. Collins'6 7 the Court of Appeals changed the former
Maryland rule that permitted liberal admission of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony,' 68 thereby bringing Maryland in line with other
states.' 69 The court ruled that hypnotically enhanced testimony
should be evaluated by the same standard as other evidence based
on scientific procedures, and applied the test set forth in Frye v.
United States,' 70 which admits such evidence only when the proce-
dure is generally accepted in the scientific community. 17 ' Because
hypnotically enhanced memory has not been shown to meet the Frye
test, the Collins court found it to be inadmissible. 72 The court
elected not to spell out general standards of scientific reliability, but
rather left the specific standards open for case-by-case develop-
ment. 173  Although it disallowed the use of the hypnotically
enhanced testimony in Collins, the court did state that hypnotically
enhanced testimony that is consistent with pre-hypnotic statements
denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979) (good cause for changing election of court trial to that ofjury
trial); Stanford v. District Title Ins. Co., 260 Md. 550, 555, 273 A.2d 190, 192-93 (1971)
(good cause for suspension of rule 530 requiring dismissal for lack of prosecution); Kay
Constr. Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479, 489, 177 A.2d 694, 700 (1962) (good cause
for reconsideration of zoning resolution). The court also looked at other Maryland
cases, and cases from Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.
165. 296 Md. at 179-80, 461 A.2d at 3.
166. Id. at 188, 461 A.2d at 7.
167. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
168. See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968), cert. denied,
252 Md. 731, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (hypnotic enhancement of testimony may
affect witness credibility, but not admissibility of testimony).
169. See Recent Decision, State v. Collins-Limiting the Admissibility of Hypnotically En-
hanced Testimony, 43 MD. L. REV. 595, 609 (1984).
170. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye was adopted by Maryland in Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), in the context of evaluating expert witness testimony
based on voiceprint evidence.
171. 296 Md. at 680-81, 464 A.2d at 1034.
172. Id. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044.
173. Id. at 702-03, 464 A.2d at 1044-45.
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is admissible without proof of scientific reliability.' 7 4
The Collins analysis was applied in two cases decided the same
day, Simkus v. State175 and State v. Metscher. 17 6 Thus, Maryland's cur-
rent rule is that hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissible if it is
either consistent with pre-hypnotic statements 177 or is found to be
scientifically reliable.
In Norwood v. State'7 1 the Court of Special Appeals held that two
criminal defendants failed to preserve the issue of the admissibility
of the victim's hypnotically enhanced testimony by not objecting to
its admission on the ground that such testimony is unreliable.'
79
Relying on the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Collins v.
State,18 0 a decision rendered after their trial, the appellants in Nor-
wood argued that none of the victim's testimony relating to her post-
hypnotic identifications was admissible. The Norwood court declined
to address the issue of admissibility because the defendants failed to
object to the victim's hypnotically enhanced testimony in spite of the
"warning flag" raised by Polk v. State.'8 t In Polk, decided five
months before the defendants' trial, the Court of Special Appeals
had specifically questioned the scientific reliability of hypnosis.' 82
174. Id. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044. For a detailed analysis of Collins, see Recent Deci-
sion, supra note 169.
175. 296 Md. 718, 464 A.2d 1055 (1983).
176. 297 Md. 368, 464 A.2d 1052 (1983).
177. In Simkus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, which had excluded hyp-
notically enhanced testimony except to the degree that it was consistent with pre-hyp-
notic statements. 296 Md. at 723, 464 A.2d at 1058. The court suggested that the best
procedure would be to introduce a videotape of statements made by the witness prior to
hypnosis. Id. at 727, 464 A.2d at 1060. In Metscher, the court held that hypnotically
enhanced testimony not consistent with pre-hypnotic statements should have been ex-
cluded due to its lack of scientific reliability. 297 Md. at 374-75, 464 A.2d at 1055.
178. 55 Md. App. 503, 462 A.2d 93 (1983).
179. Id. at 506, 462 A.2d at 95. The victim had been hypnotized prior to identifying
Howard, one of the defendants, from a photographic array, and Norwood, the other
defendant, from a lineup. Id. at 505, 462 A.2d at 94. Norwood also argued that the
identification procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. at 507, 462 A.2d at 95. Although
the victim was unable to identify Norwood from an initial photographic array that in-
cluded his picture, she selected him from a lineup weeks later. The victim did not realize
that Norwood's picture had been in one of the three photographic arrays she had re-
viewed prior to the lineup. Noting the absence of any suggestive circumstances, the
Court of Special Appeals dismissed Norwood's objection by stating that it would be
"outlandish" to hold that a suspect may not be placed in a lineup or subsequently identi-
fied because a victim previously had failed to identify his photograph. Id.
180. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), afd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.12d 1028
(1983).
181. 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041, cert. denied, 290 Md. 719 (1981).
182. Id. at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048. However, the general acceptability vel non of hyp-
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Because Polk provided authority for an objection, the Norwood de-
fendants should have objected to any hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony on the ground that hypnosis had not "gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community as a reliable tech-
nique of memory retrieval."'
' 83
The Norwood decision is troublesome because it required an ob-
jection to hypnotically enhanced testimony before any Maryland
court had specifically held that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
inadmissible. This decision suggests that all conceivable objections
based on any kind of judicial forewarning must be made in order to
avoid waiving those objections on appeal.
H. Sufficiency of Evidence
In State v. Leach,"8 4 the Court of Appeals considered the ques-
tion of what evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant of the
crimes of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and con-
trolled paraphernalia.' 8 5 The defendant and his brother were ar-
rested in a one-bedroom apartment in Baltimore City. At the time
of the arrest drugs and paraphernalia were found in the apartment,
in closed containers and a closet.' 86 The trial court convicted de-
fendant and his brother of the possession crimes based on the
brother's obvious occupancy of the apartment and the fact that the
defendant had keys to the apartment and listed it as his residence.
This occupancy established possession. Finding that this evidence
of the defendant's actual or constructive possession was insufficient
to convict, the Court of Appeals reversed that conviction1
8 7
In reaching its determination, the court looked at the definition
of possession in the relevant statute: " 'Possession' means 'the exer-
cise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by
one or more persons.' "18 To be sufficient to convict, the evidence
must support a rational inference that the defendant exercised some
restraining or directing influence over the items.' 89 Whether de-
nosis was not judicially determined in Polk, as the Court of Special Appeals remanded
the case to the trial court for determination of that issue. Id.
183. 55 Md. App. at 506, 462 A.2d at 95.
184. 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d 872 (1983).
185. Id. at 592-93, 463 A.2d at 872-73. Those possession crimes are violations of MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287(a), (d) (1982).
186. 296 Md. at 594, 463 A.2d at 873.
187. Id. at 597, 463 A.2d at 875.
188. Id. at 595, 463 A.2d at 874 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 277(s) (1982)).
189. Id. at 596, 463 A.2d at 874 (citing Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 142, 321 A.2d
767, 777 (1974)). Comparing Garrison to the instant case, the court clarified how there
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fendant did so turned on whether he resided where the prohibited
substances were found. Although he had ready access to the apart-
ment and had identified the address of the apartment as his own,
other evidence indicated that defendant had been residing else-
where.' 90 Moreover, since the trial court found that defendant's
brother was the occupant of the one-bedroom apartment, the Court
of Appeals noted that it could not be "reasonably inferred" that de-
fendant exercised control over things not in plain view.' 91 Accord-
ingly, the court held the evidence of possession insufficient to
convict.' 92 In so doing, the court affirmed that while possession
may be constructive, if possession is not actual, there must be suffi-
cient facts linking the accused to the prohibited items to support a
finding that they were his.' 9
3
I. Newly Discovered Evidence
In one recent case, Stevenson v. State,' 94 the Court of Appeals
had the opportunity to determine the standard to be applied in de-
ciding whether to grant a new trial when newly discovered evidence
is presented. The court declined to rule on a standard, however,
and found instead that the newly discovered evidence was not
material.
In Stevenson the court held that a trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a defendant's motion for a new trial. The mo-
tion was based on newly discovered evidence clearly indicating that
one of the State's expert witnesses had perjured himself in listing
his academic credentials.' 95 In considering this new evidence as
could be joint occupancy of the premises but not joint possession of items on the prem-
ises. Here, where there was a finding by the Court of Appeals that only defendant's
brother, and not defendant, occupied the premises, the possession evidence was even
weaker than in Garrison, where the court found joint occupancy but not joint possession.
Id. at 596-97, 463 A. 2d at 874-75.
190. Id. at 595, 463 A.2d at 874.
191. Id. at 596, 463 A.2d at 874.
192. Id. at 597, 463 A.2d at 875.
193. The dissent argued that the court had ignored "the first principle of appellate
review of nonjury criminal cases," i.e., that the judgment of the lower court should not
be set aside on the evidence unless "clearly erroneous." Judge Murphy cautioned that
the question was whether the trial court had sufficient evidence to convict; in his view,
the evidence of record did not indicate that the trial judge's finding of sufficiency was
clearly erroneous. Id. at 599-600, 463 A.2d at 876 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
194. 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984).
195. The defendant was accused of the first degree murder of her husband whose
death was caused by severe burns. The victim lived for nineteen days after the assault
and during that time made several statements essentially saying that the defendant
poured gasoline on him while he was in his bedroom and then ignited him with a match.
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grounds for a new trial, the trial court found that the other evidence
of guilt was so overwhelming that the verdict would have been the
same despite the perjured testimony, 96 a finding which the Court of
Appeals upheld.
The pertinent procedural rule provided that a court in a crimi-
nal case "may grant a new trial . . . on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence."'' 97  The court declined to decide whether the
standard under that rule to be used in deciding to grant a new trial
should be (1) whether the evidence would probably alter the judg-
ment or (2) whether the evidence might alter thejudgment. 9 s How-
ever, the court did state that regardless of which standard is
followed, there must first be a showing that the new evidence is ma-
terial, because a finding of materiality is a prerequisite to both the
"would probably alter" and the "might alter" standard.' 99 Because
the materiality prerequisite was not met in Stevenson, the question of
the new trial standard was not decided.20 0
The defendant also argued that use of the perjured testimony
The defendant claimed that the fire started spontaneously. To rebut this contention, the
State called a number of expert witnesses, including Dennis Michaelson. In the qualify-
ing part of Michaelson's testimony, he falsely stated that he had graduated cum laude
from the Illinois School of Technology. The State's Attorney had no prior knowledge of
the witness's false statements. Upon discovering the true facts, nearly two years after
the trial, the State's Attorney informed the defendant's attorney, who then filed a mo-
tion for a new trial. Id. at 299-300, 473 A.2d at 451.
196. The trial judge was convinced " 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the state
presented a case without the testimony of Mr. Michaelson that overwhelmingly pointed
to the guilt of the accused.' " Id. at 301, 473 A.2d at 451.
197. Md. R.P. 770(b) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). Former rule 770 has been re-
vised and renumbered as MD. R.P. 4-331. Section (b) of former rule 770 is substantially
identical to section (c) of rule 4-331.
198. 299 Md. at 301, 473 A.2d at 451-52. The defendant argued that the trial court
erred when it held that the standard for granting a new trial was whether the newly
discovered evidence "would probably alter thejudgment." The defendant urgued adop-
tion of the less stringent standard of whether the new evidence "might alter the judg-
ment," on the basis that "a murder conviction 'may not rest on probabilities.' " Id.
199. Id. at 302-04, 473 A.2d at 452-53. The court discussed Larrison v. United States,
24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), which "held that a new trial must be awarded if it is estab-
lished: a) that a material witness has testified falsely, and b) that without his testimony
the jury might have reached a different conclusion." 299 Md. at 302, 473 A.2d at 452
(emphasis added) (restating test enunciated in Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87).
The court also examined decisions in jurisdictions that have rejected the Larrison
"might" rule and that adhere to the majority "probably" rule. All required an initial
finding of materiality. See id. at 302-04, 473 A.2d at 452-53.
200. 299 Md. at 301-02, 473 A.2d at 452. The court indicated that because "the trial
judge expressly found ...that the state's evidence without Michaelson's testimony
overwhelmingly pointed to [the defendant's] guilt ... in essence, the trial judge
implicitly concluded that the newly discovered evidence was not material to the outcome
of the case." id.
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had violated her right to a fair trial, and thus the court should grant
her a new trial. In considering this argument, the court rejected the
adoption of a per se rule that would find a violation of due process
whenever a State's paid expert witness testifies falsely. 20 ' Instead,
the court, relying on federal case law, found that the proper rule
"requires that an initial inquiry be made to determine if the testi-
mony is material to the outcome of the case; if it is not, the due
process clause does not automatically require a new trial. 20 2 Ap-
plying the rule, the court found that the false testimonial evidence
was not material in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
J. Other Developments
1. Blood Chemical Test in Drunk Driving Cases.-In State v. Werk-
heiser,2°3 the Court of Appeals held that a blood chemical test is not
a prerequisite to prosecution for driving while under the influence
of alcohol.20 4 Werkheiser was involved in a single car accident. Due
to the odor of alcohol on Werkheiser and in his car, the police of-
ficer investigating the accident had reasonable grounds to suspect
Werkheiser of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of
alcohol. Werkheiser was taken to a hospital for treatment; no blood
test was administered. Werkheiser was subsequently charged with
driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alco-
hol,20 5 but the trial judge granted his motion to dismiss the charges
on the ground that the State failed to comply with the terms of the
statute requiring a police officer to obtain a blood chemical test
from a suspected drunk driver who is unconscious.20 6 On appeal,
201. See id. at 305, 473 A.2d at 453.
202. The Court of Appeals considered Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.10
(1982) (new trial required only when tainted evidence material); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (failure to disclose that a key witness had been promised
immunity was material, requiring reversal of conviction); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1967) (reversing conviction where State knowingly used false testimony pertaining to
vital piece of evidence); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (implying that due
process is violated only when perjured testimony is material). See also United States v.
Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1981) (new trials required only when there is know-
ing and intentional use of false evidence that is material); Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979,
986 (7th Cir. 1980).
203. 299 Md. 529, 474 A.2d 898 (1984).
204. Id. at 539, 474 A.2d at 904.
205. Id. at 531, 474 A.2d at 899. Driving or attempting to drive while under the influ-
ence of alcohol constitutes a violation of MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-902(b) (1984).
206. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(d)(1)(iii) (1984) states in part:
(d) Procedure where individual incapable of refusing test-(I) If a police officer
has reasonable grounds to believe an individual has been driving or attempting
to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol,
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the State challenged that ruling.
Although the court recognized that the use of the word "shall"
in the statute made the police officer's duty to obtain a blood alco-
hol test mandatory,20 7 it held that dismissal was not the appropriate
sanction for the officer's failure to obtain such a test. 20 8 The court
found that the general intent of the several statutes applicable to
prosecutions for drunk driving is to protect the public.2 0 9 Thus, due
process does not require the State to give a chemical test to
'gather evidence for the accused.' ''210
The court stated that the appropriate remedy for the officer's
failure to obtain a blood test would be "to allow an inference that
had the test been administered, the result would have been
favorable to [Werkheiser]." ' 1 ' The trier of fact would then consider
this inference, together with all of the other evidence presented, in
determining Werkheiser's guilt or innocence.212
The holding that dismissal was not the appropriate sanction for
the officer's failure to obtain a blood test is consistent with case law
in Maryland and in other jurisdictions holding that chemical tests
are neither necessary nor required to prove intoxication.213
and if the police officer determines the individual is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of refusing to take a chemical test for alcohol, the police officer shall:
(iii) If a chemical test for alcohol would not jeopardize the health or well-being
of the individual, direct a qualified medical person to withdraw blood for a
chemical test for alcohol to determine the alcohol content of the individual's
blood.
207. 299 Md. at 533, 474 A.2d at 900.
208. Id. at 538-39, 474 A.2d at 903.
209. Id. at 537, 474 A.2d at 902; see also State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 477, 436 A.2d
420, 427 (1981).
210. 299 Md. at 538, 474 A.2d at 903 (quoting People v. Culp, 189 Colo. 76, 537 P.2d
746 (1975) (en banc) (quoting State v. Reyna, 92 Idaho 669, 674, 448 P.2d 762, 767
(1968)):
Thus, the right to due process of law does not include the right to be given a
blood test in all circumstances. To hold otherwise would be to transform the
accused's right to due process into a power to compel the State to gather in the
accused's behalf what might be exculpatory evidence.
211. 299 Md. at 538, 474 A.3d at 903.
212. Id. The other evidence to be considered could include "the officer's reasons for
not directing that the test be administered." Id.
213. See, e.g. Major v. State, 31 Md. App. 590, 596, 358 A.2d 609, 613 (1975) (under
an earlier statute, court held that chemical evidence of alcohol content in body is not
prerequiste for drunk driving conviction) cert. denied sub nom. Flanagan v. State, 278 Md.
722 (1976); see also People v. Culp, 189 Colo. 76, 78, 537 P.2d 746, 748 (1975) (en banc)
(State may prove intoxication by methods other than chemical test); State v. Reyna, 92
Idaho 669, 448 P.2d 762, 766 (1968) (no obligation on State to administer blood test in
all drunk driving cases).
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However, there is nothing to support the court's proposition that
the failure to obtain a blood test should give the defendant a pre-
sumption of nonintoxication. Because the court found that the in-
tent of the statute was to protect the public, not the accused, it
would seem that there should not be any presumption at all.
2. Scientific Devices.-In Fitzwater v. State 2 14 the Court of Special
Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the accuracy of a
radar device used by a police officer to detect speeding could be
established without admitting maintenance records into evi-
dence.2 5 The records were not admitted because the State violated
discovery rules by failing to list the records as an exhibit. 21 6 How-
ever, the fact that the maintenance records existed was admitted. 17
This fact, and trial testimony indicating that proper procedures had
been followed by the police officer, convinced the court that the
guidelines for proving the accuracy of radar set forth in Great Coastal
Express, Inc. v. Schruefer2 t8 were satisfied.219
JUDITH A. BOLLINGER
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214. 57 Md. App. 274, 469 A.2d 909 (1984).
215. Id. at 280, 469 A.2d at 912.
216. Id. at 278, 469 A.2d at 911.
217. Id. at 280, 469 A.2d at 912.
218. 34 Md. App. 706, 369 A.2d 118, cert. denied, 280 Md. 730 (1977). In that case, the
Court of Special Appeals stated:
It is sufficient to show that the equipment has been properly tested and
checked, that it was manned by a competent operator, that proper operative
procedures were followed, and that proper records were kept.
[There should be proof to indicate that] the particuar instrument relied upon
was in good working order and accurate at the time the recording was made.
34 Md. App. at 715-16, 369 A.2d at 124 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Fitzwa-
ter evidence was adduced at trial that the police officer, who was a certified operator of
the radar device, performed two calibration tests on the machine before using it. 57 Md.
App. at 277-78, 469 A.2d at 911.
219. 57 Md. App. at 280, 469 A.2d at 912. The court also applied the established
rules of present recollection revived in holding that there was no reason for opposing
counsel to view a document that a witness had looked at before taking the witness stand
but had not used to refresh his recollection while on the witness stand. Id. at 285, 469
A.2d at 915. Further, the court rejected an argument that because the trooper was not a
certified technician he should not have been allowed to testify as to the accuracy of the
equipment's calibration. Following established law, the court found that the tests for
the admissibility of expert testimony, i.e., that the jury can receive "appreciable help
from the particular witness" and that the witness is competent to express an expert
opinion by reason of familiarity with the subject matter, had been met. Id. at 281, 469
A.2d at 913.
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VI. CRIMINAL LAW
During the past year Maryland appellate courts reviewed a wide
range of substantive and procedural issues relating to criminal law.
At the same time, the General Assembly made significant revisions
to the statute dealing with the insanity defense.
A. Elements of Crimes
Several cases before the courts involved considerations of the
substantive elements of various crimes. In Foster v. State' the Court
of Appeals clarified the scope of "presence" as an element of rob-
bery. The court defined robbery as " 'the felonious taking and car-
rying away of the personal property of another from his person or in
his presence by the use of violence or by putting him in fear.' "2 The
State needed to prove presence in Foster in order to establish an un-
derlying felony, as the basis for a felony-murder conviction. The
murder victim was the manager of a motel where Foster resided.
The evidence indicated that money belonging to the victim was
taken from a room in the motel other than the room in which the
murder occurred.'
Citing other courts and commentators,' the Court of Appeals
announced that the concept of "presence" entails "proximity and
control," such that "had the [victim] not been subject to violence or
intimidation by the robber, he could have prevented the taking." 5
Based on the evidence in Foster, the court concluded that the victim's
money, while in a different room of the motel, was "close enough
and sufficiently under the victim's control" as to be within her
"presence."' Thus, the evidence supported the State's contention
that a robbery had been committed.
The Foster court also considered whether the appellant commit-
ted the murder "in the perpetration" of the robbery, as required by
1. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 985 (1984).
2. Id. at 213, 464 A.2d at 997-98 (emphasis added) (quoting Hadder v. State, 238
Md. 341, 354, 209 A.2d 70, 77 (1965)).
3. Id. at 214, 464 A.2d at 998.
4. E.g., Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 551, 142 So. 2d 869, 871 (1962); State v.
Constantine, 342 A.2d 735, 737 (Me. 1975); Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mass. 526,
533, 127 N.E. 517, 520 (1920); Fields v. State, 364 P.2d 723, 726 (Okla. Crim. App.
1961); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 94, at 696 (1972); 67 AM. JUR. 2D
Robbery § 12 (1973).
5. 297 Md. at 213, 464 A.2d at 998.
6. Id. at 214, 464 A.2d at 998.
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Maryland's felony-murder statute.7 Foster contended that the un-
derlying felony of robbery was not completed until after the murder
had been committed. She argued that the murder, therefore, did
not occur "in the perpetration" of the robbery. The Court of Ap-
peals, interpreting "perpetration" broadly, ruled that the killing
demonstrated the existence of force, another essential element of
robbery. In the absence of any contention that there was insufficient
evidence of force to convict her of robbery, the court rejected Fos-
ter's argument that the murder was not committed in the perpetra-
tion of the felony.8
In Lee v. State,9 a case of first impression, the Court of Special
Appeals held that a person does not have to leave the store to be
convicted of theft for shoplifting, if his actions indicate an intent to
deprive the owner of his property.'" This is also the view of other
courts that have considered the issue."
In Cover v. State,'2 the court discussed the offense of obstructing
or hindering a police officer in the performance of his duties. ' The
court held that the defendant's action of sounding her car horn to
warn a third person that he was under observation by police was
insufficient to support a finding that the sound was understood as a
warning of police presence. 14 Because the State could not demon-
strate a sufficient causal connection between the sounding of the
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1982).
8. 297 Md. at 215, 464 A.2d at 999. See also Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 356,
473 A.2d 903, 915 (1984) (intent to steal need not have existed at time force was exerted
or threatened).
9. 59 Md. App. 28, 474 A.2d 537 (1984).
10. Id. at 36, 474 A.2d at 541. In many cases, the determinative factor in finding this
intent is the defendant's act of concealing the goods under his clothing or in a container.
Id. at 39, 474 A.2d at 542.
11. See, e.g., Groomes v. United States, 155 A.2d 73 (D.C. 1959); People v. Baker,
365 Ill. 328, 6 N.E.2d 665 (1937); People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560
(1943); People v. Olivo, 52 N.Y.2d 309, 420 N.E.2d 40, 438 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1981); State
v. Grant, 135 Vt. 222, 373 A.2d 847 (1977); accord People v. Butto, 93 Misc. 2d 151, 402
N.Y.S.2d 546 (1978).
12. 297 Md. 398, 466 A.2d 1276 (1983).
13. Generally, the elements of this offense are
(1) a police officer engaged in the performance of a duty;
(2) an act, or perhaps an omission, by the accused that obstructs or hinders the
officer in the performance of the duty;
(3a) knowledge by the accused of facts comprising the first element; and
(3b) intent to obstruct or hinder officer by act or omission constituting the sec-
ond element. Id at 413, 466 A.2d at 1284.
14. Id. at 414-15, 466 A.2d at 1285. Given that the defendant was a block away on a
well-travelled street, the court felt that the more likely inference was that the horn
blower was a reveller. Id. at 415, 466 A.2d at 1285.
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horn and the subject's apparent departure from the scene, it could
not prove the element that the defendant's actions in fact hindered
the police from further observing the subject.' 5 Without this ele-
ment, the defendant's conduct did not constitute the crime of ob-
structing or hindering an officer of the law in the performance of his
duties. 16
B. Capacity to Commit and Responsibility for Crime
1. Insanity.-The insanity defense has long been recognized in
the United States.' 7 The Maryland General Assembly, in its 1984
session, substantially revised Maryland's statute concerning this de-
fense.' 8 The changes are likely to result in a more restrictive use of
the defense and in lengthy confinements for those defendants who
do use it successfully.
A key change in the statute is semantic. Instead of the terms
"insane" or "not responsible," the new statute uses the term "not
criminally responsible" throughout.' 9 There are several reasons for
the change. The first is a desire to avoid further stigmatizing the
mentally ill population by use of the term; past use of the term "in-
sane" for the mentally ill who commit crimes has had a carryover
effect on the non-criminal mentally ill.2" A second reason for the
change is that use at trial of the term "insane" conveys to the jury an
image that may be inconsistent with the appearance of the actual
defendant who is mentally ill but appears normal. That is, a jury
expects to see some manifestation of "insanity" and, when it does
not, the jury may be prejudiced in assessing a defendant's mental
condition. By emphasizing a lack of criminal responsibility as the
characteristic, the authors of the legislation hoped to avoid this prej-
udice. 2' But more important than these policy reasons for the use
of the term "not criminally responsible," is the legal reason for the
change. The term now correctly defines the status of the defendant
under the criminal law in Maryland. That is, in Maryland, a court
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). The seminal case in Anglo-
American law is, of course, M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
18. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. Title 12. Incompetency and Criminal Responsi-
bility in Criminal Cases. The changes made in the statute were the outcome of recom-
mendations made by the Governor's Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity. For
explanations of changes, see id. task force comments throughout Title 12 (Supp. 1984).
19. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN., §§ 12-108(a), -109, -110, -111 (Supp.
1984).




may find a defendant guilty of criminal conduct but not criminally
responsible because of his mental state when the crime was commit-
ted. That finding means that although there are no criminal conse-
quences to the defendant's wrongful behavior, there may be other
consequences that stem from the guilty conviction. A recent case
illustrates that, with this change, the legislature is affirming the posi-
tion taken by Maryland courts in a key issue related to the insanity
defense: Should a defendant who is mentally ill but who commits a
crime be subject of any action on the part of the State?
In Pouncey v. State,2 the Court of Appeals held that a criminal
defendant who had drowned her son, believing the devil was pursu-
ing him, could be found guilty and insane.23 In reaching this deci-
sion, the court looked at the argument that a finding of insanity is
the functional equivalent of an acquittal. To make a determination
that this was not so, the court had to deal with statutory language
that describes what procedure is to be followed when "an individual
is found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity."24 In Pouncey, as
in an earlier case on the same issue, Lang-worthy v. State,25 the court
held that a finding of insanity did not mean an individual was not
guilty, and explained that this language was " 'a holdover from com-
mon law concepts and prior statutory provisions regarding insanity
and the commission of crimes.' ,,26 In both cases the court indicated
that the then current statutory scheme contemplated first a determi-
nation of guilt or innocence under the general plea, and then a find-
ing of sanity under the special plea,27 and thus, despite the language
of section 12-110, a finding that a defendant is insane does not
22. 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983); see also Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588,
399 A.2d 578 (1979).
23. 297 Md. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
24. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-110 (1982) (emphasis added). This section
detailed the examination and evaluation requirements that arose if a defendant was
found not guilty of crime by reason of insanity. The new statute substitutes for the
above language "after a verdict of not criminally responsible." See id. § 12-111 (Supp. 1984)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the differences in the commitment procedures
under the old and the new statutes, see infra text and accompanying notes 44-58.
25. 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1978).
26. 297 Md. at 268, 465 A.2d at 478 n.2 (quoting Langworthy, 284 Md. at 599 n.12,
399 A.2d at 584 n.12). The defendant in Pouncey argued that the language in the com-
mitment statute precluded a finding of guilty but insane because a finding of insanity is
inconsistent with a finding of criminal guilt. Id. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
27. Id. at 265-66, 465 A.2d at 476-77. Under the new statutory scheme, the jury
must still find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the general plea, then determine




mean the defendant is not guilty of the crime.28
The Pouncey court also considered the defendant's argument
that a successful insanity plea is inconsistent with a finding of crimi-
nal guilt because an insanity defense recognizes an absence of moral
blameworthiness, an absence that is inconsistent with a finding of
criminal guilt.29 Looking again to Langworthy, the court noted that
"a finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea, or
inconsistent with a general intent to commit a crime." 3 In Pouncey,
the defendant specifically intended to kill her child. A successful
insanity defense might relieve her of criminal liability, but, the court
noted, the legislature had not removed all of the consequences of
committing a criminal act while insane.3i The court emphasized
that there are collateral, non-criminal consequences, namely, com-
mitment to a mental hospital, that may accompany a finding that an
insane defendant is guilty of a crime. Since the legislature has de-
termined that a person may be insane but still have the necessary
general intent to commit a crime, the court reasoned, if she commits
a crime, the finding of insanity does not preclude state actions to
32prevent the commission of further crimes.
As Pouncey and its predecessor Langworthy indicate, the position
of the Maryland courts is clear: Mental disorder at the time a crime
is committed may preclude the State from imposing criminal pun-
ishment, but will not preclude other actions to protect society. The
language of the new statute crystalizes the concepts behind deci-
sions allowing guilty but insane verdicts. By changing the term "in-
sane" to "not criminally responsible" the statute more precisely
focuses on the fact that a defendant's mental state precludes crimi-
nal punishment, but does not obviate non-criminal actions against
him.
Among other changes in the law, one of the most important
releases the State from its burden of proving that the defendant was
sane, and instead imposes a burden on the defendant to demon-
strate that he was not "criminally responsible" for the criminal con-
duct. 3 Under the old law, the defendant had only to introduce
28. 299 Md. at 268, 465 A.2d at 478.
29. Id. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 269-70, 465 A.2d at 478.
33. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(b) (Supp. 1984) states: "Burden of
proof.-The defendant has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the defense of not criminally responsible."
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evidence of mental disorder to rebut the presumption of sanity.3 4
Once this was done, the State assumed the burden of proving the
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.35 In contrast, under
the new statute, the defendant is required to show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he was not criminally responsible for the
criminal conduct. To do this, the defendant must show that, at the
time of the conduct, because of a mental disorder or mental retarda-
tion, he lacked substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality
of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of
law. 3
6
The view of the Court of Appeals prior to the enactment of this
statute was that the State had the burden of proving the defendant's
sanity as part of its burden of proving all the necessary elements of a
criminal offense. 37 One element of most criminal offenses is the
mens rea or intent to commit the offense. Under this view, to prove
its case it was necessary for the State to prove the defendant had the
34. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 510, 200 A.2d 150, 153 (1964). In Bradford the
court stated the requirement for the defendant as follows:
[I]t must be shown by sufficient competent evidence that the defendant, at the
time of the commission of the offense, did not have capacity and reason suffi-
cient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong and understand the
nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself. Evidence of some
undefined mental disorder or instability is insufficient proof to overcome the
presumption of sanity.
Id. at 510, 200 A.2d at 153 (emphasis in original). See also Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469, 482, 486 (1895) (presumption of law that all men are sane is justified by the
general experience of mankind and general considerations of public safety).
35. State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 524, 398 A.2d 421, 425 (1979).
36. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108(a) (Supp. 1984). Section (b) excludes
from the definition "an abnormality that is otherwise antisocial conduct." The latest
revision returns the text to its status before the 1982 amendments. The Task Force
Comments to this section note that a decision was made to retain the two pronged test,
with volitional and cognitive components, because the test fully reflects all aspects of
culpability. A key factor in the decision to retain the volitional prong (a decision that
runs counter to the American Bar Association's view that the second prong should be
eliminated, see Fifth Circuit Ponders Changing Insanity Defense, 70 A.B.A. J. 152 (1984)) was a
study done for the Task Force by the staff at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center that
indicated that dropping the volitional prong "could systematically eliminate a class of
psychotic patients whose illness is clearest in symptomatology, most likely biologic in
origin, most eminently treatable, and potentially most disruptive in penal detention."
§ 12-108 task force comment, quoting Silver & Spodak, Dissection of the Prongs of A.L.I.,
(June 12, 1983). Retaining the two-pronged test places Maryland in the majority of the
states. See Caplan, Annals of Law: The Insanity Defense, THE NEW YORKER, July 2, 1984, at
45, 51. For a discusssion of this test and those used in other jurisdictions, see Richard-
son, Should We Allow the Hinckley Backlash to Cause Bad Law? The Insanity Defense, 53 OKLA.
B.J. 2180, 2184-90 (1982).
37. Bradford, 234 Md. at 514, 200 A.2d at 155.
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capacity to form the requisite intent.3" Once the defendant's sanity
had been raised as an issue, the State had to prove that sanity in
order to meet its burden of proving all the elements of the offense. 9
If sanity is part of the mens rea and is thus an element of the
offense that must be proven by the State, then there is a constitu-
tional issue as to whether the State may place the burden of proving
insanity on the defendant."° The General Assembly specifically ad-
dressed this issue and determined that it was not unconstitutional to
place the burden of proof on the defendant." The current proce-
dure of an insanity defense requires the jury first to determine
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the ele-
ments of the crime, including the requisite mens rea. If this burden is
met, then the plea of not criminally responsible is considered. 42
This procedure assumes that a mentally ill defendant can be shown
to have held the necessary intent to commit the crime at issue."3
Once the State shows that, then the defendant may argue that he is
not criminally responsible for the act. Thus, the General Assembly
apparently concluded that being not criminally responsible is an ex-
culpatory fact related to criminal punishment, and therefore due
process does not prohibit placing the burden of proof of the fact on
the defendant.
Another significant change relates to commitment of an individ-
ual who has been adjudged guilty but not criminally responsible.
Under section 12-1 11 of the revised statute, following such a ver-
dict, the court is now authorized to commit automatically an individ-
ual found not to be criminally responsible to the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene for institutional care. Following that
commitment, a hearing to determine if the individual is eligible for
release must be held within fifty days of the commitment." The
38. Id. at 512, 200 A.2d at 154.
39. Id.
40. See 54 IND. L.J. 95, 98 (1978). The Maryland statute is drafted to address the
issue of whether sanity is an element of the offense. See also MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 12-109 task force comment (Supp. 1984) ("Subsection (b) [burden of proof]
does not alter the state's burden to prove all essential elements beyond a reasonable
doubt"); 67 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 74 (1982) (successful proof of either prong of the in-
sanity defense is not necessarily inconsistent with general criminal intent or with a per-
son's ability to form a particular specific criminal intent).
41. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109 task force comment (Supp. 1984). See
also State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 209, 362 A.2d 629, 636 (1975) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not held that giving the defendant the burden of proving insanity is
unconstitutional).
42. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(c) (Supp. 1984).
43. See generally id. § 12-109 task force comment.
44. Id. § 12-114.
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former law authorized the court to commit the defendant to the De-
partment only for a limited time for the purpose of examination and
evaluation. In order to commit an individual for institutional care,
the State was required at a hearing to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual was dangerous to people or property
because he suffered from a mental disorder or was mentally re-
tarded.45 The new statute dispenses with this requirement for a
hearing on the individual's danger to society. 46 The rationale be-
hind this change is that the verdict under the revised statute would
be the result of two findings: that the defendant committed the
criminal act charged and the defendant suffered, at the time, from a
mental disorder or mental retardation. Based on these findings, an
assumption is made that the State would be justified in considering
the defendant presently dangerous and continuing to suffer from
the mental condition.4 7
Beyond this key change in the commitment process, there are
several changes to the statute that relate to the process of obtaining
a release from commitment. One change involves the burden of
proof concerning eligibility for release. Once committed, the de-
fendant is granted release hearings at various intervals. 48 Under the
new statute the committed individual has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that he is no longer, as a result of
mental disorder or retardation, dangerous to himself or to others.4 9
Previously, the State had the burden of proving that the individual
should remain in confinement; the State had to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the criteria for commitment: mental disor-
der or retardation and dangerousness.50
A recent Supreme Court case, Jones v. United States,51 indicates
that changes in the Maryland law, including the automatic commit-
ment provision and the shift in the burden of proof for release, are
likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. In Jones, the Supreme Court
dealt with a District of Columbia Code that, like the new statute,
placed the burden on the defendant to establish his sanity. 2 The
45. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-110, 12-113 (1982).
46. See id. § 12-1 11 (Supp. 1984).
47. Id. § 12-111 task force comment.
48. See generally id. §§ 12-114 to -118.
49. Id. § 12-113(d).
50. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977), modified, 604 F.2d 271 (4th
Cir. 1979).
51. 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
52. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981) provides in part:
No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was
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court held that, when a criminal defendant was found not guilty of a
crime by reason of insanity, the due process clause permitted the
government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to
a mental institution until such time as he established that he had
regained his sanity or was no longer a danger to himself or society."
The holding indicates that the Maryland procedure for automatic
commitment followed by a timely release hearing is constitutionally
permissible.54
Another changed provision now makes release at a time other
than the scheduled release hearing date more difficult, by requiring
an affidavit for release to be made by either a physician or a licensed
psychologist.55 Previously, a committed individual could file an ap-
plication for release at any time following an initial unsuccessful re-
lease hearing, if the application was accompanied by an affidavit
from anyone, other than the patient, which stated that there had
been an improvement in the mental condition of the committed in-
dividual since the last hearing. This new provision may make re-
lease at times other than the scheduled yearly hearing more difficult,
since a physician or licensed psychologist, faced with potential liabil-
ity for negligent release, will require significarit evidence of im-
provement before issuing an affidavit.
The last change related to commitment and release makes it
easier for the court to revoke a conditional release and recommit the
individual to the Department for institutionalization. Under the re-
vised statute, unless the committed individual proves he is no longer
dangerous, his conditional release can be revoked by a showing at a
hearing that a condition of release has been violated.57 Under the
insane at the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises
the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence.
53. 103 S. Ct. at 3052.
54. Id. at 3045, 3046. The District of Columbia statute, like the Maryland statute,
provides for a release hearing within 50 days of the initial commitment and periodic
hearings thereafter. Id. at 3046 nn.3 & 5. The Maryland statute places a greater burden
on the defendant at a release hearing than does the statute in Jones, since the Maryland
statute requires him to prove his lack of mental illness by clear and convincing evidence.
It is not clear from Jones whether this standard of proof would pass constitutional scru-
tiny, since under the D.C. statute, to secure release, a defendant need only prove his
sanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
55. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(a)(2) (Supp. 1984).
56. Id. § 12-114(d) (1982).
57. Id. § 12-120 (Supp. 1984). Section 12-120 establishes new procedures that are
to be followed if a report is made that an individual has violated a conditional release.
These procedures allow for an initial fact-finding stage to determine if there is probable
cause to have a revocation hearing. Previously, if a report of violation was filed, a hear-
ing was automatically held. See generally id. § 12-115 (1982).
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earlier provision, the revocation required the State to establish that
the criteria for initial commitment-mental disorder or retardation
and dangerousness-still existed.58
The effect of all the changes in Maryland's insanity defense
made during the 1984 legislative session is substantial. By shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant, it is more difficult for a de-
fendant to make a successful insanity defense. In making this
change, Maryland joins the majority of the states.59 If, however, the
defendant is successful in the defense, commitment is now auto-
matic; and, once the defendant has been committed on the basis of
the insanity defense, it is easier for the state to keep the individual
institutionalized. At the same time, by its change in terminology,
the statute now correctly reflects Maryland courts' view of the status
of a mentally disordered defendant: that he is not criminally culpa-
ble, but should be otherwise accountable for his acts. As a group,
these changes in the statute appear to be an attempt to correct per-
ceived problems with, and abuses of, the insanity defense in the
past.6
0
2. Necessity.-In Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State,6 l the
Court of Appeals considered for the first time the validity of the ne-
cessity defense.62 In doing so, the court approved two earlier Court
of Special Appeals' decisions6" that found necessity to be a valid de-
58. Id. § 12-115(a)(2) (1982).
59. Caplan, supra note 36, at 70. This is a change from 1978 when a slight majority
of the states required the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 54
IND. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1978). But as Lincoln Caplan pointed out, roughly two-thirds of the
states revised their insanity laws in some way after the Hinckley verdict. Caplan, supra
note 36, at 70.
60. See Richardson, supra note 36, for a discussion of the reaction caused by John J.
Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal by reason of insanity for the shooting of President Reagan on
March 30, 1981.
61. 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483 (1983).
62. Id. at 679, 467 A.2d at 492. This case arose from a criminal trespass action
against Debra Braun, one of the appellees. She served a subpoena duces tecum on ap-
pellant Sigma Reproductive Health Center to obtain records relating to abortions per-
formed at the center. Sigma moved to quash the subpoena and appealed the denial of
that motion. Id. at 662-63, 467 A.2d at 484. Although the court dismissed the appeal on
the grounds that the order denying the motion was not an appealable final order, it
decided to address the necessity defense in the interests ofjudicial economy. Id. at 675,
467 A.2d at 490.
63. Robinson v. State, 42 Md. App. 617, 402 A.2d 115 (1979); Frasher v. State, 8
Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970). Robinson involved a de-
fendant charged with escape, who pled defenses of necessity and duress, based on re-
peated threats by other inmates of sexual and physical attacks, an actual fight on the day
of the escape, and the failure of the prison authorities to respond to complaints about
the threats. 42 Md. App. at 618-19, 402 A.2d at 115-16. The Robinson court found that
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fense in criminal prosecutions. 64 The court, however, followed the
lead of other jurisdictions and declined to permit the defense in this
protest case involving a charge of criminal trespass.6 5
Criminal law recognizes the defense of necessity when the pres-
sure of circumstances forces a person to commit one crime in order
to avoid the commission of a more serious one. 6' This pressure
must come from physical forces and operate upon the mind rather
than the body of the defendant.67 The defense exists for public pol-
icy reasons; the law recognizes that circumstances may present a
choice of evils and prefers that the defendant avoid the greater evil
by committing the lesser one. 6 8 For the defense to apply, the de-
fendant must have acted with the intention to avoid greater harm
and have no alternative to breaking the law. In addition, the court
must conclude that the defendant's analysis of the relative harms
was correct.6 9
Defendants have raised the defense to criminal charges result-
ing from political and social protests in several cases,7" including
criminal cases involving trespass on abortion clinics.7" The courts,
the trial court should have allowed the defendants to present a necessity defense. Id. at
622, 402 A.2d at 118. In Frasher, the court recognized the validity of the necessity de-
fense as a part of the defense of duress, but found the plaintiffs contention, that he
possessed contraband because he was forced to, to be unsubstantiated. 8 Md. App. at
447-51, 260 A.2d at 662-63.
64. In Frasher, the Court of Special Appeals found that the defense only applied to
crimes requiring intent. 8 Md. App. at 448-49, 260 A.2d at 662. In Robinson, the court
used the criteria enumerated in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 110 (1974) to determine the applicability of the defense to the crime of escape. 42
Md. App. at 619, 402 A.2d at 117. Those criteria are: that a prisoner is physically
threatened with immediate harm, that there is no time for complaints to authorities or
there is a history of futile complaints, that there is not time to resort to the courts, that
the escape was done without force, that the prisoner reports to proper authorities when
he is safe from the threat. Id. at 621, 402 A.2d at 117 (citing Lovercamp).
65. 297 Md. at 689, 467 A.2d at 497.
66. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 4, § 50, at 381-82 (1972).
67. Id. If the pressure comes from another individual, the defense, if applicable, is
called duress. If the pressure acts on the defendant's body, the defendant's defense is
that no act was done. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 386.
70. 297 Md. at 681, 467 A.2d at 493. In State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d
1095 (1973), one of the earliest and most prominent cases, the defendants had tres-
passed on private property to try to stop a defense contractor's alleged "war crimes."
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the necessity defense did not apply to charges
arising from such protests. Id. at 473, 509 P.2d at 1109.
71. Four jurisdictions have found the defense to be improper in situations similar to
this case. Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); Gae-
tano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill. App. 3d 101,
416 N.E.2d 1209 (1981); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App.
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however, have uniformly rejected the defense in these situations on
three grounds. First, legal alternatives to criminal activity have been
available to protest the particular activity.72 Second, the defendants
themselves have not been threatened. Third, their activities have
not been designed to prevent further harm.73 Moreover, in the
abortion cases, the defendants were in fact interfering with the clinic
patients' exercise of their constitutional rights.7 "
In Sigma, defendant Braun raised the necessity defense to justify
criminal trespass at an abortion clinic. She claimed that her actions
were necessary to save the lives of the unborn and to discourage
women from undergoing what she considered an unnecessarily dan-
gerous medical procedure. 5 The Court of Appeals analyzed a
number of criminal trespass on abortion clinic cases76 and found
that their reasoning, when applied to the facts of this case, resulted
in a rejection of the defendant's necessity arguments. The argu-
ment made by the defendant-that her actions were necessary to
save the lives of the unborn-was rejected for two reasons. First,
her actions were not undertaken to prevent unlawful harm, because
abortion is a legally protected activity; and second, her actions were
in fact unlikely to prevent the threatened action. Defendant's argu-
ment concerning incompetent treatment was rejected because she
offered no evidence that there was such treatment. Further, even if
such treatment had occurred, there exist other avenues of com-
plaint.77 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals characterized her activi-
ties as political protest and followed the lead of other jurisdictions
in rejecting her claim of necessity.7"
C. Pleas
Plea bargaining agreements were the subject of a number of
cases reviewed by the Maryland appellate courts in the past year.
Issues considered by the courts included the circumstances under
which an agreement may be voided, the nature of a breach of an
agreement, and the scope of an agreement.
1982); see also Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic,
48 U. CIN. L. REV. 501 (1979).
72. For example, protesters can picket peacefully, write letters, and seek legislative
change.
73. 297 Md. at 683, 467 A.2d at 494.
74. See authorities cited supra note 71.
75. 297 Md. at 681, 467 A.2d at 493.
76. See cases cited supra note 71.
77. 297 Md. at 683-89, 467 A.2d at 494-97.
78. Id. at 689, 467 A.2d at 497.
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1. Plea bargaining.-In Ellison v. State,79 the Court of Special
Appeals held that the State may void a plea agreement when it dis-
covers that a defendant lied in statements made pursuant to the
agreement.8s The agreement in Ellison provided that, if appellant
breached any of the conditions, the State could void the agreement
in its entirety.8 ' Ellison involved a homicide. One of the conditions
of the agreement was the defendant's stipulation that he did not ac-
tually shoot the victim. When the State discovered facts sufficient to
charge the defendant as the killer, it revoked the agreement.
8 2
The court reaffirmed established law that the State need not
honor its bargain if the defendant has not, to a substantial degree
and in a proper manner, performed his obligations.8 " Bargaining in
bad faith will not be tolerated, let alone rewarded. 4 The question
of a breach is not, however, to be determined unilaterally by the
State;s 5 rather, once the State acknowledges the existence of an
agreement, it has the burden of establishing the breach. The court
in Ellison held that the State clearly met its burden.8 6 It is apparent
that Maryland courts will not allow defendants to receive the bene-
fits of a plea agreement unless they have performed their obliga-
tions under the agreement.
In Clark v. State,s7 the Court of Special Appeals held that, when,
pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agrees to recommend to the
court whatever disposition the pre-sentence investigation recom-
mends, it is a breach of that plea agreement for the State to remain
silent.88 Rejecting the State's argument that its silence amounted to
79. 56 Md. App. 567, 468 A.2d 413 (1983).
80. Id. at 577, 468 A.2d at 418.
81. Id. at 573, 468 A.2d at 416.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) (defend-
ant's inconsequential hesitation in identifying a co-conspirator held not to have violated
plea agreement).
84. Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1, 2, 398 A.2d 1262, 1264 (1979), aff'd, 288 Md.
199, 421 A.2d 60, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). "May a defendant strike a bargain
with the State, repudiate that bargain so far as his obligations under it are concerned
and yet retain all of the advantages he ostensibly bargained for? The answer is an imme-
diate and absolute, 'No'." Id. at 2, 398 A.2d at 1263-64.
Appropriate are the words of Cardozo: "U]ustice, though due to the accused, is
due to the accuser also." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
85. United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976).
86. 56 Md. App. at 576, 468 A.2d at 418.
87. 57 Md. App. 558, 471 A.2d 317 (1984).
88. Id. at 562, 471 A.2d at 319. No explanation was given for the State's failure to
comment on the pre-sentence investigation.
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tacit acknowledgement of the plea bargain,8 9 the court focused on
the State's promise to take affirmative action. It is well-established
that when a guilty plea "rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."90
The State's promise to make a recommendation was the inducement
to obtain appellant's plea. By its total silence, the State did not ex-
press the degree of advocacy required. 9
The court's ruling recognizes that the State's recommendation
may have an impact on the judge. Although the judge is aware of
the plea agreement, he may be more apt to follow the disposition
recommended in the pre-sentence report if the State makes the same
recommendation. This decision shows that the State must abide
strictly by the terms of the agreement, regardless of its motives for
the failure in performance.
In contrast to the deception in Ellison, which allowed a plea
agreement to be breached, was the situation found in Banks v.
State.9 2 In Banks, the Court of Special Appeals held that, absent any
fraudulent representations by the defendant, neither the judge nor
the State can void a plea agreement even when it is discovered that
the defendant's criminal record is much more extensive than previ-
ously thought.9 3 At an off-the-record chambers conference between
the prosecution, defense counsel and judge, the judge ascertained
that defendant was not then on parole or probation, but no inquiry
was made about the extent, if any, of his prior criminal record.
When he received the pre-sentence report the judge discovered that
the defendant's record was more extensive than had been re-
vealed.9 4 Both the prosecutor and the judge stated that they would
89. Id.; see also United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor half-
heartedly recommended sentence); Snowden v. State, 33 Md. App. 659, 365 A.2d 321
(1976) (prosecutor "recommended" agreement but undercut it subtly by urging court to
comply with pre-sentence report); Burroughs v. State, 30 Md. App. 669, 354 A.2d 205
(1976) (prosecutor's remarks at sentencing indicated disagreement with plea bargain).
90. Brown, 500 F.2d at 377 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971)).
91. 57 Md. App. at 561, 471 A.2d at 319.
92. 56 Md. App. 38, 466 A.2d 69 (1983).
93. Id. at 50, 466 A.2d at 75. Banks was convicted in a jury trial following the void-
ing of a plea agreement of second degree murder and sentenced to thirty years in
prison. Under the plea agreement, the maximum sentence he would have received was
ten years. Id. at 42-43, 466 A.2d at 71.
94. The presiding judge had stated that:
I was told that the defendant had been convicted of armed robbery in 1967, but
that there were no convictions, no arrests, in 9 years. It was because of that
that I accepted this guilty plea .... I was not told, however, that the defend-
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not have agreed to the plea agreement had they known the extent of
appellant's record. As a result, the judge repudiated his acceptance
of the bargain.95
The court distinguished the instant case from other cases in
which a defendant was specifically asked about a prior record or
other information and lied about the facts. 96 The defendant truth-
fully answered all questions at an open court hearing. The lack of
information simply resulted from the fact that he was not asked
about his prior record. As a general rule, once the judge has ac-
cepted a guilty plea and bound a defendant to it, the judge cannot
refuse to carry through the bargain that induced the plea, unless it
was obtained by the defendant through fraud. 97 In Banks, the de-
fendant did not procure his plea bargain fraudulently.
Stressing the importance of the "certainty" aspect that plea bar-
gaining injects into the criminal system,98 the court stated that both
sides must be able to rely on the plea agreement. 99 Once a court
has accepted a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement, specific en-
forcement of the plea agreement is the appropriate remedy if the
defendant so elects.' 00 It is unfair for the State to create and then
destroy a defendant's expectations when the defendant fulfills his
end of the bargain, even if the bargain turns out to be a bad one in
the State's eyes. The extraordinary power of a state and the critical
nature of promises concerning criminal consequences cause this ob-
ant also had been found guilty of escape and assault with a deadly weapon in
'71 and '73.
Id. at 45, 466 A.2d at 72.
95. Id. at 46, 466 A.2d at 72-73.
96. Id at 50-51, 466 A.2d at 74-75 (citing State v. Nardone, 114 R.I. 363, 334 A.2d
208 (1975)). See also United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Spanish-speaking defendant held to have understood that his probation was condi-
tioned upon the veracity of his representations concerning his prior criminal record);
State v. Darrin, 325 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa 1982) (probation revoked when defendant
fraudulently concealed his true identity to induce grant of probation).
97. United States v. Blackwell, 695 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see generally Alschuler,
The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976).
98. 56 Md. App. at 52, 466 A.2d at 76. "If the prosecutor cannot rely upon a plea
bargain, the potential 'chilling effect' upon the very institution of plea bargaining could
be devastating." Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1, 12, 398 A.2d 1262, 1269 (1979),
afd, 288 Md. 199, 421 A.2d 60, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). Similar results could
ensue if the defendant is unable to rely upon the bargain.
99. 56 Md. App. at 52, 466 A.2d at 76.
100. Id. at 47, 466 A.2d at 73. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971)
(Douglas,J., concurring); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976); Miller
v. State, 272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527 (1974); see generally Westen & Westin, A Constitutional
Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978).
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ligation to apply especially to plea agreements.' °1 Although some
jurisdictions allow ajudge to repudiate a plea agreement if he allows
the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea,'" 2 Maryland courts will
not void a plea agreement to the detriment of a defendant, unless he
procured it through fraud.10 3
In State v. Brazle, 10 4 the Court of Appeals considered the scope
of a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty
and the State agreed to make no recommendation as to sentenc-
ing. 105 Finding that the agreement did not require the judge in the
trial court either to inform the defendant that it was not bound to
follow a pre-sentence report recommending probation or to tell her
explicitly that she could go to jail for two years,' 0 6 the court upheld
the judgment of the trial court.10 7
The issue raised in Brazle was whether a guilty plea is voluntarily
and intelligently entered when the trial judge does not specifically
advise the defendant that the court is not bound to follow a pre-
sentence recommendation. Maryland Rule 731(c), which governs
the acceptance of guilty pleas, states that, before a guilty plea can be
accepted by the court, it must determine that the plea is made vol-
untarily and with an understanding of its nature and conse-
quences.108 This rule does not require a trial judge to follow a fixed
procedure in determining whether a guilty plea has been made vol-
untarily and intelligently.' 9  Rather it "can be determined only by
considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it."" 0
Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test, the court deter-
mined that the defendant's plea was given intelligently and volunta-
rily, despite defendant's mistaken impression that the judge was
bound to follow the pre-sentencing recommendation."' This case
101. 56 Md. App. at 51-52, 466 A.2d at 75-76.
102. See, e.g., Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State v.
Wenzel, 306 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Iowa 1981).
103. See Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 468 A.2d 413 (1983).
104. 296 Md. 375, 463 A.2d 798 (1983).
105. Id. at 381, 463 A.2d at 801.
106. Id. at 384, 463 A.2d at 803.
107. Id. at 385, 463 A.2d at 803.
108. Md. R.P. 731(c) (Supp. 1983) (recodified at MD. R.P. 4-242(c)) (although lan-
guage is changed, the rule is substantively the same).
109. State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 288, 424 A.2d 349, 359 (1981).
110. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
111. 296 Md. at 384, 463 A.2d at 803. Defendant was told that the maximum sen-
tence was three years. Further, defendant stated that the only promise that had been
made to her was the State's agreement to make no recommendation as to sentencing.
Finally, defendant had a twelfth grade education, was sober, and was not under the in-
fluence of any drugs.
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demonstrates that Maryland will continue to apply the "totality of
the circumstances" test in determining the voluntariness of guilty
pleas.
2. Withdrawal of guilty plea. -In Harris v. State (Harris H) 12 the
Court of Appeals held that a trial judge may consider a defendant's
motion to withdraw a guilty plea when an appellate court has re-
manded the case for resentencing. Harris pled guilty to first degree
murder, two counts of armed robbery, and a handgun violation. Af-
ter Harris waived his right to a jury sentencing proceeding," 3 the
trial judge imposed a death sentence for the first degree murder.
On its automatic review of the death sentence,' 14 the Court of Ap-
peals in Harris 1115 affirmed the verdict against Harris, but remanded
the case for resentencing on the ground that the appellant's jury
waiver was not knowing and voluntary." 
6
On remand, prior to the resentencing proceeding, Harris filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas." 17 He based the motion largely
on allegations that he lacked effective assistance of counsel at the
time of his pleas." 8 The triAl judge denied the motion because he
believed he lacked authority to consider its merits.' First, he con-
sidered the voluntariness of the pleas settled by Harris 1.120 He also
ruled that the ineffective assistance of counsel issue could only be
raised in a post conviction proceeding.' 2 ' Finally, the trial judge
said that the remand in Harris I permitted only a resentencing
proceeding. 1
2 2
The Court of Appeals in Harris 11 vacated the order denying
Harris' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and remanded the case
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the competency of
112. 299 Md. 511, 474 A.2d 890 (1984).
113. He was entitled to a jury sentencing proceeding because this was a death penalty
case. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1982).
114. See id. § 414.
115. Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 455 A.2d 979 (1983).
116. Id. at 338-40, 455 A.2d at 984.
117. He filed the motion pursuant to former Md. R.P. 731(f)(1) (Supp. 1983) (recodi-
fled at MD. R.P. 4-242(f)), which provided: "When justice requires, the court may permit
a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty at
any time before sentencing." The recodification is largely identical.
118. Harris was represented by new counsel at this point. Harris 11, 299 Md. at 514,
474 A.2d at 891.
119. Id. at 515, 474 A.2d at 891-92.
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counsel.' 23 The court ruled that Harris I only settled the voluntari-
ness of the pleas under the standards of Maryland Rule 731(c), 12 4
without considering the effect of possible counsel incompetency.' 25
In addition, the court held that its decision in Harris I to remand for
a new sentencing proceeding "had the effect of placing Harris in the
same position he had been after being found guilty of murder but
prior to initial sentencing."' 2 6 For reasons ofjudicial economy, the
Court of Appeals considered it desirable for the trial court, because
it was in a position to do SO,127 to resolve the claims of counsel in-
competency upon remand instead of delaying the matter until a
post-conviction proceeding.' 28 The court's ruling makes clear that a
remand for resentencing returns a case from the appellate stage to
the post-conviction, pre-sentencing phase of lower court
proceedings.
D. Grand Juy 12
9
Appeals in a series of cases stemming from the Attorney Gen-
eral's investigation into Medicaid fraud gave the Maryland Courts of
Appeals and Special Appeals the opportunity to consider several is-
sues related to grand jury subpoenas. Chief among these issues was
the question of whether a denial to quash a subpoena duces tecum is
an immediately appealable decision.
123. Id. at 519, 474 A.2d at 894.
124. Id. at 516-17, 474 A.2d at 892; see also supra note 117.
125. 299 Md. at 516-17, 474 A.2d at 892.
126. Id. at 516, 474 A.2d at 892.
127. Among the circumstances which the Court of Appeals considered relevant in de-
termining that the trial court was in a position to rule on the motion were that the de-
fendant had made a detailed evidentiary proffer that his counsel was ineffective and that
he was misled into pleading guilty, that the defendant was represented by new counsel,
and that the defendant's former attorney was available to testify concerning the prior
representation. Id. at 518, 474 A.2d at 893.
128. Id. Cf Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 112-13, 472 A.2d 953, 965-66 (1984) (af-
firming general rule that, once case reaches appellate level, claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel is best raised at post-conviction proceeding).
129. Related Developments
In Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7,464 A.2d 977 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that
a defendant is entitled to inspect the record of a grand jury testimony of a State witness
after the direct examination of that witness. The court found that the defendant's need
to prepare for cross-examination of the witness is a "particularized need" that justifies
lifting the veil of secrecy that normally lies over grand jury proceedings. On
reconsideration, the court explained that Jones does not mandate the recording and
transcription of all grand jury proceedings, but if a transcript exists, then courts may
apply the long-established common law rule that a defendant's "particularized need"
can override the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 22, 464 A.2d at 984. For an
in-depth discussion of this important case, see Recent Decision, Jones v. State-
Defendants Gain Access to Grand Jury Testimony, 43 MD. L. REV. 612 (1984).
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The general rule is that a denial of a motion to quash a sub-
poena duces tecum is an interlocutory decision, not a final one, and
is therefore not subject to appeal.1 31 Consequently, a party whose
motion to quash has been denied is normally faced with a harsh
choice: Either he must surrender the documents or invite a con-
tempt charge by continuing his refusal to do so.
1 31
The Court of Appeals, in In re Special Investigation No. 244,132
rejected the general rule and held than a denial to quash is immedi-
ately appealable. A party no longer needs to wait until he is found
in contempt before appealing. In a later case, however,' 3 3 the court
held that the trial judge retains the authority to issue a contempt
charge even if the party is in the process of appealing the denial.
Thus, the procedural refinement that emerged in No. 244 does not
result in any substantive change. Whether a denial of a motion to
quash a subpoena is considered to be an interlocutory or a final de-
cision, a party still risks contempt if he refuses to comply with the
subpoena.
In No. 244, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the custodian
of records of a joint venture that provided Medicaid-funded health
care to qualified Maryland residents. 33 The custodian moved to
quash the subpoena; the motion was denied. He sought to appeal
that denial. In considering the issue of whether the subpoena party
should be allowed to appeal the denial of the motion to quash the
subpoena,Judge Smith, writing for the majority, focused on the par-
ticular facts of the case. Because the custodian was not clearly one
of the targets of the Medicaid fraud investigation, it would be unrea-
sonable to force him to risk contempt if he wished to test the sub-
poena's validity. Additionally, the term of the grand jury had since
expired, and there was now no one to whom the subpoena could be
130. The leading cases are United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971) and Cobbledick
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). Federal courts have held that a denial of a motion
to quash is an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (final decision rule).
Maryland's equivalent final judgment rule is MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301
(1984).
131. The Supreme Court has allowed a few narrow exceptions to this rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1983) (appeal of denial of motion to
quash allowed when alternative would be contempt citation against the President); Perl-
man v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 (1918) (one can appeal denial to quash when items
subpoenaed are in possession of a third party, because the third party may not wish to
invite contempt by contesting the decision himself).
132. 296 Md. 80, 459 A.2d 1111 (1983).
133. In re Special Investigation No. 281, 299 Md. 181, 473 A.2d 1 (1983).
134. 296 Md. at 82, 459 A.2d at 1112.
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returned.' 35 Beyond these particular facts, Judge Smith also found
a policy reason for overturning the traditional rule. " 'It is funda-
mentally inconsistent to force a citizen to commit a crime [con-
tempt] in order to preserve his right to an appeal, while at the same
time affording civil litigants access to the courts, [by use of declara-
tory judgments].' -136 The court then held that the denial of a mo-
tion to quash the grand jury subpoena is an appealable final
order.' 3
7
In a factually similar case, In re Special Investigation No. 249,138
the court followed the holding of No. 244. Chief Judge Murphy is-
sued a strong dissent, arguing the position of the majority of juris-
dictions. That view is that a denial of a motion to quash should not
be directly appealable because this practice would have "a devastat-
ing effect on the grand jury system," possibly halting grand jury
proceedings if critical testimony and records were withheld.' 39
In a subsequent case, In re Special Investigation No. 281,' the
court issued a ruling that seems to respond to Judge Murphy's con-
cerns. No. 281 involved the issuance of a subpoena to the custodian
of records of a Medicaid provider. The motion to quash the sub-
poena was denied by the trial judge and an appeal was filed with the
Court of Special Appeals. Before the appeal was heard, the trial
judge issued a contempt order against the custodian."'4 Again writ-
ing for the court,Judge Smith said that the trial judge had the power
to issue the contempt order because the trial court retained "funda-
mental jurisdiction" over the subject matter of the case. 142
It is difficult to reconcile the outcome of No. 281 with the rea-
soning and holding in No. 244. Clearly the court was concerned that
appeal of denials to quash could have an effect on grand jury func-
135. Id. at 86, 459 A.2d at 1114.
136. Id. (quoting In re: Petition of Arlen Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 521, 317 A.2d 286, 288
(1974) (Nix, J., dissenting)).
137. Id.
138. 296 Md. 201, 461 A.2d 1082 (1983).
139. Id. at 212, 461 A.2d at 1088 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Murphy's position was
forcefully stated by Judge Friendly in United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691, 695 (2d Cir.
1967):
With the number of appeals having increased almost 70% in the last five years,
... . as against the much smaller growth in district court litigation, this is no
time to weaken the historic rule putting a witness' sincerity to the test of having
to risk a contempt citation as a condition to appeal, however harsh its applica-
tion may seem to the appellant here.
140. 299 Md. 181, 473 A.2d 1 (1984).
141. Id. at 188, 473 A.2d at 4-5.
142. Id. at 202, 473 A.2d at 11-12.
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tioning. If the court now finds that its decision to allow such appeals
was erroneous, it should overrule No. 244, rather than leaving the
subpoenaed party in the puzzling state of being allowed to appeal
the denial but being subject to contempt even if he appeals.
The Medicaid fraud cases also provided the court with the op-
portunity to reemphasize the wide scope of authority that is given to
grand juries in their investigative role. One aspect of this authority
is broad subpoena powers. In No. 244, the court held that the
power may reach witnesses and documents located outside the
county where the offense occurred and outside the county in which
the grand jury is sitting.' 43 In another case, In re Special Investigation
No. 2 4 9 ,144 the court resisted an attempt to limit subpoena power,
declining to impose a rule that would have required the State to
show that subpoenaed items are relevant, within the grand jury's
jurisdiction, and not sought primarily for another purpose. 145 And
in a further affirmation of the broad latitude afforded the grand jury
in its proceedings, the Court of Special Appeals, in In re Special Inves-
tigation No. 227,146 refused to apply an exclusionary rule in grand
jury proceedings. The court found it irrelevant that the detailed de-
scription of items sought in a subpoena was the fruit of an earlier
invalid search. 147
In additional cases the courts resisted particular challenges to
grand jury subpoena power. The Court of Appeals, in In re Special
Investigation No. 236,148 held that the accountant-client privilege did
not shield an accountant's records from a grand jury subpoena. The
court ruled that the subpoena was encompassed by the statutory ex-
ception to the privilege, which says the privilege may "not affect the
143. 296 Md. at 88, 94, 459 A.2d at 1115, 1118.
144. In re Special Investigation No. 249, 296 Md. 201, 461 A.2d 1082 (1983).
145. Id. at 206-08,461 A.2d at 1085. The court, in In re Special Investigation No. 281,
299 Md. 181, 193, 473 A.2d 1, 7 (1984) stated that a subpoena duces tecum will not be
considered to be overbroad as long as the items sought "are relevant to the investiga-
tion, are noted with reasonable particularity, and cover only a reasonable period of time
... " It is up to the party challenging the subpoena, the court added, to show that
"the subpoena impermissibly infringed upon the constitutional rights of the witness
. .. . Id.
146. 55 Md. App. 650, 466 A.2d 48 (1983).
147. Id. at 652, 466 A.2d at 49. The court followed United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, the Supreme Court ruled that "[q]uestions based on ille-
gally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search
and seizure. They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong." Id. at 354.
148. 295 Md. 573, 458 A.2d 75 (1983).
19851 459
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:439
criminal laws of the State." 49 In In re Special Investigation No. 258,150
the Court of Special Appeals applied established law to rule that a
bank customer may not successfully invoke the fourth amendment
or the due process clause to challenge a grand jury subpoena for
bank records.15
1
As the Medicaid fraud cases indicate, Maryland courts will con-
tinue to resist attempts to limit the power of the grand jury. The
Court of Appeals statement in No. 281 summarizes the position of
the courts: "[W]e recognize and intend to uphold the broad scope
of authority granted to the grand jury in investigating violations of
criminal law." 152
149. Id. at 575-77, 583, 458 A.2d at 76-77.
The accountant-client privilege statute is codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-110 (1984) and states:
(a) Privilege.-A certified public accountant, public accountant, or any person
employed by him may not disclose the contents of any communication made to
him by a person employing him to examine, audit, or report on any book, rec-
ord, account, or statement nor may he disclose any information derived from
the person or material in rendering professional service unless the person em-
ploying him or his personal representative or his successor in interest permits it
expressly.
(b) Exception.-This privilege does not affect the criminal laws of the State or
the bankruptcy laws.
The court interpreted this statute by looking at its history and at the development of the
grand jury at common law and in Maryland, and concluded that historically a grand jury
has been concerned chiefly with criminal matters. 295 Md. at 583, 458 A.2d at 79.
Thus, grand jury functions would fall under § 9-110(b).
150. 55 Md. App. 119, 461 A.2d 34 (1983).
151. Id. at 124, 125, 461 A.2d at 36, 37. The court noted that United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) held that the search and seizure of a customer's bank records
through a government subpoena issued to the bank implicated no fourth amendment
interests of the customer. But see Comment, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Bank
Records: A Reappraisal of United States v. Miller and Bank Depositor Privacy Rights, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (1981) and I W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(c) (1978), for stinging criticisms of Miller.
On the other hand, Maryland's statutes concerning the privacy rights of bank
customers, MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN., §§ 1-301 to -305 (1980 & Supp. 1984), have been
hailed as the most progressive in the nation, balancing the privacy interest against that
of law enforcement. See Comment, supra, at 284-85. Section 1-302 requires that the
privacy of the customer be maintained unless the subtitle expressly provides otherwise.
Section 1-304(b), however, permits a fiduciary institution to comply with a subpoena if
notice is also given to the customer or waived by the court for good cause. The No. 258
court correctly dismissed as absurd appellants' contention that they had a due process
right to challenge the exercise of the waiver notice, "as it presupposes the notice the
waiver provision was intended to obviate." 55 Md. App. at 125, 461 A.2d at 37.
152. 299 Md. at 193, 473 A.2d at 7. For a general discussion on grand jury subpoe-
nas, see White Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 195-
202 (1981).
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E. Speedy Trial
In 1984 the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari in
eighteen cases in which the sole issue was whether the defendant
was entitled to dismissal of criminal charges because of the State's
alleged failure to comply with Maryland Annotated Code article 27,
section 591 "' and Maryland Rule 746.' Section 591 and rule 746
require that a criminal trial be held within 180 days of defendant's
arraignment or his attorney's first appearance.155 Under section
591 and rule 746 trial may be postponed beyond the 180-day period
only by order of the administrative judge of the court in which the
matter is pending, upon a showing of good cause.
Enacted in 1971, the original section 591 required trial within
six months of defendant's arraignment or his attorney's appoint-
ment, whichever came first, and prohibited postponement except
153. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1982) provides as follows:
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of coun-
sel or the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal matter, which-
ever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the circuit court in
which the matter is pending shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date
shall be not later than 180 days from the date of the arraignment of the person
accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused
whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter shall not
be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party and only with
the permission of the administrative judge of the court where the matter is
pending.
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized to
establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of
this section in the various circuit courts throughout the State of Maryland.
154. Md. R.P. 746 (1977) states:
a. General Provision
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date
shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or
waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursu-
ant to Rule 723.
b. Change of Trial Date
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for good
cause shown, the county administrative judge or ajudge designated by him may
grant a change of trial date.
(current version at MD. R.P. 4-271).
155. The purpose of § 591 and rule 746 is not solely to implement the defendant's
constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial, but to protect society from the harms of
unnecessarily delayed criminal trials and to make efficient use of judicial resources by
avoiding unjustified postponements. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 461 A.2d 543
(1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 707 (1984).
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for "extraordinary cause."' 5 6 In 1972, in Young v. State,'5 7 the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals held that the requirements of that
statute were "directory" and not "mandatory."''  In 1977, rule
746159 was adopted, which in purpose and effect'16 superseded sec-
tion 591. The rule reduced the time period within which a trial must
be held from six months to 120 days, and redefined the events that
trigger the running of that time.' 6 ' Two years later, in State v.
Hicks,' 6 2 the Court of Appeals held that the requirements of rule
746 were mandatory and that the appropriate sanction for failure to
comply was dismissal. 163 The court noted, however, that dismissal
was inappropriate in two circumstances: first, if the trial is held
within 120 days but the "thirty day" rule for setting the trial date is
violated,' 6 4 or second, if the defendant "seeks or expressly consents
156. Act of Apr. 29, 1971, ch. 212, 1971 Md. Laws 500 (current version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 591 (1982)).
157. 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, summarily aftd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467
(1972), overruled, State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
158. Id. at 710, 292 A.2d at 139. Had the court held that the requirements of § 591
were mandatory, noncompliance would have resulted in dismissal of the indictment. In-
stead, the court found that compliance with § 591 was directory and that the require-
ment was only one factor to be considered in evaluating whether the defendant's right to
a speedy trial under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights had been violated. Id. at 710-11, 292 A.2d at
139.
159. 4:4 Md. Admin. Reg. 250 (Feb. 16, 1977) (current version at MD. R.P. 4-271).
160. The court quotes article IV, § 18(A) of the Constitution of Maryland as its au-
thority for promulgating a rule which in effect supercedes a statute. The provision, ac-
cording to the court, vests it with authority "to make rules, having the force of law
governing 'practice and procedure in the administration of the . . . courts.' " State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). The court states that its intent in
adopting rule 746 was "to supercede the provisions of § 591 (a) and put teeth into a new
regulation governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial." Id.
161. Under rule 746, the triggering mechanism became the earlier of the appearance
of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court, rather than, as
under § 591, the earlier of counsel's appearance or defendant's arraignment. Compare
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a) (1976) with Md. R.P. 746(a) (1977).
162. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
163. Id. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. The court distinguished its earlier adoption of the
Court of Special Appeals opinion in Young, which held that § 591(a) was directory in
nature. In support of the Young holding, the Hicks court stated that § 591 is "plainly a
declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal
charges," a policy that generally recognizes the detrimental effects to the criminal justice
system caused by the postponement of trials. According to the Hicks court, the Young
court's finding was necessary because of the failure of § 591 to expressly provide dismis-
sal as the sanction for administrative noncompliance. Id. at 316, 403 A.2d at 359. But,
because the language of rule 746 mirrors the language used in § 591 (a), the Hicks hold-
ing necessarily overruled Young. Id. at 334, 403 A.2d at 368 (per curiam on motion for
reconsideration).
164. The "thirty day" rule refers to the requirement that the act of setting the trial
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to" a trial beyond the statutory period.' 65 After Hicks, the legisla-
ture amended section 591, increasing the time period to 180 days
and substituting "good cause" for "extraordinary cause."' 1 66 The
dismissal sanction was not altered. In 1982 the court reaffirmed the
dismissal sanction in Goins v. State.' 67 The cases considered by the
court in the following year, when taken together, establish guide-
lines for compliance with the speedy trial statute and narrow the
availability of the dismissal sanction.
1. Procedure for Dismissal.-In State v. Frazier,168 the first of the
series of cases, the Court of Appeals developed a general proce-
dural framework for dealing with speedy trial motions.' 6 9 Frazier es-
tablishes first that the trial court may entertain a defendant's oral
motion to dismiss based on the state's alleged noncompliance with
section 591 and rule 746.17' An appellate court may not reverse this
decision to entertain an oral motion except for abuse of discre-
tion.' 7' Next, in deciding a motion to dismiss, Frazier requires the
court to look to the "critical" postponement, that is, the postpone-
ment order having the effect of postponing trial date beyond 180
days. 172 It is this "critical" order that must violate section 591 and
date be done within 30 days of the appointment or waiver of counsel, or after the ap-
pearance of counsel, whichever occurs first. See Md. R.P. 746 (1977).
165. Hicks, 285 Md. at 335, 403 A.2d at 369 (per curiam on motion for
reconsideration).
166. Act of June 1, 1982, ch. 820, § 1, 1982 Md. Laws 4390, 4400 (codified at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984)). The amendment was made in response to the
Hicks decision, in order to expand the circumstances constituting "cause" for postpone-
ment of trials. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 458-60, 470 A.2d 1269, 1288-89 (1984).
The sponsor of the bill to change the statute argued that the purpose of the "good
cause" language was to give the trial courts greater latitude in ordering postponements.
Id. at 460-61, 470 A.2d at 1289 (citing testimony of Del. Pica before the HouseJudiciary
Committee, Feb. 12, 1980 (on file with the Dep't of Legislative Reference)).
167. 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982).
168. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984).
169. In Frazier the Court of Appeals consolidated four criminal cases. The Criminal
Court of Baltimore had dismissed each case at the pretrial stage on the ground that the
defendant had not been tried within the 180-day period. The State appealed in all four
cases, raising similar issues about the operation of § 591 and rule 746. The court issued
writs of certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals and directed that
the cases be heard together. The cases which were consolidated under Frazier were State
v. Frazier, State v. Weems & Patton, State v. Shaw and State v. Richardson. Id. at 425, 470 A.2d
at 1271.
170. Id. at 436 n.11, 470 A.2d at 1277 n. 11; accord Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 71, 472
A.2d 470, 471 (1984) (per curiam); Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447,
449 (1984); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17, 20, 472 A.2d 444, 446 (1984).
171. 298 Md. at 436 n.ll, 470 A.2d at 1277 n. ll.
172. Id. at 428, 470 A.2d at 1272; accord State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474, 474 A.2d
514, 514-15 (1984); State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63, 66-67, 472 A.2d 467, 469 (1984) (per
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rule 746 or there can be no dismissal. 173
curiam); State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 61-62, 472 A.2d 465, 466-67 (1984); Grant v.
State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); Satchell v. State, 299 Md. 42, 45,
472 A.2d 457, 458 (1984).
173. Just how "critical" this postponement is was made clear in Farinholt v. State, 299
Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). In Farinholt a postponement was granted because the
defendant wished to call a co-defendant as a witness and the co-defendant would not
testify until he had been sentenced. At that time, the defendant indicated his consent to
a trial beyond the 180-day period. The trial was rescheduled for a date six days before
expiration of the 180-day period, but on that date the co-defendant was still unavailable
and the trial was again postponed. This second postponement pushed the trial date
beyond the 180-day deadline. Again, the defendant indicated consent to a trial date
beyond the 180-day period. There was a third postponement of the trial date, which was
requested by the State because the victim was on vacation. On the scheduled trial date,
the defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and rule 746 was granted. The
Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding that § 591 and rule 746 were not violated.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendant's main argument that the dis-
missal sanction is applicable to a subsequent postponement even though an earlier or-
der postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline had complied with the statute.
The court held that "the dismissal sanction has no relevance to subsequent postpone-
ments of the trial date unless the defendant's constitutional speedy trial right has been
denied." Id. at 40, 472 A.2d at 456.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) the Supreme Court adopted a four-part
balancing test to determine when a defendant's constitutional speedy trial right has
been violated. The court should consider four factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the
reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the extent of preju-
dice to the defendant. Id. at 530. None of these four factors is a necessary or sufficient
condition; rather, they are related factors that should be considered together. The
length of delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism;" before the court will inquire
into the other factors, there must be some delay that is "presumptively prejudicial." Id.
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has ruled that a delay of one year and 15 days was
"presumptively prejudicial," triggering application of the Barker balancing test. Epps v.
State, 276 Md. 96, 111, 345 A.2d 62, 72 (1975). In Epps the court stated that the State
must make a diligent, good faith effort to bring the defendant to trial. The court also
described a "presumptively prejudicial" delay as one where the " 'passage of time [is]
beyond that which is obviously within the requirements of orderly procedure.' " Id. at
110, 345 A.2d at 72 (quoting State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 230, 283 A.2d 160, 169
(1972)).
In a 1984 case the Court of Appeals considered the question of whether a de-
fendant's constitutional speedy trial right had been denied. State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565,
471 A.2d 712, cert. denied sub nom. Gee v. Maryland, 104 S. Ct. 3519 (1984). The court
noted that the speedy trial right is not relevant until the "putative defendant in some
way becomes an 'accused.'" Id. at 568, 471 A.2d at 713 (quoting State v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 313 (1971)). "A person becomes an 'accused' only upon his arrest or the filing
of an indictment, information or other formal charge against him." Id. The principal
issue in Gee was whether a document consisting of a warrant for arrest and statement of
charges upon which the warrant was based is a "formal charge" for speedy trial pur-
poses. The court held that it was. Id. at 574, 471 A.2d at 716. Finally, the court found
that a delay of approximately six months between the time Gee became an accused and
the date of trial was not of constitutional dimension and thus did not trigger the Barker
balancing test. Id. at 578-79, 471 A.2d at 718-19.
The Court of Appeals will not apply the dismissal sanction to subsequent post-
ponements when the "critical" postponement complied with the statute, unless the de-
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2. Grounds for Dismissal.-Under section 591 and rule 746, a mo-
tion to dismiss may be granted by a trial judge based on a finding
that the motion to postpone was granted by the administrative judge
without a showing of good cause. Frazier held that a trial judge may
not make a de novo determination of whether good cause existed,
absent a showing of "clear abuse of discretion" on the part of the
administrative judge who ruled on the postponement motion. 174
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the general principle that one
trial judge may consider de novo a prior ruling of another judge in
the same case does not apply if a statute or rule reflects a different
intent. That intent is evident in section 591 and rule 746, which
grant to the administrative judge sole authority to postpone a crimi-
nal trial. 175 Thus, the decision of the judge entrusted to make a
finding of good cause should not be disturbed unless there is a clear
abuse of discretion.
176
Under Frazier the defendant has the burden of demonstrating a
"clear abuse of discretion."' 177 This burden is met by showing that
the administrative judge's reason for postponement was not, as a
matter of law, sufficient cause for postponement, or that the reason
was not sufficient in the circumstances. In each of the cases consoli-
dated in Frazier the court considered whether the defendants met
this burden, that is, whether the postponements were supported by
good cause.
In two of the four cases consolidated in Frazier, the trials were
postponed beyond the 180-day period because no courtroom was
fendant's constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. However, the court has not
found a delay of less than a year to be of "constitutional dimension." Further, given the
court's expansion of the circumstances furnishing requisite cause for postponement, it
appears that the speedy trial cases decided this year create a six-month "vacuum" in
which statutory speedy trial is no longer relevant and the constitutional speedy trial right
has not yet come into play.
174. 298 Md. at 449, 470 A.2d at 1283. In fact, in Green v. State, 299 Md. 72, 472
A.2d 472 (1984), the court held that it was reversible error for the trial judge to consider
de novo whether good cause existed. Id. at 75, 472 A.2d at 473.
175. 298 Md. at 449-50, 470 A.2d at 1283-84. In Frazier the court stated that this was
a "major safeguard . . .for assuring that criminal trials are not needlessly postponed
beyond the 180-day period .... ." Id. at 453, 470 A.2d at 1285. The court went on to
say that "[t]his is a logical safeguard, as it is the administrative judge who has an overall
view of the court's business, who is responsible 'for the administration of the court,' who
assigns trial judges, who 'supervise[s] the assignment of actions for trial,' who supervises
the court personnel involved in the assignment of cases, and who receives reports from
such personnel." Id. at 453-54, 470 A.2d at 1285 (footnotes omitted) (quoting MD. R.P.
1200).
176. Id. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286.
177. Id., 470 A.2d at 1285.
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available on the date set for trial.178 The defendants argued that
"docket congestion" could not, as a matter of law, constitute good
cause for postponement. 79 The Court of Appeals rejected this ar-
gument, reasoning that the 1980 amendment of section 591 chang-
ing "extraordinary cause" to "good cause" was intended to expand
those circumstances furnishing the requisite cause for postpone-
ment in order to allow the courts greater leeway in allowing cases to
go forward rather than imposing the harsh sanction of dismissal.' 80
The court recognized that some docket congestion was unavoidable,
even in the most efficient court system, and emphasized that Balti-
more City had made substantial progress toward alleviating the
problems of docket congestion. 81 Thus, the court refused to find
that docket congestion could never, as a matter of law, constitute
good cause for postponement.
The court's reasoning suggests that docket congestion may be
insufficient cause for postponement when little or no effort has been
made to remedy overcrowded docket conditions that prevent crimi-
nal cases from being heard within 180 days. When, however, the
state has made a good faith effort to try every criminal case within
180 days, docket congestion generally will be sufficient cause for
postponement. 1
82
178. Unavailability of a courtroom refers to the lack of a trial judge and not the ab-
sence of a physical facility. Id. at 436 n.10, 470 A.2d at 1276 n.10.
179. Id. at 455, 470 A.2d at 1286.
180. Id. at 459-61, 470 A.2d at 1288-89.
181. Id. at 458, 470 A.2d at 1287-88. For an extensive discussion of the Baltimore
City criminal assignment system, see id. at 430-35, 470 A.2d at 1273-76.
182. Id. at 455-57, 470 A.2d at 1286-87. Judge Davidson in her dissent argued that
this finding was not in accord with the purpose of § 591 and rule 746. Id. at 464, 470
A.2d at 1291 (Davidson, J., dissenting). The mandatory dismissal sanction under § 591
and rule 746 is, according to Judge Davidson, " 'a prophylactic measure designed to
insure compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials
of criminal cases.' " Id. at 470, 470 A.2d at 1294 (quoting Hicks, 285 Md. at 337, 403
A.2d at 370). Judge Davidson argued that both the statute and the rule serve to protect
the defendant's right to a speedy trial and society's interest in the prompt disposition of
all criminal charges. By allowing chronic court congestion in and of itself tojustify delay
beyond the 180-day deadline, the purpose of § 591 and rule 746 is seriously under-
mined. Id. at 468-72, 470 A.2d at 1293-95.
Judge Davidson did recognize that docket congestion, even chronic congestion,
under certain circumstances, can constitute good cause for postponement. The unavail-
ability of a court resulting from "nonchronic court congestion" ordinarily would consti-
tute good cause. Id. at 465, 470 A.2d at 1291. She defined "nonchronic court
congestion" as congestion arising from "unique, nonrecurring events" such as riots or
the illness or death of a prosecutor, defense counsel or judge on the day a trial is sched-
uled, which create a particular scheduling problem or produce an inordinate number of
cases for court disposition. Id. at 466-67, 470 A.2d at 1292. Since the unavailability of a
court in two of the cases decided in Frazier did not arise from "unique, nonrecurring
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In the other two cases consolidated in Frazier, postponement
beyond 180 days was not due to docket congestion, but rather to
mistakes by court personnel. In the Weems & Patton case, clerical
personnel failed to record a new trial date after trial was initially
postponed. Consequently, the computer did not generate the
paperwork necessary to place the case on the docket, issue sum-
monses, send notices to counsel and writs to assure that defendants
were brought from jail. On the date set for trial, the defendants
were not present, only one defense attorney appeared, none of the
witnesses were present, and no court was available to hear the case.
The case was reset for a date four days beyond the 180-day limit. It
was later discovered that court personnel had not followed standard
procedure to determine if the new date was within the 180-day
period. 1
83
In the Richardson case, the defendant, Mark Richardson, was in
the custody of the Division of Corrections pending trial. There
were two other Mark Richardsons in the Division's custody at the
time. On the day of the trial, court officials brought the wrong Mark
Richardson to the courthouse. Corrections officials were unable to
ascertain who was the correct Mark Richardson and the trial was
postponed to a date twenty-six days beyond the expiration of the
180-day period. '84
In both cases, defendants argued that mistakes by court person-
nel could not constitute good cause for postponement. The Court
of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that occasional, isolated
mistakes that prevent the case from being tried within 180 days may
constitute good cause.' 85 As in Frazier and Shaw, the decision as to
whether there was an illegal postponement turns on whether the de-
events," but rather from "chronic court congestion," Judge Davidson found that there
was not good cause for postponement and that the dismissal sanction should have been
applied in these cases. Id. at 465, 470 A.2d at 1291.
Judge Davidson also rejected the majority's reliance on the fact that "in Balti-
more City 'the proportion of criminal cases which must be postponed by the administra-
tive judge beyond the 180-day deadline . . .is less than two percent' " to support its
finding that the Baltimore City courts were not chronically congested. Id. at 475, 470
A.2d at 1297 (quoting id. at 458, 470 A.2d at 1288 (majority opinion)). She noted that
there was nothing in the statute's legislative history to indicate that the legislature in-
tended that all but two percent of criminal cases be tried within 180 days. Id. at 475-76,
470 A.2d at 1297.
183. Id. at 437-38, 470 A.2d at 1276-77.
184. Id. at 444-46, 470 A.2d at 1281-82.
185. Id. at 462-63, 470 A.2d at 1290. The dissent rejected this decision as tantamount
to a finding that the State's negligence and breach of its duty to bring a defendant to




fendant has met his burden of demonstrating a "clear abuse of dis-
cretion" in the issuance of the postponement order. The court
found no "clear abuse of discretion" in either Weems & Patton or
Richardson.
Under Frazier, dismissal of criminal charges for lack of good
cause will be less frequent. The Court of Appeals has considerably
expanded the circumstances furnishing requisite good cause for
postponement, by suggesting that, as long as the State makes a
good faith effort to try every criminal case within 180 days, good
cause generally will be found. In addition, the court has stated that
the defendant has the burden of showing lack of good cause. Given
the court's interpretation of what will constitute good cause, the de-
fendant's burden is heavy. For example, in a case such as Frazier or
Shaw the defendant might meet this burden by showing that there
was, in fact, a courtroom available on the assigned trial date or that
the case was not set for the earliest available date. In cases such as
Weems & Patton and Richardson, the defendant might meet the burden
by showing that court personnel have made frequent mistakes, but
such information about the status of the dockets or the competence
of court personnel will not be readily available to most criminal de-
fendants. Unless the State blatantly disregards its duty to try each
defendant within 180 days, following Frazier, it will be difficult for
defendants to meet the burden of showing lack of good cause.
In addition to finding that overcrowded dockets and court per-
sonnel errors were not insufficient as a matter of law for postpone-
ment, the court in other cases during the period upheld
postponement on other grounds. In Satchell v. State,'" 6 one code-
fendant requested postponement because he needed time to secure
counsel. The defendant objected to the postponement, but the ad-
ministrative judge found good cause to postpone defendant's case
because it would be "inconvenient to try it separately."'' 8 7 The
court held that a decision to postpone in order to try the defendants
together was not insufficient cause.' 88
In McFadden v. State'"9 charges against four defendants were
based upon a single incident in which all four allegedly participated.
On the date set for trial, the case could not be reached because no
courtroom was available. Three of the four co-defendants agreed to
a trial date beyond the 180-day period; McFadden objected. The
186. 299 Md. 42, 472 A.2d 457 (1984).
187. Id. at 44, 472 A.2d at 458.
188. Id. at 46, 472 A.2d at 459.
189. 299 Md. 55, 472 A.2d 463 (1984) (per curiam).
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administrative judge postponed the trial, over McFadden's objec-
tions, in order not to sever the cases. The Court of Appeals held
that the postponement order was proper as "a matter within the dis-
cretion of the administrative judge, and we perceive no clear abuse
of discretion." 190
In Morgan v. State' 9 ' the State sought to introduce evidence that
was allegedly newly discovered; the defendant moved to exclude the
evidence. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress and sua
sponte ordered postponement to allow the defendant time to "look
into" the evidence. 192 The next assigned trial date was fourteen
days beyond the expiration of the 180-day time period. At the trial,
the defendant argued that the case should be dismissed, alleging
that there had not been good cause to postpone because the State's
representation that the evidence was "newly discovered" was not
accurate. The motion was denied, the trial was held, and the de-
fendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion, 9 3 holding that "[w]hen the 'good cause' question concerns the
need for postponement. . . this 'clear abuse of discretion' standard
of review necessarily relates to what is before the administrative
judge . . . at the time the postponement is ordered."' 194 The court
stated that the fact that some of the State's representations may
have been inaccurate was "simply irrelevant" to the good cause
question.' 95
The good cause necessary to sustain a postponement and avoid
a dismissal involves not only good cause to postpone but also good
cause for the length of the postponement. If the critical postpone-
ment complies with section 591 and rule 746, the defendant may
still challenge the postponement on the ground that there was not
good cause for the length of delay between the date the postpone-
190. Id. at 58, 472 A.2d at 465.
191. 299 Md. 480, 474 A.2d 517 (1984).
192. Id. at 484, 474 A.2d at 519. The defense did not ask for a postponement but
rather sought to exclude the evidence. Id. at 483, 474 A.2d at 519.
193. Id. at 485-86, 474 A.2d at 520.
194. Id. at 488, 474 A.2d at 521.
195. Id., 474 A.2d at 521-22. See also Green v. State, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984)
(per curiam). In Green, the State believed that a guilty plea had been arranged with the
defendant. On the assigned trial date, the State went forward without its witnesses, but
the defendant apparently changed his mind and decided to plead not guilty. The admin-
istrative judge postponed the trial because the State could not proceed without its wit-
nesses. The Court of Appeals found that the administrative judge had shown no clear
abuse of discretion in granting the postponement. Id. at 75, 472 A.2d at 743. This case
is different from the other postponement cases because the defendant's own act, backing
out of the plea agreement, was the "cause" for the postponement.
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ment was sought and the new date set for trial.' 96 Generally, the
defendant has the burden of demonstrating lack of good cause for
the delay.' 97 Frazier, however, suggests that a case might arise in
which an "inordinate length of time" between postponement and
the new trial date will itself be prima facie evidence of undue delay,
shifting the burden to the State to show justification for the delay.' 98
The Court of Appeals addressed the question of what might consti-
tute an "inordinate length of time" in Pennington v. State.'9 9 In Pen-
nington there was a delay of 168 days between the date the
postponement order sought by the defendant was issued and the
new trial date. On the date set for trial, defendant's attorney moved
to dismiss the charges for violation of section 591 and rule 746, al-
leging that there was not good cause for the length of the delay.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and held that the heavy
caseload in Harford County was sufficient reason for delay; the
Court of Special Appeals upheld that denial. 00 The defendant ap-
pealed, contending that the court's justification for the delay, docket
congestion, was not shown by the record and further, as a matter of
law, docket congestion does not furnish good cause for delay. Cit-
ing Frazier, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention
that docket congestion could not furnish good cause. However, the
court did find that the 168-day delay was "sufficiently long to place
the burden upon the State to offer some evidence, both in terms of
what happened in the instant case as well as the nature of the crimi-
nal case scheduling in Harford County";2 '01 the 168-day delay was
thus considered to be inordinate. The court found it appropriate to
196. 298 Md. at 448, 470 A.2d at 1282-83.
197. Id. at 452, 470 A.2d at 1285.
198. Id. at 462, 470 A.2d at 1290.
199. 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984).
200. Id. at 27, 472 A.2d at 449. The Court of Special Appeals based its decision on
two grounds. First, defendant's failure to file a written motion to dismiss precluded him
from seeking dismissal under § 591 and rule 746. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected
this ground because Frazier establishes that an oral motion to dismiss may be proper. Id.
at 28, 472 A.2d at 449. Second, since the defendant sought the latest postponement he
must file " 'a motion to compel compliance with the 180 day rule' or take 'some affirma-
tive action . . . if he insists on strict conformity with the rule ...." Id. at 27, 472 A.2d
at 449 (quoting Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 544, 454 A.2d 879, 883 (1983)).
The Court of Appeals also rejected this finding. Id. at 28-29, 472 A.2d at 450. Although
Hicks established that the dismissal sanction is inappropriate when the defendant "seeks
or expressly consents to" a trial date beyond the 180-day period, 285 Md. at 335, 403
A.2d at 369, the Pennington court held that the defendant's "mere silence ... or his
dilatory conduct contributing to a delay, does not ordinarily constitute express con-
sent .. ." Pennington, 299 Md. at 28, 472 A.2d at 450.
201. 299 Md. at 29-30, 472 A.2d at 450-51.
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remand the case and instructed that upon remand the State should
present and the court could consider this evidence.2 °2
In State v. Harris20 3 there was a 105-day delay between the date
of the critical postponement and the new trial date. Shortly after
the critical postponement, a five-day hearing was held on defend-
ant's motion to suppress evidence. The hearing concluded twenty-
seven days before expiration of the 180-day deadline; at that time
the administrative judge found it necessary to prepare a written
opinion dealing with the suppression issues. The opinion, denying
the motion to suppress, was filed forty-three days after expiration of
the 180-day deadline. The trial date was postponed once more and
trial was held eighty-four days after expiration of the 180-day dead-
line. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss for viola-
tions of section 591 and rule 746 and the defendant was convicted.
The defendant appealed, contending that charges should have been
dismissed20 4 and the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the de-
fendant. 2 5 The Court of Appeals, however, held that there were no
violations of section 591 or rule 746. In addressing the question of
whether there was good cause for the length of the delay, the court
found that, although the delay was substantial, it was justified by the
need for "extensive proceedings" and an opinion on the defend-
ant's motion to suppress evidence.20 6
In Harris the court did not address the question of whether this
delay was so "inordinate" as to shift the burden of justification to
the State, as was done in Pennington. It is not clear whether this is
because the court would not consider a delay of less than 168 days
"inordinate" or because the delay was easily explained by the need
for hearings on the suppression motion. The court has considered
202. Id. at 30-31, 472 A.2d at 451.
203. 299 Md. 63, 472 A.2d 467 (1984) (per curiam).
204. The defendant also contended that the suppression motion should have been
granted. This issue was not reached by the Court of Special Appeals inasmuch as the
case was decided under § 591 and rule 746. The Court of Special Appeals therefore
remanded the case for consideration of the suppression issue. Id. at 67, 472 A.2d at 469.
205. The Court of Special Appeals found, in an unreported opinion, that the 180-day
violation "'more directly stemmed from the administrative postponements than from
the time required to adequately consider the suppression motion.' " Id. at 66, 472 A.2d
at 469 (quoting the Court of Special Appeals unreported opinion). Since the critical
postponement was due to unavailability of a courtroom, the Court of Special Appeals
held that it was not supported by good cause. The Court of Appeals rejected that find-
ing. The court stated that the unavailability of a court, per se, does not constitute a lack
of good cause for postponement. Rather, "the test is whether the defendant has met the
burden of establishing that the administrative judge's decision to postpone. . . and the
length of delay .. .represent a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 67, 472 A.2d at 469.
206. Id. at 67. 472 A.2d at 469.
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at least one other case with a protracted delay, but did not consider
the issue of good cause for the delay. In Green v. State20 7 the delay
between the critical postponement and the date of trial was 127
days. In Green the good cause issue was never raised and there is
nothing in the opinion to explain why there was a four-month delay.
Like the defendant in Pennington, the defendant in Green was respon-
sible for the critical postponement. It is possible that, if the defend-
ant in Green had challenged the existence of good cause for the
length of delay, the court might have found a four-month delay "in-
ordinate" and required the State to show good cause for that delay.
But, while the court has made it clear that a delay of 168 days will be
considered "inordinate" unless, as in Harmis, the delay is easily ex-
plained, the question of whether and under what circumstances a
shorter period of delay will be considered "inordinate" is left open.
In several other cases during this period, the court considered
another ground for dismissal under the statute. A defendant may
seek dismissal on the ground that the State violated the statute when
his trial was postponed without the order of an administrative judge.
In two cases the court addressed the question of what constitutes an
order by an administrative judge.
In Calhoun v. State,2"' the defendants' trial was postponed to a
date five days before the expiration of the 180-day period in order
to allow for Calhoun's mental examination pursuant to an insanity
plea. Several weeks before the trial, and over Calhoun's objections,
the court granted his co-defendant's motion for severance. On the
date assigned for trial, both defendants appeared. The State chose
to proceed with the trial of the co-defendant on an unrelated matter
and, without seeking a postponement order, the State suggested
that by necessity Calhoun's trial would have to be postponed. Cal-
houn and his attorney were excused. Five days after expiration of
the 180-day deadline, Calhoun filed a motion to set a trial date and
requested a hearing on the motion. At a hearing ten days later, the
administrative judge found that the need to sever defendant's case
constituted good cause for postponement. The trial court refused
defendant's motion to dismiss, assuming that the administrative
judge had approved of the reasons for the postponement.20 9 Cal-
houn was convicted and appealed. The Court of Special Appeals
agreed that the need for a severance constituted good cause and
held that "the dismissal of counsel on August 4th in order to try the
207. 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). See discussion supra note 195.
208. 299 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984).
209. Id. at 5, 472 A.2d at 438.
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codefendant constituted a de facto order of postponement by the
trial judge pending approval by the Administrative Judge."2 l The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that failure to obtain an admin-
istrative judge's approval for postponement is a violation of section
591 and rule 746 requiring dismissal, even though good cause may
have existed for postponement. An "after-the-fact ratification" by
an administrative judge is not an "order" that complies with section
591 and rule 746.211
In Carey v. State,2" 2 in response to defendant's insanity plea, an
administrative judge signed and filed an order directing defendant
Carey to undergo a psychiatric examination. The case was called for
trial several weeks before the due date for the psychiatrist's report.
On the date assigned for trial, the defendant was not present, pre-
sumably because the examination had not been completed. The
trial judge "direct[ed] the case to be reset pending mental examina-
tion." 2 13 The report was filed on time and Carey's case was set for
trial, but the trial date was twenty-four days after the expiration of
the 180-day period. At the trial, the defendant moved to dismiss,
arguing that the order that postponed the trial was the trial judge's
direction that the case be reset, 2 4 not an order entered by an ad-
ministrative judge and therefore not in compliance with the statute.
Carey's dismissal motion was denied, he was convicted, and he ap-
pealed on the basis that motion to dismiss should have been
granted.21 5 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding
that the administrative judge's order directing the mental examina-
tion constituted an order postponing the trial within the meaning of
section 591 and rule 746. Because the trial could not proceed until
the results of the examination were received, the administrative
judge's order necessarily postponed the trial.2 16 The trial judge's
direction that the case be reset "merely reiterated to the clerical per-
sonnel that a new trial date would have to be assigned because of
210. Id. (quoting Calhoun v. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522, 451 A.2d 146, 150 (1982)).
211. Id. at 9, 472 A.2d at 440.
212. 299 Md. 17, 472 A.2d 444 (1984).
213. Id. at 19, 472 A.2d at 445 (quoting the trial court docket entry).
214. In Frazier the court established that the court may entertain an oral motion to
dismiss. 298 Md. at 436 n.ll, 470 A.2d at 1277 n.11.
215. 299 Md. at 19-20, 472 A.2d at 445. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Ca-
rey's conviction, finding that the motion to dismiss should have been denied because
Carey failed to file a written motion to dismiss. The Court of Special Appeals did not
consider the merits of defendant's contentions under § 591 and rule 746. The Court of
Appeals affirmed but rejected the ground upon which the Court of Special Appeals dis-
posed of the case. Id. at 20, 23, 472 A.2d at 446, 447.
216. Id. at 22, 472 A.2d at 447.
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[the administrative judge's] order for a mental examination.- 21 7
Based on Carey and Calhoun, it seems that the court will be generous
in deciding what constitutes an order by an administrative judge,
but will not find an order when there is no indication the administra-
tive judge took any action.2 18
3. Waiver of Dismissal Sanction.-In three cases the Court of Ap-
peals discussed the circumstances under which a defendant may
waive his right to invoke the dismissal sanction. In Farinholt v.
State 92 1 the defendant sought the critical postponement and, on two
occasions, indicated consent to a trial date beyond the 180-day limit.
Relying on its finding in Hicks that the dismissal sanction is inappro-
priate when the defendant "seeks or expressly consents to" a trial
date beyond the 180-day deadline, the Court of Appeals held that
the defendant, by his conduct, was precluded from challenging
either the existence of good cause for postponement or the exist-
ence of a postponement order by an administrative judge.220
In Rash v. State 22 1 the court considered more precisely the issue
of what action by the defendant constitutes a waiver. In Rash, the
trial was postponed beyond the 180-day deadline because neither a
judge nor a jury was available. The defendant's attorney neither af-
firmatively consented to nor objected to this postponement. At
trial, the court denied defendant's oral motion to dismiss. The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant had
waived his right to call for the dismissal by failing to object to the
postponement. 222  Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgments of the lower courts denying defendant's motion to dis-
217. Id. at 21-22, 472 A.2d at 446.
218. Cf Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 53, 472 A.2d 459 (1984) (holding inter alia that
failure to show the administrative judge's approval of the postponement at the very least
constitutes a prima facie case of noncompliance with § 591 and rule 746).
219. 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984), discussed at supra note 149.
220. Id. at 39-40, 472 A.2d at 455-56. Note that in Farinholt, none of the three post-
ponements was ordered by an administrative judge as required by § 591 and rule 746.
The court acknowledged this noncompliance with the section and the rule. However,
the issue of compliance was not properly before them because the defendant waived the
section and the rule as grounds for dismissal by seeking or expressly consenting to a
postponement that resulted in a trial date in violation of the 180-day rule. Id. at 37-38
n.2, 39-40, 472 A.2d at 454 n.2, 455-56. Therefore, by seeking or expressly consenting
to a postponement that results in a trial date in violation of the 180-day rule, the defend-
ant forfeits any argument that he might have had, such as a postponement granted with-
out good cause, postponement ordered by someone other than the administrative judge
or a postponement that resulted in an inordinate delay.
221. 299 Md. 68, 472 A.2d 470 (1984) (per curiam).
222. Id. at 70, 472 A.2d at 471. The Court of Special Appeals also found that the
dismissal sanction was inappropriate because defendant had failed to file a written mo-
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miss, it rejected the reasons used by the Court of Special Appeals,
finding instead that the defendant had failed to establish that the
dismissal represented an abuse of discretion. In rejecting the Court
of Special Appeals' reasoning, the court noted that a defendant's
"mere failure to object" is not a waiver.223
Addressing another aspect of the waiver issue, the court in Mor-
gan v. State 224 held that a defendant may waive his right to challenge
noncompliance with the statute by not asserting each specific
ground on which the motion to dismiss could be based. 22 5 At trial,
the defendant moved for a dismissal on the basis that section 591
and rule 746 were violated because there was not good cause for
postponement. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, 226
the trial continued and the defendant was convicted. Before the
Court of Special Appeals, as part of the argument that the trial court
erred in denying the motion to dismiss, the defendant introduced
the additional argument that the trial judge was not vested with the
authority to issue a continuance, since only the administrative judge
possessed such power.227 In an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's action.2 28 The Court of
Appeals upheld that affirmation on the ground that there was good
cause for postponement, rejecting the defendant's argument that
there had been no order by an administrative judge. Although the
Court of Appeals stated that the record could be read to establish a
prima facie case of violation of section 591 and rule 746 on the
ground that the postponement was not ordered by the administra-
tive judge, the court ruled that the defendant could not raise the
absence of a proper postponement order for the first time on
tion. This has been expressly overruled by Frazier. See supra text accompanying note
170.
223. 299 Md. at 70-71, 472 A.2d at 471.
224. 299 Md. 480, 474 A.2d 517 (1984), discussed at supra text accompanying notes
191-95.
225. 299 Md. at 489-90, 474 A.2d at 522-23.
226. Id. at 484-85, 474 A.2d at 520.
227. Id. at 485-86, 474 A.2d at 520-21.
228. The court did so on several grounds. First, it held that there was good cause for
the postponement. Next, the court noted that the defendant had the burden of proving
that the trial judge was not the authorized administrative judge, and implied he had not
done so. An alternative holding was that the - 'dismissal sanction is not appropriate
when an otherwise valid continuance is granted by a judge other than an administrative
judge or his designee.'" Id. at 486, 474 A.2d at 520-21 (quoting the unreported Court
of Special Appeals decision). This latter holding is wrong because § 591 and rule 746
vest the postponement authority exclusively in the administrative judge or his designee.
The court also should not have considered the latter two grounds at all since they were




The absence of a postponement order issued by an administra-
tive judge is now perhaps the easiest route to dismissal under sec-
tion 591 and rule 746. This is because the defendant need only
show that the postponement was not ordered by an administrative
judge or his designee. However, it is probable that this ground for
dismissal is the least likely to occur.
4. Nol Pros and Speedy Trial. -In two cases decided in 1984, the
Court of Appeals looked at the interaction of nol pros23° of criminal
charges and the statutory speedy trial sanction. In Curley v. State,23'
counsel for the defendant entered his appearance on September 22,
1980; the 180-day period therefore expired on March 23, 1981. A
trial date was set for November 20, 1980, but on November 12,
1980 the defendant's counsel requested a postponement. Although
the postponement was granted, the case was never assigned.232 On
March 23, 1981, the date the 180-day period expired, the state en-
tered nol pros, 233 but the charges were refiled on June 26, 1981.
Curley's defense counsel filed three motions to dismiss for noncom-
pliance with section 591 and rule 746, and all three were denied.234
The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals. Pursuant to rule 1015235 the Court of Special Appeals
certified the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
accepted the certification application and issued a writ of certiorari.
Generally in Maryland, a nol pros terminates the charges. If the
charges are refiled the "speedy trial clock" begins to run anew with
the second charges. 236 However, where the nol pros of the first
229. 299 Md. at 489-90, 474 A.2d at 522-23.
230. A nol pros, formally known as a nolle prosequi, is a formal entry on the record,
by the prosecuting officer, in which he declares that the case will not be prosecuted
further. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 945 (5th ed. 1979).
231. 299 Md. 449, 474 A.2d 502 (1984).
232. Id. at 452-53, 474 A.2d at 503-04. The court noted that the record does not
disclose why a new trial date was not assigned. Id. at 453 n.4, 474 A.2d at 504 n.4.
233. The prosecuting attorney informed the defense counsel that he entered the nol
pros because the family of the victim requested the State not to prosecute and because a
key piece of evidence was apparently inadmissible. Id. at 453, 474 A.2d at 504.
234. Id. at 453-54, 474 A.2d at 504.
235. MD. R.P. 1015(a) provides for certification of a question of law or the entire con-
troversy to the Court of Appeals.
236. 299 Md. at 459-60, 474 A.2d at 506-07. The court discussed the approaches to
the nol pros/speedy trial problem taken in other jurisdictions. These approaches fall
into three broad categories. The first category consists of cases in which the statutory
period is neither tolled nor ended by the entry of a nol pros. If charges are refiled, the
statutory period runs from the date of the original charging document. Id. at 455-56,
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charges has the purpose or effect of circumventing the requirements
of section 591 and rule 746,237 the speedy trial clock will run from
the date of the first charges.2 38 In Curley, the necessary effect of the
nol pros was to circumvent section 591 and rule 746, since dismissal
would have been mandated because trial could not have been held
within the 180-day period.2" 9
In State v. Glenn,2 40 the charging documents were defective and
the defendant's attorney indicated that he would object to any
amendment. The charges were nol prossed on the date scheduled
for the trial, which was approximately two months before the expira-
tion of the 180-day deadline. The charges were refiled on the same
day. Approximately one month after the expiration of the 180-day
deadline and about one month before the scheduled trial date, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 591
and rule 746 had been violated. The circuit court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss, with prejudice. 24' The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the speedy trial clock would run anew with the filing of
the second charges because, in this case, the necessary effect and
purpose of the nol pros was not to circumvent the requirements of
section 591 and rule 746.242 Glenn can be distinguished from Curley
because in the former case the defendant could have been tried
within the statutory period at the time the nol pros was entered,
whereas in Curley this would not have been possible.
243
A related issue was considered by the Court of Appeals in State
v. Phillips.244 In Phillips, the court granted defendant's motion to
474 A.2d at 505-06. The second approach tolls running of the statutory time for the
period during which no indictment is outstanding. Id. at 457, 474 A.2d at 506. In the
third category are cases that state that when criminal charges are nol prossed and later
refiled, the time period for commencing trial generally begins to run anew after the
refiling. Id. at 458-59, 474 A.2d at 506-07.
237. An example of a situation in which a nol pros might have the purpose or the
effect of circumventing the statutory requirements is one in which, as in the present
case, it is the final day for holding a trial within the 180-day period, the case has not been
tried, and no good cause exists for granting a postponement. Curley prevents the prose-
cutor from filing a nol pros to avoid the 180-day rule and then later refiling the charges.
238. 299 Md. at 461, 474 A.2d at 508. Most of those jurisdictions, including Mary-
land, which recognize the first and third categories mentioned supra in note 236, gener-
ally recognize an exception when the State's "action is intended or clearly operates to
circumvent the statute or rule prescribing a time limit for trial." Id. at 458-59, 474 A.2d
at 507.
239. Id. at 462, 474 A.2d at 509.
240. 299 Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984).
241. Id. at 465-66, 474 A.2d at 510-11.
242. Id. at 467, 474 A.2d at 511.
243. Id.
244. 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984).
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dismiss on the ground that the charging document was defective;
the motion was granted approximately four months before the expi-
ration of the 180-day period. Phillips was reindicted on the same
charges about one month after the original charges were dismissed.
Two days after the original 180-day period expired, the defendant
moved to dismiss the second prosecution because the State failed to
comply with section 591 and rule 746. The circuit court granted the
motion, holding that the State is not " 'free to indict on a new indict-
ment unless that is done within the time limits imposed by' " the
statute and the rule.245 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an
unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that,
in such a case, the speedy trial period begins to run anew with the
filing of the second charges.246 The court reasoned that, where the
defendant sought dismissal, he was not entitled to the benefit of the
180-day period, as he might be in a case where the State nol prossed
the original charges.147 Moreover, the court indicated that the deci-
sions in Glenn and Curley were dispositive. 241
Glenn, Curley and Phillips together indicate that, if the original
charges against a defendant are dismissed on defendant's motion or
a nol pros is entered for legitimate reasons, and if a second indict-
ment is then issued, section 591 and rule 746 will operate as if the
prior prosection had not been initiated.
F. Right to Jury Trial
In Kawamura v. State,2 49 the Court of Appeals held that the
Maryland Declaration of Rights entitled a defendant charged with
petty theft to a jury trial in the first instance.2 5 0 Kawamura was
brought before a Maryland district court and charged with the theft
of goods having a value of less than $300, a misdemeanor punish-
able by a period not to exceed eighteen months and/or a fine not to
exceed $500."'1 Kawamura requested a jury trial, and the district
245. Id. at 470, 474 A.2d at 512 (quoting the circuit court dismissal order).
246. Id. at 471, 474 A.2d at 513.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 472, 474 A.2d at 513.
249. 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984).
250. Under MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 12-401 (1974), "a criminal defend-
ant, appealing from a District Court judgment, has a right to a trial by jury in the circuit
court de novo proceedings regardless of the seriousness of the criminal charges or
whether he or she could have elected a jury trial under § 4-302(d) [of the MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.]." Hardy v. State, 279 Md. 489, 496, 369 A.2d 1043, 1048
(1977). The Kawamura court, however, was concerned about the right to jury trial in the
initial proceeding. See infra note 260.
251. MD ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(f)(2) (1982).
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court judge denied his request.25 2 A criminal defendant in Mary-
land is normally entitled by statute to a jury trial in circuit court for
any offense punishable by more than ninety days imprisonment.253
If, however, the prosecutor in district court recommends and the
judge agrees to a sentence of less than ninety days, as happened in
Kawamura, by statute the district court is allowed to retain jurisdic-
tion and deny the defendant a jury trial in the first instance. 5 4
Kawamura argued that this statutory loophole, (often called the
Gerstung rule)255 denied him his right to jury trial.
The Court of Appeals looked at whether the application of this
provision, in this case, would be unconstitutional under the Mary-
land Constitution.2 56 The court considered the State's argument,
252. 299 Md. at 279, 473 A.2d at 440.
253. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-302(d)(2)(i) (1984).
254. Id. § 4-302(d) provides:
(d) Jury trial.-(l) The District Court is deprived ofjurisdiction if a defendant
is entitled to and demands a jury trial at any time prior to trial in the District
Court.
(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, unless
the penalty for the offense with which the defendant is charged permits impris-
onment for a period in excess of 90 days, a defendant is not entitled to a jury
trial in a criminal case.
(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (i) of this para-
graph, the presiding judge of the District Court may deny a defendant a jury
trial if:
1. The prosecutor recommends in open court that the judge not im-
pose a penalty of imprisonment for a period in excess of 90 days, regardless of
the permissible statutory or common law maximum;
2. The judge agrees not to impose a penalty of imprisonment for a
period in excess of 90 days; and
3. Thejudge agrees not to increase the defendant's bond if an appeal is
noted.
(iii) The State may not demand ajury trial.
255. The rule is so labelled because Judge Robert J. Gerstung of the Baltimore City
District Court developed the concept behind the rule.
256. The court's analysis focused entirely upon the defendant's rights under the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. See infra note 258. Maryland's system meets the federal
constitutional requirements because, despite the § 4-302(d)(2)(ii) loophole, trial by jury
is guaranteed in the de novo appeal to circuit court. See supra note 250. In Ludwig v.
Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a similar Massachusetts
statutory scheme, reasoning that the two-tier system absolutely guaranteed "trial by jury
to persons accused of serious crimes" and that the system was "fair and not unduly
burdensome." Id. at 630. The Massachusetts system was considerably harsher than
Maryland's; Massachusetts permitted denial of a jury trial in the first instance even in
cases involving felonies with maximum sentences up to, and in some cases over, five
years. Id. at 620. Furthermore, unlike the Maryland statute, the Massachusetts statute
did not allow a de novo trial following a guilty plea at the district court level, although
the Court emphasized the fact that an accused in district court could save himself the
burdens of the first trial by simply declining to contest the charges against him and
19851 479
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:439
that the provision limited the possible sentence to ninety days and
thus crimes subject to the provision and District Court jurisdiction
are automatically petty offenses, and the argument that any right to
jury trial a defendant might have in such a case is fully satisfied by
his statutory right to a jury trial in a de novo trial on appeal to the
circuit court following conviction in District Court.257 Although the
"admitting sufficient findings of fact," upon which admission, he would be convicted
and could then receive a jury trial if he chose to appeal. Id. at 620-22.
The Ludwig Court did a particularly unconvincing job of distinguishing the prior
Supreme Court case on the subject. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), the Court
struck down the District of Columbia's two-tier trial system. Justice Harlan, writing for a
unanimous court, said:
But the argument, made in behalf of the government, implies that if Congress
should provide the Police Court with a grand jury, and authorize that court to
try, without a petit jury, all persons indicted--even for crimes punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary-such legislation would not be an invasion of
the constitutional right of trial by jury, provided the accused, after being tried
and sentenced in the Police Court, is given an unobstructed right of appeal to,
and trial by jury in, another court to which the case may be taken. We cannot
assent to that interpretation of the Constitution. Except in that class or grade
of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be
proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that pur-
pose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecu-
tion, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United
States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first mo-
ment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offence charged. In such
cases a judgment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, is
void. To accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury, in an appellate
court, after he has been once full tried otherwise than by a jury, in the court of
original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be imprisoned for not pay-
ing it, does not satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.
Id. at 556-57.
The Ludwig Court distinguished this case on two somewhat dubious grounds. First, the
Court noted that the federal right to jury trial might be greater than the state right
because U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 requires that "[tihe trial of all crimes ... shall be
byjury." 427 U.S. at 630. This seems to be a distinction without a difference. Certainly
the Callan Court's holding was not based exclusively on article III; that holding rested
on a broad fundamental right to jury trial, a right which the fourteenth amendment has
extended to state criminal proceedings. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967). Sec-
ond, the Ludwig Court claimed that the defendant's option of "admitting sufficient find-
ings of fact" (and thus essentially submitting to a conviction based on probable cause)
removes the unconstitutional burden of a requirement that an accused first be tried
without a jury. 427 U.S. at 630. Justice Stevens, dissenting for himself and three other
Justices, points out that the Court's assumption that this conviction is virtually meaning-
less is totally unjustified. Id. at 634-38 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Stewart,
J., and Marshall,J., dissenting). In Maryland, the accused could at least avoid the preju-
dice that would come from going through the form of an initial trial by simply pleading
guilty. But a guilty plea and resulting conviction at the initial trial stage seem a heavy
price to pay for the right to a jury trial in the first proceeding. Nevertheless, Ludwig is
the law, and under Ludwig, Maryland's system clearly meets the requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution.
257. 299 Md. at 286-87, 473 A.2d at 444.
480
CRIMINAL LAW
court conceded that the broad language of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights2 58 does not afford ajury trial to defendants accused of
certain minor offenses, a class which the court declined to define,259
the state constitutional right to jury trial does attach, according to
the court, to crimes that have historically been tried before juries
and to any infamous offenses or offenses subject to infamous pun-
ishment. 260 The court reasoned that, in determining whether an of-
fense is serious enough to warrant a jury trial, a relevant
258. The Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees the right to jury trial in several
places. Article 5 provides "[t]hat the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to ... trial by
jury . . . ;" article 21 provides "[tihat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right . . . to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he
ought not to be found guilty," and finally, article 23 provides that "[iun the trial of all
criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the
Court may pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction."
259. 299 Md. at 291, 473 A.2d at 447. The court has held that there is no right to jury
trial under the Maryland Declaration of Rights in prosecutions for a number of minor
crimes. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Superintendent, 144 Md. 204, 124 A. 870 (1923) (know-
ingly operating or occupying a stolen motor vehicle); Norwood v. Wiseman, 141 Md.
696, 119 A. 688 (1922) (selling liquor without a license); State v. Loden, 117 Md. 373,
83 A. 564 (1912) (operating a moving picture machine without a license); Crichton v.
State, 115 Md. 423, 81 A. 36 (1911) (speeding); State v. Ward, 95 Md. 118, 51 A. 848
(1902) (violation of local game regulations); State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880) (va-
grancy and habitual disorderliness).
260. 299 Md. at 291, 473 A.2d at 447. In Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 A. 965
(1899), which the Kawamura court found controlling, the defendant, like Kawamura, re-
ceived a non-jury trial in district court, where he was convicted of petty larceny (stealing
a dollar's worth of corn). Thejustice of the peace sentenced Danner to thirty days in the
county jail. The statute conferring jurisdiction on the district court, Acts of 1896, Ch.
128, was similar to the present statute. It provided for ajury trial in the circuit court if
the defendant prayed for one and also for a de novo appeal to the circuit court with a
right to jury trial following a final conviction by the justice of the peace. On appeal, the
circuit court held that Danner had waived his right to pray ajury trial. Id. at 222, 42 A.
at 965. Danner appealed, and the Court of Appeals overruled the circuit court, holding
that Danner's right to jury trial was violated by the district court proceeding, because his
offense being an infamous one, he was entitled to a jury trial at the initial proceeding.
Moreover, Danner had not effectively waived this right because the alternative was to
wait a matter of weeks or months until there was room on the circuit court docket and
this amounted to duress, forcing him to choose to be tried by the district court. Id. at
228-29, 42 A. at 968.
In Baum v. Warden ofJail, 110 Md. 579, 73 A. 294 (1909) and later in State v.
Stafford, 160 Md. 385, 153 A. 77 (1931), the court found a state constitutional right to
jury trial at the initial trial level in cases involving assault and battery.
Most recently, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant accused of driving
while intoxicated has the right to ajury trial in the first instance. Fisher v. State, No. 84-
89 (Md.Jan. 10, 1984) (per curiam order); see The Daily Record, Jan. 29, 1985, at 1, col.
1 ("Court of Appeals holds jury trial right attaches at 'first instance' in DWI cases").
It may be difficult to draw a clear distinction between these cases, in which the
court found a right to jury trial at the first trial, and the cases mentioned in supra note




consideration is not the maximum sentence or place of incarceration
determined by the court in a particular case, but rather the maxi-
mum sentence and place of incarceration established by the legisla-
ture for the offense charged.26 ' If there is a constitutional right to
jury trial, the right attaches the first time the defendant is tried; it
cannot be satisifed simply by providing a subsequent de novo trial in
the circuit court on appeal. The court determined that Kawamura's
alleged crime was serious enough to warrant ajury trial. Therefore,
the application of the Gerstung rule violated his right to jury trial
under the Maryland Declaration of Rights.262
The court's decision could be interpreted as a narrow applica-
tion of existing precedent. Certainly the court was careful not to
strike down section 4-302(d)(2)(ii) explicitly. The court, however,
based its decision on an expansive view of the right to jury trial.
The court might well consider any offense carrying a penalty of
more than ninety days imprisonment sufficiently serious enough to
warrant a jury trial. If this is so, the court has eviscerated the Ger-
stung rule.
In response to this decision, requests for jury trial by defend-
ants brought before the district courts have jumped dramatically. 63
Some prosecutors believe that allowing so many jury trials will
prove administratively unworkable, and that most requests for jury
trials by district court defendants are simply attempts to buy time, to
gain leverage in plea negotiations, or to judge-shop. 26 Kawamura
has generated great confusion. The Court of Appeals needs to re-
solve this confusion by giving some clear, consistent guidelines as to
the scope of the right to jury trial under the Maryland Constitution.
G. Trial Procedures
1. Access to Pretrial Hearings.-In Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers,265
the Court of Appeals considered the relationship between the pub-
lic's right of access to judicial proceedings and a criminal accused's
right to a fair trial. The court joined a number of other jurisdictions
holding that the public has a qualified right of access to pretrial judi-
cial proceedings in criminal cases. 2 6 6 The court found that the deci-
261. 299 Md. at 295-96, 473 A.2d at 448.
262. Id. at 297, 473 A.2d at 449.
263. The Daily Record, Jan. 29, 1985, at 1, col. 3 ("Are jury requests actually for
delay, judge-shopping?").
264. Id.
265. 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983).
266. Id. at 70, 465 A.2d at 427. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.
1982) (bail reduction hearing); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)
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sion to allow access in a particular case should be made by weighing
the qualified right of access against the probability of prejudice to
the defendant that would impair his right to a fair trial,267 and
adopted the test for "probable prejudice" used by the United States
Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.268 In Buzbee, the court
applied this analysis and determined that the defendant would not
be prejudiced by allowing the public to exercise right of access to
his pretrial suppression hearing.269 In reaching its decision, the
court noted that, while the record reflected a finding of extensive
publicity, there was no finding that an impartial jury could not be
found.2 7 °
The defendant had been accused of being the man responsible
for a series of rapes committed between March, 1981 and Novem-
ber, 1982 in the Aspen Hill area of Montgomery County, rapes that
appeared to have been committed by the same person. 27' The
crimes and the subsequent arrest of the defendant received consid-
erable media attention, and in the days that followed the defend-
ant's arrest, the media focused extensively on his background.272
(pretrial suppression hearings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982)
(pretrial suppression and dismissal for entrapment hearings); United States v. Pageau,
526 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (pretrial hearing on admissibility of certain evi-
dence); United States v. Civella, 493 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (all pretrial hearings
in the case); Star Journal Publishing Corp. v. County Court, 197 Colo. 234, 591 P.2d
1028 (1979) (preliminary hearing); State v. Couture, 37 Conn. Supp. 705, 435 A.2d 369
(1981) (pretrial suppression hearings); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (pretrial detention hearing); State v. Williams,
93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983) (bail and probable cause hearings). For a case in which
the right of access was based on sixth amendment grounds, see Kansas City Star Co. v.
Fossey, 230 Kan. 240, 630 P.2d 1176 (1981). For cases in which the right of access to
pretrial suppression hearings was based on state constitutional provisions, see R.W.
Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982); Iowa Freedom of Informa-
tion Council v. Van Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Ashland Publishing Co. v.
Ashbury, 612 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654
P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574,
281 S.E.2d 915 (1981); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d
440 (1980); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1980).
Arkansas now embraces this right of access. See Arkansas Television v. Tedder; 281 Ark.
152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1984). But see San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal.
3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 178 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1982) (holding that there is no right of public
access to preliminary hearings under either the United States or California
constitutions).
267. 297 Md. at 80-82, 465 A.2d at 433.
268. 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979). See 297 Md. at 80-81, 465 A.2d at 433.
269. 297 Md. at 70, 465 A.2d at 427.
270. Id. at 83, 465 A.2d at 434.
271. Id. at 71, 465 A.2d at 428.
272. Id. at 72, 465 A.2d at 428.
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After the grand jury returned indictments for seven rapes, the de-
fendant filed two motions to suppress evidence and, at the same
time, applied for restrictive orders to exclude the public, including
the press, from the suppression hearing, to enjoin involved persons
from making statements about the case, and to seal certain court
records.273 Journal Newspapers, publishers of three newspapers,
intervened to oppose the restrictions on access. The trial court is-
sued restrictive orders, limited in scope and duration, but, under
accelerated appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the orders were
vacated.274 The Court of Appeals granted Buzbee's petition for cer-
tiorari, in which he sought reinstatement of two of the restrictive
orders.275
The question raised on appeal was "whether the [newspapers]
have any right to attend, and thereby report on, a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing." 276 The court held that the public's qualified right of
access to criminal trials extends to pretrial proceedings, basing the
right of access on the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution 277 and on article 40 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights. 278 Noting that the United States Supreme Court
has not spoken directly on the subject of a constitutional right of
access to pretrial proceedings,279 the Court of Appeals found that
273. Id. at 70, 465 A.2d at 427.
274. Id. at 70-73, 465 A.2d at 428.
275. Id. at 71, 465 A.2d at 428. The trial court had issued a closure order excluding
the public from the suppression hearing, a gag order enjoining statements about the
case, and had sealed certain records. When the Court of Special Appeals vacated the
orders, no stay was issued, so the previously sealed records became available to Journal
Newspapers.
276. Id. at 73, 465 A.2d at 429.
277. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " This provision has been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to the states. See Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
278. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40 provides: "That the liberty of the press ought
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
privilege."
279. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979) the Court held that the
press and the public had no sixth amendment right of access to a pretrial suppression
hearing when the parties and the court had agreed to a closure order. However, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that the Supreme Court in Gannett Co. had "as-
sumed that there was a right of public access under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to pretrial proceedings and held that the assumed right had not been violated."
297 Md. at 81, 465 A.2d at 433. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion), the Court held that the press and public had a first
amendment right to attend state criminal trials. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) a majority of the Court struck down, on first amend-
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some historical and institutional features of the criminal justice sys-
tem that grant first amendment protection to a right of access to
criminal trials also apply to pretrial judicial proceedings. 28"
The court analogized from the reasoning of two recent
Supreme Court decisions finding a qualified right of access to attend
criminal trials, 281' and determined that the presumption of openness
that has historically characterized criminal trials also extends to pre-
trial proceedings.282 Although the history of open pretrial hearings
is not as well entrenched as that of criminal trials, the experience
thus far is that they are presumptively open. 28" The court found
that the practice in Maryland accords with that experience, and the
party seeking to restrict openness has the burden of obtaining an
order to alter the regular procedure.2 84
The court then examined the institutional features of our crimi-
nal justice system that encourage open trials, identifying a number
of "societal interests" that require open court proceedings, such as
an educative interest in the judicial process and an interest in assur-
ing that the proceedings are conducted fairly. 28 5 The court con-
ment grounds, a Massachusetts statute that mandatoily closed trials to the press during
the testimony of victim's in cases of alleged sexual offenses against minors.
Recently, in Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 821 (1984), a
unanimous Court held that a closure order of voir dire proceedings violated the Consti-
tution. However, the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger did not specifi-
cally ground the right of open proceedings in the first amendment, but rather
emphasized the historical legacy of public jury selection, concluding, "[ffor present pur-
poses, how we allocate the 'right' to openness as between the accused and the public, or
whether we view it as a component inherent in the system benefiting both, is not cru-
cial." Id. at 823. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens found that the right of access
to the proceedings was found in the first amendment and that the "distinction between
trials and other official proceedings is not necessarily dispositive, or even important, in
evaluating the First Amendment issues." Id. at 827-28 (Stevens, J., concurring).
280. 297 Md. at 76, 465 A.2d at 431.
281. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
282. 297 Md. at 76-77, 465 A.2d at 431.
283. Id. at 77, 465 A.2d at 431, (citing State v Williams, 93 NJ. 39, 459 A.2d 461
(1983); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 8-3.2. (1980); Revised Report of the judicial
Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair
Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 534-35 (1980)).
284. 297 Md. at 78, 465 A.2d at 431-32.
285. Id. at 78-79, 465 A.2d at 432, (quoting United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550,
556 (3d Cir. 1982)). In Criden, the court summarized the reasons for open trials given in
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion), as es-
sentially the following: (1) public access to criminal proceedings promotes informed dis-
cussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with a more complete
understanding of the judicial system; (2) access gives assurance that the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all concerned and promotes the public perception of fairness;
(3) access has a significant community therapeutic value because it provides an outlet for
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cluded that the institutional reasons for having open trials apply to
pretrial hearings as well.
28 6
Since the right of access is not absolute, 28 7 a trial court decision
on closure involves a balancing of the interests of the moving party
and the societal interest in public access.288 When the defendant's
interest is to be tried by an impartial jury, a closure decision in-
volves a weighing of the probability of prejudice to that interest
against the public's interest in open proceedings. 28 9 The court
adopted a " 'reasonable probability of prejudice' " standard, ap-
proved in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,29° to assess which interest should
prevail, and adopted the three pronged test, proposed by Justice
Blackmun, to analyze that "probability" standard. 29 ' The defendant
must (1) show that irreparable harm to his right of a fair trial will
ensue without closure, (2) that alternatives to closure would be inef-
fectual and (3) that closure will effectively protect against the per-
ceived harm. Therefore, before a trial court can close a pretrial
hearing, he must first find that there is a reasonable probability of
prejudice and determine the nature and extent of the threatened
prejudice.292 Next, the court must determine the efficacy of alterna-
tives short of complete closure, and, if some restriction is found to
be necessary, the court must adopt the least restrictive
alternative.2 93
community concern, hostility, and emotion; (4) access serves as a check on corrupt prac-
tices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny, thus discouraging decisions
based on secret bail or partiality; (5) access enhances the performance of all involved
and; (6) access discourages perjury. 675 F.2d at 556 (citation omitted).
286. 297 Md. at 79, 465 A.2d at 432. To support this proposition the court reasoned:
"Chief Justice Burger estimates that 85% of all criminal charges are resolved by guilty
pleas. The result is that
'pretrial aspects of criminal prosecutions have become increasingly important
in the modern administration ofjustice. Court decisions protecting the consti-
tutional rights of defendants have given rise to new pretrial proceedings that
frequently have a major effect on the outcome of a prosecution. As a result of
these developments, proceedings in advance of trial are now of central impor-
tance in our system of criminal adjudication.' Id. (quoting Gannett Co., 443 U.S.
at 397 (citations omitted)).
Id. at 79-80, 465 A.2d at 432 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39,
54, 459 A.2d 641, 648 (1983)).
287. Id. at 80, 465 A.2d at 433 (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606).
288. Id. at 80, 465 A.2d at 433.
289. Id.
290. Id. (citing Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 393).
291. Id. at 81, 465 A.2d at 433 (citing Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).




Applying this test to the facts of the instant case, the Court of
Appeals noted that the record only reflected a finding of extensive
publicity and that there was no finding of a probability of prejudice
at all. Moreover, there was neither an express finding that an impar-
tial jury could not be impaneled nor any likelihood, given the popu-
lation of Montgomery County, that an impartial jury would not be
impaneled.29 4 Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Special
Appeals' decision to vacate the trial court's restrictive order.295
Buzbee clearly stands for the proposition that there is a right of
public access to pretrial criminal proceedings absent a showing by
an interested party that there is a reasonable probability of substan-
tial prejudice to another right. Although the standard for determin-
ing reasonable probability imposes a difficult burden on the party
seeking closure, the strict standard recognizes the importance of
pretrial proceedings in the "modern administration of criminal jus-
tice" 296 and the great societal interests in keeping those proceed-
ings open to the public. 29 7 The difficult burden may appear unfair
to one accused of highly publicized crimes, but there are many alter-
natives open to the defendant to protect his interests in a fair
trial. 29" And, there are no alternatives that can adequately protect
society's interest in public access.
2. Right to Counsel.-(a) Custodial Interrogation.-The Court of
Appeals decided two cases in which the police obtained inculpatory
statements from suspects who previously had asserted their right to
counsel. Generally, inculpatory statements made by a suspect in
custody are subject to the protection of Miranda v. Arizona 21 if they
result from interrogation. 0 0 In Edwards v. Arizona30 ' the Supreme
294. Id. at 83, 465 A.2d at 434.
295. Id. at 85, 465 A.2d at 435. See also Journal Newspapers v. State, 54 Md. App. 98,
456 A.2d 963 (1983).
296. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. at 54, 459 A.2d at 648.
297. See supra note 285.
298. For example, change of venue, deferment of pretrial hearings until after the jury
is selected, trial continuance, partial closure of pretrial hearings, use of voir dire, seques-
tration, and admonition of the jury.
299. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not
use [inculpatory] statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the defend-
ant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privi-
lege against self-incrimination." Id. at 444. The safeguards suggested by the Court are
well-known: the suspect must be advised "that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
300. Id. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court defined
"interrogation," for Miranda purposes, to include not only "express questioning," but
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Court held that "an accused. . . having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further inter-
rogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, ex-
changes, or conversations with the police." ' 2 The Edwards stan-
dard required the Court of Appeals in these two cases to decide the
scope of the ban on further interrogation and to determine what
conduct by an accused constitutes the initiation of further
communication.
In applying Edwards in Radovsky v. State,303 the Court of Appeals
determined that the ban on further custodial interrogation subse-
quent to a request for counsel is not limited to questioning about
the specific crime with which a suspect is charged, but extends at
least to questioning about any related crimes.30 4 Radovsky was ar-
rested and charged with attempted burglary. Upon being advised of
his Miranda rights, he specifically requested the assistance of coun-
sel. Later, two detectives approached Radovsky and stated that they
wished to discuss any involvement he might have in a series of un-
solved burglaries. After indicating that he would talk, Radovsky
signed a form waiving his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present. According to the detectives' testimony, the subsequent in-
terrogation concerned recent burglaries generally, not necessarily
including or excluding the specific burglary with which Radovsky
was initially charged. 0 5
The Court of Appeals reversed Radovsky's conviction because
the trial court failed to suppress the evidence obtained after Radov-
sky's request for counsel.30 6 Relying on Edwards, the court held that
the police clearly violated Radovsky's previously invoked right to
counsel when the two detectives initiated their interrogation before
also "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
301. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
302. Id. at 484-85. See also Chief Judge Gilbert's extensive discussion of Miranda,
Edwards, and other pertinent Supreme Court decisions in Bryant v. State, 49 Md. App.
272, 273-80, 431 A.2d 714, 715-18, cert. denied, 291 Md. 772, 782 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 949 (1982).
303. 296 Md. 386, 464 A.2d 239 (1983).
304. Id. at 392-93, 464 A.2d at 242-43.
305. Id. at 388-90, 464 A.2d at 240-41.
306. Id. at 402, 464 A.2d at 247. This evidence included inculpatory statements made
by Radovsky during the course of the police-initiated interrogation and physical evi-




Radovsky's attorney was present.3" 7 The court did not find persua-
sive the State's argument that the interrogation concerned unsolved
burglaries in general, rather than the specific burglary with which
Radovsky was charged.30 8 The detectives' actions in Radovsky
clearly did not comport with the Edwards rule30 9 that "when an ar-
restee expresses his desire to have counsel present all interrogation
must cease 'unless the accused himself initiates further
communication.' "310
In contrast, Bowers v. State3 1 is an example of a case in which
inculpatory statements obtained after the accused expressed a de-
sire for counsel were held admissible because the accused initiated
communication with the police. 3 2 Bowers, while in custody on a
charge of credit card fraud, signed a written waiver of his Miranda
rights. Following police questioning concerning the credit cards,
which had belonged to a murder victim, Bowers asked to use the
telephone. Upon returning to the police interview room, Bowers
stated that he needed a lawyer. He then proceeded without pause to
give the police a lengthy self-incriminating statement. 313
The Court of Appeals held that because Bowers initiated the
conversation, "[t]here was no interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda."3 14 Absent a police-initiated interrogation,"1 5 "[n]othing
prohibited the police from merely listening to what [the accused]
307. Id. at 398-99, 464 A.2d at 245-46.
308. Id. at 392-93, 464 A.2d at 242-43. The court viewed this argument as untenable
because the detectives' questioning, while not focusing on the specific burglary with
which Radovsky was charged, nevertheless concerned other burglaries which the detec-
tives considered related. Id. at 401 n.7, 464 A.2d at 247 n.7. Had the subsequent police
interrogation pertained to a completely separate offense, the court indicated it would
have reached the same result. Id.; see also Offutt v. State, 56 Md. App. 147, 151, 467 A.2d
194, 195 (1983) (citing Radovsky for proposition that the police may not resume interro-
gation of a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel, irrespective of whether the
subsequent questioning is part of a separate investigation of a separate crime).
309. The Court of Appeals refers to the Edwards holding as a rule. In fact, that hold-
ing merely reaffirms principles previously set forth in Miranda and its progeny. See Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979); Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975).
310. 296 Md. at 399, 464 A.2d at 246 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485).
311. 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983).
312. Id. at 129, 468 A.2d at 108.
313. Id. at 122, 468 A.2d at 104-05. The police officer in the room permitted the
accused to continue without interruption following the accused's statement that he
needed a lawyer.
314. Id. at 129, 468 A.2d at 108. See supra note 300 for the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of "interrogation."
315. The court implicitly adopts the position that affirmative police efforts to initiate
communication are required before statements made by a suspect will be recognized as
products of a police interrogation. See 298 Md. at 127-28, 468 A.2d at 107-08 (quoting
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had to say. "316 Thus, the Court of Appeals declined to require that
the police terminate all communication, irrespective of who initiates
it, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel.3 t7
(b) At Trial.-In Spence v. State3 18 the Court of Appeals held
that a defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel31 9
includes an absolute, nonviolable right to have counsel present clos-
ing argument prior to verdict.320 At the conclusion of all the evi-
dence in Spence's nonjury trial on charges of robbery, burglary,
assault and theft, defense counsel moved for an acquittal. The next
day, the trial judge denied the motion and continued without pause
in announcing his verdicts of guilty on all charges. When defense
counsel objected to his lack of opportunity for summation prior to
the verdicts, the trial judge struck the verdicts and directed counsel
to present his summation. After considering counsel's arguments,
the judge reinstated his previously announced verdicts.321
The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions in a 4-3 deci-
sion. Both the majority and the dissent recognized that the oppor-
tunity for summation prior to verdict is part of the constitutionally
protected right to counsel in nonjury as well as jury trials.322 The
Court of Appeals first recognized that this guaranty of closing argu-
ment applied to nonjury trials in Yopps v. State.323 In that case, de-
fense counsel was given no opportunity for closing argument
because the trial judge indicated such argument would not change
Leuschner v. State, 49 Md. App. 490, 494-95, 496-97, 433 A.2d 1195, 1197-99, cert.
denied, 291 Md. 778 (1981)).
316. 298 Md. at 129, 468 A.2d at 108.
317. The difficult question of what constitutes an initiation of communication is one
that must be examined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct.
2830, 2835, 2839 (1983), in which the plurality and the dissent disagreed as to whether a
suspect's inquiry, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?," constituted an initiation
of communication within the meaning of Edwards.
318. 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983).
319. The right to counsel is guaranteed by article 21 of the Maryland Constitution
Declaration of Rights and by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
320. 296 Md. at 424, 463 A.2d at 812.
321. Id. at 418-19, 463 A.2d at 809. Defense counsel presented his closing argument
only after the court denied his motion for a mistrial.
322. Id. at 419, 463 A.2d at 809; id. at 432, 463 A.2d at 815-16 (Murphy, C.J.,
dissenting).
323. 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962). See aho Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975) (striking down a New York statute giving judges in nonjury criminal trials author-
ity to deny final summation before rendition ofjudgment).
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his mind.32 4 Spence raised the distinguishable issue of whether a trial
judge, after pronouncing a verdict in violation of the right to sum-
mation, may correct the error by striking the verdict and permitting
argument thereafter.325
The Court of Appeals held that such a corrective measure is
insufficient to comply with a defendant's right to have counsel pres-
ent argument. 326 In reaching its holding, the majority fashioned "a
per se rule which requires a new trial whenever the trial judge an-
nounces a verdict before the defendant has either made or waived
closing argument. ' 327 The three dissenting judges would have pre-
ferred a more flexible rule allowing a good faith exception when the
premature verdict was "inadvertent" rather than "intentional. 328
(c) Waiver of Right to Counsel.-In Colvin v. State 3 29 the Court of
Appeals clarified when a court must inquire into a defendant's
waiver of counsel. Former Maryland Rule 723(c) required that the
court conduct an inquiry prior to accepting the waiver whenever "a
defendant indicates a desire or inclination to waive counsel.- 330
Colvin, who was seeking to replace the public defender with an at-
torney of his own choice at state expense, also requested that he be
allowed "to defend himself 'to a degree.' ",331 The trial court denied
both of these motions, the latter without conducting an inquiry con-
cerning waiver of counsel.3 32
Previously, in Snead v. State,333 the Court of Appeals had held
that "any statement by the defendant from which the court could
reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation
324. 228 Md. at 206, 178 A.2d at 881.
325. 296 Md. at 421, 463 A.2d at 810.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 426, 463 A.2d at 813 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting).
328. Id. at 437, 463 A.2d at 818 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting).
329. 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 226 (1984).
330. Former Md. R.P. 723(c) (1977) (rescinded July 1, 1984) provided in part:
"When a defendant indicates a desire or inclination to waive counsel, the court may not
accept the waiver until it determines, after appropriate questioning on the record in
open court, that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the
consequences of his decision .... ." That provision has been superseded by MD. R.P.
4-215(b), which provides in part: "If a defendant who is not represented by counsel
indicates a desire to waive counsel, the court may not accept the waiver until it deter-
mines, after an examination of the defendant on the record . . . that the defendant is
knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel."
331. 299 Md. at 99, 472 A.2d at 958 (emphasis in original).
332. Id.
333. 286 Md. 122, 406 A.2d 98 (1979).
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would be sufficient" to trigger an inquiry into waiver of counsel.3 3 4
The Colvin court determined that, because Colvin modified his self-
representation request with the phrase, "to a degree," the threshold
inquiry required by Snead had not been triggered.33 5 This holding
construes Snead very narrowly. In effect, nothing less than an une-
quivocal statement by the defendant that he wants to represent him-
self would seem sufficient to trigger the Snead inquiry. 3 6
Because new Maryland rule 4-215(b) modifies the language of
the former waiver-of-counsel provision, the precise issue raised in
Colvin may be moot. The new rule requires that the court conduct a
waiver inquiry only "[i]f a defendant who is not represented by counsel
indicates a desire to waive counsel."33 7 Colvin, who was repre-
sented by a public defender, albeit one with whom he was dissatis-
fied, apparently would not meet the prerequisite for an inquiry
under the new rule. A defendant may request, as Colvin did, ap-
pointment of a different attorney, 338 but regardless of the ruling on
that request, the defendant remains represented by counsel for pur-
poses of rule 4-215(b). Thus, under the new rule, a defendant in
Colvin's position may not be entitled to a waiver inquiry even if his
expressed desire to waive counsel is unequivocal.3 3 9
3. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.-In Mann v. State's Attor-
ney. 4 ° the Court of Appeals found that, under the circumstances of
the case, the defendant, who was found incompetent to stand trial,
was also incompetent to waive his constitutional privilege against
334. Id. at 127, 406 A.2d at 101. There, Snead had asked for a continuance in order
to find his own attorney to replace the assigned public defender, with whom Snead was
dissatisfied. When the court refused to grant the continuance, Snead stated, "I don't
want no attorney then." Id. at 125-26, 406 A.2d at 100. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Snead's declaration was sufficient to require an inquiry as to whether he
truly wanted to represent himself. Id. at 132, 406 A.2d at 103.
335. 299 Md. at 101, 472 A.2d at 959. The court noted that Colvin was at best seek-
ing "hybrid" representation, rather than complete self-representation. Id.
336. Judge Davidson, in dissent, interpreted Snead less rigidly, saying an unequivocal
statement is not necessary to trigger the inquiry. Id. at 128-29, 472 A.2d at 973-74
(Davidson, J., dissenting).
337. MD. R.P. 4-215(b) (emphasis added).
338. A defendant may also seek to discharge counsel, as provided in MD. R.P. 4-
215(d). If the court permits the discharge and the defendant then indicates a desire to
waive counsel, the court must conduct a waiver inquiry.
339. It is difficult to accept such an interpretation. A represented defendant who un-
equivocally expresses a desire to waive counsel is, in effect, stating that he wishes to
discharge present counsel. The relevant inquiry thus may become the rule 4-215(d)
inquiry concerning requests to discharge counsel. The Colvin holding may be applied in
determining when that inquiry is triggered.
340. 298 Md. 160, 468 A.2d 124 (1983).
492 [VOL. 44:439
CRIMINAL LAW
self-incrimination. 34  Mann was charged in a seventy-five-count in-
dictment of crimes including multiple murder, assault with intent to
murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of crime of vio-
lence, and faced a possible death sentence. At a pretrial hearing he
was adjudged incompetent to stand trial.3 42 The State's Attorney
and a reporter subsequently requested permission to interview
Mann.3 4 3 Mann apparently wanted to be interviewed and, following
a hearing on motions seeking permission to interview him, the trial
court ordered that the interviews could take place. The trial court
noted that, as Mann was not competent and thus could not waive his
Miranda rights, any statement made during the interview would be
inadmissible in a trial. 4 4
Mann's public defender appealed the order and the Court of
Appeals, finding that it was an appealable final order, 4 5 granted
certiorari. The court considered competing constitutional argu-
ments. Mann's public defender argued that he was not competent
to waive his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination;
the State's response was that such a privilege claim was premature.
At the same time, the reporter raised his first amendment right to
speak with Mann, and argued that Mann had right to exercise his
first amendment rights.
3 4 6
The court, in addressing these arguments, looked to the nature
of Mann's incompetency.3 4 ' The trial court's finding that Mann was
incompetent to assist in his legal defense meant also that Mann was
not competent "to consider the legal implications of his proposed
actions;" the court observed that Mann's statements could destroy
his own defense.3 48 Accordingly, the court held that, in this case,
Mann was not competent to waive his privilege against self-
incrimination.4
341. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
342. 298 Md. at 162, 468 A.2d at 125.
343. Id. at 162-63, 468 A.2d at 125.
344. Id. at 166-67, 468 A.2d at 127.
345. Id. at 163-65, 468 A.2d at 126. The court found the order to be appealable
under the "collateral order exception." Using the recently defined criteria in Sigma
Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483 (1983), the court
noted that the order to allow the interview clearly determined a disputed question,
which was an important issue, and that the issue would be unreviewable on appeal be-
cause it would be too late to undo damage done by the interviews. 298 Md. at 164-65,
468 A.2d at 126.
346. 298 Md. at 167-68, 468 A.2d at 128.
347. The court found that the privilege claim was not premature and so considered
the substantive issues. Id. at 170-71, 468 Md. at 129.
348. Id. at 170, 468 A.2d at 129.
349. Id. at 169, 468 A.2d at 129.
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In assessing the reporter's first amendment claim, the court
found that because of Mann's incarceration in Perkins State Hospi-
tal, a maximum security facility for the criminally insane, the re-
porter had no first amendment claim. The court found Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 350 which holds that there is no right of access for
newsmen to visit prison inmates, to be controlling. Analogizing
from Saxbe, the court held that newsmen had no right of access to
Mann while he was hospitalized and thus, no first amendment rights
of the reporter were abridged.35" ' And as to Mann's first amend-
ment rights, the court held that because he had been adjudicated
incompetent, his counsel could object to the interview even if Mann
desired it.
3 52
Finding no constitutional reasons to allow Mann to be inter-
viewed, and compelling reasons to prohibit the interview, the court
reversed the trial judge's order granting the interview.353
4. Joinder.-In Graves v. State,354 the court was presented with
an issue of first impression relating tojoinder. The question before
the court was whether former Maryland rule 745355 dealing with
joint and separate trials applies to both court and jury trials. The
court held that the rule did so apply and upheld the trial court's
ruling that the trials of a defendant indicted for two similar but un-
350. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
351. 298 Md. at 171-72, 468 A.2d at 129.
352. Id. at 172, 468 A.2d at 130. This holding was narrowly restricted to the circum-
stances of this case, which were that Mann was found to be suffering from paranoia and
was incompetent to stand trial, and there had been no reconsideration of his compe-
tence. Moreover, Mann's conduct indicated his continuing inability to assist in his own
defense. Id. at 169-70, 468 A.2d at 129. This decision presumably may not be read to
mean that a finding of incompetency to stand trial automatically results in a finding of
incompetence to waive rights.
353. Id. at 173, 468 A.2d at 130. The court noted that no one but Mann knew what he
desired to say, and that what he might reveal might "well prove to be devastating to the
defense of the case, either as to guilt or innocence or to an insanity defense." Id. at 170,
468 A.2d at 129.
354. 298 Md. 542, 471 A.2d 701 (1983).
355. Former Md. R.P. 745 (1977) was incorporated into MD. R.P. 4-253, Joint and
Separate Trials, without change. Rule 4-253 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Joint Trial of Offenses.-If a defendant has been charged in two or more
charging documents, either party may move for a joint trial of the charges. In
ruling on the motion, the court may inquire into the ability of either party to
proceed at a joint trial.
(c) Prejudicial Joinder.-If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the
joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court may,
on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts,




related offenses may be joined.356
To reach this decision, the court had to consider whether possi-
ble prejudice should prohibit joinder. In Graves, evidence was sub-
mitted in regard to each offense, which would not have been
mutually admissible at separate trials. In prior cases under rule 745,
the court had held that, in jury trial cases, the defendant is entitled
to separate trials if evidence submitted for each offense is not mutu-
ally admissible. 57 The reason for allowing the severance is to avoid
the prejudice that would occur if a jury, in a joint trial, disregarded
instructions on the use of each piece of evidence. The court in
Graves ruled, however, that joinder does not prejudice a defendant,
as a matter of law, in cases in which the trial court is the trier of
fact. 358 The court then looked to see if the facts in Graves indicated
any prejudice, and found that the defendant was not prejudiced be-
cause he was not embarassed or confounded in his defense. Also,
the court concluded that the trial court had reached its decision on
each offense only upon the evidence relevant to each individual
charge. 359 Thus, the court ruled thatjoinder had not prejudiced the
defendant.360
Graves extends to joinder the general rule that certain practices
may be allowed in court trials that would not be allowed in jury tri-
als, because of the distinction between a judge and a jury as trier of
fact. After Graves, joinder of similar offenses with evidence that is
not mutually admissible may be permitted in court trials, if the facts
so allow, while McKnight still compels separate jury trials, as a matter
356. 298 Md. at 549-50, 471 A.2d at 705.
357. Id. at 544-47, 471 A.2d at 702-03. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 244, 395
A.2d 1182, 1189 (1979), cited in 298 Md. at 545, 471 A.2d at 702; McKnight v. State, 280
Md. 604, 612, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977).
358. 298 Md. at 549-50; 471 A.2d at 705. The court used the standard for assessing
prejudice that it had used in a related case tried before a jury, in which the evidence
likewise would not have been mutually admissible at separate trials. See generally Mc-
Knight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977). In McKnight the court noted that, in
a case of similar offense joinder, the likely prejudice caused by the joinder must be
weighed against considerations ofjudicial economy. Id. at 609-10, 375 A.2d at 554-55.
The McKnight court held that in a case tried before a jury "a defendant charged with
similar but unrelated offenses is entitled to a severance where he establishes that the
evidence as to each individual offense would not be mutually admissible at separate tri-
als." Id. at. 612, 375 A.2d at 556.
The Graves court noted that the rationale behind the McKnight holding was that a
jury would be unable to set aside the likely prejudice caused by the joinder. 298 Md. at
545-46, 471 A.2d at 702-03. The court found that the McKnight rationale did not apply
to a situation in which the judge was the trier of fact, and thus prejudice would not be
assumed as a matter of law.
359. 298 Md. at 549, 471 A.2d at 704-05.
360. Id. at 550, 471 A.2d at 705.
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of law, in such situations.3 61  Additionally, Graves makes it clear that
the Maryland rule allowing joinder pertains to both jury and court
trials. 62
5. Witnesses.-In Colter v. State,363 the Court of Appeals consid-
ered the application of former Maryland rule 74 1 (d) (3),364 which re-
quired timely disclosure of information about witnesses by the
defendant so that the State may make beneficial use of it. The court
held that a trial judge applying the rule must consider alternatives
before excluding a defendant's alibi witness for violation of the
rule.365
The defendant in Colter sought to offer a witness who would tes-
tify that, at the time and place of the crime, the defendant was else-
where with him. The prosecution objected because the defendant
had failed to furnish the witness' identity until the day before the
trial.3 66 Sustaining the objection, the trial judge excluded the wit-
ness, without considering viable alternatives, such as granting a con-
tinuance to permit the prosecution to investigate the witness'
background and the credibility of the alibi.3 67 The defendant was
convicted, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special
Appeals.
On a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the de-
fendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the
trial judge had erred in excluding the witness without considering
alternatives. 68 In reaching this determination, the court looked to
Taliaferro v. State,369 which described the several factors3 70 that
361. Id. at 545-46, 471 A.2d at 702-03.
362. Id. at 549, 471 A.2d at 704-05.
363. 297 Md. 423, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983).
364. Former Md. R.P. 741(d)(3) (1977) states that "[ulpon request of the State, the
defendant shall . . . furnish the name and address of each witness . . . whom the de-
fendant intends to call as a witness to show he was not present at the time, place and
date designated by the State .... This requirement now appears unchanged in MD.
R.P. 4-263(d)(3).
365. 297 Md. at 430, 466 A.2d at 1290.
366. Id. at 424, 466 A.2d at 1287. Several reasons have been advanced for the notice
of an alibi defense, including: 1) to prevent surprise at trial, 2) to deter false alibis, and
3) to save taxpayer dollars through pretrial investigation. Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi,
55J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 29, 31-32 (1964).
367. 297 Md. at 430, 466 A.2d at 1290.
368. Id. at 430-31, 466 A.2d at 1290.
369. 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 940 (1983).
370. These factors include: 1) the technical or substantial nature of the disclosure
violation, 2) the timing of the ultimate disclosure, 3) the reason for the violation, 4) the
degree of prejudice to the parties offering and opposing the evidence, 5) the ability to
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should be considered before a witness is automatically excluded
under Maryland rule 741(d) (3). The court in Colter affirmed the use
of these factors, 371 and affirmed that decisions to impose sanctions
for failure to comply with the rule are within the discretion of the
trial judge. 72
Thus it is now clear that, under rule 741(d)(3), a trial judge may
not use exclusion as a sanction for violating the rule's notice provi-
sions, unless the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. Ex-
clusion is retained as a possible sanction, but, to apply the sanction,
the trial judge must have explored the reason for the failure to com-
ply with the rule, and have considered whether less harsh sanctions
would be warranted.
In Jones v. State173 the Court of Special Appeals held that the
trial judge abused his discretion in failing to require the State to
justify the nondisclosure of its informant.3 74 The defendant, who
had been convicted of several drug-related charges, successfully ar-
gued that he was entitled to disclosure under this court's ruling in a
similar case, Hardiman v. State.3 75
Under Hardiman a trial judge may order disclosure of informa-
tion regarding the informant only after hearing evidence demon-
strating relevancy and necessity, and then weighing this evidence
against the State's reasons for nondisclosure. 6 In Jones the defend-
ant proffered the necessary evidence, but was denied disclosure
when the trial judge summarily denied the motion without the bene-
cure any resulting prejudice by a postponement, and 6) the overall desirability of a con-
tinuance. Id. at 390-91, 456 A.2d at 37.
371. 297 Md. at 428-29, 466 A.2d at 1289.
372. Id. at 426, 466 A.2d at 1288.
373. 56 Md. App. 101, 466 A.2d 895 (1983).
374. Id. at 113, 466 A.2d at 901.
375. 50 Md. App. 98, 436 A.2d 923 (1981). In Hardiman, the appellant raised an en-
trapment defense and moved for disclosure of the informant's identity, arguing that the
informant was the only witness who could support his defense. The trial court denied
disclosure for reasons of security and the personal safety of the informant, but the Court
of Special Appeals reversed, finding that the proffer of an entrapment defense met the
defendant's burden of showing the necessity and relevance of the informant's identity to
the preparation of his defense. Because the State had not rebutted the proffer, disclo-
sure should have been compelled. Id. at 105-08, 436 A.2d at 927-29.
376. Id. at 99-100, 436 A.2d at 924-25. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
60-61 (1957) (disclosure must be made where informant's knowledge is relevant and
useful to defendant, or necessary to a fair adjudication); Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635,
643, 262 A.2d 80, 86 (1970) (disclosure compelled when necessary and relevant to a fair
defense); cf. Dorsey v. State, 34 Md. App. 525, 530-31, 368 A.2d 1036, 1040-41 (1977),




fit of rebuttal evidence by the State. 7 7
The court in Jones held that the defendant's proffer, which de-
tailed the informant's integral role in his arrest, shifted the burden
to the State to explain why the disclosure was unnecessary to a fair
adjudgment of the case. Further, the court found that without the
benefit of any evidence from the State, the trial judge could not have
declared that disclosure would endanger the informant. 37 8 More-
over, the fact that the informant witnessed defendant's drug sale
could have been sufficient to indicate that the information about the
informant would be useful in proving defendant's entrapment de-
fense. 379 The court reiterated the standard in Hardiman as crucial to
decisions requiring disclosure of information about informants:
Absent some evidence of danger to the life or lives of the
informant (or others) threatened by the relevation of the
identity, there is a very small auncel on the State's side of
the scale. The right to produce one's only defense must
predominate over protecting the State's flow of informa-
tion-as important as that purpose may be.380
Thus Jones emphasizes that nondisclosure of an informant's identity
is not guaranteed, particularly when his identity may be crucial to
the accused's defense.
6. Jury Instructions-In Rhoades v. State, 38 1 the Court of Special
Appeals held that failure to give the Lord Hale instruction,38 2 which
cautions jurors to scrutinize carefully the testimony of a complain-
ant in a sex offense case, is not an abuse of discretion.3 83 Although
377. 56 Md. App. at 112, 466 A.2d at 900. The trial judge denied disclosure for three
reasons: 1) protection of the informant, 2) the State's lack of knowledge of informant's
whereabouts, and 3) insufficient evidence to indicate that, simply because informant wit-
nessed the crime, disclosure is necessary and relevant to a fair defense on the merits. Id.
378. Id.
379. 50 Md. App. at 109, 436 A.2d at 929 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 63 (1957)).
380. 56 Md. App. at 113, 466 A.2d at 901 (quoting 50 Md. App. at 109, 436 A.2d at
929 (citation omitted)).
381. 56 Md. App. 601, 468 A.2d 650 (1983), cert. dismissed, 300 Md. 792, 481 A.2d 238
(1984).
382. Lord Hale observed:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and
impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended
by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
M. HALE, 1 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
634 (1st American ed. 1847), quoted in 56 Md. App. at 603, 481 A.2d at 651.
383. 56 Md. App. at 610, 468 A.2d at 655.
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Lord Hale's instruction originated nearly 300 years ago, this is only
the second case in Maryland appellate jurisprudence to discuss the
instruction. 84 In the first case, Brooks v. State,385 the court held that
the instruction may be given in a sex offense prosecution only when
issues of corroboration, malice or consent have been raised.3 86 The
Brooks court tempered this holding, however, by stating that the
matter rested within the trial judge's discretion.387
In Rhoades, the court reaffirmed the discretionary nature of the
Lord Hale instruction, even when the issue of consent is raised.388
In this case the evidence clearly corroborated the victim's lack of
consent and failed to demonstrate any pre-existing malice or motive
for revenge. The Court of Appeals confirmed that, in these circum-
stances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the
instruction.389
The court also noted that the inclusion in Brooks of corrobora-
tion as one of the elements that might trigger the Lord Hale instruc-
tion conflicts with a concept firmly entrenched in Maryland law-
that a rape victim's testimony need not be corroborated to sustain a
conviction. 390 Accordingly, the issue of lack of corroboration alone,
absent evidence of the victim's consent or malice toward the ac-
cused, does not permit a trial judge to give the instruction. More-
over, even when these issues are generated, the giving of the
instruction remains discretionary.39'
H. Judgment
1. Finality.-In Jones v. State39 2 the Court of Appeals held that
the State's appeal from the trial court's ruling dismissing one count
of an indictment 393 was premature because the State filed its appeal
384. There is no paucity of appellate decisions in other jurisdictions on this issue. For
a complete survey and discussion, see Annot., 92 A.L.R.3D 866 (1979).
385. 53 Md. App. 285, 452 A.2d 1285 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 529 (1983).
386. Id. at 296, 452 A.2d at 1291.
387. Id. at 295, 452 A.2d at 1291.
388. 56 Md. App. at 607, 468 A.2d at 653.
389. Id. at 608, 468 A.2d at 653.
390. Id. at 610, 468 A.2d at 654 (citing Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80, 220 A.2d 131,
135 (1966); Doyal v. State, 226 Md. 31, 34, 171 A.2d 470, 471 (1961); Moore v. State,
23 Md. App. 540, 551, 329 A.2d 48, 55 (1974), cert. denied, 274 Md. 730 (1975); Lucas v.
State, 2 Md. App. 590, 593, 235 A.2d 780, 782 (1967), cert. denied, 249 Md. 732 (1968)).
391. Id., 468 A.2d at 655.
392. 298 Md. 634, 471 A.2d 1055, cert. denied sub nom. Beatty v. State, 105 S. Ct. 170
(1984).
393. There were four charges: first degree rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault and
battery. The defendant argued that, since the essential element of the rape count, vagi-
nal intercourse, occurred in Washington D.C., the Maryland court had no subject matter
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before final judgment was entered on the other counts.3 94 The
court stated that for a case to be ripe for appeal, judgment must be
final 39 5 and, in a criminal case, the imposition of a sentence, and not
the return on a verdict, is a final judgment.3 96 Noting that the
State's right to appeal in criminal cases is limited and may only be
exercised when authorized by statute, 97 the court held that all
counts must be disposed of before an appeal can be taken.3 9 8
When a final verdict has been entered against a defendant in a
criminal case the double jeopardy provisions of the United States
Constitution 39 9 and Maryland common law40 0 prohibit that defend-
ant's retrial. The issue before the Court of Appeals in Smith v.
State40  was what constitutes a final verdict for double jeopardy
purposes.
jurisdiction over this crime. The defendant reasoned that neither the common law nor
Maryland statutory law could confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Id. at 636, 471 A.2d
at 1056. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 465 (1982).
394. 298 Md. at 638, 471 A.2d at 1057. On May 4, 1981, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the rape count. The defendant entered guilty pleas on
the other counts, which the court accepted. On June 2, 1981, the State filed an appeal
from the trial court's granting of the motion to dismiss the rape count. Ten days later
the court imposed sentence on the other counts. Id. at 636-37, 471 A.2d 1056-57.
395. Id. at 638, 471 A.2d at 1057. The court stated that "ajudgment is final [when it]
settles the rights of the parties and leaves nothing to be decided." Id. at 637, 471 A.2d
at 1057 (citing Warren v. State, 281 Md. 179, 183, 377 A.2d 1169, 1171-72 (1977)).
396. Id. See also Lewis v. State, 289 Md. 1,4, 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1980) ("In a criminal
case, a final judgment consists of a verdict and either the pronouncement of sentence or
the suspension of its imposition or execution.").
To support the point that no appeal lies from the entry of a verdict, the court
cited Eastgate Assoc. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 350 A.2d 661 (1976), a civil action,
wherein the court stated, " '[I]t is indisputably clear that there is no right to appeal from
a verdict.' " Id. at 701-02, 350 A.2d at 664. (quoting Montauk Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md.
491, 502, 138 A.2d 907, 912 (1958)). In Easigate, the court found that the plaintiffs
appeal from an instruction granting a directed verdict was premature since the court's
instruction was a verdict and not a final order. 276 Md. at 701, 350 A.2d 663-64. See also
Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 57 Md. App. 589, 471 A.2d 333 (1984) (civil defendant could
not appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff because the trial court never entered any
judgments after granting motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict on
other counts); Hughs Automotive Co., Inc. v. Polyglycoat Corp., 54 Md. App. 80, 456
A.2d 386 (1983) (grant of defendant's motion to dismiss is not an entry ofjudgment and
does not constitute an appealable order).
397. See State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 147, 422 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980). The statutory
authority for the State's right to appeal in criminal cases is found in MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(c) (1984).
398. 298 Md. at 637-38, 471 A.2d at 1057. Since the appeal was premature, the Court
of Special Appeals never had jurisdiction. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
lower court's judgment must be vacated. Id. at 638, 471 A.2d at 1057.
399. U.S. CONST. amend V.
400. See infra note 422.
401. 299 Md. 158, 472 A.2d 988 (1984).
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In Smith, the defendant was charged with three separate
crimes; 402 a mistrial was declared when the jury was unable to reach
a unanimous verdict on each charge.40 3 On retrial, the defendant
was found guilty of two of the charges.40 4 He appealed the convic-
tions, asserting that there had been final verdicts of not guilty on
two of the charges and thus the retrials subjected him to impermissi-
ble double jeopardy.40 5
Following established law, the court declared the general prin-
ciple to be that the verdict may be altered until it is removed from
the jury's province.40 6 The court noted that "[t]here was an aura of
confusion hovering over the attempt to receive the verdicts of the
jury.' 40 7 Reviewing that confusion, the court found that verdicts in-
itially announced by the forelady were not final and were under-
mined by a subsequent polling.408 The court also found that it was
not an abuse of discretion for the judge to poll a juror a second
time, despite an apparent acquittal on two of the charges on the first
poll, when that second poll was conducted because a juror was hesi-
tant.40 9 In essence, the court held that the verdicts never left the
jury's province, 41 0 so there was no final verdict and hence double
jeopardy did not attach.
2. Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata/Double Jeopardy .- The Mary-
land courts considered several criminal cases involving the doctrines
402. Id. at 162, 472 A.2d at 989-90. The defendant was charged with first degree
murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and using a handgun in the commission of a
crime.
403. Id., 472 A.2d at 990. The jury forelady initially announced verdicts of not guilty
of the murder and robbery charges and guilty'of the weapons charges. She was polled
and verified her verdicts, with hesitancy; the other jurors were polled and agreed with
the two acquittals but were split on the weapons charge. The forelady was polled a
second time because of her hesitancy; she then changed her mind. The jury later re-
sumed deliberations but could not reach agreement, and a mistrial was declared. Id. at
171-77, 472 A.2d at 994-97.
404. Id. at 163, 472 A.2d at 990.
405. Id. at 163 n.l, 472 A.2d at 990 n.l.
406. Id. at 168, 472 A.2d at 992-93. The court explained the steps by which a verdict
becomes final. There must be some process by which the verdict is given and verified as
correct. That process may be "hearkening," see, e.g, Givens v. State, 76 Md. 485, 25 A.
689 (1893) (foreman gives verdict, officer records, then secures jurors' assent that ver-
dict is correct), or it may bejury polling. 299 Md. at 166, 472 A.2d at 991; see also Givens,
76 Md. at 487, 25 A. at 689. Thejury may be polled at any time prior to discharge. 299
Md. at 167, 472 A.2d at 992; see also MD. R.P. 4-327(d).
407. 299 Md. at 179, 472 A.2d at 998.
408. Id. at 178, 472 A.2d at 998.
409. Id. at 179, 472 A.2d at 998.
410. Id. See also Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 616-17, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) (ver-
dict of jury has no effect in law until recorded and finally accepted by the court).
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of resjudicata, collateral estoppel, and double jeopardy. The courts
essentially confirmed existing law in this area.
In Bowling v. State,4 1' the Court of Appeals considered whether
collateral estoppel could be invoked to bar a criminal prosecution
following a civil suit. The court held that when a Child in Need of
Assistance (CINA)4 12 proceeding ended in a final judgment adverse
to the State, the doctrine of collateral estoppe1413 prevented the
State from bringing criminal sex offense charges against the defend-
ant based upon the same alleged conduct.41 4
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to criminal as well as
civil proceedings.41 5 Maryland courts have developed a set of re-
quirements that must be met in order for collateral estoppel to ap-
ply. First, the earlier proceeding must have ended with a final
judgment on the issue.416 Second, the defendant must have been a
party to both proceedings. 4 7 Third, the issue must be one that nec-
essarily was resolved in order to reach the decision in the first
case.4 18 In Bowling, the court concluded that these requirements
had been met, finding that' there was a final judgment terminating
the CINA proceeding; that the defendant was a party to the CINA
proceeding since sanctions and fines could have been imposed upon
him; and that the question of whether the defendant committed the
alleged offense was an ultimate issue of fact resolved at the CINA
411. 298 Md. 396, 470 A.2d 797 (1984).
412. A CINA proceding is initiated when it appears that the parents are unable or
unwilling to give proper care to the child. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
801(e) (1984).
413. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel operates as follows: " 'If, in a second suit between the same parties, even
though the cause of action is different, any determination of fact, which was actually litigated
in the first case, is conclusive in the second case.' " MacKall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md.
221, 227-28, 443 A.2d 98, 101-02 (1982) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sterling v.
Local 438, 207 Md. 132, 140-41, 113 A.2d 389, 393 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875
(1955)). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3, at 532 (2d ed. 1977).
414. 298 Md. at 403, 470 A.2d at 800.
415. See Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 668, 381 A.2d 671, 673, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839
(1978); Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481, 486, 97 A.2d 285, 287, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865
(1953); Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310, 318, 93 A.2d 753, 757, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955
(1953); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 164-66, 180 A. 266, 268 (1935), all criminal
cases.
416. Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398, 354 A.2d 825, 834, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1027 (1976); see also Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 329, 449 A.2d 1153, 1156 (1982)
(assuming that the payment of a traffic ticket was a final judgment that determined the
issue that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle).
417. 294 Md. at 330, 449 A.2d at 1156.
418. Powers v. State, 285 Md. 269, 279, 282, 401 A.2d 1031, 1037, 1038-39, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979); see also Cousins, 277 Md. at 398, 354 A.2d at 834; Scarlett, 201




The court's decision in Bowling followed established law and
well-settled policy. A defendant who is acquitted at a civil hearing
should not then be subject to a criminal trial based on the same
alleged conduct.
In Beatty v. State,4 2 ° the Court of Special Appeals considered the
application of the doctrines of res judicata,421 collateral estoppel,
and double jeopardy4 22 as they relate to crimes committed by a de-
fendant in two different jurisdictions, when the defendant had al-
ready been convicted in the first jurisdiction of one set of charges.
Defendants Beatty and Jones kidnapped and raped a woman in
Prince George's County and then transported her to St. Mary's
419. 298 Md. at 403, 470 A.2d at 800. The criterion that an issue must necessarily
have been resolved by the final judgment may be interpreted broadly by the trial court.
See generally Powers, 285 Md. at 277-87, 401 A.2d at 1036-4 1. In Powers the court consid-
ered the general approach used to determine whether a prior judgment was necessarily
based on the issue that a defendant in a criminal case seeks to foreclose:
This approach requires a court to "examine the record of a prior proceeding,
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter,
and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration."
Id. at 278, 401 A.2d at 1037 (citations omitted) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
444 (1970). Although both Powers and Ashe involved two criminal proceedings and Bow-
ling involved a civil and a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has implicitly ac-
knowledged that the doctrine is to be treated similarly in each setting: " 'It cannot be
said that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn
reverence, are less than those that protect from liability in a debt.' " Ashe, 397 U.S. at
443 (quoting United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916)).
420. 56 Md. App. 627, 468 A.2d 663 cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218 (1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 170 (1984).
421. The Court of Appeals has stated that:
[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata. . . a final and valid judgment rendered in
one proceeding between two parties operates as a bar in a second proceeding
between them on all matters that have been or could have been decided in the
original litigation, where the second proceeding involves the same subject mat-
ter as the first cause of action.
Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 668, 381 A.2d 671, 673 (1978), aff'g 35 Md. App. 430, 371
A.2d 433 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839 (1978).
422. The doctrine of double jeopardy
is designed to prevent the prosecution of a person a second time when he has
already been subjected to the risk of "life and limb" in a prior trial .... [T]he
action which bars a second prosecution must be one instituted in a court which
has the power to convict and punish the person prosecuted for his criminal
conduct.
Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 527-28, 140 A.2d 914 (1958) (citations omitted). In
Maryland, the rule against double jeopardy derives from the common law and is not




County where they raped her again and killed her.423 After they
were convicted of rape, kidnapping, and murder in St. Mary's
County, 424 the Prince George's County State's Attorney brought nu-
merous additional charges 425 arising out of the same series of inci-
dents, and the defendants sought to prevent the second
prosecutions by invoking these doctrines.
In reviewing the motion to dismiss, under these doctrines, the
court considered first whether resjudicata barred prosecution of ap-
pellants in Prince George's County for offenses committed there,
including the first rape and the conspiracies, and concluded that it
did not.4 26 The crimes that were begun and completed in Prince
George's County were separate crimes that could not properly be
charged in St. Mary's County;4 2 7 therefore, res judicata did not bar
their prosecution.4 28
The court also considered whether collateral estoppel barred
the prosecutions.429 In a perfunctory and confused treatment of
this issue, the court failed to note that it is normally an acquitted
defendant who invokes collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of
a fact found in his favor, but in this case, a convicted defendant was
seeking to use the doctrine to bar relitigation of facts found against
him. Had the defendant been successful in this curious motion, the
result would have been that he would have aided his own conviction.
But ignoring this use of the doctrine, the court dispensed with the
issue by noting, wrongly, that collateral estoppel is not applicable
unless the prosecution has the authority to charge in a single docu-
423. The case was one of a number concerning the kidnap, rape and murder of Ste-
phanie Ann Roper.
424. Defendant Beatty pled guilty to murder, rape and kidnapping pursuant to a plea
bargaining agreement in St. Mary's County. After removal to Anne Arundel County, he
was sentenced. Defendant Jones was tried in Baltimore County, following removal from
St. Mary's County, and was convicted of rape, murder and kidnapping.
425. The defendants were charged in Prince George's County with a number of differ-
ent conspiracy counts, with the substantive crimes of rape, kidnapping, false imprison-
ment, and with various accessory crimes.
426. 56 Md. App. at 634, 468 A.2d at 667.
427. Maryland follows the common law rule that the proper venue for trial for a crime
is the county of commission. McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 32, 371 A.2d 129, 135
(1977). Also, authority to return the indictment rests with the grand jury in the county
in which the crime was committed. In re Special Investigation No. 244, 296 Md. 80, 89,
459 A.2d 1111, 1115 (1983).
428. This is necessarily so because resjudicata is invoked only for matters that were,
or could have been, litigated together. See supra note 421. The court did find, however,
that resjudicata and double jeopardy would bar the charge of kidnapping. 56 Md. App.
at 637, 468 A.2d at 668. See infra text accompanying notes 432-36.
429. 56 Md. App. at 635, 468 A.2d at 667.
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ment all of the offenses committed by a defendant.4"' This finding
overlooks case law that holds that "the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel applies even when a state is precluded by law from joining all of
its charges in a multicount indictment and proceeding against the
accused in a single trial."4 3'
The court also considered defendants' double jeopardy claim,
noting that double jeopardy precluded defendants from being tried
twice for the same crime. In this case, double jeopardy prevented
trial in Prince George's County for the crimes of kidnapping and
false imprisonment, but did not preclude trial on the conspiracy and
rape charges.432 In reaching that determination, the court distin-
guished the crime of conspiracy from the commission of the sub-
stantive offenses of kidnapping. The court found that although
kidnapping is a continuing offense, the trial of that crime in St.
Mary's county terminated the prosecution of it.433 Thus, although
the kidnapping began in Prince George's County and ended in St.
Mary's County, because a kidnapping is a single offense regardless
of how far a victim is taken or how long she is detained, the former
county could not prosecute for kidnapping once the latter county
had.43 4 But the court held that the trial and conviction of defend-
ants in St. Mary's County on charges of first-degree rape and kid-
napping did not bar their prosecution in Prince George's County of
conspiracy to commit those offenses. 435 The commission of a sub-
stantive offense and the conspiracy to commit it are separate and
distinct offenses,43 6 each requiring proof of different elements. The
court concluded that it was possible that the defendants conspired
to commit rape and other sexual offenses in Prince George's
County. Thus double jeopardy did not bar that county from prose-
430. Id.
431. Powers v. State, 285 Md. at 281, 401 A.2d at 1038. See also Turner v. Arkansas,
407 U.S. 366, 368 (1972) (per curiam) (finding doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable
even when State was precluded by law from joining all of its charges in a multicount
indictment).
432. 56 Md. App. at 638, 468 A.2d at 669.
433. Id. at 636, 468 A.2d at 668. Since false imprisonment is merged with kidnap-
ping, that prosecution was also barred. Id. at 637, 468 A.2d at 668.
434. See generally Hunt v. State, 12 Md. App. 286, 278 A.2d 637 (1971) (discussion of
kidnapping as defined by statute and developed in case law); see also Ellingham v. State,
163 Md. 278, 280, 162 A. 709, 710 (1932) (defining continuing offense and stating rule
that verdict in a trial for a continuing offense precludes second indictment for that
offense).
435. 56 Md. App. at 637, 468 A.2d at 668.
436. See Sealfron v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948); Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946).
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cuting the conspiracy charges.43 7
In a third case, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the
question of when an issue is actually litigated so that collateral es-
toppel may be used to bar its relitigation. In Myers v. State,438 the
Court of Special Appeals held that collateral estoppe 439 may be in-
voked to prevent "a perjury prosecution for testimony in a prior
trial not only where the testimony relates to an issue that was an
essential element of the crime itself but also where the testimony
relates to any peripheral matters that must have been adjudicated
and considered in order to reach a verdict. 440
The defendant, accused of stealing a pair of boots, was acquit-
ted of theft due to his possession of the sales receipt. 441 Subse-
quently, the State discovered that his testimony concerning the sales
receipt was false, and attempted to prosecute him for perjury. In a
decision that considered carefully the problem of perjured testi-
mony leading to acquittals,442 the court barred the perjury prosecu-
tion, stating that the trier of fact in the theft trial necessarily found
that the defendant's testimony about the receipt was truthful.443
The court noted that, even if newly-discovered evidence would have
resulted in a guilty verdict, collateral estoppel is applicable, regard-
less of whether the trier of fact considered all relevant evidence
437. 56 Md. App. at 637, 468 A.2d at 668. The court also held that the defendants
could be tried on the rape offenses that were committed in Prince George's County, as
the earlier trials only convicted the defendants of rape committed in St. Mary's County.
Id. at 636, 468 A.2d at 668.
438. 57 Md. App. 325, 470 A.2d 355 (1984).
439. The court correctly considered the argument to be solely one of collateral estop-
pel and not double jeopardy or res judicata. Id. at 328, 470 A.2d at 356.
440. Id. at 336, 470 A.2d at 360 (emphasis added). "When it appears substantially
certain that ajury has already decided a fact essential to conviction in the accused's favor
[Powers v. State, 285 Md. 269, 287, 401 A.2d 1031, 1041 (1979)], 'that particular fact'
[Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481, 490, 97 A.2d 285, 289 (1953)] which was 'necessarily
determined' [United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1961)] may not be
litigated at a subsequent trial for a separate crime." Wise v. State, 47 Md. App. 656,
668-69, 425 A.2d 652, 659, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981).
441. The State sought to prove that the sales receipt was evidence of a similar
purchase at the same store from which the merchandise was stolen, made hours after the
defendant had been apprehended for the theft. 57 Md. App. at 331, 470 A.2d at 358.
442. Id. at 334-36, 470 A.2d at 359-60. The court cited Adams v. United States, 287
F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961), for the two opposing policy concerns when a prosecution for
perjury follows an acquittal. If collateral estoppel insulates defendants from subsequent
perjury prosecutions, then defendants are given a license to lie. But if prosecutors can
prosecute for perjury following acquittals, they are given a "second shot" at the defend-
ant for the same wrong. 57 Md. App. at 328, 470 A.2d at 356 (quoting Adams, 287 F.2d
at 703).
443. 57 Md. App. at 336, 470 A.2d at 360.
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when it decided an issue.44 4 The judge, in acquitting the defendant
of theft, accepted his version of the purchase; thus, the jury in the
perjury case, in order to find the defendant guilty, would have to
arrive at the inconsistent factual conclusion that he stole the mer-
chandise 445 and would have relitigated the same issues.
Through a correct reading of the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel, the court barred the prosecution of the second crime, even
though that crime's commission may have resulted in an incorrect
verdict in the trial of the first crime. The court concluded that the
judge in the first trial necessarily decided on the truth of the defend-
ant's testimony regarding the sale's receipt. The doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel as articulated by the court-that it bars all matters that
must have been litigated-requires a judge to make a determination
as to what facts necessarily must have been litigated the first time.
Thus, the Myers decision is in accordance with the accepted use of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.446
I. Punishment
1. Sentencing.-In Teasley v. State,447 the Court of Appeals ex-
amined the judicial interpretation of sentencing guidelines.448 Not-
444. Id. at 332, 470 A.2d at 358 (citing Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56-57
(1971)). Here and in previous cases dealing with this issue, the courts have stressed that
even if the finder of fact has erroneously determined an issue, that determination should
be held to be final. Id. at 337, 470 A.2d at 361; see also United States v. Kramer 289 F.2d
909, 916 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (collateral estoppel applies to original determina-
tion "no matter how unreasonable the Government may consider that determination to be"). For a
similar case, see United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971) (when in a previ-
ous prosecution for and acquittal from a charge of stealing from the mails, defendant
had claimed she obtained marked quarters from a coin machine and not from a letter,
and she was acquitted, the government was estopped from prosecuting her for perjury
in respect to her testimony concerning the source from which she obtained the
quarters).
445. 57 Md. App. at 337, 470 A.2d at 361.
446. Related Development
In Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 472 A.2d 981 (1984), the Court of Appeals held
that, once a trial judge has granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on a particular
count, the prohibition against double jeopardy does not permit him to change his mind.
Id. at 155, 472 A.2d at 986. After the State had offered its evidence, the defense made
the motion, which was granted. At the request of the State, the trial judge reconsidered
the motion and reversed himself, thus allowing the conspiracy charge to go to the jury.
The court concluded that it is well-settled that once the trier of fact renders a not guilty
verdict, the verdict is final and the defendant cannot be retried. Id. at 153, 472 A.2d at
985. See also Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 707, 319 A.2d 542, 545 (1974); State v. Shields,
49 Md. 301, 303 (1878).
447. 298 Md. 364, 470 A.2d 337 (1984).
448. In 1979, the Maryland judiciary developed sentencing guidelines for voluntary
use by circuit court judges. The guidelines are to be used in the sentencing of criminal
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ing that the preface of the revised Maryland guidelines states that
the guidelines are not mandatory, the court found that they "com-
plement rather than replace the judicial decision-making process or
the proper exercise of judicial discretion." '449 Further, the court
noted that the law does not require that the sentences or principles
suggested by the guidelines must be applied, 45 ° and that it is not an
impermissible sentencing consideration for a trial judge not to apply
the guidelines, or to apply them improperly.451
With these considerations in mind, the court held that even if
the trial judge mistakenly applied experimental sentencing guide-
lines, vacation of the sentence and a new sentence hearing were not
required, because the sentences were lawfully imposed within statu-
tory limits and were the end result of the good-faith exercise of the
trial judge's discretion.452 Thus, sentencing guidelines can be seen
as a helpful tool for judges in imposing sentences but not as a rigid
formula that controls their decisions.
The court also addressed sentencing issues in Raiford v. State.45
The issue before the court was whether the imposition of a
mandatory sentence pursuant to article 27, section 643B(c) of the
Maryland Annotated Code, the recidivist statute,454 was an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of Raiford's right to equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment. 4
5 5
offenders. The guidelines assign numerical weight to enumerated factors involving the
offense and the offender; using these numbers, a sentencing score is compared to a
sentencing matrix that gives ranges of sentences for the score. The purpose of the
guidelines is to increase equity in sentencing, to provide information on sentencing for
new or rotating judges, and to promote increased visibility and understanding of the
sentencing process. Id. at 366-67, 470 A.2d at 338.
449. Id. at 367, 470 A.2d at 338.
450. Id. at 370, 470 A.2d at 340.
451. Id. at 370-71, 470 A.2d at 340. See also Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 482, 425
A.2d 632, 643 (1980). In the present case, the trial judge stated that she was going to
impose a sentence in conformity with the guidelines. However, she applied these guide-
lines mistakenly and imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent, ten-year sentences
for armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
452. 298 Md. at 371, 470 A.2d at 340.
453. 296 Md. 289, 462 A.2d 1192 (1983).
454. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1982) provides in relevant part:
Third conviction of crime of violence.-Any person who (1) has been convicted
on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions do not
arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement
in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence,
shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of violence, to
imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25
years.
455. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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In 1967, Raiford, then 17, was tried and convicted as an adult
under a law which exempted Baltimore City from observing the
Maryland statutes that classed all youths under 18 as juveniles.456
This statutory exemption was subsequently held, in Long v. Robin-
son,4 57 to violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment,458 since there is no rational basis for juve-
nile statutes that differentiate on the basis of geographical loca-
tion.459 In 1970, Raiford was convicted of rape. In 1981, he was
convicted of robbery. The trial court imposed the mandatory sen-
tence under the recidivist statute for three-time adult offenders.46 °
The Court of Appeals held that the use of Raiford's 1967 con-
viction to enhance his punishment for his 1981 robbery conviction
constituted a present deprivation of equal protection.46 1 If Raiford
had been tried as a juvenile in 1967, he would not have an adult
conviction for purposes of the recidivist statute4 6 2 and he would not
be subject to a twenty-five-year mandatory sentence. Therefore, to
allow Raiford's 1967 convictions to enhance his punishment would
cause him to "suffer anew" from the previous denial of his right to
equal protection.46 ' The court believed that "basic fairness and es-
sential justice" compelled the application of Long within the context
of use for purposes of enhanced punishment.464
At first, this decision seems inconsistent with a prior Court of
Appeals case, Wiggins v. State,465 which held that Long v. Robinson was
not to be applied retroactively.466 However, the court distinguished
the two cases in that Raiford, unlike Wiggins, did not request that
the court declare his 1967 conviction a nullity and expunge all
456. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(c) (1966) defined child as under eighteen years of
age. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70 (1951) exempted Baltimore City from the provisions
of the juvenile causes subtitle, MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 51-71 (1966). This exemption
was repealed by Acts of Apr. 14, 1966, chs. 127, 186, 1966 Md. Laws 186, 401, effective
June 1, 1969. When Raiford was tried, BALTIMORE CITY, MD., PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS
§ 240(b) (1949) defined child as under sixteen years of age.
457. 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), afd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
458. Id. at 30.
459. Id. at 27.
460. 296 Md. at 290-91, 462 A.2d at 1192-93.
461. Id. at 299, 462 A.2d at 1197.
462. Id. at 294, 462 A.2d 1194. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-824(a)(1)
(1984) states that adjudication of a juvenile cause "is not a criminal conviction for any
purpose and does not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a crimi-
nal conviction."
463. 296 Md. at 300, 462 A.2d at 1197.
464. Id.
465. 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
466. Id. at 690-91, 344 A.2d at 81.
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records of such conviction. He was merely asking that his 1967 con-
viction, since held unconstitutional by Long, not be used to enhance
his punishment by qualifying him for a mandatory sentence.467
Thus, the law seems to be that Long has no effect upon the prior
convictions themselves but is applicable to the ensuing conse-
quences (such as the application of recidivist statutes) flowing from
these convictions.
The Raiford case has already been of practical importance.
Sentences have been vacated and cases remanded for new sentenc-
ing hearings consistent with this opinion.468
The proper application of the recidivist statute in sentencing
was also considered in Sanders v. State.4 6 9 In Sanders, the Court of
Special Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing the State's
request to impose a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence pursuant
to article 27, section 643B(c) of the Maryland Annotated Code.4 7 °
The issue before the court was whether the defendant's prior con-
viction for accessory before the fact of robbery should be included
in the definition of a "crime of violence."' 47 1 The court found that
the common law doctrine of accessoryship, which makes no distinc-
tion between a principal and an accessory, holds all parties guilty of
the felony committed by the principal.472 The court concluded that
since Maryland considers any accessory equally culpable for the
principal's act, the prior conviction of accessory before the fact of
robbery is the same as a conviction for robbery.4 73 Because robbery
is within the statutory definition of a crime of violence, the
mandatory twenty-five-year sentence must be imposed. 74
2. Forfeitures.-A forfeiture is a penalty by which one loses his
rights and interest in property in consequence of a default or an
offense.475 The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently addressed
issues involved in forfeiture proceedings in several cases in which
money was seized incident to arrests for gambling and narcotics
charges. In these cases the court had occasion to interpret and con-
467. 296 Md. at 300, 462 A.2d at 1197.
468. See Harris v. State, 297 Md. 309, 465 A.2d 479 (1983); Monroe v. State, 297 Md.
340, 466 A.2d 503 (1983).
469. 57 Md. App. 156, 469 A.3d 476 (1984).
470. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
471. 57 Md. App. at 175-76, 469 A.2d at 486.
472. Id. at 176-77, 469 A.2d at 486-87. The court noted that Maryland was the only
American jurisdiction that still retains the common law doctrine of accessoryship.
473. Id. at 177, 460 A.2d at 487.
474. Id. (citing Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 237, 462 A.2d 58, 63 (1983)).
475. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 584-85 (5th ed. 1979).
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strue several provisions of the two Maryland statutes that provide
for the forfeiture of property used in connection with the violation
of certain laws.4 7 6
In Bozman v. Office of Finance,477 the court dealt with the effect of
article 27, section 297 of the Maryland Annotated Code, which re-
lates to the forefeiture of all money or currency found in close prox-
imity to contraband, controlled dangerous substances, or controlled
paraphernalia. The primary issue before the court was whether a
final disposition of the criminal charge that occasioned the forfei-
ture was a condition precedent to a forfeiture proceeding. 478 The
court held that the final disposition was not a requirement to institu-
tion of such a proceeding.479 Similarly, the court in Office of Finance
v. Previti480 held that forfeitures are not limited to situations in
which a criminal conviction against the claimant has been obtained
on gambling charges.4"'
476. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 264, 297 (1982 & Supp. 1984). Section 264 relates to
the forfeiture and disposition of money seized in arrests for gambling violations. Sec-
tion 297 relates to the forfeiture of all money found in close proximity to contraband,
controlled dangerous substances, or controlled paraphernalia.
477. 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983).
478. Id. at 495, 463 A.2d at 834. In Bozman, Baltimore County Police seized $3950 in
currency that was found when defendant's apartment was searched for drugs; small
quantities of several drugs were seized at the same time. A year and a half after the
seizures, forfeiture proceedings were conducted, and the money was forfeited to Balti-
more County. Id. at 493-94, 463 A.2d at 833. No criminal charges had been filed
against Bozman at the time of the forfeiture hearing. Id. at 494, 463 A.2d at 833.
479. Id. at 497, 463 A.2d at 835.
480. 296 Md. 512, 463 A.2d 842 (1983).
481. Id. at 513, 463 A.2d at 843. In Previti, Baltimore County Police officers executed
a search warrant at a cocktail lounge on Pulaski Highway. Previti was arrested for gam-
bling. Pursuant to the search warrant, the police seized $3341.50 from Previti's person.
A stet was entered to the criminal charge against Previti. Previti wrote to the Assistant
County Solicitor requesting the return of the money, and this letter was forwarded to
the district court. Id. at 513-14, 463 at 843. A forfeiture hearing was held, and the
money was ordered forfeited to Baltimore County. Id. at 514, 463 A.2d at 844. The
Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed, holding that a conviction was necessary for
forfeiture of money seized in connection with gambling under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 264 (1982 & Supp. 1984). 296 Md. at 515-16, 463 A.2d at 844.
For another case reaching a similar conclusion, see State v. 158 Gaming Devices,
59 Md. App. 44, 474 A.2d 545 (1984) (dealing with the forfeiture of slot machines and
other gaming devices). But see Previti, 296 Md. at 519, 463 A.2d at 846 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the district court should not have reached the merits of this
case). In order for a trial court to have jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is neces-
sary for the plaintiff to file an original pleading in that court. See Montgomery County v.
Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467, 385 A.2d 80, 84 (1978). In this case, Previti sent nothing
to a court, but instead wrote a letter to the Assistant County Solicitor for Baltimore
County. The County Attorney sent this letter to the district court where it was treated as
an original pleading. 296 Md. at 520, 463 A.2d at 846 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Since
the plaintiff did not file a statement of claim with the court, Judge Eldridge argued that
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In Director of Finance v. Cole,4 8 2 the court emphasized that the
proceeding to determine whether money seized in a gambling raid
should be returned to the claimant is a civil in rem proceeding and
is unconnected with any criminal proceeding. 4 8 3 Therefore, the
trial court, as part of its criminal proceedings, could not compel
Prince George's County to release the money.
These cases are consistent with prior Maryland law, but, as
Judge Eldridge points out in his dissents, there are strong grounds
to challenge them. First, there is an argument that the legislature
perceives section 297 as requiring a criminal conviction for forfei-
ture. In 1981 the General Assembly refused to amend section 297
to provide that criminal conviction was not necessary prior to forfei-
ture. Testimony at the time of the proposed amendments indicates
that the General Assembly believed that section 297 did not allow
for forfeiture if a criminal conviction was not obtained. Since those
amendments failed, the presumption is that the legislature intended
section 297 to require a conviction.4 8 4 Thus arguably the majority's
reading of the forfeiture statute in Bozman was incorrect, and the
forfeiture proceeding should not have been held. The second argu-
ment, advanced by Judge Eldridge, is that the forfeitures in Preveti
and Cole both involved property that was seized in violation of the
fourth amendment. Because the Supreme Court in One Plymouth Se-
dan v. Pennsylvania,4 8 5 held that the exclusionary rule was applicable
to civil forfeiture proceedings,4 8 6 the money involved in both cases
should not have been forfeited.4 8 7
the district court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Furthermore, even if the court could reach the merits, Judge Eldridge felt that a forfei-
ture order was not appropriate because the money was seized pursuant to an invalid
search warrant. Id. at 527, 463 A.2d at 850.
482. 296 Md. 607, 465 A.2d 450 (1983).
483. Id. at 629, 465 A.2d at 463. Cole and several other persons were arrested on
gambling charges. At the time of the arrest, evidence of gambling and $15,500 was
seized. After an entry of nol pros, Prince George's County initiated forfeiture proceed-
ings. Cole's demurrer was sustained, and the court ordered the return of the money to
Cole. The County appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals, which held
that the County could not petition for forfeiture because there had been no conviction.
During the same time period, in the course of criminal proceedings, Cole filed a motion
for the return of the money. The circuit court, in accord with the above decision by the
Court of Special Appeals, ordered the money returned to Cole. This case involves
Prince George's County's appeal from that decision. Id. at 614-16, 465 A.2d at 455.
484. Previti, 296 Md. at 509-10, 463 A.2d at 841 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
485. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
486. 380 U.S. at 696.
487. Plymouth Sedan requires that illegally seized money not contraband per se must be
returned unless there is independent evidence that it is contraband. Per se contraband
is an object whose possession constitutes a crime. 380 U.S. at 699-700. Judge Eldridge
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3. Restitution.-(a) Application of the Statute.-The Court of Ap-
peals was asked, in one recent case, to consider the reach of a recent
amendment to Maryland's criminal restitution statute. That amend-
ment gives the court the authority to order a defendant convicted of
a crime to make restitution to a third party payor, such as an insur-
ance company, if the payor has made payment to compensate the
victim for the loss caused by the defendant.488 In Spielman v.
State,489 the issue was whether the ex post facto prohibitions of the
federal and state constitutions 490 bar the retroactive application of
the amended statute. The question arose when the trial court, fol-
lowing Spielman's conviction for malicious destruction of property,
ordered him to pay restitution to the property owners and their in-
surers. That order was entered after the restitution statute was
amended; Spielman appealed the order on the grounds that retroac-
argued that the money seized in Cole was claimed to be contraband because it was seized
in connection with a gambling raid, but the only evidence to prove that fact was tainted
because the evidence was obtained under an illegal wiretap. Hence under Plymouth Se-
dan, the money should not have been subject to forefeiture proceedings. Cole, 296 Md.
at 643-44; 465 A.2d at 470-71 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Likewise in Previti, Judge El-
dridge argued, the money seized could not be proven to be forfeitable contraband be-
cause the evidence necessary to prove that fact was obtained by virtue of an
unconstitutional search. Previti, 296 Md. at 525-26, 463 A.2d at 849 (Eldridge, J., dis-
senting). Judge Eldridge also pointed out that Cole was charged with conspiracy to vio-
late the gambling laws, an offense not included within the provisions of MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 264(a) (1982). 296 Md. at 642, 465 A.2d at 470 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
488. In Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 438 A.2d 490 (1981), the court held that
under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 640 (1982), a convicted defendant could not be ordered
to pay restitution to a third party payor. In apparent response to this ruling, the General
Assembly modified the statute. Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 604-05, 471 A.2d, 730,
732 (1984).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 640 (Supp. 1984) as amended, reads in pertinent part:
(b) Restitution upon conviction of crime; priority of payment.-(1) On convic-
tion of a crime, the court may order the defendant to make restitution in addi-
tion to any other penalty for the commission of the crime.
k2) The court may order that restitution be made to:
(i) The victim;
(ii) The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or other governmental en-
tity; or
(iii) A third-party payor, including an insurer, which has made payment to the victim to
compensate the victim for a property loss under paragraph (1)(i) of this subsection, or pecu-
niay loss under paragraph (J)(ii) of this subsection (emphasis added).
(3) If the victim has been fully compensated for the victim's loss by a third-
party payor, the court may order restitution to the third-party payor. Other-
wise, payment of restitution to the victim has priority over payment of restitu-
tion to the third-party payor.
489. 298 Md. 602, 471 A.2d 730 (1984).
490. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 17.
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tive application of the statute was constitutionally prohibited.49'
The Court of Appeals agreed with Spielman. It found first that
the amendment created a substantive right for the third party
payors, and that creation of this additional payment right in turn
amounted to the enhancement of a criminal penalty to be assessed
against the defendant.492 Because restitution, whether to the victim
or the third party payor, is a form of punishment, the court con-
cluded that the amendment increased the defendant's punish-
ment.493 By thus increasing punishment from what it would have
been at the time the acts were committed, the retroactive applica-
tion of the amended restitution statute amounted to the use of an ex
post facto law. Accordingly, the statute could only be applied
prospectively.494
(b) Juvenile Restitution.-At common law, a parent was not lia-
ble for the tortious acts of his child, unless it could be proved that
the child was acting as the parent's agent, with the parent's consent,
or that the parent was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable
control over the child's behavior after having been warned of the
child's dangerous tendencies.495 Virtually all states however, have
passed statutes imposing strict vicarious liability on parents for the
delinquent acts of their children.49 6 Maryland law permits the court
to order a parent to pay restitution to the party wronged by the
child's wrongful act, and merges the victim's restitution action with
the juvenile proceeding.497 Following a finding at the adjudicatory
491. 298 Md. at 606, 471 A.2d at 732.
492. Id. at 608-09, 471 A.2d at 733-34.
493. Id. at 609-10, 471 A.2d at 734.
494. Id. at 611, 471 A.2d at 735. The court defined an ex post facto law as " '[a] law
which punishes that which was innocent when done; or adds to the punishment of that which
is criminal... .' " (emphasis added by court) (quoting Beard v. State, 74 Md. 130, 132,
21 A. 700, 701 (1891)).
495. See generally P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 123 (5th ed. 1984);
Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. L.J. 254 (1965).
496. P. KEETON, supra note 495. Most state provisions limit liability to wilful or wan-
ton torts of the child and limit the amount of liability. Id.
497. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1984) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a
child, or the child in any case in which the court finds a child has committed a
delinquent act and during the commission of that delinquent act has:
(1) Stolen, damaged or destroyed the property of another;
(2) Inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the injured person to
incur medical, dental, hospital, or funeral expenses.
(b) Considering the age and circumstances of a child, the court may order
the child to make restitution to the wronged party personally.
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hearing that the child committed a delinquent act, the court at the
restitution hearing may enter a judgment against the parent, the
child, or both, in favor of the victim.498
Although restitution may be an extremely effective correctional
device when it is used to sanction the child,499 that function of resti-
tution may be less effective when the order is directed solely to the
parent.500 The purpose of the restitution statute, however, is to en-
sure that the victim is compensated, 50 1 and vicarious liability is
therefore imposed on the tortfeasor's parents. 0 2 There is some
question as to whether the imposition of parental vicarious liability
is constitutional,0 3 but assuming that this procedure would pass
constitutional muster, Maryland's process by which restitution is or-
dered may nonetheless be inadequate to give parents a fair trial.
(d) A restitution hearing to determine the liability of a parent or a child, or
both, shall be held not later than 30 days after the disposition hearing and may
be extended by the court for good cause.
(e) Ajudgment of restitution against a parent may not be entered unless the
parent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present
appropriate evidence in his behalf. A hearing under this section may be held as
part of an adjudicatory or disposition hearing for the child.
Unlike Maryland, most states simply provide a civil cause of action rather than merging
the restitution process into the juvenile proceeding. See Freer, supra note 495 at 255; see
also The Daily Record, Mar. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 4. But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-
436(3)(b)(viii) (Supp. 1983).
498. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1984).
499. See P.R. SCHNEIDER, A.L. SCHNEIDER, W.R. GRFFITH & MJ. WILSON, Two-YEAR
REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE RESTITUTION INITIATIVE: AN
OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM PERFORMANCE (1982) (study indicating that restitution as the
sole sanction against juvenile wrongdoers may be the most effective correctional
option),
500. Of course, even if the statute were directed solely at the child, the parent might
end up paying his child's restitution obligation simply to prevent the child's incarcera-
tion in a situation in which restitution is a condition of probation. See, e.g., In re Weiner,
176 Pa. Super. 255, 106 A.2d 915 (1954).
501. See In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md. App. 82, 85, 329 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). But cf.
Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 471 A.2d 730 (1984), discussed at supra text accompany-
ing notes 489-94 (holding that adult restitution is a form of punishment, in case involv-
ing constitutionality of retroactive application of restitution statute).
502. In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md. App. at 85, 329 A.2d at 114.
503. In In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 271 Md. 740 (1974),
the Court of Special Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland juvenile resti-
tution statute. But see In re Dan D., 57 Md. App. 522, 525-26, 470 A.2d 1318, 1319
(1984) (noting that the Court of Appeals has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the
statute). Compare General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963)
(upholding constitutionality of parental vicarious liability for children's vandalism) with
Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971) (striking statute because it im-
posed vicarious liability solely on the basis of the parent-child relationship and therefore
violated due process). See generally Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Imposition of Vicarious
Parental Liability for Delinquent Acts of Juveniles, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 171 (1982).
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Imposing tort liability on parents without providing pretrial discov-
ery or a jury trial may raise serious constitutional problems.50 4
These questions are illuminated by a recent series of cases in which
Maryland courts looked at the scope and application of the Mary-
land juvenile restitution statute.
In In re Dan D. 50 5 and In re Herbert B.,5" 6 the Court of Special
Appeals emphasized that the only prerequisite for an award of resti-
tution is a finding that the juvenile committed a delinquent act and
so stole, damaged or destroyed the victim's property.50 7 In Dan D.,
the Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court's award of
restitution on the ground that no evidence was presented at the res-
titution proceeding to show that Dan D. actually committed such an
act. The Court held that the record of the adjudicatory hearing, an
agreed upon synopsis of it, or some other evidence must be
presented at the restitution hearing to establish that the child com-
mitted the act before the question of liability can arise.50 8 Thus the
Court underlined the fact that the restitution hearing, though a part
of the juvenile proceeding, should be a separate and complete en-
tity, not merely a continuation of the adjudicatory proceeding. In
Herbert B., the Court of Special Appeals held that the only prerequi-
site to an award of restitution under the statute is establishment of
the fact that the child committed the act and so harmed the vic-
tim. 50 9 A finding of delinquency, that is, that the child is in need of
504. See, e.g., The Daily Record, Mar. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 4 ("P.G. Circuit Court holds
parents entitled to jury in juvenile restitution actions"). It could be argued that since
juvenile restitution is based on the statute and the statute does not authorize a jury trial,
there is no right to jury trial, and that to provide a jury trial whenever it is demanded
would be administratively burdensome. But if, in fact, this action is simply a form of tort
action, it is unfair to treat it differently from other tort actions, giving the defendant less
protection, even when his liability is greater than at common law.
505. 57 Md. App. 522, 470 A.2d 1318 (1984).
506. 58 Md. App. 24, 472 A.2d 95 (1984).
507. It is important to remember here that a finding of delinquency is more than sim-
ply a finding that the child committed a delinquent act; it is a finding that the child is in
need of court assistance, guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation. In Maryland, juveniles
charged with a delinquent act (crime) receive an adjudicatory hearing (analogous to a
trial) in which the court determines whether the juvenile committed the act. Following
this proceeding, the child receives a disposition hearing (analogous to a sentencing) in
which the court determines what, if any, type of court supervision the child requires.
Concurrent with or following the disposition hearing or the adjudicatory hearing, the
court may hold a restitution hearing to determine whether an award of restitution to the
victim is appropriate and, if so, how much it should be and who should pay it. See Dan
D., 57 Md. App. at 528-29, 470 A.2d at 1321.
508. Id. at 529, 470 A.2d at 1321.
509. 58 Md. App. at 29-30, 472 A.2d at 98.
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court assistance, guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation, is not
necessary.
The Court of Special Appeals also loosened the tie between de-
linquency and restitution in In re Trevor A.51" by holding that dismis-
sal is too drastic a sanction for violating the rule that the restitution
hearing must be held within thirty days of the disposition hear-
ing.5' 1 By tying restitution to the child's act rather than to a finding
of delinquency, the court characterized restitution as being more a
tort remedy for the victim than a correctional measure for the child
or his family.512
In Dan D., the parents raised questions regarding the basic con-
stitutionality of the restitution statute: whether the statute can be
applied to a noncustodial parent, and whether there is a right to jury
trial at the restitution hearing. These issues were not addressed by
the court because of its holding that the restitution order was erro-
neously made.513 Although the Court of Special Appeals previously
has upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's juvenile restitution
system,51 4 the fact that Court of Appeals has never reviewed the
constitutionality means that questions such as these may recur.
In In re Arnold M. ,515 the Court of Appeals held that the state is
not a parent for the purposes of the restitution statute when the
state is standing in loco parentis 5 16 to the delinquent child. The court
reasoned that the plain meaning of "parent" in the statute is a father
or mother with custody of the child and that the legislature never
intended to impose liability on the state.51 7 Since the court held in
In rejames D.5" 8 that the legislature did not intend to place liability
upon the father or mother of a child who commits a delinquent act
while in the custody of the state, the victim in such a case has no
remedy under the restitution statute. This result seems inconsistent
with the idea that the restitution statute exists to provide compensa-
tion for the victim. The result does, however, allow the state to re-
tain sovereign immunity in this area. The result may also be
510. 55 Md. App. 491, 462 A.2d 1245 (1983).
511. Id. at 499, 462 A.2d at 1249.
512. See also supra note 501 and accbmpanying text.
513. 57 Md. App. at 527, 470 A.2d at 1320.
514. See supra note 503.
515. 298 Md. 515, 471 A.2d 313 (1984).
516. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979) defines in loco parentis as "In the
place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties,
and responsibilities."
517. 298 Md. at 521, 471 A.2d at 316.
518. 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983).
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supported by the argument that an important purpose of the statute
is to punish parents for failing to exercise control over their chil-
dren, and this purpose cannot be furthered by punishing the state.
J. Death Penalty Review
1. The Maryland Death Penalty Statute.-Maryland's current
death penalty statute,5 9 enacted in 1978, represents the General
Assembly's most recent effort to comply with the constitutional
standards established by the Supreme Court.5 20 The statute pro-
vides that the death sentence may be imposed only for murder in
the first degree, with life imprisonment as the alternative sentence
in such cases.5 2 ' When the State seeks the death sentence against a
defendant convicted of murder in the first degree, other statutory
requirements include: a sentencing proceeding separate from the
trial at which guilt was determined,5 22 a finding by the sentencing
authority of at least one aggravating circumstance, 521 the "weigh-
ing" of any mitigating circumstances against the aggravating cir-
cumstances,5 24 and mandatory review by the Court of Appeals of all
cases in which the death penalty is imposed.525 In conducting its
automatic review of all death sentences, the Court of Appeals must
determine whether the death sentence was imposed "under the in-
fluence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,- 5 26
whether the evidence supports the sentencing authority's findings
concerning aggravating and mitgating circumstances,5 27 and
whether the sentence is "excessive or disproportionate to the pen-
alty imposed in similar cases. "528
From the enactment of the 1978 statute until 1983, the Court of
Appeals consistently overturned the death sentence in every death
519. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414 (1982).
520. The Supreme Court established the currently accepted standards for death pen-
alty statutes in a series of five 1976 decisions. The Court approved the statutory
schemes at issue in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion), Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion), andJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(plurality opinion). Statutes that provided for mandatory death sentences were held un-
constitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion)
and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
521. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1982).
522. Id. § 413(a).
523. Id. § 413(d), (f).
524. Id. § 41 3 (g), (h).
525. Id. § 414(a).
526. Id. § 414(e)(1).
527. Id. § 414(e)(2), (3).
528. Id. § 414(e)(4).
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penalty case that came before it, either by reversing the conviction
or by vacating the sentence.529 During its 1983 term, the court re-
versed this pattern. Although it vacated the death sentence in some
cases, the court upheld imposition of the sentence in several others.
In Tichnell v. State, the first case in which the death sentence was
upheld, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the general constitutional-
ity of Maryand's death penalty statute.5 3' More significantly, the
court in Tichnell III and subsequent cases demonstrated a general
willingness to interpret the statute broadly.
2. Interpreting the Statute.--(a) Admissibility of Evidence-Sentenc-
ing Proceeding.-In two death penalty cases, Calhoun v. State532 and
Scott v. State,53 3 the Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory provi-
sion governing the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing
proceeding. 534 That provision, section 413(c)(1) of Maryland's
death penalty statute, details the types of evidence that are admissi-
ble in such proceedings, including evidence relating to any mitigat-
ing or aggravating circumstances 53 5 and evidence of any prior
criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the ab-
sence thereof.536 The final category of admissible evidence encom-
passes "[a]ny other evidence that the court deems of probative value
and relevant to sentence.
' 5 37
In Calhoun the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
section 413(c)(1). Calhoun challenged the constitutionality of Mary-
land's death penalty statute on the ground that the provision gov-
erning admissibility of evidence failed "to provide clear and
objective standards that provide specific guidance for the sentencing
authority. '53 ' He contended that the provision's lack of guidelines
for consideration of the evidence unconstitutionally granted broad
529. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982); Tichnell v. State,
287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
530. 297 Md. 432, 468 A.2d 1 (1983), cert. dnied, 104 S. Ct. 2374 (1984) (Tichnell III).
531. In doing so, the court relied on its previous discussion of the statute's constitu-
tionality in Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) (Tichnell I). The Tichnell
I court concluded that "on its face, the Maryland statutory scheme for imposition of the
death penalty satisfies the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the federal constitution, and Art. 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." Id. at 729,
415 A.2d at 848, quoted in Tichnell III, 297 Md. at 447, 468 A.2d at 8.
532. 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2374 (1984).
533. 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983).
534. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(1) (1982).
535. Id. § 413(c)(1)(i), (ii).
536. Id. § 413(c)(1)(iii).
537. Id. § 413(c)(1)(v).
538. 297 Md. at 630, 468 A.2d at 77.
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discretion to the sentencing jury.5 39
In rejecting Calhoun's argument, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered Maryland's capital sentencing statute as a whole. The court
first noted that the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions permit
a sentencing jury to exercise discretion "as long as that exercise is
conducted within the confines and in compliance with the standards
of a 'carefully drafted' capital sentencing statute., 540 Referring to
its previous analysis of Maryland's death penalty statute in Johnson v.
State54" ' and Tichnell 1,542 the court concluded that the statute satis-
fied the Supreme Court's requirement that the law should guide the
sentencing authority's discretion because the sections dealing with
aggravating and mitigating circumstances provided sufficient direc-
tion to the court in its consideration of evidence relating to such
circumstances. The statute also requires that the sentencing author-
ity's determination must be in writing and, if made by a jury, unani-
mous, and that the sentencing authority specify the factors
considered in rendering its decision.543 The Court of Appeals de-
termined that section 413(c)(1), when considered in the context of
these other provisions, did not grant unconstitutionally broad dis-
cretion to the sentencing jury.544
The Calhoun court also considered the constitutionality of ad-
mitting specific types of evidence. At Calhoun's sentencing pro-
ceeding, the State introduced evidence that Calhoun had assaulted
an officer at the detention center where Calhoun was held while
awaiting trial. 545 This evidence was introduced "for the purpose of
illustrating that not even incarceration of Calhoun would prevent
him from engaging in future criminal acts."' 54 6 One of the mitigat-
ing circumstances that the sentencing authority in a death penalty
case may consider is the unlikeliness "that the defendant will engage
in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat
539. Id. at 630-31, 468 A.2d at 77.
540. Id. at 634-35, 468 A.2d at 79 (citing, inter alia, Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct.
3418, 3424 (1983) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (plurality opinion)),
541. 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
542. 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
543. 297 Md. at 635, 468 A.2d at 79-80 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (d), (h),
(i), (j) (1982)).
544. Id., 468 A.2d at 80.
545. Id. at 596-98, 468 A.2d at 60-61. Calhoun squirted the officer with "a foul con-
coction" contained in a Wella-Balsam bottle, which turned out to be "a mixture of urine
and [feces]." Id. at 597, 468 A.2d at 60-61.
546. Id. at 618, 468 A.2d at 71. -
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to society." '547 The evidence concerning Calhoun's behavior at the
detention center tended to disprove the existence of that mitigating
circumstance.
Calhoun contended that such evidence was "highly speculative,
unreliable, and inconclusive," and that its introduction violated his
constitutional rights.548 The Court of Appeals rejected Calhoun's
contention, finding that such evidence satisfied the constitutional
standards enunciated by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the court
first noted that consideration of "particular character traits and
propensities of the defendant" is "an essential feature" of any statu-
tory scheme for imposition of the death penalty.54 9 Responding to
Calhoun's contention that the speculative nature of the evidence
used against him rendered it too unreliable to predict future behav-
ior, the court quoted Jurek v. Texas,55° where the Supreme Court
stated: "It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The
fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean
that it cannot be made." 55 ' Relying on this language, the Court of
Appeals concluded that evidence relevant to the mitigating circum-
stance concerning the defendant's propensity for further criminal
activity is constitutionally admissible. 552
In Scott v. State553 the Court of Appeals confronted a more com-
plex statutory construction problem. The "catch-all" provision of
the death penalty statute allows the admissibility of "[a]ny other evi-
dence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sen-
tence . . . . ,554 The court in Scott, in considering the interpretation
of the provision, limited its scope by holding that, in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, evidence that the defendant committed other
crimes (i.e., those unrelated to the murder for which the defendant
is being sentenced) must be restricted to evidence of crimes of vio-
lence for which there has been a conviction, or a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.55 5 By reducing the scope of this provision, the
Scott decision limits the discretion of trial courts to allow the admis-
547. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)( 7) (1982).
548. 297 Md. at 617, 468 A.2d at 71. Calhoun maintained that the evidence "not only
failed to establish his future dangerousness, but also served as a nonstatutory aggravat-
ing circumstance that inflamed and prejudiced the jury." Id. at 618, 468 A.2d at 71.
549. Id. at 618-19, 468 A.2d at 71 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
550. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
551. Id. at 274-75, quoted in Calhoun, 297 Md. at 623, 468 A.2d at 73-74.
552. 297 Md. at 623, 468 A.2d at 74.
553. 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983).
554. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(1)(v) (1982).
555. 297 Md. at 248, 465 A.2d at 1133-34.
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sion of evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. Arguing from
the Court of Appeals' previously broad construction of that provi-
sion, 556 the dissent took issue with the majority's narrow reading of
the provision.5 57
A jury convicted Scott of murdering a McDonald's Restaurant
employee during an armed robbery in November 1980. At the sen-
tencing proceeding, conceding that Scott had no prior convictions
for "a crime of violence, ' 5 58 the State then proffered evidence to
show that Scott killed two other men in separate armed robberies
during November 1980. The trial judge found that this evidence
satisfied the relevant and probative standards for admissibility
under subsection 413(c)(1) (v). 55 9
The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, disagreed with the trial
judge's assessment. The court examined the statutory scheme of
section 413(c)(1), the section governing the admissibility of evi-
dence in a capital sentencing proceeding, as a whole in order to
place subsection (v) in context,560 focusing in particular on subsec-
tions (i) and (iii). Subsection 413(c)(1)(i) provides for the admissi-
bility of evidence relating to any of the statutory mitigating
circumstances,56 ' including the absence of prior convictions of any
violent crimes. 562 The majority reasoned that "the admission of evi-
dence of crimes of violence for which there have been no convic-
tions . . . may well result in the mitigating circumstance of the
absence of prior convictions being outweighed or, in essence,
'wiped out' or eliminated. '56 3 Similarly, the majority found that
subsection 413(c)(1)(iii), which specifically provides for the admissi-
bility of evidence of prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty, and
pleas of nolo contendere, precludes use of any evidence of unre-
lated crimes except those for which there has been a conviction.564
Consequently, the language of subsection 413(c)(1) (v), providing
for the admission of "any other evidence" which is "probative" and
"relevant," should not be construed to permit the admission of evi-
556. See Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 442-43, 439 A.2d 542, 563 (1982).
557. 297 Md. at 254-58, 465 A.2d at 1136-38 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting).
558. Id. at 237, 465 A.2d at 1128. One of the statutory mitigating circumstances
which the sentencing authority in a capital proceeding must consider is the absence of
prior convictions of any violent crimes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(1) (1982).
559. See Scott, 297 Md. at 237, 465 A.2d at 1128.
560. See id. at 245-48, 465 A.2d at 1132-34.
561. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (1982).
562. Id. § 413(g)(1).




dence of unrelated crimes for which there has been no conviction,
or plea of guilty or nolo contendere.565
Chief Judge Murphy's strong dissent criticized the majority for
not following the precedent established in Johnson v. State.56 6 The
Johnson court, in deciding the same issue, construed the relevant
subsection as authorizing the trial judge to admit evidence of unre-
lated crimes for which there has been no conviction if it is probative
and relevant to the sentencing. 567 Chief Judge Murphy regarded
Johnson as controlling, and, moreover, rejected the majority's rea-
soning. In his view, the majority's holding would render subsection
413(c)(1)(v) meaningless because no evidence outside the narrow
categories created in subsections 413(c) (1) (i) through (iv) would be
admissible.5 6
8
The Scott majority distinguishedJohnson by stating that theJohn-
son court did not consider subsection (v) in terms of its interrelation-
ship with subsections (i) and (iii) 569 because the appellant there
never raised the argument that subsections 413(c) (1)(i) and (iii) re-
strict admissible evidence of unrelated crimes.
5 70
The Scott majority opinion represents a departure from the gen-
eral trend toward broad construction of Maryland's death penalty
statute. The dissent, however, raises significant questions about the
logic underlying the majority's holding.
(b) Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances.-Maryland' s death
penalty statute specifies the aggravating 571 and mitigating 572 cir-
cumstances that the sentencing authority must consider 573 in its de-
565. Id. at 248, 465 A.2d at 1133-34. But see Calhoun, 297 Md. at 596-601, 468 A.2d
at 60-63, where the Court of Appeals approved the admission into evidence of testimony
regarding the appellant's misconduct at the detention center where he was held prior to
his trial. The court ruled that "[i]n the absence of an objection focusing on the point
before the Court in Scott," the evidence was admissible under § 413(c)(1)(v) as " 'other
evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence.' " Id. at 601,
468 A.2d at 62-63 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(1) (1982). See also supra
text accompanying notes 545-52, discussing the constitutional challenge to admission of
that evidence.
566. 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
567. Id. at 443, 439 A.2d at 563.
568. 297 Md. at 259, 465 A.2d at 1139 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
569. 297 Md. at 245, 465 A.2d at 1132.
570. Id. The Scott majority characterized the discussion of § 413(c)(1)(v) in Johnson as
"dicta," id. at 243, 465 A.2d at 1131, a characterization which Chief Judge Murphy
found objectionable, see id. at 256-57, 465 A.2d at 1137-38 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
571. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1982).
572. Id. § 41 3(g).
573. In Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983), the Court of Appeals
established that the sentencing authority must, as a matter of law, consider whether,
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liberations. In two cases, Calhoun v. State574 and Colvin v. State,575 the
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of the statutory
provision that labels as an aggravating circumstance the finding that
"[t]he defendant committed [a] murder while committing or at-
tempting to commit robbery, arson, or rape or sexual offense in the
first degree. ' 576 Both Calhoun and Colvin contended that this pro-
vision of the statute articulated an overbroad aggravating circum-
stance, which would result in the mandatory application of the death
penalty in every sentencing proceeding involving a defendant con-
victed of felony murder.577
In Calhoun the court rejected the overbreadth argument, rea-
soning that the provision is limited by its own terms and that other
provisions also limit it.578 First, the court noted that this particular
aggravating circumstance does not automatically follow from every
conviction of felony murder. While Maryland's felony murder stat-
ute lists a broad range of felonies,579 the contested aggravating cir-
cumstance applies only to felony murder convictions when the
felony is robbery, arson, rape, or a first degree sexual offense.580
And accomplices to a felony who did not actually commit the mur-
der are not subject to the provision since it requires that the defend-
ant be "a principal in the first degree."' 58 ' In light of such
distinctions between the felony murder statute and the section
based upon a preponderance of the evidence, certain specified mitigating factors exist.
The Bowers court vacated the appellant's death sentence because the jury failed to find a
mitigating circumstance which the State conceded did exist. Id. at 151-52, 468 A.2d at
119-20.
574. 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2374 (1984).
575. 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953 (1984).
576. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(10) (1982).
577. Calhoun, 297 Md. at 624, 468 A.2d at 74; Colvin, 299 Md. at 122-23, 472 A.2d at
970. Under Maryland law, felony murder is murder in the first degree, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 408-410 (1982), and is subject to the death penalty. Id. § 412(b). In both
Calhoun and Colvin the sentencing juries found as an aggravating circumstance that the
defendants committed murder during the perpetration of a robbery, a felony murder
under Maryland law. Id. § 410.
578. 297 Md. at 624, 468 A.2d at 74.
579. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408-4 10. The felonies listed in § 410 include, among
others: "any rape in any degree, sexual offense in the first or second degree, sodomy,
mayhem, robbery, burglary, kidnapping . . . . storehouse breaking . . . . or daytime
housebreaking ....
580. Id. § 413(d)(10).
581. 297 Md. at 624, 468 A.2d at 74. The requirement referred to is found in MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(e)(1) (1982); see also Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 373, 473
A.2d 903, 924 (1984) (holding that requirement of being a principal in the first degree




413(d)(10) aggravating circumstance, the Court of Appeals deemed
Calhoun's claim of overbreadth "unfounded. 582
The Court of Appeals also rejected the contention raised in
both Calhoun and Colvin that this section resulted in a mandatory
application of the death penalty. The court pointed out the obvious
flaw in that argument: Any aggravating circumstance, even if found
automatically, is limited by the possible existence of mitigating cir-
cumstances.583 Moreover, the court emphasized that a jury making
a sentencing decision uses the entire statutory scheme;584 thus, no
single aggravating circumstance could mandate the death penalty in
any case. Accordingly, the court upheld the constitutionality of sec-
tion 413(d)(10).
In Stebbing v. State 585 the Court of Appeals held that the under-
lying felony that serves as the basis for a first degree murder convic-
tion may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in a capital
sentencing proceeding. 58 6 Stebbing was convicted of first degree
murder based exclusively on the felony murder rule.5 87 There was
no finding of premeditation and deliberation. In previous cases in
which the Court of Appeals had upheld consideration of the perti-
nent aggravating circumstance, 58 8 the murder conviction had been
based, in part, on a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Steb-
bing argued that, when the murder conviction for which the death
penalty was being sought was based solely on the commission of the
underlying felonies, those felonies should not be considered as an
aggravating circumstance in the death penalty sentencing.5 8 9 The
court disageed, based on the observation that Maryland's death pen-
582. 297 Md. at 626, 468 A.2d at 75.
583. Id. at 624, 468 A.2d at 74; Colvin, 299 Md. at 123, 472 A.2d at 970. See also MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h) (1982).
584. 299 Md. at 123, 472 A.2d at 970; see also Calhoun, 297 Md. at 624, 468 A.2d at 74.
585. 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903 (1984).
586. Id. at 360, 473 A.2d at 917.
587. Id. at 358, 473 A.2d at 916. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1982) (Maryland's
felony murder rule); see also id. § 407 (defining first degree murder generally).
588. See, e.g., Calhoun, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45; Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468
A.2d 101 (1983).
589. The trial court imposed sentence only on the first degree murder conviction and
not on any of the underlying felony convictions. 299 Md. at 358, 473 A.2d at 916. The
Court of Appeals implied that there might be a double jeopardy problem involved if a
defendant is sentenced both for felony murder and for an underlying felony and the
felonies themselves are used as a basis for the murder sentence. See Newton v. State,
280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977); cf. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 140-43, 468 A.2d
101, 114-16 (1983) (no double jeopardy violation in separate murder and felony convic-
tions if murder conviction based on premeditation, not felony murder). For a further
discussion of this double jeopardy issue, see infra notes 617-624 and accompanying text.
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alty statute "makes plain the legislative intent that the commission
of certain felonies, underlying a felony murder conviction, is to be
considered an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing
proceeding. 5 0 The fact that the murder occurred in the commis-
sion of section 413(d)(10) felonies "does not disappear or lose legal
significance" simply because the conviction is based on felony mur-
der rather than premeditation and deliberation.59
The Court of Appeals in Stebbing also clarified a statutory inter-
pretation issue involving section 413(e)(1) of the death penalty stat-
ute, which provides that the terms "defendant" and "person," as
used in the death penalty statute, "include only a principal in the
first degree. '592 Although a principal in the first degree in the mur-
der for which she had been convicted, the appellant in Stebbing acted
as a principal in the second degree in the underlying felonies of first
degree rape and sexual offense. She contended that because section
413(e)(1) requires the defendant to be a principal in the first degree,
the sentencing judge erred in finding the aggravating circumstances
that the murder was committed during the commission of a section
413(d)(10) felony. The Court of Appeals rejected that contention,
holding that "the requirement of being a principal in the first de-
gree, as embraced in the definition of 'defendant' and 'person,' re-
lates to the murder which is the subject of the sentencing
proceeding and not to the aggravating crimes listed in [section]
413(d)( 10)." 59 3
Addressing another issue involving the consideration of aggra-
vating circumstances, the Court of Appeals in Calhoun held that the
sentencing authority in a capital sentencing proceeding may con-
sider individually the multiple aggravating circumstances that may
arise from a single occurrence. 594 The jury that sentenced Calhoun
found three of the statutory aggravating circumstances:
that the victim was a law enforcement officer who was mur-
dered while in the performance of his duties; that the de-
fendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape
from or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful cus-
590. 299 Md. at 359, 473 A.2d at 917.
591. Id. at 360, 473 A.2d at 917.
592. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(e)(1) (1982). The statute creates an exception for
the use of those terms in § 413(d)(7), which states the following aggravating circum-
stance: "The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder
and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration."
593. 299 Md. at 373, 473 A.2d at 924.
594. 297 Md. at 593, 468 A.2d at 58.
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tody, arrest or detention of or by an officer or guard of a
correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer; and
that the defendant committed the murder while commit-
ting or attempting to commit robbery.5 05
Calhoun argued that submission of all three aggravating circum-
stances to the jury was improper because they were overlapping fac-
tors based on a single occurrence.596
The Court of Appeals determined that the three aggravating
factors submitted to the jury did not necessarily overlap because
each served a different societal objective. In distinguishing the
three factors, the court found that the first promotes the protection
of police officers, the second is intended to deter escape attempts,
and the third aggravating factor is intended to deter robbery.59 7
Demonstrating its willingness to construe this portion of the death
penalty statute broadly, the court concluded that, given the distinc-
tive elements and objectives in each factor, each aggravating factor
could be considered by the jury.59 s
(c) Constitutionality-Proportionality Review.-The Court of Appeals
in Calhoun held that its authority to review the sentencing process in
a capital punishment case 59 9 is constitutional.6 °0 Calhoun argued
that article 23 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights,60 ' which states
that the jury in a criminal trial shall be the judges of law as well as of
fact, prohibits appellate courts from passing upon the sufficiency of
the evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. Section 414 of the
death penalty statute authorizes the Court of Appeals to conduct an
independent assessment of the sentencing authority's findings con-
cerning the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating cir-
595. Id. at 589-90, 468 A.2d at 57. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(1), (3),
(10) (1982).
596. 297 Md. at 590, 468 A.2d at 57.
597. Id. at 591, 468 A.2d at 57-58.
598. Id. at 593, 468 A.2d at 58. For an example of overlapping aggravating factors
that may not simultaneously be submitted, see State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257
S.E.2d 569 (1979), which the Court of Appeals cited in Calhoun. There the overlapping
factors were "that '[t]he capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest' " and "that the 'felony was committed to disrupt or hinder
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.'" Calhoun,
297 Md. at 591-92, 468 A.2d at 58 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4), (e)(7)
(1980)).
599. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414 (1982).
600. 297 Md. at 612, 468 A.2d at 68.
601. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 23. Article 23 provides in relevant part: "In the
trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except
that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction."
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cumstances.6 2 The court upheld the constitutionality of section
414. It ruled that article 23 applies to the trial stage of a criminal
proceeding; therefore, it only imposes restrictions on appellate re-
view of "the evidence necessary to sustain a finding of guilt or inno-
cence," not on appellate review of the findings of a jury in a death
sentence proceeding. 60 3
(d) Defining the Pool of Similar Cases.-Maryland's death penalty
statute mandates that the Court of Appeals shall conduct a propor-
tionality review of all death sentences based on "the penalty im-
posed in similar cases." 6 °4 In Tichnell 111605 the Court of Appeals
held that "similar cases" encompasses only first degree murder
cases in which the State sought the death penalty under section 413,
whether or not the death penalty was imposed.60 6 In reaching that
conclusion, the court rejected the broader alternative that the pool
of similar cases should include all first degree murder cases eligible
under section 413 for imposition of the death sentence.
The court's analysis focused on the essential principle underly-
ing proportionality review-that is, reasonable consistency in the
imposition of the death penalty.60 7 Section 414(e)(4) serves that
principle by providing a review process designed to assure that
when a defendant and his crime are considered, cases with similar
aggravating and mitigating circumstances will receive similar treat-
ment.608 In the court's view, cases in which the sentencing authority
considered the imposition of the death penalty are inherently dis-
similar from cases in which the death penalty was never sought, 60 9
602. 297 Md. at 610, 468 A.2d at 67.
603. Id. at 612, 468 A.2d at 68.
604. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(4) (1982). Subsection (e)(4) provides that the
Court of Appeals shall determine: "Whether the sentence of death is excessive or dis-
proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant."
605. 297 Md. 432, 468 A.2d 1 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2374 (1984). For the facts
and previous history of the Tichnell case, see Note, Tichnell v. State-Mayland's Death
Penalty: The Need for Reform, 42 MD. L. REV. 875, 878-81 (1983).
606. 297 Md. at 464, 468 A.2d at 17. See also Calhoun, 297 Md. at 608-10, 468 A.2d at
66-67 (affirming definition of the pool of similar cases in Tichnell III).
607. 297 Md. at 460, 468 A.2d at 15. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206
(1976) (plurality opinion) ("proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibil-
ity that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury"); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-53 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding death penalty statutes without specific pro-
portionality review provisions as long as appellate review guarantees imposition of death
sentences in a reasonably consistent manner).
608. 297 Md. at 464-65, 468 A.2d at 17-18.
609. The court noted that this interpretation of § 414(e)(4) is consistent with the im-
528 [VOL. 44:439
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and a comparative review that included the latter group of cases
would not be a comparison of "similar cases." 61 0
The Tichnell III court also determined that this definition of the
pool of similar cases is not so limited as to render section 414(e)(4)
unconstitutional. The court determined that the Supreme Court
does not require a comparative review of death sentences to include
"nonappealed capital cases where a life sentence was imposed,
homicide cases where a capital conviction was not obtained, or those
in which the defendant was convicted of a lesser offense." '' Thus,
the Court of Appeals found nothing unconstitutional in limiting the
relevant inventory of cases available for proportionality review to
those in which the death penalty was sought.6 12 The court further
held that the pool of similar cases would be restricted "to cases de-
cided under constitutional death penalty statutes and to those de-
cided under . . . [Maryland] law."-6 11
(e) Jury Instructions-The appellant in Calhoun raised an issue
pertaining to jury instructions, requiring the Court of Appeals to
interpret section 413(k)(2) of the death penalty statute, which man-
dates a sentence of life imprisonment if the sentencing jury is unable
to reach a decision "within a reasonable time."' 614 Calhoun had ar-
gued that the trial judge should have instructed the sentencing jury
prior to its deliberations that a life sentence would be imposed if the
plementing provisions of Former Md. R.P. 772A (Supp. 1983) (now MD. R.P. 4-343),
which requires, for purposes of proportionality review, that trial judges file detailed in-
formational reports only in cases where the death penalty was sought. 297 Md. at 464,
468 A.2d at 17.
610. 297 Md. at 465, 468 A.2d at 18. In dissent, Judge Davidson would have held that
all " 'death-eligible murder cases in which the prosecutor could have, but did not seek
the death penalty' must be included in the inventory of relevant cases in order to achieve
the goal of proportionality review-the consistent and fair application of the death pen-
alty." Id. at 490, 468 A.2d at 30 (quoting the majority opinion) (Davidson. J.,
dissenting).
611. Id. at 465, 468 A.2d at 18. This was based on the court's reading of Gregg and
Proffitt. For a discussion of this issue, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204 n. 56; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at
259 n.16.
612. 297 Md. at 465, 468 A.2d at 18. The court noted that nothing in the Maryland
Constitution required a different result, but the court left open the door for any defend-
ant whose death sentence is under appellate review to argue, with relevant facts, that
designated non-capital murder cases are similar to the case being reviewed and should
be considered by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 466, 468 A.2d at 18.
613. Id.
614. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(k)(2) (1982) provides: "If the jury, within a rea-
sonable time, is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and
impose a sentence of imprisonment for life."
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jury could not reach a verdict within a reasonable time.61 5 In re-
jecting this argument, the Court of Appeals reasoned that giving
such an instruction might prompt ajuror to hold out longer or, con-
versely, cause a jury to rush through its deliberations. 61 6 Accord-
ingly, the court adopted the State's position that the statutory
mandate in section 413(k)(2) need not be included in a judge's in-
structions to the sentencing jury. Under the court's holding, the
question of what constitutes a "reasonable time" for purposes of
section 413(k)(2) remains within the discretion of the trial judge.
3. Other Death Penalty Issues.--(a) Double Jeopardy.-In Bowers v.
State617 the Court of Appeals held that there was no double jeopardy
violation when a defendant was convicted of first degree premedi-
tated murder after being convicted of a felony arising from the same
incident. In Newton v. State618 the court had held that an underlying
felony and a felony murder "merge" for double jeopardy purposes,
thereby precluding separate punishment of the two offenses.61 9
Bowers argued that, under Newton, the State could not try him for
first degree murder because he earlier had been convicted of kid-
napping, a felony which was part of the same occurrence. 62 ' His
argument assumed that no distinction existed between premedi-
tated murder and felony murder for purposes of applying the
Newton double jeopardy rule.
Rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals distinguished
Bowers and Newton. The court explained that Newton applied the
merger concept only to felony murder 62 1 and not to first degree
murder" 'premised upon independent proof of wilfulness, premed-
itation and deliberation.' "622 The court then determined that Bow-
ers's conviction of first degree murder was premised upon such
independent proof. Moreover, the State did not argue felony mur-
615. 297 Md. at 593, 468 A.2d at 59. The Calhoun jury reached its decision to impose
the death sentence after a little more than four hours of deliberations.
616. Id. at 595, 468 A.2d at 60.
617. 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983).
618. 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977).
619. Id. at 269, 273-74, 373 A.2d at 267, 269. The Newton court applied the "required
evidence" test for determining identity of offenses. Under that test, if each offense re-
quires proof of a fact that the other does not, the offenses are not the same and do not
merge, but if only one offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the
offenses are deemed the same, and separate sentences for each offense are prohibited.
Id. at 268, 373 A.2d at 266.
620. 298 Md. at 140, 468 A.2d at 114.
621. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1982).
622. 298 Md. at 141, 468 A.2d at 114 (quoting State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 716, 393
A.2d 1372, 1376 (1978)). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1982).
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der to the jury, nor did the trial court instruct the jury on felony
murder.623 Thus, because Bowers was not convicted of felony mur-
der, the merger principle did not apply, and the State did not violate
the prohibition against double jeopardy in trying Bowers on murder
charges following his kidnapping conviction.6 2 4
(b) Voir Dire Examination.-The Court of Appeals in Bowers also
considered whether the trial judge erred in refusing to ask prospec-
tive jurors specific questions submitted by the defendant. The trial
judge declined to ask the questions, which were designed to elicit
the prospective jurors' views on capital punishment, because he be-
lieved doing so would result in the exclusion of jurors based on
their opposition to capital punishment, 6 25 a statutorily prohibited
ground for exclusion.6 2 6 Instead, the trial judge inquired on voir
dire whether any juror's attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent him or her from making an impartial decision at the guilt-or
innocence phase of the defendant's murder trial.6 2 7
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was within the trial judge's
discretion to deny Bowers' proposed jury question because it would
result in excluding from the jury people who, by statute, may not be
excluded.6 2' Further, none of the capital punishment questions
proposed by Bowers would provide grounds for disqualification of
prospective jurors, because they would not show whether or not a
juror would follow the law or "abide by his oath as a juror.- 629
Finding that the trial judge's general question "adequately covered
the matter, "630 the Court of Appeals found no error in the trial
judge's conduct of voir dire.
623. 298 Md. at 141, 468 A.2d at 114.
624. Id. at 143, 468 A.2d at 116.
625. Id. at 145, 468 A.2d at 116.
626. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-210(c) (1984), which states: "Belief
against capital punishment-A person may not be disqualified, excused, or excluded from
service in a particular case as a juror of the State by reason of his beliefs against capital
punishment unless such belief would prevent his returning an impartial verdict accord-
ing to law."
627. 298 Md. at 144, 468 A.2d at 116.
628. Id. at 147, 468 A.2d at 118. Under current and prior procedural rules, the trial
judge has broad discretion in conducting a voir dire examination. See Tichnell Ill, 297
Md. at 436-38, 468 A.2d at 3-4 (individual voir dire examination of prospective jurors
left to discretion of trial judge); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 583, 115 A.2d 502, 510
(1955) (questions to be asked on voir dire left largely to court's discretion); see also MD.
R.P. 4-312(d); former Md. R.P. 752 (Supp. 1981).
629. 298 Md. at 147, 468 A.2d at 117.




1. Conflict of Interest.-In Young v. State63' the Court of Appeals
held that an entire county's state's attorney's office should not be
disqualified from prosecuting a defendant because one member had
previously represented the defendant in the same action.632 The
court adopted a rule that, when disqualification is sought under
these circumstances, "the trial court must make inquiry as to
whether the defendant's former counsel participated in the prosecu-
tion of the case or divulged any confidential information to other
prosecutors.' '633
In making its decision, the court considered case law that ac-
cepted a per se disqualifiying rule,6 3 " and case law that rejected such
a rule. The court reasoned that such a rule would be merely cos-
metic, making it necessary to trust that the specially appointed pros-
ecutor would not collaborate with the disqualified state's attorney's
office. 6 35 The court also considered the argument that the per se
rule is too broad and " 'would result in many unnecessary withdraw-
als, limit mobility in the legal profession, and restrict the state in the
assignment of counsel where no breach of confidentiality has in fact
occurred.' "636
Recognizing that this issue was one of first impression in Mary-
land, the court reasoned, by analogy, from two prior Maryland cases
addressing related issues.63 7 In Sinclair v. State638 the issue was
whether a state's attorney could be involved in a prosecution when
631. 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149 (1983).
632. Id. at 298, 465 A.2d at 1155.
633. Id.
634. The court examined the law in a number of jurisdictions adopting the per se
rule, including New York, People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 415 N.E.2d 909, 434
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1980) and New Mexico, State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999
(N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988 (1974), both cited in 297 Md. at
290-91, 465 A.2d at 1151-52.
635. 297 Md. at 292-93, 465 A.2d at 1152-53 (citing State v. Cline, 121 R.I. 299, 317,
405 A.2d 1192, 1206 (1979)). The court cited several other foreign jurisdictions that do
not subscribe to the per se disqualifying rule based on an appearance of impropriety.
See, e.g., State v. Laughlin, 232 Kan. 110, 652 P.2d 690 (1982); Brinkman v. State, 95
Nev. 220, 592 P.2d 163 (1979), both cited in 297 Md. at 1153, 465 A.2d at 294.
636. 297 Md. at 294, 465 A.2d at 1153 (quoting State v. Jones, 180 Conn. 443, 456-
57, 429 A.2d 936, 942-43 (1980)). The Supreme Court of Connecticut did note, how-
ever, that "[iut can be argued that the withdrawal of ... the entire state's attorney's
office, when the slightest chance of betrayal of confidential communications exists might
better preserve the integrity of the judicial system." Jones, 180 Conn. at 456-57, 429
A.2d at 942-43. The Supreme Court of Connecticut went on to reject this argument
citing the reasons set forth above.
637. 297 Md. at 296-98, 465 A.2d at 1154-55.
638. 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
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he had a conflicting private interest.6 39 The court articulated the
principle that, if an individual prosecutor has a personal or pecuni-
ary interest in a civil matter that would impair his ability to act im-
partially towards the state and the accused, he must be
disqualified.64 ° In Lykins v. State641 the issue was whether an indict-
ment should be set aside because the prosecuting state's attorney
had once represented the defendant in another matter. The court
in Lykins held that a trial court should not dismiss the indictment but
rather should supplant the prosecutor.642 Moreover, the Lykins
court indicated that the mere appearance of impropriety would not
warrant the dismissal of the indictment.643
The Young court, looking at the reasoning of Sinclair and Lykins,
held that the appearance of impropriety was not sufficient to war-
rant disqualification of an entire state's attorney's office, when one
member had previously represented the defendant currently under
prosecution. 64
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Davidson argued that this marked a
radical departure from the controlling principles established in Sin-
clair and Lykins, 64 5 finding that those principles dictated that the ap-
pearance of impropriety is sufficient to disqualify the entire office. 6 4 6
She argued that the need for public confidence in the administration
of justice far outweighs the "minor practical difficulties" that would
result from the application of a stricter rule.6 4 7
The majority's position that automatic disqualification of an en-
639. Id. at 244, 363 A.2d at 469-70.
640. Id. at 254, 363 A.2d at 475.
641. 288 Md. 71, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980).
642. Id. at 85, 415 A.2d at 1121. "[Tlhe proper action to be taken by a trial judge,
when he encounters circumstances similar to those in the case at bar which he deter-
mines to be so grave as to adversely affect the administration ofjustice but which no way
suggest the bringing of a prosecution for improper motives. . . is to supplant the pros-
ecutor, not to bar the prosecution." Id.
643. Id. at 84, 415 A.2d at 1121.
644. 297 Md. at 298, 465 A.2d at 1155.
645. Id. (Davidson, J., dissenting). Judge Davidson argued that in Sinclair the court
recognized that prosecutorial impartiality is "so essential to the fair and equal adminis-
tration of justice" that a state's attorney must not only be impartial "but must also ap-
pear to be so." Moreover she argued that Sinclair establishes that a conflict of interest
on the part of a state's attorney creates an appearance of impropriety and that, for policy
reasons, such a state's attorney is disqualified without proof of actual prejudice to the
accused. Id. at 301-02, 465 A.2d at 1157.
Likewise, Davidson felt that in Lykins the court had confirmed this reading of
Sinclair. Id. at 303-04, 465 A.2d at 1158.
646. Id. at 307, 465 A.2d at 1160.
647. Id. at 307-08, 465 A.2d at 1160. Judge Davidson noted that it is not administra-
tively difficult to appoint a special prosecutor. Id. at 307 n.7, 465 A.2d at 1160 n.7.
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tire state's attorney's office is unnecessary is consistent with prior
case law. 6"s However, the majority overlooks the difficulty that a
trial judge would face in conducting an inquiry to determine if confi-
dential information was divulged. On the other hand, Judge David-
son's position that the mere appearance of impropriety should
disqualify the entire office seems impractical in light of the fre-
quency with which public defenders move to the state's attorney's
office and the size of those offices. 6 9 In weighing the interests of a
defendant against the practical aspects of administration of justice,
the solution might be a rule creating a rebuttable presumption that
the defendant was prejudiced. This would place the burden on the
state's attorney's office, which is in the best position to know
whether any confidential information has been divulged.
2. Animal Cruelty.-In Taub v. State6 5 ° the Court of Appeals in-
terpreted the reach of the Animal Cruelty Act.651 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the Act did not apply to the activities of a scientific
researcher experimenting on laboratory animals.652 After tracing
the history of the Maryland animal cruelty statutes, the court em-
phasized the fact that the "legislature has consistently been con-
cerned with the punishment of acts causing 'unnecessary' or
'unjustifiable' pain or suffering. '653 The language of the Act, how-
ever, expressly excludes those activities where the infliction of pain
is incidental and unavoidable.654 Noting that the legislature recog-
nized that there were human activities involving animals that are be-
yond the reach of the Act, if they only involve such incidental
infliction of pain, the court concluded that the Act was not intended
648. See supra notes 637-44 and accompanying text.
649. Judge Davidson's reasoning does, however, find substantiation in the ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.2, Conflicts of Interest (1980), quoted in 297
Md. at 299 n.1, 465 A.2d at 1156 n.l.
650. 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
651. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (1982) states in relevant part that:
Any person who (1) .. .tortures, torments, . . . mutilates or cruelly kills; or
(2) causes, procures or authorizes these acts; or (3) having the charge or cus-
tody of an animal either as owner or otherwise, inficts unnecessary suffering orpain
upon the animal, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . Customary and normal
veterinary and agricultural husbandry practices. . . are not covered by the pro-
visions of this section . . . . It is the intention of the General Assembly that all
animals shall be protected from intentional cruelty, but that no person shall be
liable for. . .normal human activities to which the infliction of pain to an animal is purely
incidental and unavoidable.
Id. (emphasis added).
652. 296 Md. at 440, 463 A.2d at 819.
653. Id. at 443, 463 A.2d at 821.
654. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (1982).
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to apply to the type of scientific research in question.65 5 In reaching
this decision, the court has effectively determined that legitimate re-
search involving animal experimentation should be governed by rel-







655. 296 Md. at 444, 463 A.2d at 822.
VII. FAMILY LAW
A. Overview of the Family Law Article
1. Introduction. -As part of the continuing revision of the An-
notated Code of Maryland, a new Family Law Article was enacted by
the Maryland legislature and became effective October 1, 1984.
The new article includes provisions on marriage,2 actions for breach
of promise to marry and for alienation of affection,' rights and obli-
gations of spouses,4 domestic violence,5 displaced homemakers,6
rights and obligations of parents and children,7 adoption,8 child
care, 9 foster care,' 0 mistreatment of children," paternity proceed-
ings, 12 single parents,' 3 divorce, 14 property disposition in annul-
ment and divorce,' 5 child custody and visitation," support of
spouses, children and parents, 17 and adult protective services.18
These provisions replace all of articles 45, 62, 72A and 89C of the
Maryland Annotated Code, and portions of articles 16, 17, 27, and
88A of the Code and of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article. '0
The new Family Law Article is organized in a manner similar to
the previously revised articles and includes an index,20 tables of
comparable sections cross-referencing the old sections, 2' and revi-
22 23sor's notes after each section. An editor's note explains that
1. Act of Oct. 1, 1984, ch. 296, 1984 Md. Laws 1847.
2. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 2-101 to -503.
3. Id. §§ 3-101 to -105.
4. Id. §§ 4-101 to -302.
5. Id. §§ 4-501 to -516.
6. Id. §§ 4-601 to -613.
7. Id. §§ 5-101 to -206.
8. Id. §§ 5-301 to -415.
9. Id. §§ 5-501 to -523, -550 to -557.
10. Id. §§ 5-524 to -549, -601 to -611.
11. Id. §§ 5-701 to -912.
12. Id. §§ 5-1001 to -1048.
13. Id. §§ 6-101 to -103.
14. Id. §§ 7-101 to -106.
15. Id. §§ 8-101 to -213.
16. Id. §§ 9-101 to -307.
17. Id. §§ 10-101 to -109.
18. Id. §§ 14-101 to -404.
19. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. general revisor's note, at 352 (1984).
20. The index begins on page 365 of the MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. (1984).
21. Id. at 353.
22. The revisor's notes are not law and are not to be considered to have been en-
acted as part of the Act. However, the Court of Special Appeals has used revisor's notes
536
FAMILY LAW
cases cited in the notes to each provision are cases interpreting for-
mer statutes. These citations were retained if they were helpful in
interpreting the new statute.
The purpose of the revision was modernization and clarifica-
tion, not policy making.2" This was accomplished through reorgani-
zation, deletion of repetitive or obsolete provisions and general
improvement of language and expression.2 ' However, the article
also includes substantive changes, both because it includes legisla-
tion enacted in 198426 and because it includes some supposedly sty-
listic revisions that actually change the law in substantive ways.2 7
2. Stylistic Changes. -Many of the changes in the new article or
suggested by the Commission are purely stylistic. For example, in
the title on adoption,28 the Commission suggests substituting the
term "biological parents" for "natural parents" throughout the
Family Law Article. The use of "natural parents" is considered by
many to be disparaging to adoptive parents because, by implication,
adoptive parents are then "unnatural" parents. Other jurisdictions
have adopted the use of the terms "biological parents" or "birth
parents" in legislation dealing with adoption.29
In another stylistic change, the Commission substituted English
words for the former Latin classifications of divorce. The Commis-
sion substituted the words "absolute" and "limited" to replace "a
vinculo matrimonii" and "a mensa et thoro" throughout the article.3 0
3. Stylistic Changes that Make Substantive Changes. -Some of the
changes that the Commission claims are purely stylistic actually
change the law in substantive ways. For instance, in the provisions
to determine legislative intent at the time of the enactment of an act. See Murray v. State,
27 Md. App. 404, 340 A.2d 402 (1975). Also appearing throughout the article are spe-
cial revisor's notes that explain provisions enacted during the 1984 legislative session.
See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. general revisor's note, at 352 (1984).
23. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. editor's note, at 10 (1984).
24. COMMISSION To REVISE THE ANNOTATED CODE, REPORT ON HOUSE BILL 1, FAMILY
LAw ARTICLE 1-2 (Aug. 9, 1983).
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
28. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-303 revisor's note (1984).
29. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 224t, 224u, 224v (West Supp. 1985) (birth parents);
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 710.68(3) (West Supp. 1984-85) (biological parents). Many
commentators have also recommended use of these terms. See, e.g., A. SOROSKY, A. BA-
RAN & R. PANNER, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON
ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 26 (1978).
30. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. general revisor's note, at 352 (1984).
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dealing with actions for breach of promise to marry and alienation
of affections, the wording is clarified to show legislative intent to bar
the right as well as to prohibit the remedy."' If the individual is
pregnant, however, she still has an action for breach of promise to
marry.32
Another supposedly purely stylistic change that actually has
substantive impact derives from the Commission's clarification of
the definition of battered spouse. By changing the phrase "with
whom he or she shares a house ' 3 3 to "with whom the individual
resides,"' 34 the Commission included apartment dwellers in the defi-
nition of a battered spouse.
4. Deletion of Unconstitutional Provisions. -While revising the
Code, the Commission screened all family law provisions for obso-
lescence, conflict, repeal, unconstitutionality, and obvious gaps, and
made recommendations to the General Assembly to correct these
deficiencies.3 5 During the revision process, the Commission de-
leted several provisions that were clearly and explicitly
unconstitutional. 6
The Commission deleted the statutory presumption that it is in
the child's best interest to award guardianship to a child placement
agency without the parent's consent, when the child has been under
continuous foster care under the custody of that child placement
agency for at least two years.3 7 The new standard requires proof by
clear and convincing evidence that it is within the child's best inter-
31.. Id. §§ 3-102, -103.
32. Id. § 3-102. Because only pregnant individuals are entitled to bring this action,
this provision probably violates the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment. See MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. art. 46. The Commission chose not to delete this provision although it is
apparently unconstitutional. For a discussion of provisions that the Commission did
delete for unconstitutionality, see infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 102 (Supp. 1983) (repealed 1984).
34. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-513 (1984).
35. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND, REVI-
SOR'S MANUAL (2d ed. 1973). "The Commission can take no action resulting in an actual
change in statutory language without the approval of the General Assembly." Id. at 16.
36. See generally MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. general revisor's note, at 352 (1984).
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 75(a), (c) (198.1) (repealed 1984). This presumption
was found unconstitutional in Washington County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Clark, 296
Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077 (1983). The court followed Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) which held that in a case to terminate parental rights on a permanent basis, the
minimum standard of proof to satisfy due process must be by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 296 Md. at 195, 461 A.2d at 1080. See discussion of Clark, infra notes 249-51 and
accompanying text; Note, Washington County Department of Social Services v. Clark-
The Constitutionality of a Rebuttable Presumption in a Parental Rights Termination Case, 43 MD.
L. REV. 632 (1984).
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est for the court to grant a decree of adoption or decree of guardi-
anship without the consent of a biological parent.3 8
The Commission also deleted the former provision which gave
the mother of an illegitimate child the right to sue for the loss of
services and earnings of her minor child that was caused by an injury
wrongfully or negligently inflicted on the child. 3' The exclusion of
the rights of the father of an illegitimate child violated the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment.4 °
5. Unconstitutional Provisions That Were Not Deleted. -Due to time
constraints and the nature of the revision process, some provisions
were retained that may be unconstitutional. Included among these
questionable provisions are the two-year statute of limitations on
paternity proceedings, 4' the marriage license form,4 2 the ban on ad-
vertising in solicitation of performing marriages,43 the doctrine of
necessaries, 44 procedures to institute support payments by the fa-
ther of a child,45 the restriction on travel as a condition of the bond
38. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-313 (1984). The revision also allows an action to
terminate biological parental rights to be brought after only one year of continuous
foster care in the child placement agency.
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 3 (1983) (repealed 1984).
40. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46. Obviously, if this right were extended to both
the mother and the father of an illegitimate child, the provision would no longer violate
the Maryland Constitution. However, the Commission chose to delete the right entirely
because it is beyond its mandate to create new substantive rights.
41. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1006 (1984). In Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1
(1983), the Supreme Court struck down a two-year limitation period for paternity pro-
ceedings, holding that it violated the fourteenth amendment by denying illegitimate
children equal protection of the laws. The Maryland Court of Appeals followed Pickett in
Frick v. Maldonado, 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983). See discussion of Frick, infra
notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
42. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-403 (1984). Because the form asks for the age of
the intended husband, but not the intended wife, it probably violates the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment.
43. Id. § 2-408. The ban on advertising set out in subsection (a)(2) may infringe on
first amendment rights. See Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Don-
nelly Advertising Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d
1127 (1977).
44. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 4-302 (1984). In Condore v. Prince George's
County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981), the Court of Appeals held that the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries violated the Maryland Equal Rights Amendiment. See
Note, Condore v. Prince George's County-Is the Necessaries Doctrine Necessary?, 41 MD. L.
REV. 527 (1982).
45. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1032 (1984), allowing for a court-ordered lien on
the earnings of the father of a child but not the mother is probably violative of the
Maryland Equal Rights Amendment.
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in a paternity proceeding, 46 the continuation of a father's duty to
support an illegitimate child after the father's death, 47 and the
power of a court to order any party to a paternity proceeding to
remain in the state.48 In addition to these, provisions involving the
Married Women's Property Act may raise constitutional questions. 49
6. Substantive Changes Made by Incorporation of 1984 Legislative
Session Laws. -The article also incorporates many substantive
changes made during the 1984 legislative session. Several of the
changes strengthen a court's ability to ensure that adequate child
support is provided. When issuing a support order, a court may
now order a parent to add a child to an existing health insurance
policy, if it can be done at a reasonable cost. 50
Pursuant to 1984 session law, the revised statutes now provide
that a court may award alimony and child support beginning on the
date the pleading requesting alimony or child support is filed.5'
Formerly, trial judges had the discretion to award alimony and child
support retroactively, for periods before pleadings were filed.
A revision codifying Haines v. Shanholtz52 affects paternity pro-
ceedings. Affirmative blood tests5" may now be admitted into evi-
dence, and the party who secures the appearance of the laboratory
technician in court is responsible for the costs associated with the
appearance.54 An exception is made, however, if that party prevails
or is indigent.5 5
In response to the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and
Neglect, the 1984 General Assembly enacted several measures
46. Id. § 5-1042. This provision may restrict the constitutionally protected right to
travel.
47. Id. § 5-1043.
48. Id. § 5-1035.
49. Id. §§ 4-202 to -301. These sections were enacted to ensure that a married wo-
man has the same rights as an unmarried woman. The common law, which limited a
married individual's rights on the basis of sex, violated the Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment. It is possible that a repeal of the Married Women's Property Act may re-
vive the common law and reopen constitutional questions. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
introductory general revisor's note to §§ 4-202 to -301, at 48 (1984).
50. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-102 (1984).
51. Id. §§ 11-106, 12-101.
52. 57 Md. App. 92, 468 A.2d 1365 (1984).
53. The results of blood tests will be received into evidence if definite exclusion is
established or the test excludes 97.3% of alleged fathers who are not biological fathers,
and the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity is at least 97.3%. MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1029(e) (1984). See discussion of Haines v. Shanholtz, infra notes
234-38 and accompanying text.




strengthening sanctions against child abuse and neglect. A court
may now deny custody or visitation rights to a party if he or she is
reasonably suspected of past child abuse or neglect.56 A very strict
standard is set by the new statute. If, during a custody hearing, a
court has reasonable grounds to believe a child has been abused or
neglected by the party seeking custody, the court must determine
whether abuse or neglect is likely to recur if custody is granted. 57
Unless the court makes a specific finding that no likelihood exists of
further abuse or neglect, the court is required to deny custody or
visitation rights to that party.58 The statute does provide that super-
vised visitations may be permissible as long as the child's safety is
not endangered. 59 It is unclear whether the statute includes all in-
stances of past child abuse or only those instances of abuse directed
against the child whose custody is sought.
A separate provision clarifies the procedures for the investiga-
tion of a reported child abuse.60 Within twenty-four hours of a re-
port, the child's home should be visited by a representative of the
local department of social services or the appropriate law enforce-
ment agency to see the child, interview the caretaker, and decide on
the safety of the child.6 t The provision also sets out the scope of the
investigation 6 2 and requires that, within each county and Baltimore
City, the State's Attorney, the law enforcement agencies and the De-
partment of Social Services agree on standard operating procedures
for child abuse cases. 63 The standard operating procedures were
set up in January, 1985.' Although differing from county to
county, all procedures require that some response be made within
twenty-four hours. 65 All investigations must be completed within
ten days of the initial report of the abuse.66
56. Id. § 9-101.
57. Id. § 9-101(a).
58. Id. § 9-101(b). As a practical matter, once past abuse is shown, a court would
never make a specific finding that the abuse will not recur. Because the standard is so
strict, it may be unconstitutional.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 5-905.
61. Id. § 5-905(a)(2).
62. Id. § 5-905(b).
63. Id. § 5-905(d).
64. Telephone interview with Olga Bruning, Assistant State's Attorney, Baltimore
City (Mar. 21, 1985).
65. In Baltimore City, the police respond to child abuse calls. This procedure en-
ables prosecutors to obtain immediate physical evidence of any abuse. Practitioners
should check with their local state's attorney's office to ascertain procedure in their juris-
diction. Id.
66. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-905(f) (1984).
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Another provision requires the Governor to set aside budget
funds to pay for emergency medical treatment for abused
children.6 7
Related to these measures against child abuse is a new provi-
sion which provides that a spouse whose minor child is being
abused now has grounds for a limited divorce. 68 This provision
overrules Binder v. Binder,69 which held that mistreatment of a child,
in and of itself, was not sufficient justification to constitute an affirm-
ative defense to a charge of desertion by the abusing spouse. 70 A
proposal to add similar language 7' to the grounds for an absolute
divorce was rejected by the General Assembly.72 Thus a spouse
whose minor child is being abused may file for a limited divorce but
must wait two years to obtain an absolute divorce unless other
grounds satisfying the statute are present.73
This provision may have little impact on divorce law, since lim-
ited divorces are rarely sought, but it does provide a court with an-
other weapon against child abuse. The practical effect of this
provision is to enable a court to get a child abuser out of the family
home by awarding custody of the family home to the non-abusing
parent for a period of up to three years. 74 This provides a more
long-term solution than was previously available in Maryland.75
7. Ambiguous and Conflicting Sections. -The Commission also
noted those provisions that are ambiguous or in conflict with an-
67. Id. § 5-910(f).
68. The court may issue a decree of limited divorce on the following grounds: (1)
cruelty of treatment of a minor child of the complaining party, or (2) excessively vicious
conduct to a minor child of the complaining party. Id. § 7-102.
69. 16 Md. App. 404, 297 A.2d 293 (1972).
70. "Such mistreatment [of children] is relevant in divorce law only in its effect upon
the complaining spouse, and generally is merely cumulative with other evidence of the
conduct of the offending spouse." Id. at 413, 297 A.2d at 298.
71. "Abuse, as defined in § 5-901 of this Article, of a child of the complaining party
• . . if the parties have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for 12 months
without interruption before the filing of the application of divorce . Act ofJuly 1,
1984, ch. 371, 1984 Md. Laws 2359.
72. Id.
73. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 7-103(a)(5) (1984). The statute also provides that,
even if a party has obtained a limited divorce, a court may still decree an absolute di-
vorce. Id. § 7-103(e).
74. Id. §§ 8-208, -210..
75. Previously, a household member could only seek relief from abuse by filing a
petition with a court. The court could then enter a temporary ex parte order granting
temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner for not more than five days.
After a hearing, a court could grant a protective order and temporary possession of the
family home to the petitioner for not more than fifteen days. Id. §§ 4-505, -506.
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other section of the Code. For example, the definition of "natural
father" allows the possibility of more than one man being the natu-
ral father of a child. 76 Another provision states that "[i]f a final dis-
position as to alimony has been made in an agreement between the
parties, the court is bound by that agreement as the agreement re-
lates to alimony," but fails to clarify the meaning of "final disposi-
tion" and "agreement between the parties."-77 An example of an
inconsistency between sections is evidenced by the sections entitled
"Special Provisions of Alimony, Annulment and Divorce ' 7 and
"General Provisions." 79 The former requires only the oral testi-
mony of the plaintiff in a hearing before a final decree can be en-
tered in an action for alimony, annulment, or divorce. In contrast,
the latter section provides that a court "may not enter a decree of
divorce on the uncorroborated testimony of the party who is seeking
the divorce. '8
8. Conclusion. -Reorganization and collection of all family law
statutes in one volume vastly improves the former system, where
family law statutes were scattered throughout the Code. It is now
up to the legislature to respond to Commission suggestions to en-
sure that all family laws are just and effective.
B. Marital Property
1. General. -In 1978, the Maryland General Assembly com-
pletely revised state law regarding distribution of property at di-
vorce."' The law, commonly referred to as the Marital Property Act,
became effective onJanuary 1, 1979. Prior to this date, distribution
of property depended primarily on record title.8 2 Under pre-ex-
isting law, if a spouse did not contribute monetarily to the purchase
of property, the courts could not award that spouse any portion of
76. Id. § 5-310.
77. Id. §§ 11-101, 8-103.
78. Id. § 1-203.
79. Id. § 7-101.
80. Id. Other sections which are unclear or inconsistent are §§ 4-504, 5-203, 5-311,
5-1005, 6-102, 8-201, 8-202, 8-203, 8-207, 8-208, 8-210.
81. Act ofJan. 1, 1979, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (originally codified at MD. CTS.
&JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -07 (1979)) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213 (1984) by Act ofJuly 1, 1984, ch. 296, 1984 Md. Laws 1847).
Although formally titled "Property Disposition in Annulment and Divorce," the law is
commonly referred to as the Marital Property Act.
82. Comment, Property Disposition Upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Stat-
ute, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 377, 380 (1979).
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the property held in the other spouse's name. 3 No recognition was
accorded to a non-working spouse's contributions to the marriage.84
During the 1970's, the rebirth of the women's movement generated
widespread changes in societal attitudes about divorce and the roles
of women, marriage, and family.8 5 These attitude changes created
pressure for legislative changes as well.86
In 1977, Governor Mandel appointed a commission to review
state constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law affecting do-
mestic relations and make recommendations for change.87 The
commission's first report proposed comprehensive revision of the
laws governing property disposition on divorce or annulment.88
This proposed legislation, passed on the last day of the 1978 legisla-
tive session, 89 provides for recognition of the non-working spouse's
contributions to the family's well-being.90
The Marital Property Act provides a comprehensive framework
for the equitable distribution of property upon divorce. 9' The Act
defines marital property as all property, however titled, acquired
during the marriage. It excludes property acquired before mar-
riage, property acquired by inheritance or gift, property excluded
from marital property by valid agreement, or property directly
traceable to one of these sources.92
When a dispute arises concerning property distribution in a di-
vorce proceeding, the court determines which property is marital 93
and the value of that marital property.94 Although the Act specifi-
cally prohibits the court from transferring ownership of both real
83. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS, REPORT ACCOMPANYING THE
COMMISSION'S PROPOSED BILL ON THE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A
DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
84. Id.
85. Comment, supra note 82, at 377.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 383.
88. REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.
89. Comment, supra note 82, at 384-85. For discussion of the committee hearings on
amendments to the original bill, see id. at 383-85.
90. Id. at 386.
91. In equitable distribution jurisdictions, the court recognizes the contribution of
each party to the family's wealth and adjusts the equities accordingly. By contrast, in
community property jurisdictions, each spouse acquires a half-interest in all property
acquired during the marriage. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 123 n.6, 437 A.2d 883,
887-88 n.6 (1981).
92. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e) (1984).
93. Id. § 8-203(a).
94. Id. § 8-204.
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and personal property, 95 the court does have the discretion to grant
a monetary award to adjust the equities between the parties. 6 The
Act enumerates ten factors to be considered in determining the
amount and method of payment of any award.97 The law also pro-
vides for temporary use and possession of the family home and fam-
ily use property,"8 and excludes this property from marital property
until the expiration of any use and possession order.
99
In Dobbyn v. Dobbyn,' 00 the Court of Special Appeals provided
additional clarification regarding the proper application of this
Act.' ° ' The Dobbyn court held that marital property should always
be valued as of the date of the divorce decree,10 2 although the par-
ties may agree on an earlier date to determine which property is to
be considered marital.' 0 3 The court also held that no distinction
should be drawn between property that increased in value after sep-
aration, due to one party's activities, and property that passively in-
creased in value.'0 4 Once the date is chosen to determine which
property is marital, all marital property in existence on that date is
valued.
In Sharp v. Sharp,'05 the Court of Special Appeals confirmed
that the enactment of the Marital Property Act did not change the
law in Maryland regarding the effect of deliberate dissipation of
marital assets prior to divorce.'0 6 The record sustained a finding
95. Id. § 8-202(a)(3).
96. Id. § 8-205(a).
97. These factors include the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of each
spouse to the family, the value of each party's property, the economic circumstances of
each party at the time the award is made, the circumstances leading to the divorce, the
duration of the marriage, the age of each party, the physical and mental condition of
each party, how and when specific marital property was acquired, any alimony award,
and any other factors that the court deems relevant. Id. § 8-205(a)(1)-(10).
98. Id. § 8-206 to -210.
99. Id. § 8-203(c).
100. 57 Md. App. 662, 471 A.2d 1068 (1984).
101. Several Court of Appeals decisions have also interpreted this Act and provided
guidance to trial courts in its application. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448
A.2d 916 (1982) (source-of-funds theory used to determine marital and nonmarital
property); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981) (Act has substantially
modified traditional property rights).
102. 57 Md. App. at 676, 471 A.2d at 1075.
103. Id. at 671, 471 A.2d at 1073.
104. Id. at 674, 471 A.2d at 1074. For example, investment accounts that increased in
value due to one partner's active trading after the couple's separation should not be
excluded from marital property on that basis. Since the accounts represented assets
acquired during marriage, the statute requires that they be included in marital property.
Id. at 673-74, 471 A.2d at 1074.
105. 58 Md. App. 386, 473 A.2d 499 (1984).
106. Id. at 403, 473 A.2d at 507.
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that Mr. Sharp deliberately dissipated marital assets to avoid a mon-
etary award and the payment of alimony. The Sharp court held that
the trial court had correctly applied the criteria in the Marital Prop-
erty Act and prior case law in determining which property was mari-
tal, its value, and the amount of the award.'" 7 This decision also
reaffirmed cases on the dissipation of marital assets issue decided
prior to the enactment of the Marital Property Act.' 0 8
Another decision of the Court of Special Appeals treated sev-
eral marital property issues. In Gravenstine v. Gravenstine,'0 9 the
Court of Special Appeals considered which items of property consti-
tuted marital property. The court held that securities acquired dur-
ing marriage through the investment of dividends from securities
Mr. Gravenstine purchased before marriage constituted marital
property." 0 In a straightforward application of Maryland law,'
the court found that Ms. Gravenstine's monetary and nonmonetary
contributions to the marriage made it possible for the couple to re-
invest the dividends." 2 In addition, the court ruled that one-half of
the balance withdrawn from a joint savings account by Mr. Graven-
stine prior to divorce was properly awarded to Ms. Gravenstine' 1
and that the portion of Mr. Gravenstine's pension that "accrued af-
ter the date of marriage" was marital property.' 14
107. Id. at 394-403, 473 A.2d at 502-07. The Sharp court relied on Harper v. Harper,
294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982), which established that MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1984) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 8-203 to -205 (1984))
required a three-step process for the equitable distribution of marital property. First,
property must be characterized as either marital or nonmarital. Then, the value of mari-
tal property must be determined. Finally, the court may make a monetary award to ad-
just the parties' equities and interests in the marital property. 294 Md. at 79, 448 A.2d
at 928.
108. See, e.g., Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 65 A.2d 899 (1949); Levin v.
Levin, 166 Md. 451, 171 A. 77 (1934); Colburn v. Colburn, 15 Md. App. 503, 292 A.2d
121 (1972). The court also relied heavily on Illinois case law, noting the similarity be-
tween Maryland's and Illinois' provisions for the valuation of marital property. 58 Md.
App. at 401 n.1, 473 A.2d at 506 n.l.
109. 58 Md. App. 158, 472 A.2d 1001 (1984).
110. Id. at 174, 472 A.2d at 1009.
111. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 80, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982) (applying
source-of-funds theory to determine whether property is marital or nonmarital); Brodak
v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 27, 447 A.2d 847, 855 (1982). The Gravenstine court used MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-01(e) (1984) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 8-203(a) (1984)) to determine what constituted marital property.
112. 58 Md. App. at 173-74, 472 A.2d at 1008.
113. Id. at 176-79, 472 A.2d at 1009-11. The court relied on Sody v. Sody, 32 Md.
App. 644, 363 A.2d 568 (1976).
114. 58 Md. App. at 169, 472 A.2d at 1006. Because there was no proof of the value
of the marital portion of the pension, the case was remanded to the trial court for deter-
mination of that value and equitable distribution. Id. at 171, 472 A.2d at 1007. For a
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2. Monetary Awards. -In McAlear v. McAlear,' t5 the Court of
Appeals was presented with the question of whether a lump sum
monetary award granted pursuant to a divorce decree constituted a
form of alimony." 6 If the court had found that the monetary award
was alimony in gross, 1 7 Mr. McAlear could have been imprisoned
for failure to pay the award.'18 Because the court held that a mone-
tary award was not alimony," 9 failure to pay merely created a debt.
Pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, 2 ' Mr. McAlear could not be
imprisoned for failure to pay a debt.
In spite of the close relationship between a monetary award and
an award of alimony,' 2 ' the McAlear court found that the interrela-
tionship was not enough to transform a monetary award into a form
of alimony.' 22 The court held that a monetary award constituted a
discussion of pension valuation, see generally infra notes 131-69 and accompanying text.
In contrast to the pension, the court found that real estate that had been totally acquired
prior to the marriage was not marital property, despite the fact that property taxes were
paid on it out of marital funds. 58 Md. App. at 171-72, 472 A.2d at 1007-08.
115. 298 Md. 320, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984).
116. Id. at 324, 469 A.2d at 1258. The McAlears were divorced in June, 1981. The
trial court awarded the wife alimony as well as a monetary award of $64,000 to be paid in
installments. Mr. McAlear failed to make the first payment. Ms. McAlear filed a petition
to have Mr. McAlear held in contempt of court. The trial court determined that a mone-
tary award was a form of alimony. Because the award was not a debt, Mr. McAlear was
held to be in contempt and sentenced to ninety days. Id. at 326, 472 A.2d at 1258-59.
117. Alimony in gross is the award of a sum of money. Full payment of alimony in
gross discharges the payor's obligation of support to the recipient spouse. On the other
hand, after an award of permanent alimony, the payor can never discharge the obliga-
tion. Support payments must be made so long as both spouses are alive and the recipi-
ent spouse remains unmarried. A monetary award is an award wholly separate from an
alimony award, designed to achieve an equitable division of property accumulated dur-
ing marriage.
118. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-08(a) (1984) (recodified at MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 8-213 (1984)).
119. 298 Md. at 351-52, 469 A.2d at 1272.
120. MD. CONST. art. Ille, § 38, provides:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support
of a wife or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or
children, or for alimony, shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this
section. (emphasis added)
121. A monetary award granted pursuant to MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205 (1984)
and an award of alimony granted pursuant to id. §§ 11-101 to -103, -106 to -107 may
resemble one another. Like a monetary award paid in installments, alimony may be
granted for a definite period of time rather than over the life of the spouse. Also, courts
consider similar factors in determining the amount of either the monetary award or ali-
mony. One of the factors considered in the awarding of alimony is any monetary award
received by the spouse, and the amount of any monetary award is often based on the
amount of alimony being received.
122. 298 Md. at 348, 469 A.2d at 1270.
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property disposition award, adjusting the marital property interests
of the spouses.123 The court expressly stated that monetary awards
are not a form of alimony. 124
The McAlear result is sound, given the fact that the General As-
sembly has consistently distinguished alimony from the disposition
of property incident to a divorce. The McAlear court found that the
legislative history of the Property Disposition Act, 125 the language
of the Act itself, and the Act's stated purpose 12 6 evinced an intent to
restrict the scope of the Act to the disposition of property acquired
before and during the marriage.' 27
Another factor warranting the conclusion that a monetary
award should not be enforceable through a contempt proceeding is
that Maryland, through its constitution, has expressly indicated that
no individual should be incarcerated for failure to pay a debt. t 28
Given this clear indication of intent, contempt proceedings should
only be utilized where expressly designated by the legislature.
It is important to note that a spouse is not without recourse
merely because a monetary award is not enforceable by contempt.
Monetary awards may be enforced in accordance with the Maryland
Rules. 129 In order to enforce a monetary award, courts could there-
fore place a lien on property, enjoin a spouse from alienating prop-
erty, or require a spouse to assign property as security for the
obligation.0iS
3. Pensions. -Two recent decisions by the Court of Special Ap-
peals illustrate the importance of the method used to value retire-
123. Id. at 351, 469 A.2d at 1272.
124. Id.
125. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1984) (recodified at MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213 (1984)).
126. The stated purpose of the Act is to grant equity courts the authority to make
monetary awards and provide for the disposition and use of property under certain cir-
cumstances in conjunction with a divorce. Act ofJan. 1, 1979, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws
2304.
127. 298 Md. at 344, 469 A.2d at 1268. The Governor's Commission on Domestic
Relations Law specifically indicated several times that the Property Disposition Act "re-
late[s] as its Title indicates, only to the disposition of property between spouses. " REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAw 17 (1978) (emphasis added). See
id. at 1, 14, 18 (other repeated indications).
128. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
129. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-08(a) (1984) (recodified at MD. FAM.
LAw CODE ANN. § 8-213 (1984)). See MD. R.P. 2-648 (Enforcement ofJudgment Prohib-
iting or Mandating Actions); id. 2-641, 2-642 (Writ of Execution); id. 2-646 (Garnish-
ment of Wages); id. 3-115 (Attachment Before Judgment).
130. Cf Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511, 119 A.2d 430 (1956) (proposing these
remedies to enforce alimony awards).
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ment benefits when determining the amount and form of a
monetary award in a divorce proceeding. In both Cotter v. Cotter'3'
and Barr v. Barr,1 32 the couples had been married for more than
twenty years, and the husbands had made substantial contributions
to a retirement plan during the marriage. Each case involved a de-
termination of what portion of the pension benefits were marital
property and how those benefits should be valued in calculating
monetary awards.13 3 However, the methods used to value Mr. Cot-
ter's expected pension benefits was very different from the method
used to value Mr. Barr's expected pension benefits. Thus, the court
made very different monetary awards. While Ms. Barr received a
percentage of her husband's actual contributions, 13 4 Ms. Cotter was
awarded a percentage of her husband's pension reduced to its pres-
ent value at the time of the divorce. 135 The Court of Special Ap-
peals approved the method used in each case, noting that the trial
court has the discretion to select the valuation method based on the
facts in each case. 13 6
Treatment of pensions as marital property is a relatively new
phenomenon in Maryland. Prior to the passage of the Marital Prop-
erty Act, ' 3 7 the courts had never considered the issue.' 38 With near
unanimity, however, both community property 39 and equitable dis-
131. 58 Md. App. 529, 473 A.2d 970 (1984).
132. 58 Md. App. 569, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984).
133. See generally Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 536-40, 473 A.2d at 974-76; Barr, 58 Md. App.
at 588-91, 473 A.2d at 1310-11. Cotter also treated briefly the need to value correctly all
marital property. Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 535-36, 473 A.2d at 973-74. Barr considered a
number of issues, including whether the absolute divorce was properly granted, holding
that it was; whether the period of use and occupancy of the family home had been prop-
erly determined, finding it necessary to remand for a fuller determination; and whether
the trial judge had abused his discretion in making a finding on the needs of the minor
child and apportioning support, concluding that there was no such abuse of discretion.
Barr, 58 Md. App. at 574-88, 473 A.2d at 1302-10.
134. Barr, 58 Md. App. at 589, 473 A.2d at 1310.
135. Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 538, 473 A.2d at 975. The Court of Special Appeals ap-
proved this method of valuation. The issue of the monetary award, however, was re-
manded for further consideration because the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering alimony and monetary award payments that exceeded Mr. Cotter's annual in-
come. Id. at 541-42, 473 A.2d at 976-77.
136. Barr, 58 Md. App. at 590-91, 473 A.2d at 1311; Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 540-41,
473 A.2d at 976.
137. For a discussion of the Marital Property Act (codified as MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213 (1984)), see supra notes 81-114.
138. Comment, supra note 82, at 400-01.
139. Jurisdictions with community property statutes divide all property acquired dur-
ing marriage equally between the partners upon divorce. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md.
115, 123 n.6, 437 A.2d 883, 887-88 n.6 (1981).
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tribution 1  states consider pensions as marital property. 14 ,
The Maryland Court of Appeals first considered the issue of
whether pensions constituted marital property in Hill v. Hill.1 42 Re-
lying on a recent Supreme Court decision, McCarty v. McCarty,t 4 3 the
Hill court held that it was precluded from considering military re-
tirement pay as marital property. 144 The proper treatment of civil-
ian retirement benefits was not addressed in either Hill or McCarty.
Civilian retirement benefits were first addressed in Deering v.
Deering,14 5 where the Court of Appeals determined that marital
property did include civilian pension benefits. 146 The court relied
140. Jurisdictions with equitable distribution statutes, like Maryland, provide for an
equitable monetary adjustment of property rights upon divorce. Id.
141. Id. at 123, 437 A.2d at 887.
142. 291 Md. 615, 436 A.2d 67 (1981).
143. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
144. 291 Md. at 620-1, 436 A.2d at 70. The McCarty decision turned on the unique
character of military retirement pay and the absence of any federal legislation authoriz-
ing its division in a divorce proceeding. 453 U.S. at 220-32. Public Law No. 97-252,
title X, § 1002(s), 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1983)), amended
the military retirement statute to allow military pensions to be divided in divorce pro-
ceedings to the extent permitted by state law. Maryland subsequently amended the Mar-
ital Property Act to provide that military pensions be treated as any other pension or
retirement benefits. Act of July 1, 1983, ch. 159, § 2, 1983 Md. Laws 781 (codified at
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-07 (1984), recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 8-203(b) (1984) by Act ofJuly 1, 1984, ch. 296, 1984 Md. Laws 2080).
See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (holding that federal rail-
road retirement benefits not divisible at divorce). Congress responded to this decision
by amending the statute to permit division of federal railroad retirement benefits in
certain circumstances. Pub. L. No. 98-76, title IV, § 419(a), 97 Stat. 438 (1983) (codified
at 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2) (Supp. 1984)).
Federal civil service pensions can also be divided by court order at divorce, see 5
U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (1980), as can federal foreign service pensions, see 22 U.S.C. § 4060
(Supp. 1984).
145. 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981).
146. Id. at 128, 437 A.2d at 890. The court noted that the Employment Retirement
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975 & Supp. 1984), preempts state law
with regard to private pension plans. Both plans involved in Deering were governmental
and expressly exempted from compliance with ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32),
1003(b)(l) (1975). Thus, the court did not reach the issue of ERISA's preemption of
Maryland divorce law. 292 Md. at 125-26 n.8, 437 A.2d at 889 n.8. Public Law 98-397,
the recently enacted Retirement Equity Act of 1984, clarifies that ERISA does not pre-
empt state divorce law which allows division of pension benefits upon divorce. 116 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 284 (1984). Prior to the enactment of this legislation, three federal
courts of appeals had also determined that ERISA did not preempt state domestic rela-
tions laws. See Savings & Profit Sharing Fund v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1983);
Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th
Cir. 1981); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). In addition, the Supreme
Court had dismissed the appeal of a preemption claim for want of a substantial federal
question. See Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
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on case law from other jurisdictions 47 and interpreted the then new
Marital Property Act in reaching its decision.' 48 The Deering court
then discussed the methods of valuing this asset. In recognition of
the variety of pension plans and the difficulty in valuing pensions,
the Court of Appeals gave the trial court complete discretion to
choose the most appropriate method in a particular case.149 By
summarizing three different approaches approved by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Bloomer v. Bloomer'5' the court, by implication, di-




The first of the pension valuation alternatives recommended in
Deering recognizes only employee contributions to the plan. If the
spouse's pension plan requires employee contributions, the court
can determine the amount of such contributions, add interest, and
award a portion of this sum to the other spouse. 15 2 Certainly this
method is simple; however, it understates the value of the pension
because it ignores the employer's contributions. Under the second
valuation method endorsed by Deering, the court can calculate the
present value of the retirement benefits when they vest. This calcu-
lation can be very speculative, depending on the individual's age,
duration of pension plan participation, projected future earnings,
and job changes.' 5 ' Finally, employing the third Deering alternative,
the court simply can determine what percentage one spouse should
receive of any future benefits received by the other.'54
The Deering court recognized that pensions have become an in-
147. E.g., Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Robert C.S. v.
BarbaraJ.S., 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981); Tavares v. Tavares, 58 Hawaii 541, 574 P.2d 125
(1978); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84
Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.3D 176 (1979) (dis-
cussing the division of pension benefits in divorce proceedings).
148. 292 Md. at 122, 437 A.2d at 887 (Marital Property Act represents new approach
to marriage and each spouse's contribution to the marriage).
149. Id. at 130-31, 437 A.2d at 891-92.
150. 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978).
151. See Barr, 58 Md. App. at 590, 473 A.2d at 1311 (court summarizes three methods
of determining proper allocation of retirement benefits discussed in Deering); Cotter, 58
Md. App. at 537-38, 473 A.2d at 974-75 (court quotes the three suggested methods
from Deering). In determining which valuation method is most appropriate, the particu-
lar type of pension must also be taken into account. The application of the various
methods to any particular situation requires expert advice. The details and calculations
involved are beyond the scope of this discussion.
152. 292 Md. at 130, 437 A.2d at 891.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 130-31, 473 A.2d at 891-92.
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creasingly important employee fringe benefit 55 and may well repre-
sent the most valuable marital asset.' 56  It also characterized
pensions as investments from which both partners expect support
upon retirement. 57 Therefore, these investments should be valued
the same as any other investment-the total value at the date of di-
vorce.' 58 For that reason, calculation of the present value of pen-
sion benefits clearly represents the most equitable method of
valuation.
Present value calculations can be difficult. If the parties do not
offer expert testimony concerning valuation, the court cannot deter-
mine the pension's present value.' 5 9 Further, if the pension has not
vested 160 or matured 161 at the time of the divorce, the calculation of
present value will be too speculative. 6 2 In these two situations, the
trial court should reject the present value method of valuation.
If the present value method of valuation is rejected, a percent-
age of benefits, when received, should be awarded rather than a per-
centage of employee contributions. This approach eliminates the
problem of valuation completely. All the trial court must do is de-
termine the appropriate percentage to which the other spouse is en-
titled. This approach also allows both spouses to realize the true
value of the pension; employee and employer contributions as well
as interest are included. 163
The remaining approach suggested by Deering, awarding a per-
centage of only employee contributions, should be avoided. This
approach consistently underestimates the true value of a pension by
ignoring employer contributions as well as interest on total contri-
butions. 64 This undervaluation frustrates the intent of the Deering
court that pensions be recognized as valuable assets and treated like
155. Id. at 122, 437 A.2d at 887.
156. Id. at 123, 437 A.2d at 887.
157. Id. at 125, 437 A.2d at 888.
158. See, e.g., Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. 662, 471 A.2d 1068 (1984), discussed
supra notes 100-04. Dobbyn held that marital stocks and securites are to be valued as of
the earlier time of either liquidation or the date the parties were granted a divorce. Id. at
675, 471 A.2d at 1074.
159. In re Marriage of Pea, 17 Wash. App. 728, 566 P.2d 212 (1977).
160. Pensions vest when the employee has worked the minimum number of years re-
quired to receive pension benefits. 292 Md. at 118 n.3, 437 A.2d at 885 n.3.
161. Pensions mature at the time benefits become presently payable. Id.
162. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561
(1976).
163. See Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371 (1981) (suggesting that with
this approach both spouses share the risk that no benefits will ever be received).
164. Amicus Brief for Women's Legal Defense Fund at 6, Barr v. Barr, 58 Md. App.
569, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief].
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any other investment. 16 5
After Deering, trial courts have complete discretion in selecting
the method of pension valuation.' 66 Barr and Cotter illustrate the in-
equity in allowing such broad discretion. Expert testimony in both
cases established the present value of the husbands' pensions. 167 In
Cotter the trial court accepted the expert's opinion and divided the
pension based on its present value.168 In Barr the court rejected the
present value as too speculative and chose instead to award Ms. Barr
only a portion of Mr. Barr's contributions. 169 Because the Barr
court rejected the present value method of pension valuation, Ms.
Barr received proportionately a much smaller monetary award than
Ms. Cotter. Courts should take greater care to prevent such dispa-
rate treatment in the future.
C. Divorce
1. Separation Agreements. -In Johnston v. Johnston,'7 0 the Court
of Appeals held that a separation agreement, with a nonmerger
clause that was later incorporated by reference into a divorce de-
cree, survived the decree.' 7 ' The trial court's approval of the agree-
ment established its validity and precluded collateral attack. 172 In
1973, Mr. and Ms. Johnston executed a separation agreement to
"effect a final and permanent settlement of their respective property
rights" 7 on their divorce. The agreement also contained a provi-
sion that, if acceptable to the court, it would be incorporated in the
divorce decree but would survive as a separate, enforceable con-
tract. 1 74 In 1981, Mr. Johnston filed a petition to have the agree-
ment set aside, alleging mental incompetency at the time of
165. Id.
166. 292 Md. at 130-31, 437 A.2d at 891.
167. Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 539, 473 A.2d at 975; Barr, 58 Md. App. at 589, 473 A.2d
at 1310. In Barr, both parties presented expert testimony which established very similar
present values for Mr. Barr's pension. Amicus Brief, supra note 164, at 2.
168. Cotter, 58 Md. App. at 537, 473 A.2d at 974.
169. Barr, 58 Md. App. at 589, 473 A.2d at 1310.
170. 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983).
171. Id. at 58, 465 A.2d at 441. Although recent cases have discussed the incorpora-
tion of settlement agreements into divorce decrees, these agreements did not contain
nonmerger clauses. Thus, the issue of merger had not arisen previously. See Winston v.
Winston, 290 Md. 641,431 A.2d 1330 (1981); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 428
A.2d 469 (1981).
172. 297 Md. at 66, 465 A.2d at 445. Although the parties did not raise the issue of
res judicata, the court believed it dispositive of the case and raised it pursuant to MD.
R.P. 813(a). 297 Md. at 59, 465 A.2d at 441-42.
173. Id. at 49, 465 A.2d at 437.




Relying primarily on case law from other jurisdictions, the court
determined that the intent of the parties at the time of the execution
of the agreement controlled. 76 The agreement specified that it
would survive the decree.' 77 Further, the trial court's approval of
the agreement established its validity.' 7  The Court of Appeals em-
phasized that, prior to the execution of the agreement, both parties
had been represented by independent counsel, and that extensive
negotiations had occurred. 179 The Johnston court also indicated that
the trial court had considered the fairness of the property settle-
ment during the divorce proceeding.8 0
In Hamilos v. Hamilos,'8 1 the Court of Appeals held that a sepa-
ration agreement incorporated but not merged in a divorce decree
could not be collaterally attacked. 8 2 The court concluded that Ms.
Hamilos' allegations of fraud, irregularity, and mistake were not suf-
ficient to have the decree set aside pursuant to Maryland Rule
625(a). 18 3 Applying the holding from Schwartz v. Merchants Mortgage
Co. ,184 the Hamilos court held that, without a showing of jurisdic-
tional mistake or a defect in the proceeding or process, an enrolled
divorced decree cannot be set aside.18 5
2. "Divisible" Divorce. -In Komorous v. Komorous,18 6 the Court of
Special Appeals extended previous decisions regarding the award of
permanent alimony to awards of temporary alimony. Mr. Komorous
obtained a foreign ex parte divorce and subsequently filed an action
in Maryland to partition or sell marital property. 8 7 In response to
Ms. Komorous' cross-complaint for the award of alimony, the trial
175. Id. at 50-51, 465 A.2d at 437.
176. Id. at 58, 465 A.2d at 441. The court relied primarily on McNelis v. Bruce, 90
Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625 (1961) and Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 865 (1954).
In both cases, the courts looked to the intent of the parties at the time of the execution
of the agreement to determine the merger issue.
177. 297 Md. at 58, 465 A.2d at 441.
178. Id. at 66, 465 A.2d at 445.
179. Id. at 60, 465 A.2d at 437.
180. Id. In effect, the agreement was ratified and confirmed by the divorce decree. If
Mr. Johnson had wanted to attack the agreement on the ground of mental incompe-
tency, he should have done so at the divorce proceeding.
181. 297 Md. 99, 465 A.2d 445 (1983).
182. Id. at 104-05, 465 A.2d at 448-49.
183. Id. at 106-07, 465 A.2d at 449-50.
184. 272 Md. 305, 322 A.2d 544 (1974).
185. 297 Md. at 105-07, 465 A.2d at 449-50.
186. 56 Md. App. 326, 467 A.2d 1039 (1983).
187. Id. at 328, 467 A.2d at 1040.
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court ordered the payment of temporary alimony.' 88 The Court of
Special Appeals rejected Mr. Komorous' contention that temporary
alimony could only be awarded to support a spouse during divorce
proceedings and affirmed the order of temporary alimony.' 89 The
court reasoned that the state's interest in protecting its domiciliaries
and prior decisions upholding awards of permanent alimony after ex
parte foreign divorces justified awards of temporary alimony as
well.' 90
With this decision, Maryland joined the majority ofjurisdictions
fully recognizing the "divisible divorce."' 9 ' Although the Supreme
Court approved the concept in 1948,192 Maryland continued to con-
sider foreign ex parte divorces as dispositive of support issues until
1978.' In Altman v. Altman,' 94 the Court of Appeals recognized
Maryland's interest in safeguarding the economic security of its resi-
dents whose marriages had been ended by foreign divorce and up-
held an award of permanent alimony.' 95 As the Komorous court
recognized, this same policy consideration supported an award of
temporary alimony pending the final adjudication of a claim for per-
manent support.' 96
3. Antenuptial Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce. -In Frey v.
Frey, 197 the Court of Appeals overruled Cohn v. Cohn' 98 and held that
188. Id., 467 A.2d at 1041.
189. Id. at 338, 467 A.2d at 1045.
190. Id. at 330-38, 467 A.2d at 1042-45.
191. The divorce decree may be divided into provisions for support and for dissolu-
tion of the marriage. The term "divisible divorce" refers to the effect of a foreign exparte
dissolution of marriage on the support provisions of a divorce decree. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 430 (5th ed. 1979).
192. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
193. Maryland is required to recognize valid foreign divorces by the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Komorous, 56
Md. App. at 331, 467 A.2d at 1042. Prior to 1978, the Court of Appeals considered
alimony an inseparable incident of marriage, extinguished by such a foreign divorce.
Brewster v. Brewster, 204 Md. 501, 506, 105 A.2d 232, 235 (1954). In 1969, the Court
of Appeals, in dictum, indicated that it would approve an award of alimony consistent
with the divisible divorce doctrine of Estin. Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 346-47,
250 A.2d 60, 68-69 (1969). Finally, in Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 386 A.2d 766
(1978), the Court of Appeals recognized the injustice created by its previous decisions.
The court held that the state's interest in protecting the domiciliary spouse required
support orders, even when the other spouse had obtained a foreign divorce. Id. at 493,
386 A.2d at 771-72.
194. 282 Md. 483, 386 A.2d 766 (1978).
195. Id. at 493, 386 A.2d at 772.
196. 56 Md. App. at 337, 467 A.2d at 1045.
197. 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984).
198. 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956).
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antenuptial agreements waiving alimony are no longer void per se
as contrary to public policy.' 99 The court refused to continue the
traditional distinction between antenuptial agreements made in con-
templation of death and those made in contemplation of divorce. z°
Rather than continuing to totally prohibit antenuptial agreements
made in contemplation of divorce, the Frey court ruled that such
agreements will now be treated the same as antenuptial agreements
made in contemplation of death. From now on, the validity of every
antenuptial agreement must be determined using traditional con-
20120tract doctrines, z° as enumerated in Hartz v. Hartz. 2  With this de-
cision, Maryland joined the majority of jurisdictions that will
consider the validity of antenuptial agreements waiving alimony.
20 3
Prior to its decision in Frey, the court maintained that public
policy dictated disapproval of antenuptial agreements waiving ali-
mony in the event of separation or divorce. 0 4 This stand was based
on an assumption that the state's legitimate interest in preserving
marriage would be frustrated by such agreements, presumably be-
cause planning for divorce prior to marriage promoted and facili-
tated divorce.2 0 5 Further, agreements that allowed a husband to
"buy" a divorce for less than the court would award in alimony
would limit the state's ability to enforce a husband's traditional re-
sponsibility to support his wife.20 6
The Frey court determined that these concerns no longer accu-
rately reflect public policy in Maryland. Since divorce is both more
accepted and more easily obtained, the state no longer has an inter-
199. 298 Md. at 561, 471 A.2d at 710.
200. Id. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711.
201. Id.
202. 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967). In Hartz, the Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of an antenuptial agreement made in anticipation of death. Both partners had
children from previous marriages as well as substantial assets. Both wanted to assure
that their children, not their new spouse, inherited their property. For discussion of the
Hartz criteria, see infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
203. 298 Md. at 561, 471 A.2d at 710. Several jurisdictions have recently reconsid-
ered and abandoned the view that antenuptial waivers of alimony are void per se. E.g.,
Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc); Osborne v. Os-
borne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506
P.2d 719 (1973). At least three jurisdictions, however, still consider such waivers to be
against public policy. In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 1973); Mul-
ford v. Mulford, 211 Neb. 747, 320 N.W.2d 470 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d
913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
204. 298 Md. at 557, 471 A.2d at 707; see also Cohn, 209 Md. at 475-76, 121 A.2d at
706 (stressing that the Cohn decision accorded with the weight of authority).
205. 298 Md. at 559, 471 A.2d at 708; Cohn, 209 Md. at 477-78, 121 A.2d at 706.
206. 298 Md. at 559, 471 A.2d at 708; Cohn, 209 Md. at 477-78, 121 A.2d at 707.
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est in preventing spouses from planning for separation and divorce
prior to marriage. 20 7 Further, the disapproval of such agreements
rested on rigid definitions of marital roles that have little, if any,
validity today.2 0 8 Whatever interest the state retains in ensuring ad-
equate support for both parties in a divorce action can be addressed
when assessing the validity of each agreement.
20 9
The court stressed the stringent criteria for validity described in
Hartz.21 0 Since the parties stand in a confidential relationship,
"[t]he real test . . .is whether there was overreaching, ... unfair-
ness, or inequity." '2 1 1 Full and truthful disclosure of each party's
assets is essential; both the procurement and result of the agree-
ment must be equitable. Both parties should retain counsel to en-




1. Statute of Limitations. -In Frick v. Maldonado,2 t3 the Court of
Appeals reconsidered 214 whether a Maryland statute imposing a
two-year limitations period on paternity actions on behalf of illegiti-
mate children denied those children equal protection of the laws.21 5
The court relied on two recent Supreme Court decisions, which
held that one- and two-year statutes of limitations did not provide
illegitimate children with an adequate opportunity to obtain support
and were not substantially related to the legitimate state interest in
207. 298 Md. at 560-61, 471 A.2d at 709-10.
208. Id. at 560, 471 A.2d at 709.
209. Id. at 559, 471 A.2d at 709. The court noted that its decision only reached agree-
ments relating to property and financial obligations. Agreements purporting to limit the
duty of support during marriage or the duty to support children after divorce may be
contrary to public policy and, thus, unenforceable. Id. at 563 n.3, 471 A.2d at 711 n.3.
210. Id. at 564, 471 A.2d at 711.
211. Hartz, 248 Md. at 57, 234 A.2d at 871.
212. Id.; 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711.
213. 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983).
214. The court had upheld the constitutionality of the two-year statute of limitations
in Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 404 A.2d 269 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
1062 (1980).
215. The relevant statute stated in the pertinent part:
Proceedings to establish paternity under the subtitle 'Paternity Proceedings'
and to charge the putative father of an illegitimate child. . . with their support
and maintenance shall be commenced during the pregnancy of the mother
thereof or within two (2) years after the birth of such child ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66(e) (1973). This statute has been recodified without sub-
stantive change at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1006(a), (b) (1984). The Commission
to Revise the Annotated Code included this section in the new Family Law Article de-
spite the holding in Frick.
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preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. 21 6 Accord-
ingly, the court held that Maryland's two-year statute of limitations
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the Constitution.217
One vital question remains unanswered after the Court of Ap-
peals decision: how long a period of limitations, if any, is constitu-
tional? In Mills v. Habluetzel,218 the Supreme Court established a
two-part test for determining the constitutionality of statutes of limi-
tations for paternity actions. First, the period must be sufficiently
long to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest
in establishing the paternity of an illegitimate child to assert a claim.
Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be sub-
stantially related to the state's interest in avoiding the litigation of
stale or fraudulent claims.2 1 9
A child's right to paternal support is severely restricted by any
statute of limitations. Societal disapproval of the pregnancy of an
unwed mother presents an obstacle to her bringing a support suit
on behalf of her child. Financial difficulties, continued affection for
the father, a desire to avoid family and community disapproval, to-
gether with the emotional strain that often attends the birth of an
illegitimate child all interact to impede the mother's filing of a pater-
nity suit. 22 0 This unwillingness to file suit underscores the fact that
the mother's and the child's interests may not necessarily be congru-
ent. The person upon whom society places the expectation and bur-
den of protecting the child's interest may very often find those
interests in direct conflict with her own. Before Frick, children inca-
pable of protecting their legal interests were statutorily denied a
legal remedy if suit had not been filed by their second birthday. The
unfairness of this restriction on the child's rights becomes more ob-
vious when one considers that Maryland tolls the statute of limita-
tions on most other actions during a child's minority. 22'
It is entirely possible that any statute of limitations would vio-
216. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (holding the Tennessee two-year statute
of limitations unconstitutional); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 100 (1982) (holding
the Texas one-year statute of limitations unconstitutional).
217. 296 Md. at 309, 462 A.2d at 1208.
218. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
219. Id. at 99-100.
220. Id.
221. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-201(a) (1984) provides: "Extension of Time
- When a cause of action. . . accrues in favor of a minor . . , that person shall file his
action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the
date the disability is removed."
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late a child's right to a reasonable opportunity to bring suit. Under
Maryland law, it is a misdemeanor for a parent to fail to support a
destitute adult child who is unable to support himself by reason of
mental or physical infirmity.222 There is no rational basis for this
statute to apply only to legitimate chidren.
Maryland inheritance laws may preclude imposition of any stat-
ute of limitations during a child's minority. Under inheritance stat-
utes, an illegitimate child may inherit from his biological father
when legitimation has occurred.223 Moreover, the child who is legit-
imated subsequent to the execution of his father's will is entitled to
a forced statutory share in the estate. 224 Therefore, imposition of
any statute of limitations on paternity proceedings may operate to
deny a child his rightful share of his biological father's estate.
Another reason that any statute of limitations may be unduly
burdensome relates to the child's ability to discover the identity of
his biological father. Maryland courts have held that a plaintiff need
not sue until he knows or should have known that he has suffered a
wrong. 225 The rationale for this rule, preserving a plaintiff's right to
sue when that right has been delayed through no fault of the plain-
tiff, is equally applicable to paternity proceedings. If an illegitimate
child does not know the identity of his biological father and, after
reasonable efforts, was unable to determine his father's identity, the
222. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 97 (1982) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 13-102(b) (1984)). This section evinces clear legislative intent to place failure to sup-
port an incapacitated child on equal footing with failure to support a minor child. Smith
v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 360, 176 A.2d 862, 865 (1962).
223. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208(b)(l)-(4) (1974). The four methods to
achieve the status of legitimation occur when the father:
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action brought
under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; or
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; or
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged him-
self, orally or in writing, to be the father.
This legitimation also makes the child eligible for survivor benefits granted to children
under the Social Security Act. Massey v. Weinberger, 397 F. Supp. 817 (D. Md. 1975).
224. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-301(b)(l)-(4) (1974) provides:
(b) Legacy to a Child - A child . . . is entitled to a share in the estate . . . if:
(1) the will contains a legacy for a child of the testator but makes no
provision for a person who becomes a child of the testator subsequent to the
execution of the will;
(2) the child was born, adopted, or legitimated after the execution of
the will;
(3) the child, or his issue, survive the testator; and
(4) the will does not expressly state that the child, or issue, should be
omitted.
225. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981).
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statute of limitations should be tolled until such time as the child
should have known his father's identity.
According to the second prong of the Mills test, any time limita-
tion placed on the opportunity to assert the child's claim must be
substantially related to the state's interest in avoiding the litigation
of stale or fraudulent claims. 226 Recent developments in blood test-
ing have substantially reduced the danger of fraudulent claims. A
series of blood tests can now provide over a 90% probability of ne-
gating a finding of paternity for erroneously accused men. 227 The
Maryland legislature recently acknowledged these developments by
enacting a statute which makes certain affirmative blood test results
admissible at trial.
2 28
The strength of the state interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent
claims is undercut by the exception in the Maryland statute that al-
lows for the tolling of the statute of limitations when the mother is
under eighteen years of age.229 This exception seriously under-
mines the state's argument that the two-year limitations period is
substantially related to the state's interest in preventing the prose-
cution of stale or fraudulent claims. If the fear of fraudulent claims
were that great, the state would not toll the statute for underaged
mothers.
The state interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims is fur-
ther undercut by the countervailing state interest in ensuring that
genuine claims for child support are satisfied. 230 The purpose of
subtitle 10 of the new Family Law Article is to impose the obliga-
tions of parenthood upon both parents, by ensuring that illegitimate
children will enjoy the same right of support as legitimate chil-
dren. 23 1 This purpose is thwarted when the child is presented with
no reasonable opportunity to obtain support because of unfounded
226. 456 U.S. at 100.
227. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause,Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status
of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258 (1976); see also
Stroud, Bundrant, & Galindo, Paternity Testing: A Current Approach, 16 TRIAL 46 (Sept.
1980).
228. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66(G) (Supp. 1982) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 5-1029(e) (1984)); see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
229. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1006(a)(2) (1984) states that a proceeding to es-
tablish paternity may be brought within two years of the mother's eighteenth birthday, if
the mother was a minor when the child was born.
230. One purpose of the paternity proceeding is to shift the burden of support from
the taxpayers to the parents of the illegitimate child. Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 61,
441 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1982).
231. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1002(b) (1984) offers three purposes for the Pater-
nity Proceeding Subtitle:
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fears of fraudulent claims. The Court of Appeals in Frick, by merely
quoting Supreme Court opinions rather than presenting its own
analysis, gives little guidance to the legislature regarding what pe-
riod of limitations would pass constitutional muster. 2
2. Admissibility of Affirmative Blood Test Results. -Legislative
changes in the statute governing the admissibility of blood test re-
suits23 3 presented the Court of Special Appeals with another pater-
nity-related problem in Haines v. Shanholtz.234 In Haines, the trial
judge refused to admit blood test results that indicated a 98%
probability that the defendant was the father of the child. 235 The
judge concluded that the tests were not admissible because the
mother failed to satisfy the test for reliability of scientific evi-
dence.2 36 The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that leg-
islative recognition of the reliability of blood testing relieved the
mother of the burden of proving general scientific acceptance.23 7
After Haines, the Maryland Legislature removed a trial judge's dis-
(1) the promotion of the general welfare and best interests of such chil-
dren by securing to them, as near as possible, the same right to support, care
and education as legitimate children;
(2) the imposition upon both parents of such children the basic obliga-
tions of parenthood; and
(3) the simplification of such procedures.
232. The North Carolina legislature has enacted a statute that accomodates all rele-
vant interests in a paternity proceeding. The statute permits suit to establish paternity
at any time prior to the death of the putative father or biological mother. Because both
parents are needed to perform the necessary blood tests to prove paternity, the death of
either parent precludes the child's right to sue. The reliability of blood test results cir-
cumvents the litigation of fraudulent claims. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) (1984).
233. The statute, first enacted in 1982, recognizes the advances made in the science of
genetic testing and mandates that blood test results are admissible in paternity cases, in
which exclusion is not established, if the results are extensive enough to exclude 97.3%
of putative fathers who are not biological fathers and where the statistical probability of
the alleged father's paternity is at least 97.3%. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66(G) (Supp.
1982) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1029(e)(ii) (1984)).
234. 57 Md. App. 92, 468 A.2d 1365, cert. denied, 300 Md. 90, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984).
235. Id. at 97, 468 A.2d at 1367.
236. Id. The test for reliability of scientific evidence is set out in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). A court may take judicial notice of the reliability of a
scientific technique if it is generally accepted in the scientific community. When reliabil-
ity cannot be judicially noticed, testimony must establish general acceptance in the sci-
entific community. 57 Md. App. at 97, 468 A.2d at 1367.
237. 57 Md. App. at 97, 468 A.2d at 1367. Even though she had no burden to prove
general scientific acceptance of the blood test procedure, the mother sustained the bur-
den. She presented uncontradicted testimony regarding its reliability. Id. at 100, 465
A.2d at 1368. The trial judge's refusal to admit the evidence violated the basic premise
of the Frye test-the answer to the question about the acceptability of a scientific process
should not vary according to the circumstances of the case. It is inappropriate to view
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cretionary power regarding the admissibility of certain blood test
results.238
3. Weight of Blood Test Result Evidence. -The court in Frick v.
Maldonado 239 stated that "[b]ecause of its effective date, the Mary-
land statute [admitting affirmative blood test evidence of paternity]
is not applicable to this case. "241 Seven months later, in Colgan v.
Hammond,241 the Court of Special Appeals determined that the stat-
ute governing the admissibility of affirmative blood testing results
was procedural in nature and, as such, applied to all actions whether
accrued, pending, or future at the time the legislation became
effective.242
The Colgan court also held that affirmative blood test results,
standing alone, are legally sufficient to withstand a motion to dis-
miss. 2 4 3 However, the opinion failed to clarify how much weight
should be given to the blood test results. In State v. Pernell,244 the
court held that, in the absence of evidence that the tests were im-
properly conducted, blood test results establishing definite exclu-
sion of paternity should be given conclusive weight. The Colgan
court only held that affirmative blood test results were legally suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Presumably, at trial, the
mother would also have to offer something more than affirmative
blood test results to establish paternity.245
The question of whether a Maryland court could compel a de-
fendant in a paternity proceeding to submit to blood testing has
never been considered. There is no statutory provision requiring
this threshold question of acceptability as a matter within each trial judge's individual
discretion. Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367.
238. Act of Oct. 1, 1984, ch. 551, 1984 Md. Laws 2874, substituted "shall" for "may"
in the introductory language of MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1029(e)(1) (1984), which
now provides: "The results of each blood test shall be received in evidence if:
(i) definite exclusion is established; or
(ii) the testing is sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3% of alleged fathers who
are not biological fathers, and the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity
is at least 97.3%." (emphasis added)
239. 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983).
240. Id. at 309, 462 A.2d at 1208.
241. 58 Md. App. 120, 472 A.2d 497 (1984).
242. Id. at 126, 472 A.2d at 500.
243. Id at 127, 472 A.2d at 501.
244. No. B.I. 872 (Crim. Ct. tf Baltimore City 1956), cited in Comment, Conclusiveness
of Blood Tests in Paternity Suits, 22 MD. L. REV. 333, 333 n.1 (1962).
245. It would be logical also to require the mother to prove some reasonable connec-
tion between the putative father and herself. This would avoid the spectre of the ran-
dom selection of putative father candidates until someone's blood test results were
admissible. Probabilistically, two out of every 100 men would fall into this category.
562 [VOL. 44:536
FAMILY LAW
compulsory tests.2" 6 The statute governing the request for blood
tests simply permits the State's Attorney to request that the court
order any person refusing to take the blood test to submit to such a
test. 24 7 Refusal to submit to blood tests may only be commented on
by the court or by counsel. 248 The implication of these provisions,
when read together, is that the compulsory testing is not available in
paternity proceedings. Because the legal sufficiency of a case may
depend upon the ability to present blood test results, the capacity to
compel an individual to submit to the tests is crucial.
E. Adoption
In Washington County Department of Social Services v. Clark,249 the
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a statute that
created a presumption that it is in the best interest of a child who
has been in continuous foster care for at least two years to terminate
biological parental rights.25" The court held that this presumption
violated a parent's right to procedural due process.25'
This decision and the subsequent repeal of the statute take a
clearly unfair advantage away from the child placement agency. The
statutory short cut, which eased agency termination of parental
rights, created an unfair allocation of burden of proof between the
246. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court held that
compulsory blood tests do not violate an accused's privilege against self-incrimination
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Maryland has also held that compulsory
blood tests do not violate Maryland's Declaration of Rights § 22. Davis v. State, 189 Md.
640, 57 A.2d 289 (1948). These cases may be distinguished because they involved crim-
inal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings. But at least one state has applied the
Schmerber rationale to conclude that compulsory blood testing in paternity proceedings is
also constitutional. Department of Social Servs. v. Thomas J.S., 100 A.D.2d 119, 474
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1984).
247. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1021 (1984).
248. Id. § 5-1029(f.
249. 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077 (1983). For more extensive discussion of this case,
see Note, Washington County Department of Social Services v. Clark-The Constitutional-
ity of a Rebuttable Presumption in a Parental Rights Termination Case, 43 MD. L. REv. 632
(1984) (discussing problems of legal presumptions and why Clark failed to resolve
them).
250. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76(c)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1982) stated:
If a child has been under continuous foster care in the custody of a child place-
ment agency for at least two years, the court shall presume that it is in the
child's best interest to award to that child placement agency a decree granting
guardianship, without the consent of the parents.
The presumption has been deleted from the new Family Law Article. See MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 5-313 revisor's note (1984).
251. 296 Md. at 197, 461 A.2d at 1081. Massachusetts courts reached the same con-
clusion in Petitions of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
389 Mass. 793, 802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983).
1985]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
State and the biological parents. It is exceedingly difficult for a bio-
logical parent to prove that she is fit to raise a child for which she
has not been responsible for at least two years. The statutory pre-
sumption increased the risk that erroneous terminations of parental
rights would occur, by placing the burden of proof on the parent,
rather than on the agency, which has greater resources at its com-
mand. The agency's interest in the welfare of the child is not im-
paired by requiring the agency to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of the biological parent's rights is in the
child's best interest.
F. Child Custody
In Kennedy v. Kennedy,25 2 the Court of Special Appeals approved
a split custody award, a grant of use and possession of the family
home to Ms. Kennedy, and an order for the entire family to partici-
pate in family counseling.25 In this bitterly contested divorce, both
parents petitioned for custody of their three children as well as use
and possession of the family home. The trial court awarded custody
of a daughter to Ms. Kennedy and custody of two sons to Mr. Ken-
nedy. 54 The trial court also awarded the use and possession of the
family home to Ms. Kennedy so that the Kennedy daughter would
not suffer the unsettling loss of her familiar environment. Mr. Ken-
nedy appealed, claiming that the award to Ms. Kennedy caused his
sons to be unsettled by the loss of their familiar environment. In
affirming the trial court, the Court of Special Appeals merely re-
peated the statutory requirements for a use and possession order,255
offering no guidance as to how this decision should be made when
custody of minor children is split between parents.256
Split custody decisions are certainly within the power of the
trial court.2 5 7 Such decisions may be the only way for courts to
252. 55 Md. App. 299, 462 A.2d 1208 (1983).
253. Id. at 306, 311, 462 A.2d at 1213, 1216.
254. Id. at 300, 462 A.2d at 1210.
255. Id. at 302-06, 462 A.2d at 1211-13.
256. Grant of the use and possession of the family home is supposed to ensure that
children of divorce do not suffer the unsettling loss of their familiar environment. Obvi-
ously, in the case of split custody, a decision must be made as to which children of
divorce will not suffer the uprooting. Clearly, some of the children will have to suffer
the loss of their home.
257. See Ester, Maryland Custody Law--Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD.
L. REv. 225, 267-68 (1982). Maryland case law presumes that the best interests of the
children are served by keeping them together. The court, however, has the discretion to
determine that children should be separated and to make split custody awards. Id. See,
e.g., Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Hild v.
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resolve bitter custody battles when both parents are equally compe-
tent to care for the children. 258 It seems unfair, however, to con-
done an arbitrary award of use and occupancy of the family home in
the situation of split custody. Instead, the trial court should be re-
quired to demonstrate a rational basis for such an order. Appellate
courts could then provide meaningful review of the trial court's de-
cision rather than slavishly repeating statutory requirements.
The Kennedy court also recognized the trial court's broad discre-
tion to make decisions in the best interest of the children.2 59 The
master appointed by the trial court recommended that any custody
decision should be temporary, pending counseling for the entire
family. According to the master, the parents' bitter fights over the
terms of the divorce had affected the children to such an extent that
protracted family counseling was necessary. 260 In the first appellate
approval of court-ordered counseling for an entire family in Mary-
land, the Court of Special Appeals relied on prior decisions requir-
ing a parent to pay a child's medical expenses, 261 to provide specific
religious training,262 and to accommodate visitation rights of the
other parent.263 The court did not examine the alleged need for
counseling or the wisdom of requiring the entire family to partici-
pate.264 In addition, the court did not recognize that ordering an
entire family to participate in counseling differed significantly from
the issues involved in the cases cited as support for the order.265
G. Child Neglect/Child Abuse
In In re Jertrude O. ,266 the Court of Special Appeals considered
the question of the appropriate standard for removing a child from
the family home.2 67 The court accepted the trial judge's finding that
Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607, 145 A. 10
(1929); see also Annot., 98 A.L.R.2D 926, 928 (1964) (indicating that Maryland case law
on this issue is in accord with most jurisdictions).
258. For a discussion of the factors that Maryland courts consider to resolve custody
issues, see Ester, supra note 257.
259. 55 Md. App. at 310, 462 A.2d at 1215. See also Ester, supra note 257.
260. 55 Md. App. at 308, 462 A.2d 1214-15.
261. Meyers v. Meagher, 277 Md. 128, 132-33, 352 A.2d 827, 829 (1976).
262. Wagshal v. Wagshal, 249 Md. 143, 148-49, 238 A.2d 903, 907 (1968).
263. Raible v. Raible, 242 Md. 586, 219 A.2d 777 (1966).
264. Mr. Kennedy did not challenge the children's need for counseling or the court's
requirement that he pay for the counseling. He balked at the order that the family par-
ticipate, as a family, in the counseling. 55 Md. App. at 309, 462 A.2d at 1215.
265. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
266. 56 Md. App. 83, 466 A.2d 885 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 309, 469 A.2d 863
(1984).
267. Id. at 98, 466 A.2d at 893.
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Jertrude and her sisters were "children in need of assistance, ' 268
but held that stronger evidence must be presented before Jertrude
could be removed from her home.269 The court remanded the case
for application of this stricter standard, with instructions to the trial
judge to clearly articulate factual findings and reasons forJertrude's
removal. 270 However, the appellate court failed to promulgate any
test or offer any guidelines to determine when removal of a child is
indicated.
268. A "[c]hild in need of assistance" includes a child who requires the assistance of
the court because: "(1) [h]e is ... not receiving ordinary and proper care and attention,
and (2) [h]is parents, guardian or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care
and attention to the child and his problems." MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
801(e) (1984). The term "child in need of assistance" came into usage in 1975 with the
redefinition of "neglected child." Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 554, 1975 Md. Laws 2670.
The term "neglected child" is still used by the courts as short hand for a child in need of
assistance, and is used throughout this discussion in the same manner.
269. A preponderance of the evidence standard is used for determining whether a
child is in need of assistance. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-819(d) (1984). The
court never expressly stated the standard to be applied when the child is to be removed
from the home, but indicated that it was "far more stringent" than the standard for
finding a need for assistance. 56 Md. App. at 98, 466 A.2d at 893. In Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their child, due process requires that
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 768.
270. 56 Md. App. at 100, 466 A.2d at 894. Neglected children are not removed from
the home as frequently as abused children. After a child is determined to be neglected,
the court may:
(1) Place the child . . .under supervision in his own home or in the
custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms
the court deems appropriate;
(2) Commit the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the
Juvenile Services Administration, a local department of social services, the De-
partment of Health and Mental Hygiene, or a public or licensed private agency;
or
(3) Order the child, parents, guardian or custodian of the child to par-
ticipate in rehabilitative services that are in the best interest of the child and the
family.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(c)(1)-(3) (1984 & Supp. 1984).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(7)(A) (1982) (recodified without substantial
change at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-901(b)(1) (1984)), defines abuse as "physical
injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a
result of malicious act or acts by any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has
permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a minor
child."
After a child is determined to be abused, the local department of social services
or the State's Attorney "shall render the appropriate service in the best interests of the
child, including, when indicated, petitioning the juvenile court on behalf of the child for
the added protection to the child which either commitment or custody would provide."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(i) (1982) (recodified at MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-
907(a) (1984)). The lack of established choices in this statute ensures that, in most
cases, the abused child will be removed from the home.
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Jertrude only serves to perpetuate the confusion surrounding al-
most every aspect of Maryland child neglect/child abuse adjudica-
tion. The court failed to distinguish between the two findings, often
using the terms interchangeably. 27' Child abuse and child neglect
are two distinct findings. Over the years, Maryland courts have
blurred the distinction between the two, and, in the process, have
complicated a very sensitive area of the law.
This confusion stems from State v. Fabritz,2 72 in which the Court
of Appeals held that a person could be criminally punished for fail-
ure to act to prevent aggravation of an injury.2 73 In Fabritz, the child
was brutally beaten by a friend of the mother and the mother failed
to seek medical attention for the child, This omission resulted in
the child's death.274 The Fabritz court stretched the abuse statute by
equating such an egregious omission with cruel and inhumane treat-
ment. Therefore, because the court found abuse, it could criminally
punish Ms. Fabritz, an option not available under the neglect
statute.
In holding that the "cause" of an injury referred to in the child
abuse statute included an act of omission, Fabritz conflicted with the
child neglect statute, which purported to address the consequences
of a parent's omission to act.2 7 5 In the absence of an involuntary
manslaughter charge,276 child neglect was clearly the proper charge
271. See, e.g., 56 Md. App. at 98, 466 A.2d at 893. The difference in the determination
is critically important to the parent. Under Maryland law, a finding of child abuse carries
with it a potential prison sentence of up to 15 years. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)
(1982 & Supp. 1984). Child neglect is determined in a civil proceeding and is not crimi-
nally punishable. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801 to -820 (1984 & Supp.
1984). For a discussion of the consequences of the two different findings, see Steelman,
Maryland Laws on Child Abuse and Neglect: History, Analysis and Reform, 6 U. BALT. L. REV.
113, 123-24 (1976).
272. 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
273. Id. at 425-26, 348 A.2d at 280-81.
274. 276 Md. at 419, 348 A.2d at 277.
275.
"Neglected child" means a child who has suffered or is suffering significant
physical or mental harm or injury as a result of conditions created by the ab-
sence of his parents, guardian, custodian, or by the failure of that person to
give proper care and attention to the child and his problems under circum-
stances that indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened
thereby.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 4(d) (1983) (recodified without substantive change at MD.
FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5- 701(g) (1984)).
276. It is not clear why the State chose to charge Ms. Fabritz with child abuse rather
than involuntary manslaughter. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1983) (recodified
at MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-203(b) (1984)), "[tlhe father and mother.., are jointly
and severally charged with [the] support, care, nurture, welfare and education" of their
minor children. Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959), interpreted medical
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against Ms. Fabritz. 2" However, after a finding of child neglect, the
court could not criminally punish. 278 Obviously a finding of child
abuse or child neglect should not turn upon the extent of the child's
injuries. The Fabritz court, in its attempt to punish, engrafted ele-
ments of the offense of involuntary manslaughter upon the child
abuse statute. 79
The lack of a distinction between neglect and abuse caused by
Fabritz results in confusing opinions like Jertrude. At trial, doctors
often cannot testify that a particular injury was intentionally in-
flicted. 28 ° Therefore, there is often not enough evidence to sustain
a finding that injuries were intentionally inflicted.28' In turn, the
trial judge is forced to conclude that injuries were the result of an
omission. Without established criteria, the judge cannot know
whether the omission was an act of abuse or neglect. The judge,
care as being embraced within the scope of this language. Id. at 596, 155 A.2d at 688.
In order to find an individual guilty of involuntary manslaughter for failure to seek medi-
cal attention, the State must prove gross negligence. Clay v. State, 217 Md. 577, 128
A.2d 634 (1957). There must also be a substantial causal connection between the par-
ent's gross negligence and the resulting death. In Craig, the Maryland court found that a
lack of sufficient causal connection can be proved if the evidence is insufficient to show
that by the time the need for a doctor should have become apparent, the child could
have been saved. Craig, 220 Md. at 598-99, 155 A.2d at 689. It is this causal connection
that was a possible problem in Fabritz. Ms. Fabritz was not present during the beating of
her child. Though there was testimony that the child would have lived had an operation
been performed at least 12 hours prior to death, Ms. Fabritz had been home less than
eight hours before the child died. The State may have felt that there was insufficient
evidence to show that the child's life could have been saved if Ms. Fabritz had called in
medical attention at the time when she should have had the knowledge of the gravity of
the child's illness.
277. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (1975)
(defining child neglect as the continued failure by adults to protect the child from known
and obvious peril).
278. Even with the finding of child abuse, the Court of Special Appeals was reluctant
to criminally punish the mother, remarking:
Our review of the record compels us to remark upon our concern that the State
has been unable to apprehend and punish the execrable wretch who committed
this unbelievably vicious act. [Mr. Crockett was acquitted due to a lack of evi-
dence.] The alternative of turning to the tangentially culpable mother, whose
judgment was so unwise that her child's death may well have been the result,
seems somehow unfulfilling.
Fabritz v. State, 24 Md. App. 708, 714, 332 A.2d 324, 327, rev'd, State v. Fabritz, 276
Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
279. 276 Md. at 429-30, 348 A.2d at 283 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting). Cf Palmer v.
State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684
(1959); Bowers v. State, 38 Md. App. 21, 379 A.2d 748 (1977), aff'd, 283 Md. 115, 389
A.2d 341 (1978).
280. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Stan-
dards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1010 (1975).
281. 56 Md. App. at 92, 466 A.2d at 890.
568
FAMILY LAW
like the judge inJertrude, removes the child from the home.28 2 On
appeal, the court cannot determine why the trial judge removed the
neglected child from the home. A trial judge cannot apply stan-
dards because he has none to apply. Jertrude contributed to this con-
fusion by stating that under extreme circumstances, neglect
warrants removal for the child's safety, 28 3 but offered no guidelines
for determining when those circumstances exist.
The child and the family are hurt both when the child is unnec-
essarily removed from the home and when the child who should be
removed is not, leaving the child to sustain further injuries. 284 Ad-
ditional unnecessary harm is inflicted upon families and children,
who must endure three or four court decisions to determine
whether removal from the home is necessary. Protracted and con-
fusing litigation is not consistent with the stated goal of the juvenile
causes subtitle: "[tlo conserve and strengthen the child's family ties
and to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his
welfare." 285
The Maryland courts must clarify the difference between abuse
and neglect. The confusion caused by Fabritz leads to situations in
which children like Jertrude are harmed by laws originally designed
to protect them.
H. Other Developments
Boothe v. Boothe28 6 reaffirmed prior case law which held that trial
courts are given broad discretion in reaching conclusions regarding
child custody. Because the trial judge was able to view the wit-
nesses, the Court of Special Appeals did not disturb his
conclusion. 287
Weinschel v. Strople288 reaffirmed prior case law which held that
one biological parent may retain visitation rights even when the
child is adopted by the other biological parent's new spouse so long
as visitation is in the best interest of the child and public policy does
not prevent such visitation.2 89
Stern v. Stern29 ° stands for the proposition that a parent cannot
282. See, e.g., id. at 94, 466 A.2d at 891.
283. Id. at 99, 466 A.2d at 894.
284. See Wald, supra note 280.
285. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a)(3) (1984).
286. 56 Md. App. 1, 466 A.2d 58 (1983).
287. Id. at 6-7, 466 A.2d at 61.
288. 56 Md. App. 252, 466 A.2d 1301 (1983).
289. Id. at 261, 466 A.2d at 1305.
290. 58 Md. App. 280, 473 A.2d 56 (1984).
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avoid his obligations to his adult destitute child merely by getting
his unsuspecting spouse to sign a separation agreement containing
no provision for the child and language to the effect that the agree-
ment could not be altered. The court admitted extrinsic evidence to
alter a very unambiguous contract, by characterizing the language as
ambiguous to prevent the parent from receiving the benefits of his
attempted manipulation of the parole evidence rule.29" '
In Rutherford v. Rutherford,292 the Court of Appeals held that,
when incarceration is ordered, denial of the right to appointed
counsel in a civil contempt proceeding for noncompliance with a
child support order violated both the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.293
In Lee v. State, 2 94 the Court of Special Appeals held that a de-
fendant in a civil contempt proceeding for noncompliance with a
child support order had no right to a jury trial, 295 but that if a de-
fendant was entitled to appointed counsel, a defendant had a right
to presentation of closing arguments by counsel.2 96
In Litzenberg v. Litzenberg,2 97 the Court of Special Appeals held
that a woman who allegedly saw her divorce settlement agreement
for the first time in court was entitled to more than an immediate





291. Id. at 292, 473 A.2d at 61-62. It does not appear that Ms. Stern attempted to set
aside the agreement on the ground of fraud, perhaps because the elements of fraud are
so difficult to prove.
292. 296 Md. 347, 464 A.2d 228 (1983).
293. Id. at 363, 464 A.2d at 237. For a discussion of Rutherford, see supra CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
294. 56 Md. App. 613, 468 A.2d 656 (1983).
295. Id. at 622, 468 A.2d at 661.
296. Id. at 624, 468 A.2d at 661. For a discussion of Lee, see supra CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
297. 57 Md. App. 303, 469 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 300 Md. 89, 465 A.2d 1201 (1984).
298. Id. at 314, 469 A.2d at 1285. For a comment on Litzenberg, see supra CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
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VIII. HEALTH CARE
A. Health Services Cost Review Commission'
During the past ten years, Maryland's Health Services Cost Re-
view Commission has developed sophisticated and comprehensive
cost-containment methodologies.2 Its "guaranteed inpatient reve-
nue" (GIR) system establishes pre-set rates for particular diagnostic
groups and provides a financial incentive for a hospital to tailor its
services and hold expenses below the GIR rates.' Regulated rates
replace traditional cost-based reimbursement systems that provided
little incentive for efficiency.4 In developing its rates, the Commis-
sion also utilizes a "market basket" methodology that basically in-
volves an inter-hospital cost comparison evaluation.5
These methodologies loom large in the background of two re-
cent decisions. In Health Services Cost Review Commission v. Harford
Memorial Hospital,6 the court addressed the issue of whether the
Commission has the authority to set rates for ancillary services
1. The Commission was established in 1971 to control rising hospital costs. Act of
May 24, 1971, ch. 627, 1971 Md. Laws 1311 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-201-222 (1982 & Supp. 1984)). In its early years the Commission sought to
control costs by rate disclosure; in 1974 it initiated a process of mandatory rate setting
for Maryland hospitals. Rates are established based on statutory guidelines that include
a determination as to the existence of a reasonable correlation between rates, costs and
services. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-210 (1984). A hospital may not charge
rates that do not conform to the Commission's review decision. Id. § 19-216. This rate
setting authority was upheld in Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hosp.,
277 Md. 93, 352 A.2d 798 (1976). See also Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n v.
Franklin Square Hosp., 280 Md. 233, 372 A.2d 1051 (1977).
2. Section 19-216(c) of the Health-General Article gives the Commission authority
to "promote and approve alternate methods of rate determination and payment that are
of an experimental nature." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-216 (c)(1982 & Supp.
1984). This authority was affirmed in Harford Memorial Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost
Review Comm'n, 44 Md. App. 489, 410 A.2d 22 (1980).
3. For a discussion of GIR, see Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n v. Lutheran
Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 659-60 n.5, 472 A.2d 55, 59 n.5 (1984).
4. In 1983 the federal Medicare program switched from cost-based reimbursement
to a "prospective payment system" similar to Maryland's GIR. The statutory authority
for the system is 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 ww (West 1983).
5. For a discussion of this methodology, see Brief for the Health Services Cost Re-
view Commission at 17-19, Prince George's Doctors' Hospital v. Health Servs. Cost Re-
view Comm'n, 302 Md. 193, 486 A.2d 744 (1985). Originally developed in 1977, this
methodology has been renamed the Inter-hospital Cost Comparison Methodology
(ICC). It compares a hospital's aggregate costs to "the average costs of a peer group of
hospitals" within the state. Id. at 18-19 n.16.
6. 296 Md. 17, 459 A.2d 192 (1983).
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provided by specialists in hospitals. 7 In two previous cases,8 the
court had said it did not.9 In the present case, the court distin-
guished the factual situations and concluded that the Commission
did have such authority."0 The interesting part of this decision is
that while the Commission had previously taken the position that it
had rate-setting authority over physician fees, it reversed this posi-
tion in Harford."
The facts reveal that, in June, 1981, Harford Hospital sought
Commission approval of a rate increase to cover professional fees to
its radiologists.' 2 The hospital had recently negotiated a contract
whereby it assumed responsibility for billing, collecting, and deter-
mining the amount of patient fees. Physicians were compensated
according to a "value unit" system, which guaranteed them 100%
payment for actual billable procedures.'"
7. Id. at 18, 459 A.2d at 192.
8. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 393
A.2d 181 (1978) (Holy Cross 1); Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
290 Md. 508, 431 A.2d 641 (1981) (Holy Cross III).
9. In Holy Cross I the court held that fees of radiologists, pathologists and cardiolo-
gists for services delivered in-hospital are not subject to regulation by the Health Serv-
ices Cost Review Commission unless the statutory phrase "total costs of the hospital" is
a term of art including such specialist fees. 283 Md. at 689-90, 393 A.2d at 187. This
term was at issue because the language of the authorizing statute gave the Commission
regulatory authority over the costs encompassed by the term. The authorizing statute,
MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 568H (1980) stated:
(1) The purpose of this subtitle is to create a commission which will . . .
cause the public disclosure of the financial position of all hospitals . . . and the
verified total cost actually incurred by each such institution in rendering health serv-
ices ....
(2) . . . [A]n additional responsibility of this Commission is to assume all pur-
chasers of health care hospital services that the total costs of the hospitals are rea-
sonably related to the total services offered by the hosital [and] that the
hospital's aggregate rates are set in reasonable relationship to the hospital's
aggregate costs . . . . (emphasis added).
The court remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether this was a term of art.
283 Md. at 689-90, 393 A.2d at 187.
In Holy Cross III the court held that since the Commission had failed to prove on
remand that "total costs of the hospital" was such a term of art, the ordinary meaning of
that language precluded the Commission from regulating these charges. 290 Md. at
515-18, 431 A.2d at 644-46.
10. Harford Memorial, 296 Md. at 25-26, 459 A.2d at 196.
11. In Holy Cross I and Holy Cross III the Commission had argued that it did have
authority to regulate charges by these ancillary physicians for services delivered in hos-
pitals. See 283 Md. at 686-87, 393 A.2d at 186; 290 Md. at 511, 514, 431 A.2d at 642. In
neither case was the Commission's argument successful. The Commission relied on the
adverse decisions in its argument disclaiming the regulatory authority at issue in Harford
Memorial. 296 Md. at 20, 459 A.2d at 193.
12. 296 Md. at 18, 459 A.2d at 193.
13. Id. at 21-22, 459 A.2d at 194.
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The Commission maintained that the contractual arrangement
between Harford Hospital and physicians essentially made the hos-
pital a "billing agent" for the physicians and thus the costs at issue
were not actual hospital costs.' 4 The Commission denied the rate
increase, claiming lack of authority to regulate such fees.' 5 The hos-
pital argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the arrangement
did place these fees within the "total costs of the hospital," since the
hospital had exclusive authority to establish rates and to bill and
collect for services rendered.' 6
In holding that the Commission had the authority to regulate
the physician fees, the court was extending to the Commission a
rate-review authority that it had earlier argued for,' 7 but now did
not want. This seemingly anomalous position may be explained if
one considers the Commission's larger goal of working out effective
methodologies for cost-containment. The issue here is whether the
Commission can formulate an accurate "market basket" measure for
aggregate hospital costs if doctors are able to "jump" in and out of
hospital billing systems.' 8 The Commission's position implies that
it either wants all hospital based specialists under rate review and
subject to "market basket" analysis, or none at all." 9
In Health Services Cost Review Commission v. Lutheran Hospital,20 the
Court of Appeals had the opportunity to address directly the merits
14. Id. at 18, 459 A.2d at 193.
The Commission argued that the court's interpretation of the statutory language
"total costs of the hospital" in Holy Cross I and Holy Cross III, see supra note 9, barred
Commission regulation of the Harford Memorial fee system. Id. at 19-20, 25, 459 A.2d at
193, 196.
15. Id. at 19, 459 A.2d at 193.
16. Id. at 21-22, 25-26, 459 A.2d at 194, 196.
17. See, e.g., Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677,
393 A.2d 181 (1978).
18. Because of their bargaining power, physicians are able to modify their contrac-
tual arrangements with relative ease. In the present case, radiologists went from a direct
billing system to a "relative value unit" arrangement. 296 Md. at 18, 459 A.2d at 193.
In Holy Cross 1, the physicians went from an independent billing system to a hospital
billing arrangement, triggering the controversy between the hospital and the Commis-
sion. After the Commission issued its rate order establishing what it considered to be
appropriate charges, the physicians switched back to a direct billing system. Holy Cross I,
283 Md. at 682 n.3, 393 A.2d at 183 n.3.
19. The problem for the Commission is the lack of uniformity in billing systems
among the state's hospitals. The inclusion of these physician fees as a hospital cost in
some hospitals, but not in others, skews the aggregate cost basis that is used to imple-
ment the "market basket" analysis against which individual hospitals are measured.
Thus, the Commission cannot achieve its goal of developing a valid measure of average
costs, to be utilized in its rate setting.
20. 298 Md. 651, 472 A.2d 55 (1984).
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of the Commission's "market basket" and GIR methodologies, but
it declined to rule on them. The case involved Lutheran Hopsital's
challenge to the rate order issued by the Commission, following the
hospital's application for a rate increase.2' The trial court consid-
ered the hospital's argument that the Commission's methods of rate
setting were arbitrary and capricious and in excess of its authority,22
and the allegation the Commission had exceeded the statutory time
limit for issuing a rate order at all,23 and ruled for the hospital on
both issues. 24
The Commission appealed, but neglected to include in its briefs
the limitation-in-time issue.25 Side-stepping the substantive meth-
odology issues, the court affirmed the lower court's decision for the
hospital on the procedural ground.26 Curiously, the court devoted
substantial time to a discussion of the substantive cost review issues
it had declined to address directly.27 This may have indicated an
acknowledgment by the court that such issues are indeed central to
the Commission's cost-containment endeavors, since, within ten
months, the court considered the issues on their merits, in what it
apparently considered a more suitable case. 28
B. Health Clains Arbitration System 29
Maryland's appellate courts have recently issued a number of
21. Id. at 655, 472 A.2d at 57.
22. The hospital questioned the Commission's application of a "market basket"
analysis to its rates. It also argued that by imposing a GIR scheme, the Commission was
impermissibly regulating the quality and quantity of hospital services. Id. at 655, 657-
59, nn.3-5, 472 A.2d at 58-59 nn.3-5.
23. Id. at 655-56, 472 A.2d at 57. For the time limits, see MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 19-219 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
24. 298 Md. at 657-61 & nn.3-5, 472 A.2d at 58-59 & nn.3-5.
25. Although the Commission had argued that 150-day cut-off issue at the trial level,
it did not include the statutory time issue in its brief to the Court of Special Appeals, its
memorandum in support of petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, or its brief
filed in that court. Id. at 661-63, 472 A.2d at 60-61.
26. Id. at 664-65, 472 A.2d at 62. The court held that the Commission waived the
limitation issue by failing to appeal it, and the lower court's ruling that the Commis-
sion's rates were time barred thus allowed the hospital's own rates to prevail.
27. Id. at 657-60 nn.2-5, 662-63 nn.8-10, 472 A.2d at 58-59 nn.2-5, 61 nn.8-10.
28. In Prince George's Doctors' Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 302
Md. 193, 486 A.2d 744 (1985), the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision
that utilization of the guaranteed inpatient revenue system to establish rates is within the
power of the Commission. Id. at 204-05, 486 A.2d at 750. Additionally, the court af-
firmed the decision that the Commission's use of the "market basket" methodology was
not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 207-08, 486 A.2d at 753.
29. Maryland's nonbinding arbitration process for medical malpractice claims was
instituted in 1976, Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 495, and is codified at
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"Health Claims" opinions amidst continuing controversy over the
efficacy of the system itself.3" Originally established to avert a mal-
practice insurance crisis, 3 ' the arbitration system has been criticized
by legal practitioners since its inception.3 2 More than twenty bills
were introduced at the 1983 session of the General Assembly to
either abolish or significantly alter the system.33
One area of vulnerability highlighted by the court's recent
decision in Hartman v. Cooper34 is the lack of a meaningful voir
dire-type screening of prospective panel members3 5 to minimize the
MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984). Basically, it requires that
all claims over $5000 shall be filed with the Health Claims Arbitration Office for initial
assessment of liability and damages by an independent three-member arbitration panel.
The statute preserves the right of a de novo trial should a party for any reason wish to
nullify the panel's decision.
30. At the request of the General Assembly, the system was recently subjected to an
in-depth analysis; the subsequent Commission on Health Care Providers Professional
Liability Insurance issued its report in early 1984. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMIS-
SION ON HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, January 26, 1984
[hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission noted a gen-
eral discontent with the system, and concluded that mandatory arbitration may not have
lowered insurance costs at all. It further suggested that the process may be operating
actually to multiply the number of claims. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at
10-16.
31. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 98-99, 447 A.2d 860, 868 (1982); Attorney
General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 280-81, 385 A.2d 57, 61 (1978). For background on
alternative methods of malpractice claim resolution, see generally Abraham, Medical
Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 489 (1977). For general back-
ground on Maryland's arbitration procedure, see Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice
Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74
(1980).
32. The Governor's Commission noted that:
We have detected almost unanimous dissatisfaction with the functioning of the
procedure on the part of counsel who must practice before the arbitration of-
fice, and substantial dissatisfaction on the part of health care providers and
malpractice insurers. The Medical and Chirugical Faculty, which originally en-
thusiastically supported adoption of the procedure now has adopted a position
of more tempered support of its maintenance. A Special Committee of the
Maryland State Bar Association composed of six attorneys representing claim-
ants and six representing defendants has unanimously recommended its
abolition.
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 11.
33. See, e.g., S.B. 1002/H.B. 1526 (1983) (abolish Health Claims Arbitration system);
S.B. 1003/H.B. 1527 (1983) (raise $5000 threshold level; set minimum three-year bar
membership to serve as attorney panel member; question prospective panel members
more closely for potential conflicts; permit motions in limine and for summary
judgment).
34. 59 Md. App. 154, 474 A.2d 959, cert. denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 (1984).
35. Prospective panel members are chosen from lists maintained by the Director of
the Health Claims Arbitration Office. Five names from each of three categories (lawyer,
health care provider, lay person) are submitted to claimant and defendant. Biographical
data is distributed with the list of potential arbitrators. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 01,
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possibility of bias in panel proceedings. In Hartman the Court of
Special Appeals found that a panel member's failure to disclose cer-
tain information prior to his selection as a Health Claims Arbitration
panel member created an "appearance of bias" that fatally flawed
the arbitration process.
36
Hartman involved a medical malpractice claim in which the arbi-
tration panel found for defendants.3 7 After the plaintiff learned that
the health care provider member of the panel, Dr. Howard, had
failed to disclose that he was a defendant in a pending malpractice
suit and that he had also been deposed twice as a medical expert for
the defense,38 the plaintiff brought an action to nullify the award,39
and by preliminary motion sought to vacate the arbitration panel's
decision, alleging evident partiality on the part of Dr. Howard.4"
The trial judge denied the motion, thus allowing the panel's decison
to be placed into evidence with a presumption of correctness. 4 ' The
de novo trial by jury resulted in a verdict for defendants.42
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals found that the panel
decision had been "tainted" by an evident partiality and that al-
lowing it into evidence with its presumption of correctness was
clearly prejudicial to plaintiff.4 3 In concluding that the motion to
§ 01.03.01.07 (1976). Although the Director is required by statute "to assure himself
that [prospective members] have no personal or economic relationship with any party,"
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(b)(1984), in reality opposing counsel are
stuck with whatever outdated or inadequate information they receive. Based on this
information they may make objections for cause and are also allowed two peremptory
strikes from each of the three lists. Id. § 3-2A-04(c).
The Court of Appeals has held that the lack of voir dire does not render the
statute constitutionally infirm. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 296-97, 385
A.2d 57, 70 (1978). See also Bovey v. Executive Director, Health Claims Arbitration Of-
fice, 292 Md. 640, 649, 441 A.2d 333, 338 (1982) (court will not issue mandamus to
compel Director to ask specific questions of potential panelists).
36. 59 Md. App. at 164-69, 474 A.2d at 965-67.
37. Id. at 157-58, 474 A.2d at 961-62.
38. Id. at 158-59, 474 A.2d at 962.
39. In order to trigger the de novo trial review, a party must file an action to nullify
the panel's award. MD. CTs. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1984).
40. While an action to nullify is merely a formal technique requesting de novo re-
view, a preliminary motion to vacate the panel's decision must be based on a showing of
fraud, corruption or partiality on the part of an arbitrator. Id. § 3-2A-06(c).
41. Admissibility of the award and the presumption of correctness are treated at MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d)(1984). Although the Court of Appeals has
noted that such a presumption does not change the burden of proof upon plaintiff, At-
torney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 293-94, 385 A.2d 57, 68-69 (1978), it is doubt-
ful that juries have such a refined understanding of the burden of proof issue that they
would give no additional weight to this declared presumption which favors defendant.
42. 59 Md. App. at 162, 474 A.2d at 963.
43. Id. at 168-69, 474 A.2d at 967.
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vacate should have been granted, the court reasoned that "evident
partiality" includes an "appearance of bias," such that an inference
of partiality could be made by a reasonable person. 4 4 The court
noted that the provisions in the Health Claims Act detailing the se-
lection of panel members presupposed the availability of accurate
background information to allow the parties to raise timely objec-
tions.45 In the present case, the court found that plaintiff was de-
prived of information that might have induced him to seek
disqualification of this particular doctor panel member.46 Hartman
thus sends a clear message to those who administer the Health
Claims arbitration system that accurate and up-to-date background
information on prospective panel members is vital.
Several recent Court of Appeals decisions serve to clarify the
jurisdiction of the arbitration system.47 In Cannon v. McKen,48 the
court held that claims cognizable under the Act require that defend-
ant have breached his duty to render health care in his/her profes-
stonal capacity. Breaches of non-professional duties that may occur
through premises liability, slander, or assault do not come under the
Act and should be treated as normal tort claims.49
Plaintiff in Cannon was injured when a piece of dental machinery
fell on her while she was under the care of defendant dentist.50 She
sued under theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach
of warranty. Defendant raised a preliminary objection based on
plaintiff's failure to file a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration
Office.5'
44. The Court of Appeals rejected the standard used by the trial court, i.e., that
actual bias must be demonstrated before an award can be vacated for evident partiality.
The court cites federal and state case law for the proposition that the mere "appearance
of bias" is sufficient to constitute evident partiality: "[T]he test for vacatur on the
ground of evident partiality is whether the reasonable person, as a party to the arbitra-
tion proceeding, upon being advised of the undisclosed matters, would have. . . doubts
regarding the prospective arbitrator's impartiality .... See, e.g., Richco Structures v.
Parkside Village, Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 263 N.W.2d 204 (1978), cited in 59 Md. App. at
166, 474 A.2d at 966.
45. 59 Md. App. at 166, 474 A.2d at 966.
46. Id. at 168, 474 A.2d at 967.
47. The Health Claims Act provides for arbitration of claims "by a person against a
health care provider for medical injury." MD CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(a)
(1984). Medical injury is defined as "injury arising or resulting from the rendering or
failure to render health care." Id. § 3-2A-01(f).
48. 296 Md. 27, 459 A.2d 196 (1983).
49. Id. at 36-37, 459 A.2d at 201.
50. Id. at 28-29, 459 A.2d at 197-98.
51. The mandatory nature of the Act is analogous to the obligation to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. The court explains it in terms of a "condition precedent," with-
out which a medical malpractice claim cannot be brought into court. Id. at 30-31 n.3,
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In rejecting that argument, the court first concluded that the
language of the statute was ambiguous, 52 and then looked to the
legislative intent described in Attorney General v. Johnson.53 The court
noted that since the system had been established to address a medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis, only those claims normally associ-
ated with the rendering of health care were intended to come within
the Act.54 Therefore, injuries resulting from something incidental
to health care treatment and not arising from the breach of medical
professional standards of care are not cognizable under the Act.55
The court reiterated this proposition in Nichols v. Wilson.56
Plaintiff brought suit in her own name and on behalf of her child
against defendant doctor and others, alleging assault and battery,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
child had been admitted to defendant hospital for suture removal.
Plaintiff claimed that her child was forcibly restrained, struck by the
doctor, and abandoned while in physical and emotional distress.57
Plaintiff's damage claim for the negligence count fell below the
statutory minimum provided in the Health Claims Act. 5 8 The court
held that the other two counts arose from conduct other than that
traditionally associated with medical malpractice.59 Although the
court cited Cannon as dispositive,6" the facts indicate a somewhat
closer case here than in Cannon. The alleged slapping of the child
459 A.2d at 198-99 n.3. See also Attorney General v.Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 283-84, 385
A.2d 57, 63 (1978). This requirement has been extended by case law to include diver-
sity suits brought in federal court. Davidson v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D.
Md. 1978).
52. 296 Md. at 32, 459 A.2d at 199.
53. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
54. 296 Md. at 33-34, 459 A.2d at 199-200.
55. Id. at 36-37, 459 A.2d at 201. The court noted that the pleadings were "too
sparse" to indicate whether the injury arose from defendant's breach of his professional
duty or from some other non-professional duty, and remanded the case for more de-
tailed pleadings. Id. at 37-38, 459 A.2d at 201-02. In a detailed dissent, Judge Davidson
found that the pleadings clearly indicated negligence other than medical malpractice,
and that the claim was consequently outside the purview of the Act. Id. at 45, 459 A.2d
at 205 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
56. 296 Md. 154, 460 A.2d 57 (1983).
57. Id. at 155-57 n.2, 460 A.2d at 58-59 n.2.
58. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1984) provides that all claims in
excess of $5,000 are covered by the Act. Plaintiff had first sought damages of $10,000
on the negligence claim and subsequently reduced them to $5000--ostensibly to re-
move the claim from the requirement of mandatory arbitration. Id. at 156-57, 460 A.2d
at 59. Defendants nonetheless argued that the aggregate damages from all three counts
should be considered as one, since the alleged injuries arose out of a continuous occur-
rence. The court rejected the argument. Id. at 158-60, 460 A.2d at 59-60.
59. 296 Md. at 160-61, 460 A.2d at 60-61.
60. Id. at 160, 460 A.2d at 61.
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clearly suggests assault and battery, but it could also be construed as
a breach of a professional duty since it was so closely associated with
defendant's actual rendering of a health care service. Both Cannon
and Nichols make clear, however, that tortious conduct in a medical
setting does not necessarily trigger mandatory arbitration. The true
test is whether the alleged misconduct violated a professional stan-
dard of care resulting in an injury traditionally associated with medi-
cal malpractice.
Brown v. Rabbitt6' presents the reverse of Cannon and Nichols.
Here, the court concluded that the injury did in fact arise from a
failure to render appropriate health care, even though the claim
sounded in breach of warranty.62 Plaintiff claimed that defendant,
prior to performing a sterilization on her, had expressly warranted
that certain post-operative complications would not arise and that
he also impliedly warranted that all of her medical care would be
rendered in accordance with appropriate standards.6 3 Following
the surgery, complications arose and plaintiff filed a breach of war-
ranty claim against the doctor.6 4 The court made clear that the style
of the claim was irrelevant and that the present case fell within the
Act.
6 5
The effect of these decisions involving the functioning of the
Health Claims Arbitration System is to clarify aspects of jurisdiction
and procedure. We may, however, expect further challenges to the
system as critics continue to question whether it is achieving its
goals.
C. Health Care Providers
In State v. Good Samaritan Hospital,6 6 the Court of Appeals held
that a Maryland statute67 requiring hospitals to allow staff
61. 300 Md. 171, 476 A.2d 1167 (1984).
62. Id. at 176, 476 A.2d at 1170.
63. Id. at 173-74, 476 A.2d at 1168-69.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 174-76, 476 A.2d at 1169-70.
66. 299 Md. 310, 473 A.2d 892 (1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984).
67. Section 19-351 (b) of the Health-General Article provides:
(b) Podiatrists. - (1) A hospital or related institution that provides medical or
surgical care of the foot, other than incidental care, shall include, in its bylaws,
rules, or regulations, provisions for use of facilities by and staff privileges for
qualified podiatrists.
(2) The hospital or related institution may restrict use of facilities and staff priv-
ileges by podiatrists to those podiatrists who meet the qualifications that the
hospital or related institution sets for granting those privileges.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-351 (1982). A year after the enactment of the stat-
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privileges68 to qualified podiatrists does not violate the constitu-
tional prohibition against impairment of contract.69
Good Samaritan Hospital sought a declaratory judgment invali-
dating the statute, alleging that it violated the contract clause of arti-
cle I of the United States Constitution,70 the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 71 article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights,72 and article III, section 33 of the
Constitution of Maryland. 73 The constitutional challenge raised by
the hospital basically questioned the State's right to use its police
power to require that a state-chartered private hospital grant privi-
leges to a group the hospital wished categorically to exclude.
The trial court held that the statute violated the contract clause,
resulting in an impermissible taking of the use of the hospital's
property. 4 The court reasoned that the hospital's charter was, in
fact, a contract with the State, and that the podiatry statute materi-
ally interfered with the hospital's right to manage its internal affairs.
It concluded that this interference was unconstitutional since its
purpose was not the "abatement of a nuisance" or a response to "an
immediate threat to public health and safety." 75
The Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning, finding no consti-
tutional infirmity in the statute. 76 The court noted that there is al-
ways some accommodation between the State's interest in
protecting the general welfare and a party's right to be secure in its
contractual relationships.77 The question becomes not whether the
State can impinge on a contractual relationship, but to what degree
ute, an Opinion of the Attorney General noted that many hospitals were denying staff
privileges to podiatrists, and that such class-wide exclusion was inconsistent with the
podiatry statute. 65 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 231, 239-40 (1980).
68. Staff or admitting privileges policies, while generally under the authority of the
institution's trustees, have traditionally reflected the opinions of the hospital's medical
staff. Clark, Why Does Health Care Regulation Fail?, 41 MD. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1981).
Hence, physicians have had considerable input in decisions to exclude non-physician
health care providers as a class. For a discussion of the potential abuse of such author-
ity, see Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 488, 497 P.2d 564, 573 (1972)
(Abe, J., concurring) (danger that credentials committees will seek to exclude for other
than reasons of competence).
69. 299 Md. at 323, 473 A.2d at 898-99.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24.
73. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33.
74. 299 Md. at 318, 473 A.2d at 895-96.
75. Id., 473 A.2d at 896.
76. Id. at 323, 473 A.2d at 898-99.
77. Id. at 319-20, 473 A.2d at 896-97.
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and for what purpose. If reasonable and geared to justifiable public
purposes, legislative enactments are generally accorded deference
by the courts.78 The court found that in this case, no specific provi-
sions of the hospital's charter insulated it from the reach of legisla-
tive enactments designed to promote the general welfare.79 And the
court found no impairment of contract even reaching the threshold
level needed to trigger the constitutional inquiry. The court noted
that the statute does not require the hospital to offer any services
which it does not already provide-only that it not exclude as a class
those who are licensed podiatrists.80 The court upheld the statute,
finding that it does not "defeat or fundamentally change Good Sa-
maritan's corporate purpose to erect and maintain a hospital."'"
The case raises the interesting possibility that, should the Gen-
eral Assembly pass statutes prohibiting hospitals from excluding
other non-physician health care providers on a class-wide basis,82
such statutes would be upheld. As it stands, Good Samaritan unequiv-
ocally upholds Maryland's statute granting right of access to quali-
fied podiatrists. Not only was the court unconvinced by the contract
clause argument, it addressed the merits of the other constitutional
arguments and found them wanting as well.83
78. Id.
79. Id. at 321, 473 A.2d at 897-98. Both the Maryland Constitution and the Anno-
tated Code directly contradict the claim that corporate charters are beyond the reach of
the police power. Section 48 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution allows for the
repeal, modification and alteration of corporate charters, as does MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. § 1-102(e) (1985).
80. 299 Md. at 323, 473 A.2d at 898-99.
81. Id. at 323, 473 A.2d at 898.
82. The District of Columbia recently passed a statute prohibiting class-wide denial
of staff privileges to nurse-anesthetists, nurse-midwives, nurse practitioners, podiatrists,
or psychologists. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1307 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
83. Basically, the court applied a rational-basis analysis to the due process and equal
protection arguments, finding that the statute was neither arbitrary nor capricious, but
could reasonably be construed as promoting the public welfare. 299 Md. at 324-29, 473
A.2d at 899-901.
The court noted three possible public policy reasons underlying enactment of
the podiatry statute: 1) there is a public health interest in affording a sterile hospital
setting for certain foot care; 2) there is the possibility that without such a statute hospi-
tals would continue to deny privileges to podiatrists contrary to the public interest; and
3) there is a state interest in promoting competition between podiatrists and physicians
to reduce patient costs. Id. at 326, 473 A.2d at 900.
The court also rejected the argument that the podiatry statute was a "special
law" in violation of article III, § 33, of the Maryland Constitution. The court has inter-
preted that language in the past to prohibit enactments benefiting particular persons or
cases. In the present case, the court reasoned that since the statute burdened no single
hospital more than another or benefited any particular podiatrist, it can not be consti-
tuted a "special law." Id. at 331, 473 A.2d at 902.
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Another provider dispute is found in Board of Examiners in Op-
tometry v. Spitz84 in which the Court of Appeals resolved a long-
standing feud between optometrists and opticians. In Spitz, the
court ruled that an optician who fits contact lenses is not practicing
optometry.
8 5
The Board of Examiners in Optometry brought an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against optician Richard Spitz for
unlawfully practicing optometry by fitting contact lenses.86 At the
trial substantial technical evidence was heard as to the actual fitting
process,87 with the Board claiming that the procedures actually uti-
lized by Spitz involved activities reserved by statute for licensed op-
tometrists or physicians.88 The trial court concluded that Spitz
could not engage in acts requiring the exercise of his independent
judgment or discretion, but that he could perform purely mechani-
cal operations pursuant to a physician's prescription. 9
On appeal the Board argued that Spitz, by making his own mea-
surements and assessments, was in violation of the language and
purposes of the optometry statute.90 Spitz argued that the statute
does not preclude his fitting contact lenses because it nowhere men-
tions contact lens fitting.9 ' Furthermore, he noted that numerous
attempts to place such procedures within the optometry statute have
failed. 92 Spitz cited a 1976 Attorney General Opinion which had
concluded, albeit with some reservations, that the fitting of contact
lenses by opticians did not constitute the practice of optometry.93
84. 300 Md. 466, 479 A.2d 363 (1984).
85. The "practice of optometry" is defined in MD. HEALTH-OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-
101-02 (1981).
86. 300 Md. at 467, 479 A.2d at 364.
87. The Court of Appeals decision includes an extensive summary of the trial court's
factual findings as to the step-by-step fitting process. The procedures indicate that a
significant amount of independent judgment and expertise is involved in fitting contact
lenses. Id. at 468-72, 479 A.2d at 364-66.
88. Id. at 473, 479 A.2d at 366-67.
89. Id. at 473, 479 A.2d at 367. The trial court's decision was described by the Court
of Appeals as a middle course between the opposing contentions. Id. Neither side was
willing to accept this. The Board appealed, Spitz cross-appealed, and the parties jointly
petitioned for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 468, 479 A.2d at 364.
90. Id. at 473, 479 A.2d at 366-67. The court has previously considered the statute's
purpose in Dvorine v. Castelberg Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 A. 562 (1936) (protection of
the public against unskilled practitioners).
91. The optometry statute was enacted in 1914 at a time when contact lenses were
relatively unknown. 300 Md. at 476, 479 A.2d at 368.
92. Id. at 473, 479 A.2d at 367.
93. 61 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 630, 636-37 (1976). The Opinion noted that out-of-state
cases are divided. Some have reached the conclusion that contact lens fitting involves
complicated procedures demanding the expertise and judgment of an optometrist. See,
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The Court of Appeals basically agreed with Spitz, holding that
opticians do not practice optometry as long as they work from a
physician's prescription and ultimately refer the wearer back to the
prescribing physician for final approval.94 In reaching this decision,
the court weighed very heavily the fact that opticians have been fit-
ting contact lenses since the 1940's, ostensibly with the approval of
the prescribing opthamalogists, and the fact that there was no em-
pirical evidence in the record to suggest that the public has been
endangered by such a practice. The court also gave "careful consid-
eration" to the Attorney General Opinion,95 and to the numerous
unsuccessful attempts to specifically place contact lens fitting within
the optometry statute. 96 Finding that the legislature has tacitly ac-
quiesced in the long-standing practice, 9 7 the court stated that any
change must come from them.98
The court's decision appears to leave a gap in the regulation of
health care practitioners. After Spitz, it is clear that opticians may
legally fit contact lenses. Yet because opticians are unregulated,
there is no statutory or other regulatory bar to prevent anyone from
engaging in the fitting of contact lenses. The legislature should ad-
dress the issue of contact lens fitting directly and delineate who may
engage in this practice and under what circumstances.
e.g., Ketring v. Sturges, 372 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1963) (fitting of contact lenses is not
purely mechanical and involves judgment within meaning of optometry statute); State ex
rel. Reed v. Kuzirian, 228 Or. 619, 365 P.2d 1046 (1971) (optician may fit contact lenses
only under direct personal supervision of optometrist or physician). Other cases have
concluded that the procedures are relatively simple and within certain bounds do not
constitute the practice of optometry. See, e.g., State ex rel. Londerholm v. Doolin, 209
Kan. 244, 497 P.2d 138 (1972) (contact lens fitting not the practice of optometry since
doesn't involve "adaptation" of lenses); High v. Ridgeway's Opticians, 258 N.C. 626,
129 S.E.2d 301 (1963) ("fabricating, fitting and inserting" contact lenses allowable pur-
suant to a prescription with return to physician for final approval). The Maryland Attor-
ney General Opinion basically followed the view of the latter cases, while at the same
time admitting that there was substantial authority suggesting the correctness of the
former position. It suggested that a full evidentiary hearing as to the technical aspects of
the procedure might reach a different conclusion. The Opinion recommended clarify-
ing legislation by the General Assembly. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. at 638.
94. 300 Md. at 482, 479 A.2d at 371.
95. Id. at 476, 479 A.2d at 368.
96. See, e.g., S.B. 845 (1975), S.B. 721 (1974); H.B. 959 (1965), cited in 300 Md. at
478, 479 A.2d at 369. The Board had argued that there were, as well, a number of
proposed amendments which would have allowed opticians to fit contact lenses and that
the legislature had rejected these too. 300 Md. at 478-79, 479 A.2d at 369.
97. 300 Md. at 479, 479 A.2d at 369-70.
98. Id. at 482, 479 A.2d at 371.
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D. Wrongful Birth
Negligent sterilization or "wrongful birth" cases have prolifer-
ated in recent years.99 The issue gained prominence in Maryland
following the Court of Appeals decision in Sard v. Hardy.'0 0
Although the holding in Sard addressed the problem of informed
consent,' 0 ' the underlying compensable injury was the birth of a
child subsequent to a sterilization procedure. 0 2
Courts are now faced with the issue of what kinds of damages
should be recognized in "wrongful birth" cases. Most allow for
losses associated with the medical costs of the unplanned preg-
nancy, the expense of a second sterilization, and the pain and suffer-
ing surrounding the pregnancy and delivery.'1 3 A harder question
is whether to allow the inclusion of the costs of raising the child.
In Jones v. Malinowski,"4 a case of first impression in Maryland,
the Court of Appeals joined a substantial minority of states 0 5 that
allow child care costs to be included as damages in a suit for negli-
gent sterilization.'0 6 The plaintiff in Jones had three children, the
birth of each having caused considerable trauma to her. She and
her husband were of limited financial means and plaintiff had
planned to resume working full-time when her third child started
school.'0 7 The couple sought sterilization. Following a tubal liga-
tion by defendant physician, plaintiff became pregnant and subse-
quently delivered a live, healthy baby. She and her husband
brought suit for negligent sterilization. 108
99. See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.3D 15 (1978).
100. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
101. The question was whether the doctor's failure to apprise plaintiff of material
facts relating to her surgery constituted negligence. Id. at 434-35, 379 A.2d at 1017.
For the only reported case to date in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit review-
ing the informed consent principles of Sard, see Lipscomb v. Memorial Hosp., 733 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1984).
102. 281 Md. at 435-38, 379 A.2d at 1017-19.
103. For a discussion of compensable damages in wrongful birth suits, see generally
Note, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motivational Analysis, 32
EMORY L.J. 1167, 1168-69 (1983).
104. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
105. One of the earliest cases to allow child care damages was Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (child care damages awarded to alleviate
financial burden on mother who already had nine children). Other states allowing such
damages include Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and the District of
Columbia. See cases cited in 299 Md. at 265, 473 A.2d at 433; Note, supra note 103, at
1177-79.
106. 299 Md. at 269-70, 473 A.2d at 435.
107. Id. at 260, 473 A.2d at 430.
108. Id. at 260-61, 473 A.2d at 431.
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Following a trial in the circuit court, the judge instructed the
jury that it could consider "the costs of raising the unplanned child
from birth to the age of majority," as well as the value of a healthy
child's "aid, comfort and society during the parents' life expec-
tancy."' 0 9 The jury was not instructed, however, to consider that
plaintiff might have aborted the child or placed it up for adop-
tion." The jury awarded plaintiff $70,000 and defendant
appealed. ''
The Court of Appeals basically affirmed the propriety of the
trial court instructions. In structuring its opinion, the court looked
to traditional tort law, reasoning that the cost of raising an unplan-
ned child is, in fact, a foreseeable consequence of a negligent sterili-
zation." 2 The court saw no reason why a physician should be
exempted from basic rules of negligence damages merely because
the primary evidence of the tortious conduct is a healthy child." 3
The court found it inappropriate to presume that the birth of a
healthy child will automatically entail benefits outweighing dam-
ages" '4 and found that the trier of fact should look to the reasons
why plaintiff sought sterilization in the first place.' This formula-
tion focuses on the actual injury sustained-circumventing the prob-
lem of categorically denying child care damages in all cases and yet
allowing for a realistic appraisal of each fact situation.
A further element in this appraisal process involves weighing
the pecuniary costs of raising the child against the nonpecuniary
109. Quoted in 299 Md. at 261, 473 A.2d at 431.
110. Id.
111. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to the intermediate court's consid-
eration of the case. Id. at 259 n.1, 473 A.2d at 430 n.l.
112. Id. at 268-70, 473 A.2d at 435.
113. In structuring the opinion in this way, the court avoided interpreting the child as
the "injury"-a notion offensive to many courts which have disallowed childrearing
damages. Id. at 263-64, 473 A.2d at 432. For a discussion of the "child-as-injury" ap-
proach, see Note, supra note 103, at 1169-70.
114. The court noted opinions of other courts rejecting the argument that the birth of
a child is always a blessing that offsets the economic burden of child rearing. See, e.g.,
University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (although
norm is that family will adjust to birth of child, birth can cause serious emotional or
economic problems); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) ("no incon-
sistency in [the] view that parental pleasure softens but does not eradicate economic
reality"), cited in 299 Md. at 265-68, 473 A.2d at 433-34.
115. Possible reasons may be roughly categorized as economic, genetic, or therapeu-
tic. Plaintiff may have wished to prevent an additional economic or psychological bur-
den on the existing family, or she may have feared the birth of a defective child. She
might also have acted to avoid risking a health hazard to herself. 299 Md. at 267, 270-
71, 473 A.2d at 434, 436. See also Note, supra note 103, at 1189-97.
1985] 585
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
benefits derived from the child's presence in the family." 6 Thus,
the trier of fact may consider the intangible elements of love, com-
fort, and solace that may benefit the parents, as well as the possibil-
ity that, once grown, the child may contribute tangible economic
assets to the family. It is perfectly conceivable that a particular jury
may find, given this evaluation, that no child-rearing damages are
appropriate. 1 17
The court cautioned that juries may not consider that plaintiff
may have aborted the fetus or placed the child up for adoption'
8
because it would be unreasonable to carry the doctrine of avoidable
consequences' "9 this far. Lastly, the court noted that Maryland pub-
lic policy recognizing the special nature of the family relationship
does not compel the conclusion that birth can never be construed as
a compensable injury. 1 20 Rather, it stated the rule in Maryland to be
that child-rearing costs may be considered in assessing damages in a
suit for negligent sterilization since they are a direct and foreseeable
consequence of defendant's tortious conduct.
E. Abortion
In Coleman v. Coleman,' 2 1 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
rejected a husband's argument that he had a right to prevent his
wife from having a first trimester abortion. 22 Although the fetus
had already been aborted, thus rendering the controversy moot at
116. The reasoning used by the court is found in the "benefits rule" of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979), which allows for mitigation of damages if the
tortfeasor's conduct also conferred a benefit on the plaintiff.
117. The majority viewpoint prohibits such damages from even being considered by
the jury, whereas the minority allows the jury to exercise its traditional fact-finding role
in appraising each situation. 299 Md. at 266-67, 273-74, 473 A.2d at 434, 437.
118. Id. at 274, 473 A.2d at 437-38.
119. For this doctrine, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979). The doc-
trine requires plaintiffs to minimize damages as much as is reasonably possible.
120. The court rejected the argument, stating that family planning is not against pub-
lic policy and that there is no reason based on law or public policy to immunize a doctor
from the consequences of his negligence. 299 Md. at 273, 473 A.2d at 437.
121. 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (1984).
122. Id. at 763, 471 A.2d at 1119. Other states addressing the issue have held that a
woman has a right to an abortion irrespective of the consent or objections of the child's
father. See, e.g., Rothenberger v. Doe, 149 NJ. Super. 478, 374 A.2d 57 (1977). State
statutes requiring the father's consent have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Wynn v. Scott, 449
F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 8 (1978). But cf. Scheinberg v.
Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (invalidating a state statute requiring notice of
proposed abortion to the husband and opportunity to consult prior to abortion). In
Scheinberg the court indicated that the state might justifiably seek to protect the hus-
band's interest in the procreative potential of the marriage when the abortion creates a
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the time of the hearing, 23 the court chose to address the merits., 24
Reasoning that such cases were likely to recur, the intermediate
court directly contradicted the position taken by the Court of Ap-
peals the previous term, when the high court had dismissed an al-
most identical case for mootness.125
In Coleman, the Court of Special Appeals held the portion of
Maryland's abortion statute 26 that defines the circumstances in
which an abortion may be obtained to be unconstitutional because it
conflicts with Roe v. Wade' 2 7 and its progeny.' 28 The statute has
never been modified to conform to the Roe standard despite several
attacks on its validity.' 29 Whatever the reasons for the legislative
risk to future childbearing, but that modern techniques used in most first trimester abor-
tions create only a negligible risk. Id. at 1123.
123. Appellant originally filed a petition seeking an injunction to prevent appellee
from having an abortion. 57 Md. App. at 757, 471 A.2d at 1116-17. The trial judge
issued a temporary restraining order which he subsequently dissolved following a hear-
ing. Within three days appellee obtained an abortion. Id. at 758, 471 A.2d at 1117.
Meanwhile appellant filed an appeal and petitioned unsuccessfully for a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals. 298 Md. 353, 469 A.2d 1274 (1984).
124. The Court of Special Appeals heard oral arguments, issued a per curiam order
affirming the trial court, and published an explanatory memorandum one month later.
57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (1984).
125. See Hagerstown Reproductive Health Servs. v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3538 (1983).
126. Appellant's first argument was that under the Maryland Code a woman is not
permitted to elect an abortion. The statute permits abortions, to be performed in ac-
credited and licensed hospitals, only if the pregnancy is likely to "gravely impair" the
physical or mental health of the mother, likely to result in the birth of a severely de-
formed or retarded child, or occurred as a result of a rape. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 20-208(a) (Supp. 1984)
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe, along with its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973), established that a woman is permitted to terminate a pregnancy, in
consultation with a physician and up to the end of the first trimester, without state inter-
ference. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Key to the Roe decision is the assumption that the fetus is
not viable in the first trimester. Id. at 463-65.
128. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (husband's consent to
wife's first trimester abortion is unnecessary); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Roe trimester standard continues to determine
point at which state interest in maternal health deemed appropriate).
129. As early as 1972, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held unconstitutional that part of the Maryland statute requiring that abortions be per-
formed in accredited and licensed hospitals. Vuitch v. Hardy, Civ. No. 71-1129-Y (D.
Md., filed June 22, 1972). The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, noting
the applicability of the recently decided Roe and Doe cases. 473 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 824 (1973). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled similarly in
State v. Ingel, 18 Md. App. 514, 308 A.2d 223 (1973) (the Code provision defining
abortion as a crime if performed other than in an accredited and licensed hospital is
unconstitutional on its face). A 1977 Attorney General Opinion agreed with the ration-
ale of these cases and further noted that the sections of the Code limiting abortion to
situations that threaten substantial harm to mother or child or that result from rape do
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inactivity,'3 ° Coleman now expressly holds the statute uncon-
stitutional. 131
After addressing the constitutional issue, the court disposed of
the husband's additional arguments: 1) that science has changed
the definition of viability;. 32 2) that nontherapeutic abortions are
impermissible; 3 3 and 3) that there is a recognized right under the
ninth amendment to defend the preborn child.' 34
The court found the husband's viability argument unpersuasive
despite testimony of a geneticist that viability is present just after
fertilization. Concluding that such an opinion was basically theoret-
ical and not within the mainstream of medical science, the court
held that the evidence presented was insufficient to impeach the Roe
standard.' 35 The court was similarly unimpressed with the hus-
band's contention that there was no health reason justifying his
wife's election to abort. Roe does not demand such justification dur-
ing the first trimester, but rather permits a woman, in consulation
with her physician, to terminate a pregnancy without interference
from the state.1
3 6
The court also rejected the husband's construction of a consti-
tutional argument combining the ninth amendment 3 7 of the United
States Constitution with common law language prescribing a paren-
tal duty to maintain and care for the child,'33 noting that the
not conform to the holdings of Roe and Doe and are therefore unconstitutional. 62 Op.
Md. Att'y Gen. 3, 4-7 (1977).
130. The abortion restrictions subsections were transferred and renumbered without
change by Act ofJune 1, 1982, ch. 770, 1982 MD. Laws 4182 (codified at Mo. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208).
131. "[T]he Maryland Statute fails to delineate between terminating the pregnancy
during the first trimester and any subsequent time. Because of that failure, Health-Gen-
eral Art. § 20-208(a) is unconstitutional insofar as it conflicts with decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States." 57 Md. App. at 760, 471 A.2d at 1118.
132. Id. at 764, 471 A.2d at 1120.
133. Id. at 762, 471 A.2d at 1119.
134. Id. at 760, 471 A.2d at 1118.
135. Id. at 765, 471 A.2d at 1120. The court noted that as recently as 1983 the
Supreme Court reiterated Roe's first trimester standard as marking the point at which
maternal choice outweighs the state's interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 763, 471
A.2d at 1119-20, (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983)).
136. Id. at 762-63, 471 A.2d at 1119 (citing City of Akron, 436 U.S. at 434). Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) invalidated a state statute granting a hus-
band the right to veto his wife's decision to have an abortion. Based on its reading of
Roe and Danforth, the Maryland court stated that the husband had no standing to enjoin
his wife from having an abortion. 57 Md. App. at 763, 471 A.2d at 1119.
137. U.S. CONST., amend IX.
138. The husband quoted 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447, for the proposi-
tion that parents have a duty to provide, and children have a right to receive, care and
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Supreme Court has already construed the ninth and fourteenth
amendments to give a privacy right to the woman during the first
trimester of pregnancy.' 3 9 As the court stressed, the Supreme
Court has not indicated that such rights as the husband asserted
would outweigh this privacy right. 4 °
For the present, Maryland case law explicitly follows Roe v.
Wade.' 4 ' Whether the legislature will choose to conform the statu-
tory law to the constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court is un-
certain, but given the law's nonenforcement and the court's decision
in Coleman v. Coleman, legislative inaction will clearly have no effect
on abortion rights in Maryland.
F. Statutory Developments
During its 1984 session, the Maryland General Assembly en-
acted several bills aimed at providing more comprehensive and
more appropriate community-based services for disabled individu-
als. House Bill 1333142 authorizes private group homes for emo-
tionally disturbed children and adolescents. 14  Although a number
of state agencies currently provide services for delinquent,1 44 ne-
glected, 145 and educationally handicapped children, 46 there has
maintenance. "By begetting... [the children, the parents] have entered into a volun-
tary obligation . . . [to preserve the life] they have bestowed ...... Id., quoted in 57
Md. App. at 760, 471 A.2d at 1118.
139. Id. at 761, 471 A.2d at 1119; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
140. 57 Md. App. at 761, 471 A.2d at 119.
141. The Court of Appeals has yet to address the issue on its merits. Its denial of
appellant's petition for certiorari in Coleman came before the intermediate court issued
its opinion. 298 Md. 353, 469 A.2d 1274 (1984). It is unclear whether the court's denial
was in consideration of the mootness of the controversy or whether it signifies an unspo-
ken approval of the trial court's decision to deny injunctive relief to the husband.
142. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 477, 1984 Md. Laws 2582 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 10-920 (Supp. 1984)).
143. The preamble to the bill states in part that: "It is the policy of the State: ... (4)
To provide homelike and community-based, private therapeutic group homes for chil-
dren and adolescents who would otherwise be inappropriately confined to State residen-
tial institutions and centers ...... Id. at 2583. The new program will be under the
aegis of the Mental Hygiene Administration, whose Director is authorized to license,
regulate and evaluate the group homes. Id. at 2587-88 (codified at MD. HEALTH GEN.
CODE ANN. § 10-921 to -926 (Supp. 1984)).
144. The Juvenile Services Administration provides institutional and group homes for
children who are classified as delinquent, truant, or who generally need supervision
based on their social misconduct. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-109 (1982); MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(f) (1984).
145. The Department of Human Resources places abused and neglected children in
foster homes or group home facilities. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-525 to -526
(1984).
146. Maryland's Department of Education is required to provide free special
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been a long-recognized gap in meeting the needs of emotionally dis-
turbed youngsters requiring noninstitutional residential care. The
legislation does not mandate the establishment of group homes, but
requires the Director of the Mental Hygiene Administration to sub-
mit a needs and implementation plan by early 1985.117
The legislature's enactment of a family support services bill
(HB 441)148 reflects a related emphasis on maintaining disabled
children in their own homes or in a family environment rather than
in institutional placements. The new program is designed to keep
"developmentally disabled"' 149 children in the home by providing
money for such support services as counseling, personal care,
equipment, and transportation.1 5 0 As administered by the Depart-
ment of Health and Mental Hygiene, the program contemplates the
coordinated use of existing private nonprofit community-based
services to which the developmentally disabled are already
entitled. 151
A third bill (HB 375)152 focusing on community-based care
mandates the preparation of a five-year master plan identifying
housing and support services needs of the mentally ill. The immedi-
ate goal of the legislation is to assess the number of individuals now
in institutions, as well as in the community,153 who would be better
education and other services to handicapped children with related learning disabilities.
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-401 to -417.6 (1985). While some emotionally disturbed
children may fall into this category, many others do not. For a comprehensive survey of
Maryland programs and an analysis of the special needs of the emotionally handicapped,
see Leviton & Shuger, Maryland's Exchangeable Children: A Critique of Maryland's System of
Providing Services to Mentally Handicapped Children, 42 MD. L. REV. 823 (1983).
147. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-925 (Supp. 1984).
148. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 617, 1984 Md. Laws 3118 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -204 (Supp. 1984)).
149. "Developmentally disabled" is defined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 128(c)
(Supp. 1984) as a severe, chronic mental or physical disability that is manifested in child-
hood, likely to continue indefinitely, results in substantial functional limitations in living,
and reflects a need for extensive special care.
150. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -203 (Supp. 1984).
151. Id. § 15-203. A similar "coordination of services" rationale underlies H.B. 487
(1984) ("Registry Bill"). Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 416, 1984 Md. Laws 2443 (codified at
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Supp. 1984)). The legislation requires the De-
partment of Health and Mental Hygiene to establish a central information registry of
disabled individuals-defined as spinal cord, stroke, amputation, or head injured-in
order to assess their numbers and needs and provide these individuals with information
as to available public and private rehabilitative services. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 20-108 (Supp. 1984).
152. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 405, 1984 Md. Laws 2421 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 10-525 (Supp. 1984)).
153. The Mental Health Association of Maryland (MHA) estimates that there are 6500
people currently living in the community who are in need of residential placement. Tel-
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served in a residential facility.' 54 Once identified, and the need for
additional facilities determined, the ultimate goal of the legislation
is to place those with mental disorders into a more appropriate re-
habilitative setting. ' 55
The legislature also passed a number of bills clarifying and ex-
panding rights of the mentally disabled.' 5 6 House Bill 1373157 re-
quires that mentally ill persons be informed of their rights on
admission to facilities, and that the latter post notices as to these
rights, and implement complaint procedures.15 8  Patients are ex-
pressly granted the right to converse privately with a lawyer, clergy-
man, or other visitor. 159
House Bill 230160 adds to the enumeration of rights of the men-
tally retarded the right to worship as one chooses, and the right to
receive an accounting of funds held by the facility.' 6 '
An entirely new section was added to the patient "Bill of
Rights," granting mentally ill individuals the right to refuse medica-
tion.' 6 2 The legislation excepts emergency situations and, with re-
spect to patients involuntarily hospitalized, it authorizes a clinical
review panel to override a patient's refusal. 163 Right to refuse treat-
ment issues are highly controversial, 64 and this bill attempts to
strike a balance between patient rights and his or her participation
ephone conversation with Herbert S. Cromwell, Executive Director, Baltimore Chapter
of MHA (Sept. 12, 1984).
154. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-525 (Supp. 1984).
155. Id.
156. The legislature had previously focused a great deal of attention on the rights of
mentally ill individuals during its 1983 session. A significant patient "Bill of Rights" was
passed that established new rights and consolidated provisions defining existing rights.
Regulatory provisions and pertinent Mental Hygiene Administration policies were con-
solidated within the "Bill of Rights." It is now codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-701 to -713 (Supp. 1984). The 1984 bills add additional rights to this comprehen-
sive "Bill of Rights."
157. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 481, 1984 Md. Laws 2597 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-701, 03, 06, 07 (Supp. 1984)).
158. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-701(f)(g) (Supp. 1984).
159. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-703 (Supp. 1984).
160. Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 171, 1984 Md. Laws 590 (codified at id. § 7-601(b) (Supp.
1984)).
161. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-(601)(b)(7), (8) (Supp. 1984).
162. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 480, 1984 Md. Laws 2594 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 10-708 (Supp. 1984)).
163. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708 (Supp. 1984). The three-member review
panel must follow a fairly strict procedural process in determining whether the patient's
refusal should be overridden. Panel decisions approving the use of medication must be
re-evaluated every 60 days. The medication may not be given at all if there is an alterna-
tive treatment acceptable to both the individual and his doctors. Id. § 10-708(c).
164. See generally Apelbaum & Gutheil, Rotting With Their Rights On: Constitutional Theory
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in treatment on the one hand, and timely and responsible medical
care on the other.'6 5 A majority of states have similar statutes and
others provide for such a right pursuant to court action, administra-
tive rules, departmental policies, or Attorney General rulings.'
66
Maryland began utilizing clinical review panels within state facilities
in early 1983 and the practice is now extended to private
facilities. 16
7
The legislature also enacted SB 433168 providing a relatively
simple substitute consent procedure authorizing medical or dental
treatment for a disabled individual. The bill eliminates the need for
judicially appointed guardians in instances where a close relative is
available and willing to consent to the proposed treatment.' 69
Health care providers who reasonably rely on this substitute consent
and persons giving such consent are exempted from civil and crimi-
nal liability.'O
KATHERINE D. SAVAGE
and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
306, 306-15 (1979).
165. The bill reflected a consensus appoach with input from, among others, the Mary-
land Attorney General's Office, the Maryland Psychiatric Society, the Mental Hygiene
Administration, Legal Aid, and the Mental Health Association of Maryland. Testimony
on HB 1372, Mentally Ill Individuals-Refusal of Medication, given by the Mental
Health Association of Maryland (March 13, 1984).
166. See generally Callahan & Longmire, Psychiatric Patients' Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication: A National Survey, 7 MENTAL DISABILITIES L. REP. 494, 499 (1983). This sur-
vey reflects state status on this issue as of May, 1983.
167. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708 (Supp. 1984).
168. Act of May 19, 1984, ch. 540, 1984 Md. Laws 2843 (codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Supp. 1984)).
169. The legislation limits the substitute consent procedure to certain enumerated
relatives who must be contacted in descending order, for example, "(1) [a] spouse, or, if
not reasonably available; (2) an adult child ..... " MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-
107(d) (Supp. 1984). Thus, the physician or facility may not "shop" the list for a relative
amenable to the treatment. Advice memo from Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr., Asst. Attorney
General, to All State Psychiatric Facilities; State Mental Retardation Facilities and Facili-
ties for the Chronically Ill and Aging, at 3 (Aug. 15, 1984).




1. Use of Extraneous Evidence to Determine Testamentary Nature of
Documents.-In construing wills, the court's primary purpose is to
ensure that the testator's intent is fulfilled.' Such intent is normally
to be determined from the "four corners of the will" 2 rather than
from any presumed intention which is not embodied in the express
language of the will. However, when the issue is whether the prof-
fered document was actually intended by the testator to be his will,
pertinent accompanying facts and circumstances may be considered
which tend to prove or disprove that fact.3 In Lowenthal v. Rome,4 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals recognized this vital distinction
and affirmed a lower court decision which relied heavily on extrane-
ous written evidence of the testator's intent.
The testator in Lowenthal was a Maryland domiciliary. He had
substantial assets located both in Maryland and in Spain. The court
had before it three wills executed by the testator. Two wills were
written in Spanish and executed in accordance with Spanish law and
one will was written and executed in accordance with Maryland law.
The first will, written in Spanish and executed in Spain, left the
Spanish estate to the testator's stepchild and the remainder (roughly
two-thirds of the total estate) to his brother. The second will was
executed approximately six weeks later. It was written in English
and executed in Maryland. It distributed the estate in the same
manner as the first. The third will was executed approximately
three months after the second. This will was written in Spanish and
was executed in Spain. It left the Spanish estate to the testator's
brother but was silent as to the disposition of the Maryland estate.
1. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 810 (1953).
2. The "four corners" doctrine was coined by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Fersinger v. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 36 A.2d 716 (1949) (a will construction case determin-
ing whether the testator left his wife the entire estate or merely a life interest). The
doctrine limits inquiry into the testator's intent to the face of the writing or the "four
corners of the will." It necessarily excludes consideration of extrinsic evidence as to
intent. It is important to note that courts are not in all cases limited exclusively to the
language of the will. Where the language of the will contains some ambiguity either
expressly, or as applied to the facts and circumstances at the time the will was executed,
the court may look outside the will to determine the testator's intent. See T. ATKINSON,
supra note 1, at 810-15.
3. Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A.2d 922 (1939).
4. 57 Md. App. 728, 471 A.2d 1102 (1984).
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Had the last Spanish will been taken as the only evidence of the
testator's intent, the result would have been a finding of intestacy as
to the Maryland estate. Because there is a presumption against in-
testacy, the lower court sought to avoid a finding of intestacy as to
the Maryland estate. It accepted as evidence of the testator's intent
a letter he had written to his brother. This letter indicated that the
last will was intended merely to revise the previous documents, not
to revoke them.5 Thus, the court did not read the Maryland will and
the final Spanish will as separate documents, but read them together
as evidence that the testator intended the entire estate to go to the
testator's brother.6
The trial court's decision was unquestionably in accord with the
testator's true intent. But because it was not possible to determine
the trial court's actual use of the letter in this case, the Court of
Special Appeals avoided any attempt to make the necessary distinc-
tions between use of evidence to determine testamentary validity of
documents and its use to show testamentary intent.7 The court
found that the admission and use of the letter was at most harmless
error.
8
The Lowenthal court's acknowledgement that extrinsic evidence
may be admitted (even in the absence of facial ambiguity) to deter-
mine the testamentary validity of a document is an important dis-
tinction to make because it runs counter to the normal rules of
testamentary construction. It is unfortunate that in Lowenthal the
court did not clarify the practical problems posed by the admission
of such evidence. It is likely that in many cases such evidence may
5. The letter which the testator wrote to his brother stated that the testator had
revised his American will and had given all of the Spanish assets to his brother. Id. at
753, 471 A.2d at 1115.
6. This is not the first time a Maryland court has held that two testamentary docu-
ments should be read together to form a total disposition of a decedent's estate. In
Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A.2d 922 (1939), the court considered the testamen-
tary validity of three wills executed over an eight-year period, the last two of which were
Geyman. The court's determination of the validity of the wills was far less consequential
since it determined the force of a perpetual care clause. However, the case established
the basic framework for determining which of several writings is to be read as a testa-
mentary instrument. In holding that the first and third instruments should be read to-
gether, the court noted that the first instrument disposed of all of the decedent's
property and the third made only a slight modification, which made sense only when the
latter will was read in conjunction with the first.
7. The Lowenthal court adds the caveat that, if the "inquiry should lead to incidental
construction of the paper writing, the construction would be permitted, while restricted
to its bearing on the issue of the subsistence or revocation of the testamentary instru-




lead to an incidental construction of the document beyond its bear-
ing on the issue of testamentary validity. And such consideration
may not always be harmless error. Therefore, the court could have
enhanced the opinion's value to practitioners by further exploring
the trial court's use of the testator's letter.
2. Waiver of Conditions Precedent to Testamentary Requests.-In
Martin v. Young 9 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals indicated in
dicta'" that performance of a condition precedent to a testamentary
bequest may be waived when performance of the condition is ren-
dered impossible just five days before the testator's death. The
court's analysis focused on what the testator's intent would have
been had the testator anticipated the circumstances that rendered
performance impossible.
In Martin, Mrs. Fravel, the testator, left her house to Mrs. Mar-
tin, her domestic employee of eleven years, subject to the condition
that she be in the testator's employ at the time of her death. Five
days prior to Mrs. Fravel's death Mrs. Fravel was moved to a nursing
home. The legatee was dismissed by a bank officer under a general
power of attorney because her services were no longer needed. Af-
ter the testator's death, employees of the bank acting as personal
representative refused to pay the bequest. They argued that Mrs.
Martin's bequest had lapsed because she failed to comply with the
condition. 1
The Martin court adopted the Restatement of Property doctrine' 2
which excuses performance of a condition if the excusal accords
with the testator's intent.'" To determine that intent, the focus of
the court's inquiry "is whether the testator's primary concern was
the betterment of the individual or the performance of the condi-
tion."' 4 The court expressly refused to limit its inquiry to the "four
corners of the will," as proposed by the defendant. It was con-
cerned that a narrow construction of wills in condition precedent
cases could "open the door to all types of manipulations of the
9. 55 Md. App. 401, 462 A.2d 77 (1983).
10. The sole issue before the Court of Special Appeals was whether the trial court
had erred in granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant per-
sonal representatives. The court found that sufficient factual issues had been left un-
resolved, so it reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. Id. at
408, 462 A.2d at 80-81. As a result, the court's discussion of the appropriate analysis in
condition precedent cases cannot be considered a part of the court's holding.
11. Id. at 402-03, 462 A.2d at 77-78.
12. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 438 (1944).




testator's true intent as well as a legatee's privilege to inherit."' 5 If
the court limited itself only to consideration of the strict terms of
the will, it could not take into account such relevant factors as the
testator's waiver of the condition after its breach' 6 or a reason, such
as impossibility, for the failure of performance.
The court easily distinguished Pacholder v. Rosenheim,' 7 the only
other Maryland case dealing with a devise or bequest subject to a
condition precedent, which held that the condition could not be
waived.' 8 In Pacholder, the testator left a cash bequest to his niece,
conditioned upon the niece's marrying within her faith and with her
parent's consent. The niece married within her faith, but eloped.' 9
Three differences in the factual situations of Pacholder and Martin
enabled the court to distinguish Pacholder. First, in Pacholder, the tes-
tator had two and one-half years to change the condition if he so
desired; in Martin, the testator, had she been competent and physi-
cally able, had only five days to change the condition."0 Second, the
Pacholder legatee made a voluntary choice to violate the condition,
whereas the Martin legatee attempted to fulfill it but was prevented
by her dismissal by the bank.2' Third, in Pacholder the legatee's be-
havior was at issue, whereas in Martin the impossibility of perform-
ance was the key.22 The court's refusal to follow the Pacholder
precedent is significant because it reveals the court's willingness to
adopt a case-by-case analysis in condition precedent cases and to
consider the equitable aspects of individual situations.23
In developing its argument for waiving a condition precedent
on grounds of impossibility, the court did not refer to or acknowl-
edge the Maryland cases which allow a waiver of conditions
15. Id.
16. Id. The court spoke in general terms when it discussed the possibility of waiver
of the condition because it was not a factor in Martin. In Martin, the testator died five
days after the breach of the condition and arguably never knew the condition was
breached.
17. 129 Md. 455, 99 A. 672 (1916).
18. Id. at 463, 99 A. at 675.
19. Id. at 459, 99 A. at 673.
20. 55 Md. App. at 405, 462 A.2d at 79.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court draws an exceedingly fine line between the second and third differ-
ences, which is arguably without significance because both focus on whether the breach
was a result of the legatee's voluntary actions, or the result of actions outside the lega-
tee's control. The court also noted that the overwhelming weight of authority today,
unlike the Pacholder holding, recognizes the doctrine of substantial performance. See id.
23. Id. at 405-06, 462 A.2d at 79. Consideration of the fairness of requiring the
performance of an impossible condition or one made impossible by an individual who
stands to gain from the breach provides a more satisfying result.
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subsequent. In 1881, in Hammond v. Hammond,24 the Maryland Court
of Appeals excused performance of a condition subsequent to a be-
quest and implicitly rejected the four corners doctrine 25 when per-
formance was rendered impossible by an act of God. 6 In 1949, in
Keyser v. Calvary Brethren Church ,27 the court extended the doctrine to
excuse performance due to physical impossibility or the illegality of
performance. 28
The Martin court's failure to cite these condition subsequent
cases does not weaken its opinion. However, the court could argua-
bly have added depth to its opinion by citing to the parallel premises
advanced in these condition cases. It is unfortunate that the court
did not take advantage of this opportunity to fit the condition prece-
dent analysis into a larger framework which would enhance the
practitioner's understanding of both types of conditions. 29
3. Mandatory Time Limit on Filing Caveats to Wills.-In 1982, in
Sole v. Darby,3 ° the Maryland Court of Special Appeals for the first
time applied the equitable principles of waiver and estoppel to toll
or otherwise interrupt the generally mandatory six-month time limit
imposed on filing caveats to wills3 under the Maryland Estates and
Trusts Article, section 5-207.12 In the Sole case, the out-of-state ca-
24. 55 Md. 575 (1881).
25. Id. at 583. The court enforced the payment of a cash bequest conditioned upon
the beneficiary's provision of care and burial of the testator's brother. Performance was
rendered impossible when the testator's brother predeceased the testator. This was
considered an act of God. Id. at 577, 583.
26. Id. Had the court restricted its consideration to the terms of the will, any reason
for not complying with the condition, including an act of God, would have been
irrelevant.
27. 192 Md. 520, 64 A.2d 748 (1949).
28. Id. at 525, 64 A.2d at 750. The court enforced the payment of a cash bequest to
a church conditioned upon the church's using the money to build a church within five
years of payment of the bequest. Performance was rendered impossible by statutory
restrictions on the use of building materials due to World War II. Id. at 522-23, 64 A.2d
at 748-49.
29. A troublesome aspect of the condition subsequent cases cited is that, as a thresh-
old matter, each distinguishes between conditions precedent and subsequent. Hammond,
55 Md. at 581-82; Keyser, 192 Md. at 523, 64 A.2d at 749. The importance of this distinc-
tion is never explained.
30. 52 Md. App. 218, 447 A.2d 506 (1982).
31. Since a will caveat is an attack on the validity of an alleged will, the effect of a will
caveat in Maryland is to trigger judicial probate proceedings for the alleged will. MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 5-207 (1974); id. § 5-207, comment to former article 93.
32. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 5-207 (1974) provides in relevant part:
(a) Filing petition to caveat-Regardless of whether a petition for probate has
been filed, a verified petition to caveat a will may be filed at any time prior to
the expiration of six months following the first appointment of a personal
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veator missed the six-month filing deadline by four days because of
a defective notice of appointment (a copy of which was sent to the
caveator). The notice, as approved by the Register of Wills,3 1 cor-
rectly stated that the filing deadline was six months from the date of
appointment, but erroneously dated the deadline six months and
four days after appointment. Relying on the date given, the cavea-
tor missed the deadline by four days. The fact that the Register of
Wills' actions misled the caveator to act to her own detriment ap-
pears to be the single most influential factor in persuading the court
to establish an equitable exception to the six-month rule.3"
Two years later, in Durham v. Walters,35 the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals addressed a second case in which the caveators
missed the six-month time limit for filing a caveat petition. In
dicta, 6 the court refused to apply the exception established in
SoleY.3  Therefore, what at first under Sole appeared to be a common
law exception to the caveat filing deadline, became, after Durham, a
limited exception available only in cases which closely follow the
facts in the Sole case.
In Durham, thirty-nine distant relatives of the testator missed
the filing deadline by nine months. None of them received personal
notice of the probate of the will, 38 but some did live in the county
representative under a will, even if there be a subsequent judicial probate or
appointment of a personal representative ....
33. In Sole, as in most jurisdictions, the actual notice was not prepared by the Regis-
ter, but by the personal representatives. The court charged the Register of Wills with
the error, noting that to require greater diligence from the personal representatives than
from the Register would lead to an unduly harsh result. 52 Md. App. at 224 n.1, 447
A.2d at 508 n.1.
34. "It is clear in this case that somebody 'goofed.' It is equally clear that it was not
the appellant." Id. at 223, 447 A.2d at 508.
35. 59 Md. App. 1, 474 A.2d 523 (1984).
36. The appellants did not raise the waiver and estoppel issues before the lower
courts. Thus, any discussion of these issues in the Durham opinion cannot technically be
considered part of the court's holding. One explanation for the appellant's failure to
raise these issues may have been that the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Sole was
not issued until after the judicial probate hearing in Durham.
37. 59 Md. App. at 13, 474 A.2d at 529.
38. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1974) requires only that the personal
representative provide the Register of Wills with a list of interested persons "to the
extent known to him" so that the Register may issue the notice provided in MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 2-210 (1974). The caveators argued unsuccessfully that the failure
to notify them constituted a fraud and, in the alternative, if the personal representative
did comply with the statutes without evidence of fraud, that the terms of MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 2-210 and 7-104 violate the procedural due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In both cases, the court
rejected the caveators' argument based on the testimony and on established federal and
state case law. The court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
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where notice was published.39 In general, as in Durham, the failure
to file a timely caveat bars the court from granting relief.40 In Sole,
the court was persuaded to recognize an exception to that rule be-
cause the Register of Wills' actions directly misled the caveator,
causing her to miss the filing deadline. In Durham, however, there
was no analogous fault on the part of the Register of Wills or per-
sonal representative. The court clearly indicated that absent such
circumstances and absent any fraudulent concealment of the testa-
tor's death, 4 1 the doctrine of laches would bar the caveators' estop-
pel argument.42 The testimony in Durham indicated that the notice
clearly stated the correct filing deadline, that it appeared as required
in the newspaper, and that it was delivered to those people required
to receive it by law. The personal representative acted in good faith
and complied fully with the statute.4' The court therefore found no
justification for waiving the time limitation. The court correctly
faulted the caveators and not the Register of Wills or personal rep-
resentative for the nine-month late filing.
The Durham case presented the court with its first opportunity
to refine the Sole exception. The court addressed the issue in dicta,
despite the fact that the lower court had not addressed this issue.
The opinion is of value because it provides guidance for future ca-
veat litigation and is reasonably clear in its use of case law and
306 (1950), for the proposition that the requirements of due process may be satisfied by
publication where personal notice is either not reasonably possible or practical, as when
all possible unknown heirs would be difficult to identify. The court also cited James v.
Zantzinger, 202 Md. 109, 96 A.2d 10 (1953), for the general proposition that notice by
publication in Maryland satisfies due process of law. 59 Md. App. at 14-15, 474 A.2d at
530. See also MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 2-210 (1974), which is designed to com-
ply with the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
39. 59 Md. App. at 4-5, 474 A.2d at 525.
40. In the instant case, because a court of law considered the caveat, MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 5-207 (1974) operated as a statute of limitation for filing the caveat
petition. At the Orphans Court level, the statute limits jurisdiction. The Orphans Court
may exercise jurisdiction only when expressly conferred by statute. See MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 2-102 (1974). Therefore, the Orphans Court is without jurisdic-
tion to consider caveat petitions filed after six months. Only courts of law may consider
such exceptions as those pleaded in the Durham case. 59 Md. App. at 9, 474 A.2d at 527.
41. The court suggests that the caveators are charged with knowledge of the testa-
tor's death inasmuch as several of them were residents of the county where notice was
published. The court, citing P. SYKES, CONTEST OF WILLS IN MARYLAND § 3, at 4-5
(1941), clearly states that the caveators are charged with knowledge of their right to
caveat. When considered with the fact that the caveators missed the deadline by nine
months, the fairness of the court's decision is clear. 59 Md. App. at 13-14, 474 A.2d at
529-30.
42. 59 Md. at 14, 474 A.2d at 530.
43. Id. at 10, 474 A.2d at 528.
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waiver and estoppel principles. Unfortunately, the court was not
presented with a particularly difficult set of facts which might have
pushed the court to define its exception more clearly.
4. Limitation of Rights of Residuary Beneficiary of Testamentary
Tirust.-In Probasco v. Clark,4" the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held that the residuary beneficiary of a testamentary trust may not
successfully request the early termination of the trust 4 5 over the ob-
jections of the life income beneficiary. 46 The court reached this de-
cision even though the life income beneficiary's interest would not
be effectively altered under the residuary beneficiary's proposal.
Under the terms of the will, the testator left his son a $300
monthly payment for life out of the income and principal of the re-
siduary trust. On the son's death, the trust was to terminate and the
proceeds were to be paid outright to the Bel Air United Methodist
Church (Church) as remainderman. 47 As a result of the Church's
need to fund its building program, the Church petitioned the circuit
court to terminate the trust, which had grown from $187,551.38 to
$267,826.97. The Church asked the court to order the trustee to
pay over the balance of the trust estate, less expenses and the cost of
an annuity purchased from a reliable insurance company, which
would pay the life income beneficiary $300 a month." The circuit
court approved the plan, but required that, as an additional safe-
guard, $50,000 of the trust corpus be retained to guarantee the
monthly payments to the life beneficiary."9 On appeal, the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision.5 °
The Probasco court adopted a very traditional approach in its re-
fusal to modify the terms of the trust. The court's primary concern
was to carry out the intent of the settlor. 5 1 The court acknowledged
that courts generally possess the power to modify trust terms, but
the exercise of such power is conditioned upon the existence of
three conditions. The court must be satisfied that the facts and
44. 58 Md. App. 683, 474 A.2d 221 (1984).
45. Pursuant to MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 14-101 (1974), the remainder bene-
ficiary petitioned the Circuit Court for Harford County to order termination of the trust.
46. 58 Md. App. at 690, 474 A.2d at 224.
47. Id. at 685-86, 474 A.2d at 222.
48. Id. at 686, 474 A.2d at 222. The remainder beneficiary's novel proposal appears
to present a case of first impression in Maryland.
49. Id. at 687, 474 A.2d at 223.
50. Id. at 690, 474 A.2d at 222.
51. Id. at 688, 474 A.2d at 223. The court was equally concerned that its power not
be used "merely as a tool or device to enable beneficiaries to receive a greater income or
use of trust property ...... Id. at 687, 474 A.2d at 223.
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circumstances leading to the request for modification could not
have been foreseen by the trustee, 52 that if the terms are not modi-
fied, the beneficiary will suffer loss,53 and that some exigency, con-
tingency or emergency must have arisen out of the trust itself 54 that
"makes the action of the court indispensable to the preservation of
the trust." 55
The Probasco court correctly recognized that the testator might
have foreseen the Church's desire to expand and could have easily
provided for such need.56 The court found no threat of loss to the
beneficiary. And it refused to classify the Church's desire for the
funds for its building program as "an exigency, contingency or
emergency." 5
7
The court also rejected application of an exception to the rules
governing early termination of a trust, which would permit early ter-
mination if all of the beneficiaries are sui juris, if all of the benefi-
ciaries consent, and if the objective of the trust is not violated.
Without unanimous consent, the court cannot accelerate the trust's
termination." In Probasco, the life income beneficiary's refusal to
consent proscribed early termination.
The court's holding is supported by citation to many authorities
but the opinion is disappointing both because of its mechanical ap-
plication of prior case law and because of its technical flaws. In
52. Id. at 687-88, 474 A.2d at 223 (citingJohns v. Montgomery, 265 I1. 21, 106 N.E.
497 (1914) (agricultural land held in trust for production of crop income permitted to
be sold when land was incorporated into city limits and agricultural value dramatically
decreased); Dyer v. Paddock, 395 Ill. 288, 70 N.E.2d 49 (1946) (residential property
held in trust for production of rental income permitted to be sold after area changed to
almost exclusive commercial use)).
53. Id. at 688, 474 A.2d at 223.
54. Id. See Stellings v. Autrey, 257 N.C. 303, 312, 126 S.E.2d 140, 155 (1962); Carter
v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 6, 62 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1950).
55. 58 Md. App. at 688, 474 A.2d at 223 (quoting Stellings, 257 N.C. at 321, 126
S.E.2d at 155).
56. Id. The court suggested that, had the testator wished to give the Church money
for its immediate use, or for a use prior to the life beneficiary's death, the testator could
have provided for the purchase of an annuity just as the Church proposed to do. Id. at
690, 474 A.2d at 224.
57. Id. Implicit in the court's refusal to characterize the Church's desire as an exi-
gency, contingency or emergency justifying early termination of the trust is the equitable
notion that the Church cannot create its own emergency, plead emergency and then
benefit by it.
58. In support of this proposition, the court cited Altemeier v. Harris, 403 Il. 345,
352, 86 N.E.2d 229, 234 (1949) (family settlement agreement); New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Kann, 363 Mass. 425, 427, 294 N.E.2d 390, 392 (1973) (request to increase
annual stipend payable to last surviving annuitant). The court erroneously cites Potter
v. McLane, 247 Mass. 387, 142 N.E. 49 (1924). See infra note 59.
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Probasco, the court was faced with a novel and inventive proposal by
the residuary beneficiary. Because the proposal virtually insured
that the life beneficiary's monthly income would remain unchanged,
the court's historic reluctance to modify the terms of a trust without
the beneficiary's approval was strongly challenged. The court could
have taken this opportunity to develop the rationale behind the ben-
eficiary consent requirement, and could have reevaluated the justifi-
cation for the enduring force of judicial reluctance to modify the
terms of a trust. Unfortunately, the court did neither. Rather, it
recited various holdings of foreign cases to reach the desired con-
clusion without actually developing the Maryland case law into
which those out-of-state premises fit.5 9
B. Eminent Domain60
1. Interest Payable in Quick-Take Condemnation Proceedings.-The
Court of Appeals in King v. State Roads Commission6t held that the
compensation payable in quick-take condemnation proceedings
62
59. The court's approach appears particularly hollow in view of the technical errors
in the opinion. The court cited Altemeier v. Harris, 403 Ill. 345, 86 N.E.2d 229 (1949)
(family settlement agreement) for the premise that a trust may be prematurely termi-
nated if all beneficiaries consent and are sui generis. The Altemeier court's use of the term
sui generis is arguably erroneous. Common sense suggests that the Altemeier court in-
tended to require that all consenting beneficiaries be suijuris, or "legally competent"
rather than "peculiar." The Probasco court could and should have recognized the error
and cited Altemeier accordingly. The court instead cited with approval the Altemeier error
and then cited an equivalent proposition which requires that the beneficiaries be suijuris
and not sui generis. 58 Md. App. at 688-89, 474 A.2d at 223-24 (citing Re Bowlers' Trust
Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 87, 29 A.2d 519, 520 (1943)).
The court also miscites Potter v. McLane, 247 Mass. 387, 142 N.E. 49 (1924), as
authority for the premise that, absent an agreement of all interested parties, the court is
without power to modify a trust. Potter deals with ascertaining the intention of the testa-
tor as the cardinal rule of construction, but not with beneficiary consent.
60. See also discussion of Harford Building Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 58 Md. App. 85, 472 A.2d 479, cert. denied, 300 Md. 153, 476 A.2d 722 (1984)
infra text accompanying notes 107-115.
61. 298 Md. 80, 467 A.2d 1032 (1983).
62. Quick-take condemnations are those in which the condemnor has authority to
take land immediately upon payment into court of such amount as the condemnor shall
estimate to be the fair value of the property. MD. CONST. art. III, § 40A (state or Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore may condemn land in Baltimore City); id. § 40B (State
Roads Commission may condemn land which in its judgment is needed for highway
purposes); id. § 40C (Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission may condemn land in
Prince George's County which in its judgment is necessary for water supply, drainage
and sewer systems). Each section provides that the enabling legislation must also re-
quire the payment of all sums later awarded by a jury. Id.
In conventional condemnations, the condemnor cannot take the property until




63may include interest calculated at the prevailing market rate.
Before King, interest had been computed using the six percent statu-
tory rate.64 The market rate was held to be applicable in quick-take
condemnation cases in order to meet the constitutional requirement
that the condemnee be justly compensated for the property that was
taken.65 The statutory rate could be too low to achieve this
purpose.
In quick-take condemnations, land is taken before its monetary
value is determined.66 Thus, there is often a considerable time
lapse between the taking and full payment. 67 This delayed payment
puts the property owner in a worse position than he would have
occupied had the property not been taken because he forfeits the
significant earning capacity that immediate payment would have
provided.68 To be made whole, as the constitution requires, the
property owner is entitled to be paid interest at a rate which accu-
rately reflects the time value of the money.69
To meliorate the hardship to the property owner, the Maryland
General Assembly provided that he is entitled to interest at six per-
cent. 70 The interest is payable on the deficiency (the amount by
which the fair value as determined by the jury exceeds the deposit
63. 298 Md. at 93, 467 A.2d at 1039. King appealed the judgment of the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County contending that he was entitled to a greater rate of inter-
est in the determination of his just compensation. The court considered the issue raised
by King but held that he was not entitled to another trial to prove additional elements of
just compensation because he had not presented any evidence on this issue in the origi-
nal trial. Id. at 93-94, 467 A.2d at 1039.
64. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-106(c) (1981) provides that, in quick-take pro-
ceedings, "the plaintiff shall pay interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum .... " This
is distinguished from the legal rate of interest, which is that rate determined by the
General Assembly to be applied to judgments generally. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 11-107 (1984).
Compensation in quick-take proceedings is required by the constitution. See infra
note 65. Thus the interest rate here is not controlled by the code's "legal rate."
65. "The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be
taken for public use, without just compensation ... . MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40, 40A,
40B, 40C.
66. See supra note 62.
67. In King, the land was taken on April 26, 1977 and judgment was entered on
October 20, 1980. This was a lapse of nearly three and one-half years. 298 Md. at 87,
467 A.2d at 1035.
68. If the property had not been taken, the owner could have sold it, immediately
received the fair value, invested the funds, and earned interest.
69. "[T]he required payment is not an award of interest in the traditional sense but
rather . . . interest is a good yardstick by which to determine the rate of return on the
property owner's money had there been no delay in payment of the full amount of the
deficiency." 298 Md. at 89, 467 A.2d at 1037.
70. See supra note 64.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
into court) for the period between the taking and the court's judg-
ment in the condemnation proceeding.
In King the court held that just compensation may require inter-
est to be paid at a higher rate than that provided by the legislature.7"
The interest rate under the constitutional analysis is that rate which
compensates the property owner for the time value of his money.
The time value of money is a product of the prevailing economic
climate. The court held that the proper rate is the rate which would
be received by "a reasonably prudent person investing funds so as
to produce a reasonable rate of return while maintaining safety of
principal .. ."72
King argued that the statute was unconstitutional because the
statutory requirement that interest be paid at six percent was in con-
flict with the constitutional requirement that interest be paid at a
rate which approximates the time value of the money owed to the
condemnee.7 3 The court avoided this conflict by holding that the
statutory rate is not required but rather is merely the minimum rate
to which a property owner might be entitled.74 Although the statu-
tory language is not easily so construed,75 the alternative holding of
unconstitutionality was unacceptable. First, this alternative holding
would have placed upon the legislature the burden of articulating in
a statute an interest rate that comports with the court's discussion in
King. This would be no easy task. Second, to have no statutory rate,
as a minimum or otherwise, would create the need for additional
fact-finding in every quick-take condemnation action.7 6 Third, the
71. 298 Md. at 93, 467 A.2d at 1039.
72. Id. at 91, 467 A.2d at 1038.
73. Id. at 89, 467 A.2d at 1036.
74. Id. at 91, 467 A.2d at 1038. The court noted that this holding is supported by
decisions of the federal courts and of other jurisdictions that have construed statutes
worded similarly to Maryland's statute. The federal cases all construe the federal Decla-
ration of Taking Act as setting a floor of six percent, not a ceiling. The Act requires that
"interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum be included in the ascertainment ofjust
compensation in a quick-take proceeding." 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976). See, e.g., Washing-
ton Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312, 1322 (4th
Cir. 1983); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 812 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
97.19 Acres, 511 F. Supp. 565, 567 (D. Md. 1981). See also Department of Transp. v.
Rasmussen, 108 Ill. App. 3d 615, 439 N.E.2d 48, 59 (1982) (statutory rate of 6% con-
strued as minimum only, with proper rate to be determined by trier of fact); State v.
Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981) (the rate to which condemnee is entitled may be
more than, less than, or equal to the statutory rate); City of Buffalo v.J.W. Clement Co.,
28 N.Y.2d 241, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 269 N.E.2d 895 (1971) (statutory rate presumptively
reasonable, merely fixes a prima facie measure of the proper rate).
75. See supra note 64.
76. The minimum rate not only provides a starting point, but also provides a
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minimum rate is very helpful to the condemnor because the burden
is on the condemnee to prove that the minimum rate is insufficient
to provide just compensation.77
This holding should provide condemnors in quick-take con-
demnations greater incentive to estimate more closely and deposit
into court the true market value of the property. Previously, the
condemnor could pay a minimally reasonable deposit 78 whenever
the interest rates in the market were greater than six percent.79 The
condemnor could then earn interest at the higher rate (or forego
borrowing at the higher rate) and only pay the property owner inter-
est at six percent. The property owner, concomitantly, was without
the use of his monies and was thus foreclosed from investing the
money at a higher rate (or using it to avoid borrowing at a higher
rate to purchase like-kind property). Such conduct by the con-
demnor after King, however, will expose the condemnor to the risk
of a court determination that the market rate was higher than the
condemnor had actually earned on that money (or would have paid
had it borrowed the money elsewhere). That danger, coupled with
court costs, might compel more agreements between condemnors
and condemnees at the time of the taking80 and create fewer con-
demnation court cases.
2. Compensable Damages.-Two cases recently decided by the
Court of Special Appeals involved the determination of compensa-
ble damages in eminent domain cases. Perkins v. State Roads Commis-
sion8 1 considered whether certain damages were the direct result of
functional rate in those cases in which interest is not substantial (because of a minimal
time period or deficiency award). It thus precludes the necessity of presenting evidence
as to rates in cases when it is not worth the effort.
77. "If the property owner produces evidence that the six percent rate is constitution-
ally insufficient, he should be entitled to a higher rate of return as part ofjust compensa-
tion." 298 Md. at 91, 467 A.2d at 1038 (emphasis added).
78. The State Roads Commission must make a reasonably supportable estimate be-
cause it will have to support that estimate in court at a later date. Otherwise, the con-
demnee will most likely be awarded the amount he is seeking.
79. 298 Md. at 87, 467 A.2d at 1035-36. In King the State Roads Commission (SRC)
deposited $16,875 for property that was later determined to have a value when taken of
$64,693.50. The deficiency that was outstanding for over three years was $47,818.50.
The SRC paid approximately $10,800 of interest for the period of April 26, 1977 (date
taken) to October 20, 1980 (date ofjudgment). This was computed at 6%. Assuming
that the SRC invested this money due King at the rate of 12%, it would have accrued
$23,300. The SRC thus netted $12,500 by holding King's money. In addition, the SRC
enhanced its operating flexibility by maintaining a higher level of funds.
80. MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40, 40A, 40B, and 40C provide for 'just compensation, as
agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury .
81. 55 Md. App. 639, 465 A.2d 1175 (1983).
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the taking and thus compensable, or were consequential and un-
compensable. Griffith v. Montgomery County 2 considered that issue
and also considered whether, and under what circumstances, conse-
quential damages may be compensable.
In Perkins, the appellant had portions of her land taken by the
State Roads Commission of the State Highway Administration
(SRC) for the purpose of building an access ramp to the Capital
Beltway (I-495). 8" In addition to the taking, an alley on which the
appellant's land bordered was closed.s4 The appellant argued that
the loss of her access to the alley was compensable as part of the
taking.8 5 The trial court ruled that the denial of access to a closed
alley was not admissible on the issue of damages.86 The trialjudge
relied on Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co.,87 which
held that diminution of value of remaining (not taken) land caused
by the acquisition and use of adjoining land is consequential dam-
age and not compensable.88
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge erred in
denying the appellant the opportunity to show that the loss of access
was a direct result of the taking of the land.8 ° It agreed with the trial
judge that the damages would not be compensable as consequential
damages.9 0 However, the court held that, if the loss of access was a
direct result of the taking, then it was compensable. Because the
trial judge did not permit the distinction between consequential and
direct damages to be made, the Court of Special Appeals reversed
the judgment of the trial court.9 '
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the loss of access resulted from the taking. If not, it was to
82. 57 Md. App. 472, 470 A.2d 840 (1984).
83. 55 Md. App. at 640, 465 A.2d at 1176. The appellant's land was situated be-
tween the Capital Beltway and St. Barnabas Road (Md. Rte. 414). An access ramp was to
be built between the two roads. This necessitated the taking of a strip of appellant's
land, which abutted the Beltway, and another portion of her land, which abutted St.
Barnabas Road. Id.
84. Id. The alley was perpendicular to and joined St. Barnabas Road forming one
corner of appellant's property. It was from this corner that the SRC took the land which
abutted St. Barnabas Road. Id. Thus, the piece of taken property fronted both St. Bar-
nabas Road and the alley.
85. Id. at 642, 465 A.2d at 1177.
86. Id. at 645, 465 A.2d at 1179.
87. 187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d 918 (1947).
88. Id. at 473, 450 A.2d at 927, cited in 55 Md. App. at 645, 465 A.2d at 1179.
89. 55 Md. App. at 646, 465 A.2d at 1179.
90. Id. at 645, 465 A.2d at 1179.
91. Id. at 646, 465 A.2d at 1179. The trial court had ruled that testimony regarding
any denial of access to the alley was not relevant.
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determine whether the closing was done in contemplation of the
taking. The second determination is significant because it demon-
strates the court's interpretation of the concept of "flowing from the
taking."'92 If the alley was closed in contemplation of the taking,
then the damages suffered from the loss of access flowed from the
taking and were compensable. Any other holding would permit the
SRC to close any public way along which it contemplated the taking
of property and thus eliminate any compensation for damages re-
sulting from loss of frontage.
In summary, the court foresaw three possible determinations
on remand. First, the appellant's damages were the result of the
taking of her alley frontage property. Her damages in such case
would be compensable. Second, the damages resulted from the
closing of the alley but the alley was closed in contemplation of tak-
ing her land. Her damages in this case would have flowed from the
taking and therefore would be compensable. Third, the alley would
have been closed without regard to whether other property was to
be taken. In this case, the damages resulting from the alley closing
would not be compensable as part of the taking.
The court also considered briefly whether damages that result
from loss of access but do not "flow from the taking" are compensa-
ble. The court agreed with the trial judge's statement that damages
caused by the use of adjoining land are not compensable.9 4 But
Griffith suggests that this is not a bright line rule.
In Griffith the appellant's land and agricultural easement were
taken for the purpose of building an access road to a landfill con-
structed on adjoining land. Appellant argued that he was entitled to
damages he suffered from the project as a whole.95 His total dam-
ages included diminution in the value of his land resulting from the
adjoining landfill. The court held that the damages resulting from
the taking of his property to construct the road were separable from
92. The court reviewed 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.45 (. Sackman rev. 3d
ed. 1981), [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS] which indicates that the key to allowing com-
pensatory damages is whether they "flow[ J from the taking." 55 Md. App. at 643, 465
A.2d at 1178. The court did not accept the appellant's interpretation that a taking al-
lows a concomitant closing to be compensated even though the closing would not be
compensable without a taking. The court rejected the interpretation as too broad. It
held that the proper view of the NICHOLS' distinction is that "the damages for which an
owner is entitled to be compensated are restricted to those which 'result' or 'flow from
the taking,' not merely from the public purpose or project giving rise thereto." Id. at
644, 465 A.2d at 1178.
93. 55 Md. App. at 645, 465 A.2d at 1179.
94. Id.
95. 57 Md. App. at 479, 470 A.2d at 843.
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damages resulting from the use of adjoining property for a landfill.
Therefore, he could not recover for the diminution to his remaining
land due to the adjoining landfill. 96
Griffith suggests that the diminution to the condemnee's remain-
ing land caused by the use of adjoining taken land may be compensa-
ble in certain situations where both takings are part of the same
project. The property owner can recover if the damages to the land
not taken are not separable from the damages caused by the
taking.97
Griffith also involved claims for damages resulting from the im-
pairment of a right to cross the property taken.98 The court held
that such damages were not recoverable. The court stated that the
rule in Maryland is that "an adjoining owner is not entitled to com-
pensation where his right of access to a street or highway is not
taken away but is only made more inconvenient."99 The court con-
tinued: "When the inconvenient access is to a new highway which
does not replace an existing road there is no entitlement of compen-
sation."100 These holdings follow the general rule that interference
with or obstruction of the use of an easement must be of such a
material character as to interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of
the easement.'0 1 The court held that such interference did not exist
96. Id. at 481, 470 A.2d at 845.
97. Id. at 480-81, 470 A.2d at 844-45. The court found that the holding in Johnson
(see supra text accompanying note 88) supported this rule. The court also discussed the
triparte analysis announced in United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1982). Under that analysis, the property owner first needs to show that his taken
property was indispensable to the overall project. Second, he must show that the use to
which his taken property was put was a substantial part of the project. The third ele-
ment is that which Griffith embraces as the rule in Maryland. The property owner must
establish that the damages flowing from the use to which his taken property was put
cannot be separated from the damages flowing from the use to which adjoining taken
property was put. 57 Md. App. at 480, 470 A.2d at 844.
98. The appellant owned land on both sides of the strip of land taken for construc-
tion of the road. His predecessors in title, who once owned all the property involved,
had sold the strip of land to a utility company. The predecessors had reserved both a
right to cross the strip and an agricultural easement on the strip. These property rights
were included in the sale to appellant of the property on both sides of the strip. The
appellant claimed the access road to be constructed on the strip (and on pieces of appel-
lant's taken property) would destroy the agricultural easement and impair the appel-
lant's right to cross. The court held that the appellant could recover for the taking of his
agricultural easement. 57 Md. App. at 485, 470 A.2d at 847.
99. Id. at 483-84, 470 A.2d at 846 (citing Turner v. State Roads Comm'n, 213 Md.
428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957)).
100. Id. at 484, 470 A.2d at 846 (citing D'Arago v. State Roads Comm'n, 228 Md. 490,
180 A.2d 488 (1962)).
101. Id. at 483, 470 A.2d at 846.
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here. 102
The court was aided in its decision by two factors. First, lan-
guage in the appellant's deed reserved the right to cross the prop-
erty taken "at [the appellant's] own risk."' 3 The court held that
such risk included monetary risk as well as risk of personal injury.'° 4
Second, the claim was speculative in nature because the appellants
did not proffer that a road was to be constructed on the strip of
property in the foreseeable future.'0 5
C. Procedural Issues1°6
1. Proper Party to Open and Close at Condemnation Trial.-In
Harford Building Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore'0 7 the Court
of Special Appeals reaffirmed the procedural rule that in condemna-
tion actions the condemnor, as plaintiff, has the right to open and
close at trial.'0 8 The court looked to common law and the Maryland
Rules of Procedure to support its decision.
The court refused to accept the rule, followed in federal courts
102. Id.
103. Id. at 482, 470 A.2d at 845.
104. Id. at 483, 470 A.2d at 845-46.
105. Id. at 484, 470 A.2d at 846.
106. Other Developments:
1. In Boyd v. Supervisor of Assessments, 57 Md. App. 603, 471 A.2d 749
(1984), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals dismissed appellant's case for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The appellant filed suit over the tax assessment of his
home. Maryland law allows an appeal of the asssessment to the Property Assessment
Board of Baltimore City and an appeal of the Board's decision to the Tax Court. MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 81, §§ 228-229 (1980 & Supp. 1983). Boyd did not appear before the
Board, but he appealed the Board's approval of the assessment to the Tax Court. The
Court of Special Appeals held that Boyd's failure to appear before the Board, a failure to
take a necessary step in the administrative process, was fatal to his case.
2. Chapter 130 of the 1984 Session Laws makes a minor change in the
procedures of foreclosure proceedings. Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 130, 1984 Md. Laws 529
(codified at MD. Ann. Code art. 81, § 108 (1984 Supp.). The Act sets a limit of 10 on the
number of tax sales certificates that may be included in the bill of complaint of a single
holder if more than one property owner is involved. Under the new law, if a single
holder is holding more than 10 certificates of sale which involve more than one property
owner, he must file more than one bill of complaint and pursue foreclosure through
more than one proceeding.
107. 58 Md. App. 85, 472 A.2d 479, cert. denied, 300 Md. 153, 476 A.2d 722 (1984).
108. Id. at 90, 472 A.2d at 482. The court also considered whether the property
owner should have been allowed to use a capitalized lease agreement as evidence of the
property's value. The court held that such evidence is clearly admissible under Mary-
land law for purposes of valuation, but in this instance the trial court's failure to allow its
admission was harmless error. The court here reasoned that there was other compara-
ble evidence admitted, and that the difference between the value claimed by the prop-
erty owner and that claimed by the condemnor turned on different methods of valuation
rather than on specific value estimates. Id. at 87-88, 472 A.2d at 481.
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and in the majority of state jurisdictions,' which recognizes the
property owner as the "constructive plaintiff," and gives him the
procedural advantage of opening and closing the trial." 0 In its
opinion the court did recognize the rationale for the majority view
on this point."' In practice, the condemnor's right to take is rarely
contested, and when it is, it must be decided by the court prior to a
jury trial on the question of damages. Thus, at trial, the only ques-
tion for the jury to decide is the value of the property. At this point
the property owner must convince the jury that the condemnor's
valuation is too low. 1 2
Despite this rationale, the court refused to change the proce-
dure. The court apparently was influenced by the fact that a bill that
would have made this change was considered by the General Assem-
bly in 1970, and failed to win approval.' ' The court held that the
right to open and close at trial in condemnation proceedings re-
mains with the condemnor "until the law is amended by statute or
rule change .... "1"
In its opinion the court carefully laid out the arguments for
109. See 5 NICHOLS, supra note 92, § 18.5[2].
110. 58 Md. App. at 90, 472 A.2d at 482.
111. Id. at 88, 472 A.2d at 481.
112. Thus in practice the property owner in condemnation proceedings comes into
court bearing the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to contravene the con-
demnor's valuation of the property. If the owner fails to produce such convincing evi-
dence, the condemnor's valuation will stand. NICHOLS, supra note 92, § 18.5[2], at 18-
371, states the rationale for the majority view:
The general rule is that the right to open and close goes to the one on whom
the burden of proof lies in the first instance-upon the party who would suffer
defeat if no evidence should be given on either side. It consequently follows
. . .that the owner should have the right to open and close, and this is gener-
ally the law.
The Illinois Supreme Court has pointed out that "[wihenever the plaintiff has anything
to prove in order to secure a verdict, the right to open and close belongs to him ....
[This] is a substantial right in the person who must introduce proof to prevent judgment
against him." Liptak v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 350 Ill. 614, 618, 183 N.E. 564, 566
(1932).
In some jurisdictions the trial court has the discretion to decide which party
opens and closes. NICHOLS, supra note 92, § 18.5[2], at 18-375 & n.20. In other jurisdic-
tions the nature of the issue to be decided, for example, the right to take or the amount
of damages, will determine which party opens and closes. Id. at 18-377 to -378 & nn. 22-
26.1.
See also Ghingher & Ghingher, A Contemporary Appraisal of Condemnation in Mary-
land, 30 MD. L. REV. 301, 324-25 (1970) (inequity arises from condemnor's right to open
and close); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2D 618 (1960) (cases discussing the right to open and close
argument in condemnation proceedings).
113. 58 Md. App. at 88, 472 A.2d at 482. See S.B. 470, MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL
314-15 (1970).
114. 58 Md. App. at 90, 472 A.2d at 482.
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each side, so carefully, in fact, that it seemed to deliberately avoid
taking a position itself. The present Maryland practice is based on
common law, so the court appears to have had the power to change
the practice if it chose to do so. However, the court's references to
the "unbroken practice""' 5 in Maryland, the clear statement of the
Maryland Rules, and the failure of the legislature to act suggest that
the court believed the practice to be so well-established apart from
the common law that the decision to bring Maryland in line with the
majority position must rest with the legislature. Since there are co-
gent arguments to justify either position, this may have been the
appropriate way to handle the decision. In denying certiorari the
Court of Appeals appears to agree.
2. Foreclosure of Equity of Redemption at Tax Sale.-In Simms v.
Scheve" 6 the Court of Appeals held that a purchaser of property at a
tax sale may obtain foreclosure of equity of redemption without the
entry of a decree pro confesso against a defendant who fails to file a
responsive pleading."' Underlying the court's holding was a find-
ing that the Maryland statute regulating the tax sale procedure" l8
supersedes general equity procedures found elsewhere in the Code
and in the Maryland Rules. "' Therefore, although the Maryland
Rules required that, in equity, a decree pro confesso was necessary
before proceeding against a party who failed to respond, 0 such a
115. Id.
116. 298 Md. 1, 467 A.2d 499 (1983).
117. Id. at 8, 467 A.2d at 502. A decree pro confesso is "[o]ne entered in a court of
equity in favor of the complainant where the defendant has made no answer to the bill
and its allegations are consequently taken 'as confessed.' It is merely an admission of
the allegations of the bill well pleaded." Id. at 5, 467 A.2d at 500-01 (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 370 (5th ed. 1979)). The decree pro confesso was developed to provide
"relief [to the plaintiffs] against the delay and neglect of defendants." Id. at 6 (quoting
E. MILLER, EQuITr PROCEDURE § 272, at 338-39 (1897)).
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 70-123C (1957 & Supp. 1982).
119. 298 Md. at 8, 467 A.2d at 502. The court was persuaded by two factors. First,
the language of the statute (particularly §§ 102, 106, 107, 112) suggests that a decreepro
confesso was not to be entered before final judgment. Second, the foreclosure proceed-
ings provide explicit notice to the defendant of the consequences of inaction. Since
providing this notice is an important purpose of the decree pro confesso, requiring the
decree would only be duplicating safeguards. Id. at 10, 467 A.2d at 503-04.
120. Md. R.P. 310(b), 611, 675 (1977). The function served by these rules is now
addressed in MD. R.P. 2-613 (Default Judgment). This new rule provides that, if a de-
fendant fails to file a responsive pleading, the court will enter an order of default with
notice to the defendant. The defendant may move to vacate this order within 30 days
after its entry; if he does not do so or the motion is denied, judgment by default is




decree is not necessary in tax sale proceedings.' 2 ' The court noted
that the subpoena form required by statute in foreclosure proceed-
ings clearly warns the defendant of the consequences of his inaction.
This warning is a substitute for the decree pro confesso. 1 22 The effect
of the holding in Simms is to speed up the entry of judgment in pro-
ceedings to foreclose equity of redemption, while protecting the de-
fendant's ability to respond.
3. Time for Appeal in Summary Ejectment Actions.-In Parkington
Apartments v. Cordish,123 the Court of Appeals held that an appeal
from a Baltimore City District Court order in a summary ejectment
action 124 must be filed within two days of the trial judge's declara-
tion of his decision in open court. 125 This holding is an exception to
the common law principle that appeals may only be taken from final
judgments.
The court's decision was prompted by two factors. First, it
found that landlord-tenant actions must be governed by general
statutes, public local laws and municipal and county ordinances.'
26
When general and public local laws conflict, public local law should
prevail.' 2 7 The Baltimore City Code of Public Local Laws gov-
erning summary ejectment actions requires an appeal to be filed
within two days of "rendition of judgment."'12 8 The court defined
"rendition of judgment" as the trial judge's declaration of his deci-
sion in open court.' 2 9 Second, the court was influenced by the pub-
lic policy of the local law to expedite the hearing of summary
ejectment appeals.'o
121. 298 Md. at 8, 467 A.2d at 502.
122. Id.
123. 296 Md. 143, 460 A.2d 52 (1983).
124. CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS art. 4, § 9-3 to -8 (1980 ed. as to Baltimore City)
provides the procedure for summary ejectment actions in Baltimore City.
125. 296 Md. at 153, 460 A.2d at 57. Because this case was decided pursuant to local
law, the decision technically applies only to appeals from summary ejectment orders in
Baltimore City. However, essentially the same appeals procedure is required by state
law governing summary ejectment in all Maryland jurisdictions. MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-401(0 (Supp. 1984). Given the reasoning of this opinion, it seems highly likely
that the court will interpret the statewide law in the same manner.
126. 296 Md. at 147, 460 A.2d at 54 (citing MD. DIST. RULE lb (1981), now codified in
MD. R.P. 3-711)).
127. Id. at 149, 460 A.2d at 55 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 13 (1957)).
128. CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAws art. 4, § 9-7 (1980 ed. as to Baltimore City).
129. 296 Md. at 149, 460 A.2d at 55. The court found the definition in BLACK's LAw
DICTIONARY 1165 (5th ed. 1979) "instructive as to what the General Assembly may have
contemplated when it used the term .... ." Id.
130. 296 Md. at 150, 460 A.2d at 55. The court noted that
[t]he two-day provision undoubtedly was placed in the act to prevent tenants
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The court rejected the contention that, because the district
court had established a rent escrow fund, the appeals procedure
should be governed by the local rent escrow law, thus requiring a
final judgment before the filing of an appeal.1 3 ' It reasoned that,
because the original action was to recover possession of the land-
lord's premises for nonpayment of rent, use of the rent escrow pro-
cedure could not convert the proceeding into an ordinary civil
action.'3 2
D. Tenancy by the Entireties
1. Termination of Lease by Lessors Who Hold as Tenants by the Entire-
ties.-In Arbesman v. Winer13 3 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
"continued validity and vitality of the tenancy by the entireties es-
tate in Maryland,"' 134 and expanded the law relating to tenancy by
the entireties by ruling on a previously undecided question. The
court held that when a husband and wife own property as tenants by
the entireties, both must give their consent to terminate a letting of
the property. 
3 5
As long ago as 1878, Maryland law recognized that when hus-
band and wife hold property as tenants by the entireties neither can
dispose of the property in any way without the consent of the
other. 1 6 They are considered to be one person. The law has con-
tinued to develop along those lines.' 37 In a recent case the court
enunciated a "team theory" approach to a tenants by the entireties
estate: " 'Viewing the offer [to sell] of tenants by the entireties as
from prolonging possession by the device of an appeal. Moreover, the right of
appeal accorded the tenant would be meaningless if he could be set on the
street two days after trial as the statute clearly provides but he has no right of
appeal until the expiration of three days after trial when ajudgment absolute is
entered.
Id.
131. CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS art. 4, § 9-9 (1980 ed. as to Baltimore City).
132. 296 Md. at 153, 460 A.2d at 57.
133. 298 Md. 282, 468 A.2d 633 (1983).
134. Id. at 287, 468 A.2d at 636.
135. Id. at 296-97, 468 A.2d at 640. In Pollok v. Kelly, 6 Ir. R-C.L. 373, 8 Ir.Jur. 360
(Ireland 1856), cited by the court, it had been held that a husband had the right to
convey an interest, without his wife's consent, in property held by both as tenants by the
entireties. However, in Arbesman the court said that Pollok "arose so many years ago and
under such a different concept of the role of women from that existing today that we
regard it as lacking in precedential value." 298 Md. at 295, 468 A.2d at 639-40.
136. 298 Md. at 286, 468 A.2d at 635 (citing Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402, 411
(1878)).




being made by a team rather than the two individuals' " means that
" '[t]he continuation of an offer made in this fashion depends upon
the continuous assent of both tenants [by the entireties].' "1138
While this "team theory" approach follows from previous
Maryland cases, conceptually it can lead in two different directions.
In Arbesman, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County emphasized the
importance of the requirement of continuous assent. Reasoning
that this requires a "joint act" of husband and wife for the tenant to
remain on the premises, the circuit court ruled that when the hus-
band withdrew his consent to the tenancy, the necessary joint act
was destroyed.1 9 The effect of this approach would be to allow one
spouse to make a change in the use of the property, a result which
appears to contradict the concept of tenancy by the entireties that
has developed in Maryland law.
The Court of Appeals saw the consequences of the husband's
withdrawal of consent differently. Looking at the language of previ-
ous cases that emphasized that neither party to a tenancy by the en-
tireties owns a separate interest, that there is only one owner (the
"team"), and that husband and wife must act together to sell or
lease the property, the court concluded that both spouses must con-
sent to terminate a lease of the property. 40
The effect of this holding, in contrast to the lower court's deci-
sion, is to make it impossible for one spouse to take action regard-
ing the property without the consent of the other. This is consistent
with previous Maryland case law, and in addition gives greater em-
phasis to the active participation of both spouses in the disposition
and control of the property. This posture is more in accord with the
concept of tenancy by the entireties as it has developed in Maryland
law, which has consistently stressed the equality of each spouse in
the tenancy by the entireties relationship.' 4 1
2. Characterization of Ownership of Check Drawn to Multiple Par-
ties.-In Diamond v. Diamond,'42 the Maryland Court of Appeals re-
138. Id. at 289-90, 468 A.2d at 637 (quoting Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 235, 434
A.2d 1015, 1021 (1981)).
139. Id. at 285, 468 A.2d at 634.
140. Id. at 296, 468 A.2d at 640.
141. In its opinion the court recognized that one spouse can lease or dispose of prop-
erty owned as tenants by the entireties if that spouse is acting as the agent of the other.
However, the court emphasized that agency will not be inferred from the marital rela-
tionship alone; there must be specific evidence to support the claim of agency. Id. at
290-92, 468 A.2d at 637-38.
142. 298 Md. 24, 467 A.2d 510 (1983).
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jected the plaintiff's argument that a tenancy by the entireties
interest had been created in an uncashed insurance settlement
check 3 made payable to the plaintiff, his wife and his attorney. 44
The plaintiff hoped to establish a tenancy by the entireties interest
in the check in order to insulate his share of the proceeds against a
writ of attachment filed against him individually. 45 The court based
its decision on the fact that there was no discernible intent to estab-
lish the tenancy by the entireties interest. 146 Absent such intent the
check was held in joint tenancy.
3. Subrogation for Mortgage Payments Made by Children on Parental
Request.-In Springham v. Kordek,' 4 7 the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals considered the effect of mortgage payments made for prop-
erty held in tenancy by the entireties when one spouse and the chil-
dren made payments and the other spouse did not. The court held
that the children may be entitled to subrogation for mortgage pay-
ments made at their parent's request when that parent has a lawful
claim for the payments against a third party,' 8 in this case, her hus-
band. In addition, the court found that a spouse may be entitled to
reimbursements for mortgage payments he or she made after being
143. The insurance settlement was made in response to two actions brought by the
plaintiff and his wife against a freight company. In the first action the plaintiff claimed
damages for personal injuries. In the second action the plaintiff and his wife claimed
damages for loss of consortium. As is often the case, the insurance company made the
settlement check payable to the plaintiff, his wife, and his attorney without apportioning
the proceeds among the individual claims. Id. at 26-27, 467 A.2d at 511-12.
144. Id. at 26, 467 A.2d at 511. As part of the case at bar, the attorney requested that
a lien for his fees be given priority over satisfaction of the writ. The Court of Appeals,
like the lower courts, rejected the request and cited numerous Maryland cases which
hold that charging liens are not recognized in the absence of a statute. Id. at 35, 467
A.2d at 516. Retaining liens are recognized but require that the attorney reduce the
property recovered to her possession. The attorney's lien failed because the insurance
company successfully stopped payment on the check. Id. at 36, 467 A.2d at 516.
145. Id. at 29, 467 A.2d at 513. A valid tenancy by the entireties interest cannot be
violated to satisfy the individual debts of either the husband or wife. Lake v. Callis, 202
Md. 581, 97 A.2d 316 (1953); Hertz v. Mills, 166 Md. 492, 171 A. 709 (1934); McCubbin
v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 37 A. 214 (1897).
146. 298 Md. at 29, 467 A.2d at 513 (citingJones v.Jones, 259 Md. 336, 270 A.2d 126
(1970) (the act of obtaining an attorney to represent both husband and wife in a damage
action falls short of showing evidence of an intent to create a tenancy by the entireties
interest in the proceeds of any recovery)).
The court never makes clear whether an intent to establish such an interest in the
proceeds is to be established before the issuance of the check or simply before the issu-
ance of the writ. Because a party may transfer his interest at any time, an intent to create
a tenancy by the entireties interest should only have to occur sometime before the issu-
ance of the writ.
147. 55 Md. App. 449, 462 A.2d 567 (1983).




Mr. Kordek deserted his wife and children in 1971 and neither
made payments for his family's support nor made any part of the
mortgage payments. Ms. Kordek continued making payments on
the property which she and her husband owned as tenants by the
entireties. After seven years she could no longer afford to make the
payments and her children did so at her request. When Ms. Kordek
died, her husband tried to sell the house. The children filed a bill of
complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to enjoin the sale,
pending a determination of their share and Ms. Kordek's estate's
share of the sale price. Mr. Kordek demurred, arguing that neither
the estate nor the children had a legal basis for recovery, and the
circuit court sustained his demurrer.
150
On appeal the Court of Special Appeals determined that a
spouse may be entitled to restitution for mortgage payments made
after desertion. The court noted that mortgage payments made
while spouses are living together are presumed to be gifts to each
other. However, mortgage payments made by a spouse who has
been deserted are not presumed to be gifts. Therefore, the spouse
who has been deserted may be entitled to his or her expenses as
carrying charges for maintaining the deserting party's interest.' 5 '
To determine whether the children acquired rights as subro-
gees for the mortgage payments they made, the court looked to es-
tablished principles of subrogation in Maryland law. 15 2 The court
held that the contribution might not have been voluntary because
the children may have made contributions on behalf of a destitute
parent at the parent's request, they may have had an interest of their
own to protect, or they may have had a moral obligation to make the
payments.15 3 If the contributions were not voluntary, the children
149. Id. at 457, 462 A.2d at 571.
150. Id. at 450-51, 462 A.2d at 568-69.
151. Id. at 457-58, 462 A.2d at 572 (quoting Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307, 309-
14, 443 A.2d 599, 600-03 (1982)).
152. The elements of legal subrogation were set forth in George L. Schnader, Jr., Inc.
v. Cole Bldg. Co., 236 Md. 17, 23, 202 A.2d 326, 330 (1964) in which the court held the
following to be essential to legal subrogation:
(1) the existence of a debt or obligation for which a party other than the subro-
gee is primarily liable, which (2) the subrogee who is neither a volunteer nor an
intermeddler, pays or discharges in order to protect his own ights and
interests.
Id. See also Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 270 Md. 11, 21, 310 A.2d 49, 55
(1973) (quoting Schnader, Inc.).
153. 55 Md. App. at 454-56, 462 A.2d at 570-7 1. The court looked at three criteria to
determine whether payments were voluntary: if one is protecting an interest of his own,
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would be entitled to subrogation.' 54 The Court of Special Appeals
remanded the case to the circuit court for trial to determine whether
the children were entitled to subrogation, and whether Ms. Kordek's
estate was entitled to contribution from the time of the desertion. 55
E. Zoning'
5 6
The Maryland courts considered a number of procedural issues
presented in zoning cases in the past year. In Howard Research &
Development Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for Columbia Concept,' 57 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Howard County Board of
Appeals had the authority to hear an appeal from a County Planning
Board decision approving a site plan.158 Howard Research and De-
velopment had argued that the Board was only permitted to hear
appeals from an administrative officer's decision under the Howard
County Code' 5 9 and that the Planning Board, being a group of
he is not a volunteer; if payment is made under a moral obligation, it is not voluntary; if
one pays a debt at another's request, and thus discharges the latter's liability, the
payment is not voluntary. Id. at 453-54, 462 A.2d at 569-70; see also Schnader, Inc., 236
Md. 17, 24-25, 202 A.2d at 326, 331.
154. 55 Md. App. at 452-55, 462 A.2d at 569-71 (citing 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation
§§ 14, 24, 25 (1974)).
155. 55 Md. App. at 458-59, 462 A.2d at 572.
156. Other Developments:
In Williams v. William T. Burnett & Co., 296 Md. 214, 462 A.2d 66 (1983), the
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed an Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals
decision, which had reclassified 20.7 acres from a residential to a heavy industrial zone.
The respondent had sought the industrial classification, even though it was in conflict
with the County's 1978 General Development Plan. He argued that his land had been
mistakenly zoned residential in a 1973 comprehensive rezoning and on the 1976
comprehensive zoning map. The respondent had conceded that ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY, MD., CODE § 2-100(a) (1976), passed in 1979, forbade a reclassification unless
there was a mistake in the comprehensive zoning map, and the reclassification would
comply with the General Plan. Nevertheless, he had maintained that the Code was not
intended to apply to a reclassification based on a mistake in a comprehensive rezoning
plan enacted before § 2-100(a)'s passage because to do so would be to apply it
retroactively. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying the section was intended to be
applicable, since the only comprehensive zoning map in existence in the County was
enacted in 1976--prior to the effective date of § 2-100(a). The court pointed out that, if
the respondent's analysis was followed, the Code would only apply to mistakes made on
maps adopted after 1979. Since there were no such maps, the Code would be
meaningless. The court reasoned that the legislative intent was to disallow
reclassifications based on mistakes in the 1973-1976 comprehensive rezoning unless the
reclassifications were consistent with the General Development Plan, and the
respondent's reclassification request was denied. 296 Md. at 220-21, 462 A.2d at 69.
157. 297 Md. 357, 466 A.2d 31 (1983).
158. Id. at 367, 466 A.2d at 36. Concerned Citizens had appealed the decision of the
County Planning Board approving the construction of a gas station. Id. at 358, 466 A.2d
at 31.
159. The Howard County Code provides that the Board of Appeals shall have the
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persons, could not be construed to be an officer. 160 The Court of
Appeals disagreed, finding that the County Council specifically au-
thorized the Board to hear appeals from the decisions of administra-
tive agencies, as well as those of individuals, when it had enacted a
local rule of statutory construction that "words used in the singular
number shall include the plural."' 6 1 Because the Maryland Code
provides that chartered counties may provide for a board of appeals
to "hear matters .. .on review of the action of an administrative
officer or agency,"' 6 ' the holding in this case may be applied to any
chartered county whose statutory board of appeals authorization in-
cludes similar language and rules of construction.
The Howard Research decision is reminiscent of dicta in the ear-
lier case of Board of County Commissioners v. Gaster163 in which the
Court of Appeals expressed doubt as to whether the Cecil County
Planning Commission was an administrative official since, it said, the
term "official" suggests an individual, not a group." While Howard
Research holds that, at least in Howard County, an "official" includes
the Planning Board, Howard Research may be distinguishable from
Gaster. Howard Research involved an interpretation of article 25A,
section 5(U) of the Maryland Code and provisions of the Howard
County Code,' 6 5 while Gaster involved an interpretation of article
66B, section 4.07(d)(1) of the Maryland Code and provisions of the
Cecil County Code. 1 66 Nevertheless, in light of a recent opinion of
the Maryland Attorney General which followed Gaster and stated
that the "official" in section 4.07(d)(1) of the Maryland Code in-
cludes a local planning commission, 6 7 and in light of Cecil County's
having a "singular includes plural" provision in its code, 16 8 it can be
expected that a local board of zoning appeals may hear an appeal
from the decision of a planning commission, whether in a chartered
power to hear and decide appeals from determinations "made by any administrative
official." HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 16.301(b) (1979).
160. 297 Md. at 363, 466 A.2d at 34.
161. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 16.106(4) (1977).
162. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(U) (1981 & Supp. 1983).
163. 285 Md. 233, 401 A.2d 666 (1979).
164. Id. at 242 n.1, 401 A.2d at 671 n.1.
165. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(U) (1981 & Supp. 1983); HOWARD COUNTY, MD.,
CODE § 16.106(4) (1977).
166. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d)(1) (1983); CECIL COUNTY, MD., CODE § 47-
46(d)(l)(a) (1970 & Supp. 1980).
167. See 64 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 349 (1979).
168. CECIL COUNTY, MD., CODE § 47-1(f (1970 & Supp. 1980) ("The singular
number includes the plural.").
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or non-chartered county and whether or not a local rule of construc-
tion explicitly includes the commission in its definition of "official."
In two cases, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether
the actions of local administrative bodies in allowing a rezoning and
variance were proper. In Floyd v. County Council1 69 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that the Prince George's County Council, meeting
as an administrative body, had not acted arbitrarily when it reclassi-
fied property from a residential zone to a floating employment insti-
tutional area zone even though the floating zone did not comply
with the Master Plan's map.' 70 The court reasoned that the local
code created a flexible standard for review of rezoning proposals,
permitting their approval even if they are inconsistent with the
Plan's map as long as they are consistent with the Plan's princi-
ples.' 7 1 The court also noted that the trial court had erred in its
review of the Council's decision when it considered evidence re-
garding a Plan amendment that supported the rezoning but which
had been enacted subsequent to the Council's decision on the rezon-
ing proposal, 172 but this was not reversible error because it did not
cause the trial court to overturn the Council's decision. With or
without the additional evidence, the Council's action was
justifiable. 173
In Klein v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 174 the Court of Special Appeals
overturned the denial of a variance by the Harford County Board of
Appeals because it had acted arbitrarily, first, in imposing a more
stringent requirement on the applicant than that mandated by the
County's zoning ordinance1 75 and, second, in using the denial of the
request to punish the applicant for an earlier zoning violation. 176
169. 55 Md. App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983).
170. Id. at 257, 461 A.2d at 82.
171. Id. at 256-57, 461 A.2d at 82 (citing PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-
591(b)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1981)).
172. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 156-57, 210 A.2d 505,
512 (1965).
173. Under Meltzer, if the additional evidence had caused the trial court to overrule
the Council, there would have been reversible error because the trial court would have
gone beyond its role as a reviewer of an administrative decision and done the rezoning
itself, a function reserved to the Council. Id. at 156, 210 A.2d at 512.
174. 55 Md. App. 324, 462 A.2d 546 (1983).
175. Id. at 337, 462 A.2d at 554. The Board of Appeals denied the variance, stating
that Colonial had not complied with Harford County Zoning Ordinance § 15.051 be-
cause Colonial had not met its burden of proof that it had the best possible means for fire
protection. Section 15.051 only requires that the best practicable means be provided. See
HARFORD COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 15, § 15.051 (1979) (repealed 1982).
176. 55 Md. App. at 337, 462 A.2d at 554. Colonial had failed to fully comply with
conditions imposed on an original 1965 conditional use permit. The Board of Appeals
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The court declared that "[i]t is an improper exercise of the Board's
and Hearing Examiner's function to transform zoning application
proceedings into a violation and enforcement process."' 1 7 7 It based
its finding on several out-of-state cases, 178 apparently making new
law in Maryland. In so holding, the court has removed an effective,
albeit illegal, enforcement tool from county zoning officials, forcing
them to fall back on the more conventional, sometimes cumbersome
and ineffective remedies permitted by their ordinances.
In Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Friend-
ship Heights,1 79 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied ex-
isting Maryland law in deciding a number of zoning matters
concerning right to appeal, standing, and judicial review of zoning
decisions. After extensive hearings, the Maryland-National Capital
Park and Planning Commission approved a building and road ex-
tension site plan pursuant to its zoning ordinance authority.'
8 0
Friendship Heights, a special taxing district, appealed to the Mont-
gomery County Circuit Court' 8 ' contending that the approval was
arbitrarily made, that the Commission should have considered evi-
dence submitted substantially after the Commission's deadline,
8 1
and that, as a special taxing district, Friendship Heights had veto
power over any road constructed partially within its boundaries.
183
The circuit court dismissed the case, holding that, since the Mont-
gomery County Code did not require hearings prior to site plan ap-
provals, there was not a contested case and, therefore, no right of
cited this lack of compliance as a reason for denying Colonial's 1979 variance request.
Id.
177. Id. at 338, 462 A.2d at 554.
178. Id. The court also held that the resjudicata doctrine does not apply to adminis-
trative proceedings as an inflexible rule of law. Colonial applied for a conditional use
permit in 1976 which was denied by a hearing examiner based on an error of law. The
decision was reversed by the circuit court, but reinstated by the Court of Appeals be-
cause proper appellate procedure was not followed. The Court of Special Appeals held
that it would be impermissible to allow resjudicata to perpetuate the illegality, especially
because there was a substantial change in conditions, and an error of law in the first
decision. Id. at 340-41, 462 A.2d at 556.
179. 57 Md. App. 69, 468 A.2d 1353 (1984).
180. Id. at 75, 468 A.2d at 1356.
181. The appeal was taken pursuant to the Maryland Code which states in pertinent
part that "any party aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case . ..is entitled to
judicial review thereof under this subtitle." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255 (1982).
182. Friendship Heights submitted expert studies 24 days after the final date set by
the Planning Board for final evidence submittal.
183. Friendship Heights was relying on the Montgomery County Code, which pro-
vides that "the governing body of such ... special taxing area shall consent thereto to
the other . . .part[y] desiring to construct such road or public way." MONTGOMERY
COUNTYr, MD., CODE § 49-57 (1977).
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appeal to the circuit court. 18 4 However, for purposes of judicial
economy, the circuit court addressed the substantive issues raised
by Friendship Heights.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's dis-
missal. It held that Friendship Heights, as a special taxing district,
did have legal standing to appeal to the circuit court because of the
potentially adverse economic impact of the Commission's deci-
sion.'8 5 Furthermore, since a Montgomery County site plan review
hearing is statutorily mandated, 8 6 it is a "contested case" and sub-
ject to judicial review.' 8 7 The court also noted that the Commis-
sion, even though nominally successful below, could appeal since it
was prejudiced by the circuit court's "no contested case" decision,
which would have permitted an attack on a site planning decision of
the Commission through a mandamus, declaratory, or injunctive ac-
tion for three years.'88 A decision on the merits would have re-
quired that any appeal be taken within thirty days.'8 9 Therefore, the
circuit court's dismissal was prejudicial to the Commission by ex-
posing it to attack for three years rather than thirty days.
Reaching the merits, the court held, first, that because the dead-
lines for the submission of evidence to the Commission were
deemed fair, it was not arbitrary for the Commission to refuse to
review evidence submitted twenty-four days after the deadline, 90 as
Friendship Heights contended. Second, Friendship Heights had no
legal right to veto the road construction since veto authority is given
184. 57 Md. App. at 76 & n.2, 468 A.2d at 1356 & n.2.
185. Id. at 78, 468 A.2d at 1357. The court also noted that, under the Maryland Code,
Friendship Heights could be an aggrieved party and, therefore, could meet the second
condition precedent to appeal to a circuit court from an administrative decision, as held
in Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 256A (1982).
186. The site plan hearings were required under the Montgomery County Planning
Board's procedural rules. An agency must adhere to its rules and regulations or its
decision will be struck down under the Accardi doctrine. United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). The court therefore reasoned that the hearing was
required by law.
187. Since the hearing was required by law it fell within the contested case definition
of MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 244(d) (1982). An aggrieved party in a contested case is
entitled to judicial review. Id. § 255(a).
188. 57 Md. App. at 78, 468 A.2d at 1357.
189. "An order for appeal shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the action
appealed from ..... " MD. R.P. B4a.
190. 57 Md. App. at 90, 468 A.2d at 1363. The court held that "[als a matter of
fundamental fairness to all participants . . . there must be a definite date after which




here to ensure that construction standards are met, 91 rather than to
ensure that a community does not get a road it does not want. Fi-
nally, the court held that the Commission's decision was supported
by substantial evidence and was reasonable, and, therefore, should
stand because "[t]he standard of review on appeal of administrative
actions is whether a reasoning mind could have reached the factual
conclusion decided by the agency."'' 92
In Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission, the
Court of Special Appeals applied existing Maryland law in deciding
a number of zoning-related matters concerning right to appeal,
standing, and judicial review. Since the case involves a strict appli-
cation of existing law to facts, it is of limited significance.
F. Other 193
1. Rights of Receivers of Real Property.-In Ivy Hill Association v.
Kluckhuhn,t 94 the Court of Appeals extended to real property claims
a rule that it has consistently applied to claims against personal
191. 57 Md. App. at 85-86, 468 A.2d at 1361. See supra note 183. The court con-
strued the language in § 49-57 of the Montgomery County Code to be permissive, al-
lowing parties to waive their standards for road construction within their boundaries,
but not granting veto authority over road construction. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.,
CODE § 49-57 (1977).
192. 57 Md. App. at 83, 468 A.2d at 1360 (citing Public Service Comm'n v. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co., 274 Md. 357, 329 A.2d 691 (1974)).
193. Other Developments:
Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church was affiliated with the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. It was incorporated in Maryland
as required by United's Book of Order, and was bound by its bylaws to United's rules
and constitution. As a consequence of a dispute with United, Babcock sought in 1980 to
sever its ties with United and transferred its property without United's consent to
another local church, which was not affiliated with United. Contending that the transfer
violated its constitution, United took possession of the property, and Babcock brought
an ejectment action.
In Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Baltimore, 296 Md.
573, 464 A.2d 1008 (1983), the Maryland Court of Appeals, wisely avoiding
entanglement in a discussion of church doctrine, applied straightforward concepts of
corporate law to reach the conclusion that a local affiliate of the United Presbyterian
Church could not transfer its church property without the presbytery's consent. The
court considered the secular aspects of the local church's bylaws and constitution before
determining that, under Maryland corporation law, the local congregation could neither
sell nor give the property away because "[i]t is elementary that a corporation has only
such powers as are expressly granted by its charter or by statute and such as may
impliedly be derived from its corporate purposes." Id. at 591, 464 A.2d at 1017. The
court found that, by its bylaws, Babcock was organized as part of the hierarchical
structure of United and, as such, was under the control of that larger body. By those
same bylaws, Babcock was not permitted to transfer its property without United's
written permission. Id. at 588-90, 464 A.2d at 1016-17.
194. 298 Md. 695, 472 A.2d 77 (1984).
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property that is subject to receivership. In short, the court held that
"[t]he appointment of a receiver neither affects title nor determines
any rights to the property, but rather the receiver takes possession
of the property subject to those liens and encumbrances which al-
ready may exist."'
19 5
The plaintiff, Ivy Hill Association, was successor to a receiver of
all the property of Ivy Hill Cemetery Company of Prince George's
County. The original receiver was appointed in 1953. The defend-
ant, Kluckhuhn, owned property adjacent to that of the Cemetery
Company. The disputed property was a tract of the Cemetery Com-
pany's land, which bordered Kluckhuhn's property. Kluckhuhn
claimed to have been in adverse possession of the disputed property
since 1946, or for more than twenty-five years.
196
The receiver claimed that the appointment caused the property
to be in custodia legis (in the custody of the court). The receiver con-
tended that, because the property was thus in the custody of the
court, it was beyond any claim to title. The court dismissed this
complaint, holding that the mere appointment of the receiver does
not place the property in the custody of the court.' 97 The appoint-
ment vests the receiver with the right to demand and to accept pos-
session. However, the receiver must actually take possession for the
property to be under the protection of the court. Thus, there must
be both appointment and possession by the receiver in order to
place the property in the custody of the court.' 98
The receiver also claimed that the appointment tolled the run-
ning of the statute of limitations with respect to third party claims
against the property. The court held that the receiver's appoint-
ment serves only to put him in possession of such property that is, at
the time of the appointment, in possession of the entity for which he
is acting as receiver. 199 The appointment does not interrupt the
running of the statute of limitations in favor of an adverse posses-
sor.z 00 Only the institution of a possessory action by the receiver
would cause the property to be in custodia legis and toll the statute of
limitations.20 t
The effect of the holdings in Ivy Hill is to place an affirmative
195. Id. at 704-05, 472 A.2d at 82.
196. Id. at 697-98, 472 A.2d at 78-79.
197. Id. at 699-700, 472 A.2d at 80.
198. Id. at 699, 472 A.2d at 80.
199. Id. at 701, 472 A.2d at 80-81.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 704, 472 A.2d at 82.
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duty on the appointed receiver to institute claims of possession
against any adverse possessor of property over which he has receiv-
ership. In this way the adverse possessor is not divested of his rights
by means of a judicial proceeding to which he is not a party.
2. Redemption of Leased Premises.-The Maryland Real Property
Code permits a landlord to obtain summary eviction of a tenant for
nonpayment of rent within seven days from the date the rent be-
comes overdue.2 °2 A tenant may redeem his right to possession of
the premises, however, by tendering "to the landlord .. .all past
due rent and late fees, plus all court awarded costs and fees, at any-
time before actual execution of the eviction order.1
20 3
In Berlin v. Aluisi,2 ° 4 the Court of Special Appeals held that,
under this provision a tenant may redeem the premises by tendering
the amount of rent which was judicially determined to be due at the
trial. The court held that such a tender is sufficient, even if addi-
tional rent has in fact accrued and is overdue on the date the war-
rant is executed. 0 5
The landlord argued that because the statutory language condi-
tions the right of redemption on the tender of "all past due rent" he
should be entitled to repossess the premises unless the tenant has in
fact tendered all rent which had accrued and was unpaid when the
warrant was executed. 20 6 The court admitted that the statute could
202. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401(a)-(d), (f) (1981 & Supp. 1984). These sub-
sections prescribe the procedures to be followed to evict a tenant who has failed to pay
the rent. Briefly, the landlord is to file a written complaint with the district court where
the property is located setting forth, inter alia, the amount of rent due and unpaid. The
district court will then issue a summons notifying the tenants that the trial will be held
on the fifth day following the filing of the complaint. At the trial the court determines
the amount of rent due, enters a judgment in favor of the landlord, and orders the
tenant to render the premises to the landlord within two days. (The tenant can pay, at
the end of the trial, the amount determined to be due and the complaint would be en-
tered as satisfied.) If the tenant does not pay or surrender the premises within two days
the court will issue a warrant ordering the sheriff to cause the landlord to repossess the
property.
203. Id. § 8-401(e)(1981). However, if the tenant has received more than three such
summonses in the 12 months preceding the initiation of the present action, he does not
have this right to redemption prior to conviction. Id.
204. 57 Md. App. 390, 470 A.2d 388 (1984).
205. Id. at 403, 470 A.2d at 395.
206. Id. at 397, 470 A.2d at 392. The complaint was filed on November 12, 1981. The
trial was held on December 3, 1981 and the court determined that the November rent
was due and unpaid. The warrant was presented to the tenant on December 29, 1981.
The tenant, when presented with the warrant, paid the sheriff only the amount stated as
due on the warrant (November rent). The landlord demanded that the tenant also pay
December rent which was, on December 19, also due and unpaid. The sheriff refused to
evict the tenant because the tenant had paid the amount stated on the warrant. Id. at
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be construed to bear the meaning the landlord attributed to it. But
the court found that the legislative purpose underlying the right of
redemption compelled a less restrictive construction of the statutory
language.
20 7
The court reasoned that the redemption provision was enacted
to avoid forfeiture of the premises. It was "clearly intended to me-
liorate the plight of the tenant who might be unable to pay the rent
on the day it falls due but can manage to pay it before he is actually
evicted."
2 8
The court admitted that the overall purpose of the summary
proceedings is to provide the landlord with a fast and efficient mech-
anism by which to evict tenants who have not paid their rent.20 9 The
court recognized, however, that the statutory right of redemption
was intended to benefit the tenant by providing him with an oppor-
tunity to tender the past due rent and maintain possession. The
court then concluded that because the right of redemption statute
was intended to benefit the tenant, it should be construed so as to
best effectuate this purpose. 1 0 If the tenant was required to tender
all the amounts claimed by the landlord to be due, then the purpose
of the redemption statute would be circumvented. What the court
failed to stress was that this construction would also conflict with the
purpose behind the proceedings. Although intended to benefit the
landlord by their expediency and ease, the proceedings also guaran-
tee the tenant a judicial determination of amounts due before evic-
tion can be had. This guarantee would be eluded if the tenant were
required to tender the landlord's claim of rents due without a judi-
cial determination that they in fact were due.
The court suggested that an eviction of a tenant for failure to
pay amounts that were not judicially determined could be a depriva-
tion of the tenant's property rights without due process of law.
211
But the court refrained from relying on the constitutional issue in
deciding the case. By raising the issue, however, the court intimated
the importance of this underlying constitutional guarantee.
The court also addressed the landlord's suggestion that the
sheriff should have determined how much rent was actually due
392-93, 470 A.2d at 389. This cause of action by the landlord included a writ of manda-
mus against the sheriff. Id. at 394, 470 A.2d at 390.
207. Id. at 402, 470 A.2d at 394.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 401, 470 A.2d at 394.
210. Id. at 402, 470 A.2d at 394.
211. Id. at 397-98, 470 A.2d at 392.
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when he presented the warrant to the tenant, and then required the
tenant to tender such amount to avoid eviction. The court sug-
gested that the constitutional mandate of separation of powers 21 2
might be violated if the sheriff, an executive officer, determined a
matter reserved to thejudiciary. 21 3 The court held that the sheriffs
statutory duty is merely to execute the instructions of the war-
rant. 14 This construction is supported by the district court's prac-
tice of requiring the sheriff to evict the tenant only if the tenant did
not pay the judicially determined amount as shown on the
warrant.
215
Landlords need to take advantage of the time efficiencies of the
summary proceeding in order to avoid the accrual of substantial
amounts of rent from the time the complaint is filed until the time
the warrant is served. The statutory scheme permits this period to
be as short as seven days.2 1 6 Furthermore, landlords should repeat-
edly file complaints against delinquent tenants in order to take ad-
vantage of the provision which prevents the tenant from abusing the
redemption procedure. This provision estops the tenant from re-
demption if three summonses have been issued to him in the prior
twelve months. 21 7 Although the decision appears to disadvantage
landlords, it should merely prompt them to capitalize on the effi-
ciencies and remedies provided by the summary proceeding
statutes.
3. Interest Payable in Mortgage Foreclosures.-In Weismiller v.
Bush 2 18 the Court of Special Appeals held that, when the holder of a
deed of trust or mortgage purchases the mortgaged property at a
foreclosure sale at a price below the outstanding balance owed (in-
cluding costs), the mortgagee is not required to pay any interest on
the purchase price, which otherwise may be required prior to
212. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. VIII ("That the Legislature, Executive and Judi-
cial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other;
and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or dis-
charge the duties of any other.").
213. 57 Md. App. at 398-99, 470 A.2d at 392.
214. Id. at 395, 470 A.2d at 391.
215. Id. at 400, 470 A.2d at 393.
216. See supra note 202 (i.e., five days from filing of complaint to trial and two days
from trial to issuance of summons). In Berlin, a total of 47 days elapsed between the
filing of the complaint and the presentment of the warrant. The court did not explain
the reasons for the delay.
217. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401(e) (1981).
218. 56 Md. App. 593, 468 A.2d 646 (1983).
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settlement. 21 9 The court reasoned that the mortgage debt should
be treated as a credit against the purchase price. Hence it would be
inappropriate to charge interest on a debt that has been paid.22 °
According to the court, this principle is well established in Maryland
law.22'
The resolution of this question presented a corresponding is-
sue under a Maryland statute222 which provides that a mortgagee
may continue to collect interest on a note for sixty days after the
property is sold at a foreclosure sale. 22' This provision is inconsis-
tent with the right of the mortgagee as purchaser to forego paying
interest on the purchase price of the property, because that right
assumes that the mortgage has been paid off by the purchase. 224
The court held that "[t]he mortgagee/buyer cannot have it both
ways-collecting interest on the mortgage but not paying interest
on the purchase price. ' 225 The implication is that the mortgagee
must select the position it will take, thus choosing one or the other
benefits of the law.
4. Scope of Judicial Review.-In Prince George's County v.
Silverman,2 26 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals indicated that it
is the substance and not the form of a legislative body's act which
determines the degree to which the act is subject to judicial re-
view. 2 27 At issue in Silverman was the Prince George's County Coun-
cil's indefinite tabling of a resolution that would have designated a
tract of land upon which the plaintiff held a purchase option as
219. Id. at 598-99, 468 A.2d at 648-49. This extends as well to any deposit on the
purchase price which may be required.
220. Id. at 599, 468 A.2d at 649.
221. Id. at 598-99, 468 A.2d at 648-49. The court cited cases from over 130 years of
Maryland law to support its opinion, from Murdock's Case, 2 Bland 461, 468 (1828), to
Woelfel v. Tyng, 221 Md. 539, 158 A.2d 311 (1960).
222. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105(d)(2) (1974 & Supp. 1983). This statute
applies in Calvert, Cecil, Frederick, Kent, Queen Anne's, Talbot, Caroline, Charles, St.
Mary's and Worcester Counties only, absent a contrary provision in the mortgage.
223. In Worcester County the period is 180 days. Id. § 7-105(d)(2)(ii).
224. 56 Md. App. at 599, 468 A.2d at 649.
225. Id. at 599-600, 468 A.2d at 649.
226. 58 Md. App. 41, 472 A.2d 104 (1984).
227. Id. at 50, 472 A.2d at 108. The standard of review depends upon the character of
the legislature's act. The general test to determine whether a legislative action is truly
legislative in nature (as opposed to administrative or quasi-judicial) is whether the action
is one making new law. See Eggert v. Montgomery County Council, 263 Md. 243, 259,
282 A.2d 474, 482 (1971); City of Bowie v. County Comm'rs, 258 Md. 454, 463, 267
A.2d 172, 177 (1970); Scull v. Montgomery Citizen's League, 249 Md. 271, 282, 239
A.2d. 92, 98 (1968).
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surplus county property. 228 Rejecting the County's argument that
the propriety of the Council's action was not subject to judicial re-
view because it was legislative in nature,229 the court affirmed the
existing standard 230 and determined that the Council was operating
in a quasi-judicial or administrative capacity when it considered the
resolution, since the measure was not a new enactment of general
application but merely an act administering a law already in force. 23
Accordingly, the court noted that the appropriate standard of re-
view was whether the Council's action was arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory. 232 The court concluded that, measured by this stan-
dard, the Council acted arbitrarily in failing to approve the resolu-
23tion, 3 and it affirmed the lower court's issuance of a writ of
mandamus compelling conveyance of the property to the
plaintiff.23 4
5. Liability Associated with Removal of Abandoned Vehicles.-In TR.
Ltd. v. Lee,2 5 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered two
questions concerning the rights of towing companies that remove
228. 58 Md. App. at 47, 472 A.2d at 106-07. Pursuant to § 2-111.1 of the Prince
George's County Code, the County Executive had determined that the property in ques-
tion was no longer needed for public use and it was submitted to the County Council for
approval as surplus property. However, contrary to the express requirements of § 2-
111.1, the County had put the property up for sale, before submitting the matter to the
Council for approval, at an auction in which the plaintiff was the highest bidder. Id., 472
A.2d at 107.
229. Id. at 50-51, 472 A.2d at 108-09. The County relied upon the general rule that
treats a legislative body's enactment as presumptively valid and provides that the mo-
tives, wisdom, or propriety of the enactment are not subject to judicial review. See, e.g.,
County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975).
230. See supra note 227.
231. 58 Md. App. at 50-51, 472 A.2d at 108-09. The Council's action concerned the
disposition of one parcel of land, and its effect was limited to the plaintiffs rights in the
property. Moreover, far from being a new legislative enactment, the Council's action
was merely taken pursuant to previously enacted legislation, namely § 2-111.1 of the
Prince George's County Code. Id. at 49, 472 A.2d at 108. See City of Bowie v. County
Comm'rs, 258 Md. 454, 463, 267 A.2d 172, 177 (1970).
232. 58 Md. App. at 50, 472 A.2d at 108. See, e.g., County Council v. Carl M. Freeman
Ass'n, 281 Md. 70, 376 A.2d 860 (1977).
233. Apparently, the Council was concerned that the prior owners of the property had
been unfairly forced to sell the land to the County and it tabled the resolution so that an
amendment to the County Code giving prior owners of surplus county land a right of
first refusal could become effective. Since the Council's sole function was to decide
whether the property was no longer needed for public use, and it was undisputed that
the land was surplus, the court held that the Council's action was clearly arbitrary. 58
Md. App. at 54, 472 A.2d at 110.
234. Id. at 46, 472 A.2d at 106.




vehicles from public highways at the direction of law enforcement
officers. It held that, under the Prince George's County Code, (1)
state police are authorized to order the removal of abandoned vehi-
cles from any road in Prince George's County, and (2) towing com-
panies are entitled to reimbursement for towing and storage to the
time the vehicles are reclaimed by their owners. However, in the
absence of the owner's consent to the towing of his vehicle, or a
statute creating a lien, towing companies are not entitled as a matter
of law to payment beyond the date the owner demands return of his
vehicle because they have no lien on the property.236
Appellee Lee's stolen tractor trailer was overturned on an inter-
state highway in Prince George's County on October 29, 1980. The
vehicle was abandoned by the driver, and Maryland State Police or-
dered it removed from the roadway by appellant T.R. Ltd.'s towing
company, under the authority of Prince George's County Code sec-
tion 26-160. When Lee sought to recover his vehicle from the ap-
pellant's storage lot, T.R. Ltd. refused to release it until Lee paid
the towing and storage bill. Lee brought a cause of action in Prince
George's County Circuit Court to replevy the vehicle, claiming that
the appellant had no legal right to retain possession of his property.
T.R. Ltd. argued that it had acquired a lien on the equipment 23 7 and
that it was entitled to payment for the cost of righting, towing, and
storing the tractor-trailer. The trial court held that T.R. Ltd. had no
legal basis for recovery. 2
38
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court, declaring
that Maryland law23 9 gives the state police the same jurisdictional
authority to order removal of vehicles from county roads as local
police under local statute. Because the Prince George's County
Code authorizes county police to order the removal of vehicles from
all roads in the County and to charge the owner the costs of towing
and storage, 240 the court concluded that T.R. Ltd. was entitled to
compensation from Lee for righting, towing, and storing the vehicle
236. Id. at 634, 465 A.2d at 1190.
237. Id. at 631, 465 A.2d at 1188. The towing company believed it had a statutory
lien on the equipment under MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 7-307 (1975), which provides
that "[a] carrier has a lien on the goods covered by a bill of lading for charges subse-
quent to the date of its receipt of the goods for storage or transportation," and under
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 26-160 (1979), which provides that "the County
Police Department shall have the authority to impound and remove such motor vehicle
and charge the owner thereof the costs of towing, storage, and any other charges in-
curred in connection therewith."
238. 55 Md. App. at 631, 465 A.2d at 1189.
239. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 4 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
240. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 26-160 (1979).
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until Lee requested the vehicle's return.241 The court, however, de-
clared that the Prince George's County Code provision alone pro-
vided a basis for the reimbursement, not a lien. The court found
that T.R. Ltd. had not acquired a lien on the tractor-trailer and was
not entitled to storage fees beyond the point in time when Lee first
demanded his vehicle's return. Lee had not given his consent to the
initial towing, which might have created a common law possessory
lien,2 42 and the police officer, only having custody of the vehicle at
the time, could not speak for the owner. Moreover, there was no
statute to support the creation of a statutory lien.243 Therefore, not
having a lien, T.R. Ltd. was not entitled to retain possession of the
vehicle after Lee requested its return. It also was not entitled to
storage fees beyond the time of Lee's request, and therefore, only
had a limited right of recovery.
G. Legislative Developments244
1. Maryland Real Estate Time-Sharing Act.-"Time-share"
schemes provide for the ownership of, or the right to use,
241. 55 Md. App. at 636, 465 A.2d at 1191.
242. Id. at 635, 465 A.2d at 1191. Although not relied on by the court, there is an-
cient Maryland precedent for this holding. In Wilson v. Guyton, the Court of Appeals held
that, where a lost horse was found and the true owner had offered a "liberal reward,"
the finder could not retain possession, claiming a lien, while the owner sued to replevy
the horse because it would be a "gross perversion of the intention of the owner to infer,
from his offered reward, an agreement on his part, that he was to be kept out of posses-
sion of his property till all the delays of litigation were exhausted." Wilson v. Guyton, 8
Gill 213, 216 (1849). As in Wilson, the T.R. Ltd. court would not recognize a common
law lien where neither express nor implied owner's consent existed.
243. 55 Md. App. at 635-36, 465 A.2d at 1191. A statutory lien may be created when
a chattel's owner transfers custody to the lienholder. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 16-202(c) (1983).
244. Other Developments:
1. A 1984 amendment to MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-110 provides that any
deed executed or recorded before June 1, 1974 is valid despite the fact that the deed
conveys land in a subdivision which is part of an unimproved plat. The statute formerly
validated only those deeds filed between January 1, 1971 (the original enactment date of
the Revised Real Property Article) and June 1, 1974.
2. Mortgages or deeds of trust are now presumed to be released 12 years after
the "last payment date called for in the instrument of the maturity date." MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-106(c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1984). Before the 1984 amendments, the
presumption arose only after 20 years. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-106(c)(1)(i)
(1981).
3. Title 16, subtitle 2 of the Commercial Law Code creates a statutory lien in
favor of persons in possession of aircraft, boats, and motor vehicles for which they have
provided services or materials. Proceeds from a lien sale under this subtitle are
distributed pursuant to § 16-207(e). That section formerly gave an unlimited second
priority to storage fees of a third party holder. Satisfaction of this second priority
frequently depleted the entire pool of proceeds, leaving no funds for the satisfaction of
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property245 for certain specified periods over a course of years.
the claims of the statutory lien creditor or other creditors, including holders of purchase
money security interests. To remedy this, the General Assembly limited the recovery
under the second priority to a maximum of $300 (auctioneers are expressly excluded).
Any resulting unsatisfied claim for storage fees must await satisfaction as a fifth priority.
4. In response to the move from Baltimore of the Baltimore Colts football
team, the General Assembly sought to extend the eminent domain powers of Baltimore
City to include the power to acquire by purchase or condemnation any professional
sports franchise that had territorial rights in Baltimore City on or after January 1, 1983.
Act of Mar. 29, 1984, ch. 624, 1984 Md. Laws 18. Subject to condemnation under the
new provisions are all property rights of the business entity including real, personal,
intangible, and tangible property. CHARTER OF BALTIMORE CITY, MD. art. II, § 2(B).
This broad provision was thought necessary to make concrete the elusive concept of a
sports franchise.
The Act permits the City to condemn or purchase any property of the franchise
that is located in the State of Maryland. Id. That is, the franchise must have (or have
had) territorial rights to represent Baltimore City, but the condemnable property need
not be in the City. The Baltimore Colts do own property in Baltimore County, including
land and buildings at the Owings Mills training complex. This property would be
subject to condemnation under the Act.
The Act is retrospective in that the City may now condemn any franchise that had
territorial rights to represent Baltimore City on January 1, 1983. Id. This provision
permits the City to attempt to condemn the Colts even though the team has departed,
relocated in Indianapolis, and no longer represents Baltimore.
The Act also empowers the City to sell any franchise the City should purchase or
condemn under the Act. Id. This provision, in effect, enables the City to finance the
purchase of the franchise through private funds.
The innovative and unprecedented provisions of the Act raise many
constitutional issues. Among them are arguments that the Act violates the commerce
clause and sanctions the taking of property without due process. These issues will be
decided in pending litigation between the City of Baltimore and the owner of the Colts.
Mayor of Baltimore v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc., No. 885-0020 (D. Md. filed Jan. 3, 1985).
5. The language of MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-102 (1981) was refined in
1984 to expressly insure that readvanced mortgage and deed of trust funds enjoy the
same lien priority as those funds originally advanced under the mortgage or deed of
trust. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 624, 1984 Md. Laws 3134. Although title 7 does not
define the term "readvanced," it is meant to refer to and include revolving credit lines
and other similar arrangements in which the borrower may secure loans on a continuing
basis so long as the outstanding principle balance on the loan never exceeds the stated
principal amount. Arguably, the former provision provided this protection to such
mortgages and deeds of trust. However, the new language removes any uncertainty as
to the security of such readvances.
6. Prior to the 1984 session of the Maryland legislature, MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 7-101 (b) (1981) required that the assignment of mortgages for security purposes
be perfected by filing a financing statement and entering the transfer in the grantor-
grantee index and block index maintained in the appropriate county land record office.
The new provision dispenses with the requirement of these filings. MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 7-101(b) (Supp. 1984). It now requires only that an assignment of the
mortgage be recorded in the land records of the county in which the assigned mortgage
is recorded. A concomitant change was made in MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 9-
302(l)(h) (Supp. 1984).
245. The property subject to time-share developments is generally real property used
for vacation purposes, although personal property (such as recreational vehicles) may
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Time-share ownership is similar to condominium ownership in that
the buyer receives an individual interest in a particular unit plus an
undivided interest in a common area which is shared by all unit own-
ers. However, as the name implies, the time-share owner's interest
in his individual unit extends only for a limited period of time. Be-
cause time-share ownership is relatively new and is an unfamiliar
concept to many people, and because it involves creating many dif-
ferent interests in a single piece of property, there exists real poten-
tial for abuse.
Prior to 1983, no Maryland statutory or case law existed in re-
gard to time-sharing.246 In 1982 complaints about a time-share pro-
ject in Ocean City, Maryland led to an investigation by the Attorney
General's Office. This investigation uncovered a pattern of fraud
and mismanagement in a scheme which had sold time-share inter-
ests to over 1 100 purchasers.247
In response to the abuses discovered, the 1983 General Assem-
bly quickly passed some minimal regulations requiring registration
and bonding of time-share developers, and forbidding misrepresen-
tation in sales.248 In 1984 these were replaced by the Maryland Real
Estate Time-Sharing Act, a comprehensive regulatory plan.249
This Act applies to all time-share developers, defined broadly
as anyone in the business of creating or disposing of his own time-
share in a time-share project. 250 The Act distinguishes between sale
of ownership for a limited period (a time-share estate),251 and sale
of the right to use property (a time-share license).252 The only
major differences in treatment of the two within the Act appear to
conceivably be "time-shared" as well. This Act was not designed to cover personal
property.
246. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -143 (1974 & Supp. 1984), the Mary-
land Condominium Act, regulates a separate but related area.
247. Interview with Francis X. Pugh, Assistant Attorney General and Counsel to the
Department of Licensing and Regulation, State of Maryland, in Baltimore (October 15,
1984). Mr. Pugh was a member of the Governor's Task Force on Time-Sharing, which
authored the Maryland Real Estate Time-Sharing Act. The investigation by the Attor-
ney General's office led to criminal conviction of the developers.
248. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 212(d-2), (d-3), 217B, 224D (1983).
249. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 579, 1984 Md. Laws 2964 (codified as MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 1 A-101 to -128 (Supp. 1984)).
250. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11A-101(g) (Supp. 1984).
251. Id. § I lA-101(s) defines time-share estate as "the ownership during separated
time periods, over a period of at least 5 years, including renewal options, of a time-share
unit or any of several time-share units, whether the ownership is a freehold estate or an
estate for years."
252. Id. § 1lA-101(w) defines time-share license as the right to use or occupy units
over the separated time periods defined in id. § 1 A-101(s), supra note 251.
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be in the required content of the time-share project instrument, 253
and the requirement that time-share estates be transferred by re-
corded deed.254
The Maryland Real Estate Time-Sharing Act applies to all time-
share projects located within the state.255 Its provisions are en-
forced by the Maryland Real Estate Commission.256 Provisions of
the Act can be divided roughly into two areas: (a) documentation,
registration, and bonding requirements for time-share developers;
and (b) consumer protections.
(a) Documentation, Registration, and Bonding Requirements.-These
requirements were designed to accomplish three major goals: to
provide information to the purchaser; to require developers to think
through and carefully plan projects in advance; and to provide the
state with documentary evidence in case enforcement of the Act is
necessary.257
(i) The Time-Share Instrument.-The Act requires time-share de-
velopers to record a time-share instrument in the land records of
the jurisdiction in which the project is located. This instrument
must contain a description of the physical, financial and administra-
tive structure of the project. 258 Instruments for time-share estates
must include a description of arrangements by the owners to man-
age and operate the project, as well as arrangements to maintain,
repair and furnish the units. The instrument must also provide for
an owners' association, must establish rules and regulations gov-
erning the administration of the project once the purchasers take
possession, and must provide for the assessment and collection of
expenses. 259 Time-share license instruments must describe ar-
rangements that the developer has established to perform these
253. Id. §§ IIA-103,-105, -107.
254. Id. § 11A-102(b).
255. Id. § 1 IA-127. Pre-existing project instruments, documents or contracts con-
taining rights or obligations inconsistent with the Act are excepted, and project instru-
ments of a time-share project in existence before January 1, 1985 may be amended to
achieve compliance.
256. Id. § I IA-122.
257. Interview with Francis X. Pugh, supra note 247.
258. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § II A-103 (Supp. 1984). The instrument must in-
clude the project's location, description of units and common elements, amenities,
structure of time-share arrangements, method for allocating votes and expenses, and
provisions for amending and terminating the arrangement. Id.
259. Id. § 1 IA-105. Additionally, id. § 1 1A-106 provides for the timing of transfer of
control from the developer to time-share owners.
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functions for the licensees.26 °
(ii) The Public Offering Statement.-In addition to filing a time-
share instrument, the developer must draft a public offering state-
ment, which must be given to potential purchasers before a contract
is signed.26 ' This document must describe the project in detail,
must identify the managing entity, and must contain detailed finan-
cial data on the project, as well as any fees the purchaser may have
to pay after purchase.262
Exchange agreements that allow time-share owners to trade
units are common features of time-share arrangements. The details
of all exchange programs affiliated with a project must also be
spelled out in the public offering statement.263
(iii) Certificate of Registration.-All time-share developers must
apply for and receive a certificate of registration from the Maryland
Real Estate Commission. 2 ' To receive the certificate developers
must post a purchase money bond or letter of credit in the amount
of $100,000.265 In addition, each developer must designate a pro-
ject broker for the time-share project, who must be a licensed real
estate broker.266 Only licensed brokers or sales people can sell, ad-
vertise or offer time-shares.267
260. Id. § I IA-107.
261. Id. § 1 IA-I 12(a). The public offering statement must also be filed with the Mary-
land Secretary of State. Id. § 1 A-112(b).
262. Id. § 1 A-I 12(f). In the case of older buildings a detailed description of physical
condition and cost of necessary repairs must be included. Id. § 1 A- 113.
263. Id. § 1 1A-120. Such exchange programs are typically run by one of several in-
dependent national exchange brokers rather than by the time-share developer. The
statement must include a description of the mechanism for the program, protections
available to unit owners, costs, number of participants and confirmed exchanges. Id.
264. Id. § 1 A-121(a). This certificate may be denied or revoked after a hearing for
misconduct or misrepresentation. To apply for the certificate the developer must file
copies of the time-share instrument, the public offering statement, forms used for deeds
and sales contracts, and evidence that the building to be converted permits time-share
arrangements.
Generally a developer who owns 25% or more of a project must file annual up-
dates with the Commission. Id. § 1 IA-121(g).
Registration is not required if a time-share unit is disposed of by gift, foreclo-
sure, or pursuant to court order. Id. § 1 A-123.
Out-of-state developers of in-state projects will generally be certified if they are
in compliance with time-share regulations in their own states, though the Commission
can ask for additional documentation. Id. § I IA-121(h).
265. Id. § llA-121(a).
266. Id. § 1 IA-124(a). This applies to the sale of both time-share estates and time-
share licenses.
267. Id. § I1A-124(c).
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(iv) Other Limitations.-The Act places additional limits on de-
velopers attempting to convert existing buildings to time-share
projects in order to protect current residents. If an entire building
is to be converted, current residential tenants in that building must
be given 120 days notice to vacate.268 In a condominium building, a
developer may partially convert the building to time-shares by sell-
ing time-share interests in individual units. In such a building, if
thirty-four percent of current owners vote to limit time-shares,
thereafter no one can become a developer with respect to more than
one unit, with the exception of units owned by a developer before a
document specifying this limitation is filed in the land records.269
(b) Consumer Protections.-The Act forbids developers to make
any kind of misrepresentation in promoting a time-share project.27 °
This prohibition includes misrepresentation of the project itself in
words or pictures,27' and misrepresentation of the price of units, the
resale potential, the availability of exchange programs, or auxiliary
facilities.272 The Act also regulates the use of prizes, sweepstakes,
and gifts and discounts which are frequently used to attract poten-
tial purchasers to project sites.273
To further protect consumers the Act provides that a purchaser
may cancel his contract within at least ten days after signing a sales
contract. 274 During this "cooling-off period" the purchase money
must be kept in escrow by the developer.2 75
Implied and express warranties generally required in the sale of
real property are applicable to time-share estates.2 76 The Act also
provides additional implied warranties applicable only to time-
shares. These include a one-year warranty on defects in construc-
tion of individual units, and a three-year warranty on the project's
268. Id. § IIA-113.
269. Id. § llA-104(a). A vote of 80% of unit owners can remove this limitation. Id.
§ 11A-104(b).
270. Id. § IIA-119.
271. Id. § llA-119(a).
272. Id. § llA-1l9(b).
273. Id. § II A-1 19(c). It apparently is not unusual for such promotional expenses,
along with commissions and other sales costs, to consume 40% of income from sales in
large time-share projects. Interview with Francis X. Pugh, supra note 247.
274. Id. § 1 A- 114. The cancellation period extends until a copy of the public offer-
ing statement is received, the construction of the building in which the time-share units
are located is completed, or a performance bond for its completion is posted, even if this
extends the cancellation period past 10 days. Id. Section I lA-l 15 provides for a seven-
day cancellation period in the case of a resale.
275. Id. § I lA- 116(a).




The Act requires the developer to provide a managing entity
before transferring the first time-share if the number of time-share
units in a project exceeds twelve. 278 This requirement ensures that
purchasers know clearly who will be responsible for managing the
maintenance and repair of a project, and who will be responsible for
handling financial assessments. The Act also provides a procedure
for assigning and collecting assessments and limits such assessments
to those time-share owners whose units will receive some benefit
from them. 79
This Act seems to reflect an attempt to deal with possible
abuses in time-share developments by preventing them before they
occur. To comply with the Act's requirements developers must plan
the entire physical, financial and administrative structure of the pro-
ject before offering any units for sale. Potential purchasers will have
the details of this plan available to them before they make a
purchase.
The success of the Act in actually protecting consumers appears
to depend to a great degree on two factors beyond the control of
any law: the diligence of consumers in actually reading and evaluat-
ing the information available to them, and the ability of developers
to actually carry through the plans they commit to paper (although
the bonding requirements do provide protection in case they fail to
do so).
To the extent, however, that any law can prevent the kind of
fraud and mismanagement that shows the need for regulation, this
Act seems capable of accomplishing that purpose because it is com-
prehensive and detailed. Additionally, it insures that, should its pre-
ventive purpose fail, the information necessary to deal after-the-fact
with abuses will be readily available.
2. Modifications to the Maryland Condominium Act.-The Maryland
Condominium Act 280  comprises a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for condominium development and management. The
1984 General Assembly modified the Act in a number of ways.28'
277. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § llA-l17(b), (c) (Supp. 1984).
278. Id. § 1 IA-109. This may be the developer during the period he is responsible for
the project, a special association, or the council of unit owners if the project is a
condominium.
279. Id. § IIA-lI0.
280. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -143 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
281. Changes to title 11 are included in Act of April 10, 1984, ch. 23, 1984 Md. Laws
60; Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 525, 1984 Md. Laws 2782; id., ch. 570, 1984 Md. Laws
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Some of these modifications simply clarified ambiguous language or
procedures.282 Others made substantive changes in the law. These
substantive changes fall into two broad categories: (1) changes that
affect the development of or conversion to condominium projects;
and (2) changes that affect the management of such projects after
the unit owners have assumed control from the developer.
(a) Development and Conversion.-Unless the property is being
used for residential purposes, lessees under a lease exceeding sixty
years are now permitted to convert the property to a condominium
regime.28 3 Prior to the amendment the right to convert was limited
to fee simple owners.
Special notice to current tenants of a property being converted
to condominiums is required only in the case of conversions of resi-
dential rental facilities.284 Prior law required notice to all tenants
who used the property as a residence, without reference to the char-
acter of the building as a whole.
Prior law required that certain classes of tenants receive
mandatory lease extensions. The 1984 amendment continues this
requirement and in addition specifies that the lease extensions, as
well as leases continued during the required notice period, must
contain the same terms and conditions as leases prior to notice of
conversion.285
In addition to reimbursement of moving expenses for current
tenants the Act requires a minimum cash payment to qualifying low-
income residents.286
The law now provides that a condominium developer's public
offering statement must be filed with the Maryland Secretary of
State,2 8 7 and that, if a building to be converted is more than five
2936; id., ch. 575, 1984 Md. Laws 2949; id., ch. 576, 1984 Md. Laws 2956; id., ch. 580,
1984 Md. Laws 3002; id., ch. 581, 1984 Md. Laws 3006; id., ch. 583, 1984 Md. Laws
3016; id., ch. 584, 1984 Md. Laws 3019.
282. See Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 525, 1984 Md. Laws 2782 (modifying MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 11-110, -114, -116, -127, -137, -138); id., ch. 570, 1984 Md. Laws
2936 (modifying § 11-127); id., ch. 575, 1984 Md. Laws 2949 (modifying §§ 11-136,
137); id., ch. 580, 1984 Md. Laws 3002 (modifying § 11-104).
283. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102(a)(Supp. 1984).
284. Id. § ll-102.1(a)(1).
285. Id. § 11-102.1(f). Mandatory lease extensions are required for the handicapped,
elderly and low-income residents who qualify under the terms of § 11-102.1 (f).
286. Id. The minimum cash payment required is $375, plus the previously required
reimbursement for moving expenses actually expended up to a maximum of $750.
287. Id. § 1 -126(a)(1). The mandatory notice to current tenants must be included in
the public offering statement. Id. § 11-126(b)(14).
1985] 637
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
years old, the public offering statement must contain a statement of
repairs the developer intends to make.288
(b) Management.-The 1984 law made several changes in the
way condominiums can be governed by the council of unit owners.
Prior law required the consent of 100% of unit owners and mortga-
gees to effect changes in the condominium declaration289 or plat. 290
Current law requires consent of 80% of unit owners.29 ' In certain
cases which could affect the property interests of individual unit
owners, approval of all unit owners is still required to make a
change.292 Changes which could affect property interests of parties
outside the council of unit owners are not permitted at all.293 An-
other provision of the current law permits the council of unit owners
the power to grant leases in excess of one year. 94 Specific and de-
tailed requirements for adequate notice, hearings, and an appeals
process were added to the sections of the Act dealing with proce-
dures for the council of unit owners to establish a lien on individual
units295 or to make changes in the project's rules and regulations.296
A new provision was added to the law regulating the power of
the council of unit owners to allow access to "utility services or com-
munication systems for the exclusive benefit of units. ' 297 The
amendment provides that such access may be granted by a majority
vote of the board of directors. 298  This action by the board must
comply with detailed notice and hearing requirements, and may be
invalidated by the unit owners through a reconsideration process. 299
288. Id. § 11-126(b)(12). A statement of physical condition plus an estimate of the
cost of needed repairs was already required by law.
289. Id. § 11-103(c) (1981 & Supp. 1983).
290. Id. § 11-105(e) (1981 & Supp. 1983).
291. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 580, 1984 Md. Laws 3002 (codified at MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 11-103(c), - 105(e) (Supp. 1984)).
292. For example, changes in unit boundaries, percentage interest in common ele-
ments, liabilities for common expenses and rights to common profits, percentage vote
allocated to each unit, a change from residential to non-residential, or vice versa. MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-103 (c)(i), (iii) (Supp. 1984).
293. For example, changes to rights or benefits reserved to the developer or a utility,
or required by governmental authority are not permitted. Id. § 11-103(c)(ii).
294. Id. § 11-109(d)(14).
295. Id. § 11-110(d), (g). This amendment also made provisions for judicial review.
296. Id. §§ 11-11 IA, -11 ID. Section 11-124(e) specifies that in case of conflicting
provisions in the condominium's title, declaration, plat, bylaws, or rules and regulations,
the order of precedence is the order just stated.
297. Id. § 11-125(0(2). Access includes easements, rights of way, licenses, and leases
in excess of one year.
298. Most other changes require approval by at least two-thirds of unit owners.
299. Id. There are some limitations on this power to grant access: The cost of instal-
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An additional amendment established the time and procedure
for electing the board of directors after the council of unit owners
takes control of the project.3 00
3. Housing Discrimination.-The 1984 Maryland General As-
sembly expanded the statute prohibiting discriminatory housing
practices 30 ' to prohibit landlords, real estate brokers and real estate
agents from refusing to rent or sell housing to persons sixty-two
years of age or older solely on the basis of age.302 The General As-
sembly enacted the amendment despite a general lack of documen-
tation regarding widespread discriminatory practices against the
elderly in housing matters. 3
4. Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program.-In 1984,
the Maryland General Assembly responded to the plight of unem-
ployed homeowners faced with losing their homes due to mortgage
foreclosures by establishing the Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage
Assistance Program. 0 4 Under the terms of the program the
lation must not be excessive; the council of unit owners must be indemnified for dam-
ages arising out of installation; and the condominium board must have the right to
approve or disapprove the actual installation on the basis of safety concerns or
appearance.
300. Id. § 11-109(c).
301. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (1979).
302. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 468, 1984 Md. Laws 2561 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, § 20(b) (Supp. 1984)). Maryland continues to allow communities planned ex-
clusively for a specified age group to refuse to sell or rent to persons outside the speci-
fied age. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20(c) (Supp. 1984).
303. This is not to suggest that housing discrimination is not already a widespread
problem, but only that it often goes unreported. In the typical case, landlords refuse to
renew the leases of elderly tenants for no other apparent reason except age. Landlords
may prefer younger tenants who can often afford to pay higher rent and who require
fewer services. Letter from Sam Bernstein, Project Planner; Gussie Clifford, President,
National Council of Senior Citizens Ch. 381; and G. Pearl Pollack, President, Seniors
Organized for Change to the Constitutional and Administrative Law Committees of the
Maryland General Assembly (Mar. 12, 1984)(submitted in support of H.B. 1245 Hous-
ing Discrimination-Elderly (1984)).
An eviction or a refusal to renew a lease may be considered to constitute a refusal
to rent under the new statute. Unpublished opinion letter from Richard E. Israel, Asst.
Att'y Gen. of Md. to Idamae T. Garrott, Delegate (July 25, 1984)(advisory opinion which
concludes that refusals to renew a lease or an eviction based solely on age would be
actionable under the statute); letter from Risselle R. Fleisher, General Counsel, State of
Md., Commission on Human Relations to Idamae T. Garrott, Delegate (Aug. 1, 1984)
(concurring with the advisory opinion of Asst. Att'y Gen. Richard E. Israel).
304. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 593, 1984 Md. Laws 3051 (codified at MD. FIN. INST.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-401 to -409 (Supp. 1984)). Programs with purposes similar to that of
the Maryland program now exist at both the federal and state levels. The HUD Home
Mortgage Assignment Program provides emergency mortgage assistance to FHA-in-
sured homeowners. Temporary Mortgage Assistance Payments and Assignment Pro-
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Department of Economic and Community Development will make
loans to recently, involuntarily unemployed persons,3 °5 unable to
make current mortgage payments on their homes. The loan pro-
ceeds, available for up to twenty-four months, will be paid directly
to the mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor 30 6 on a monthly basis
and are to include an initial amount equal to any delinquent amount
and penalties owing on the mortgage. 30 7 To qualify, the applicants
must meet seven criteria.3 0 8 The applicant must:
1. be unemployed and currently receiving, have received
within six months, or have exhausted available state
and federal unemployment insurance benefits;
2. be the owner and occupant of property with one or two
units on which there is a qualified mortgage;30 9
3. have a reasonably good credit history prior to the
unemployment;
4. be delinquent in paying a qualified mortgage;
5. not be eligible for mortgage assistance under any fed-
eral program;
6. be reasonably expected to resume employment within
twenty-four months after the benefits are first pro-
vided; and
gram of Mortgages to HUD, 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.640-.662 (1984). Under that program,
HUD accepts an assignment of the mortgage and either suspends or reduces the mort-
gagor's mortgage payments for up to 36 months. The program requires that the mort-
gagor repay the entire mortgage amount by the original maturity date, extended up to
10 years. Pennsylvania has the recently created Homeowners' Emergency Assistance
Program which is similar to Maryland's program in both purpose and procedure.
Homeowners' Emergency Assistance, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1680.401c-.410c (Supp.
1984-85). The noteworthy differences between the Pennsylvania program and the
Maryland program are that Pennsylvania requires that (1) the mortgagor must have re-
ceived notice of the mortgagee's intention to foreclose or have mortgage payments 60
or more days in arrears, id. § 1680.404c, and (2) up to 36 months of benefits be pro-
vided the mortgagor, id. § 1680.405c.
305. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 13-402 (Supp. 1984) states the program's purpose to
be "to assist homeowners who, because of recent involuntary unemployment, are unable
to make current mortgage payments on their homes." Section 13-408 lists applicant
qualifications but does not define the term "recent." By implication, "involuntary" may
be defined as loss of employment due to any reason which would qualify the applicant
for state or federal unemployment insurance benefits because applicants must be quali-
fied to receive or have received such benefits for involuntary unemployment.
306. Id. § 13-406(a).
307. Id. § 13-406(c).
308. See id. § 13-408.
309. A "qualified mortgage" is defined as a mortgage which is (1) a lien on residential
property owned and occupied by the mortgagor; (2) the mortgage payments are delin-




7. participate in a financial counseling program. 310
The mortgage program will be funded by the sale of state gen-
eral obligation bonds.3 " The mortgagor will be required to repay
the loan plus interest,31 2 and the loans made will be secured by liens
on the mortgaged property.31 3 The loan payments paid out to the
mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor will be set at an amount
equal to the difference between the mortgage payments due and the
amount the mortgagor can reasonably be expected to pay.
314
5. Home and Housing Rehabilitation Financing, Interest on Loans.-
In an attempt to perfect earlier legislation aimed at providing low
interest home mortgages and rehabilitation financing3 1 5 to low in-
come persons, the Maryland General Assembly repealed and reen-
acted article 41, subsections 257L(c)(1) and (c)(6).3 16 Formerly, the
subsections required that the interest rates charged to participants
in the program be set high enough to cover all of the programs'
310. The counseling program will either be sponsored by the Department or be a
program approved by the Department. Id. § 13-408(7).
311. Id. § 13-405.
312. Id. § 13-407(b). It is not clear when the repayment of the loan by the mortgagor
is to begin, and over what term the repayment may be. Currently, the terms of repay-
ment are being determined on a case-by-case basis.
313. Id. § 13-406(f).
314. Id. § 13-406(b). Under the terms of the program, the interest rate charged to the
homeowner will be set by the Department of Economic and Community Development,
presumably on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the costs of the moneys to
the Department and possible losses. Id. § 13-407(l)-(3). This should allow the Depart-
ment to make these loans affordable to those who need it in much the same manner as is
provided in article 41, § 257L, Home and Housing Rehabilitation Financing. See infra at
text accompanying notes 315-20.
315. MD. ANN CODE art. 41, § 257L(b)(5) (1982) defines "rehabilitation" as
the repair, reconstruction, renovation, redevelopment, or improvement of an
existing building to restore it to a decent, safe, and sanitary condition in ac-
cordance with applicable construction, health, safety, fire, occupancy, and other
codes and standards, to ensure that the building can be maintained in that con-
dition, and to improve the general utility and attractiveness of the building.
Except as provided in § 257L(d), applicable codes and standards shall be those
in force in the political subdivision where the building is located. If the polit-
ical subdivision lacks codes and standards deemed sufficient by the Secretary to
promote the objects of this section, the Department may by regulation pre-
scribe codes and standards which shall apply in that subdivision solely for pur-
poses of this section. The Secretary may allow exceptions to any code or
standard, with the approval of the local enforcement authority when necessary
to preserve the historic or architectural value of any building undergoing reha-
bilitation pursuant to this section. "Rehabilitation" includes the provision of
utility submetering for units in a residential rental building.
316. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 597, 1984 Md. Laws 3062 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 257L(c)(1), (c)(6) (Supp. 1984)).
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costs. 3 1 7 This is no longer a requirement for low income partici-
pants.3 1 The change is in response to what is considered the pro-
grams' recent failure to serve the lower part of the income scale for
which they were designated319 and should enable the various pro-
grams3 20 to lower their interest rates to levels within the financial
reach of lower income persons.
6. Title to Street or Highway.-Before the 1984 amendments to
the Real Property Code, a grantor who owned tracts of land on op-
posite sides of a road and who transferred only one tract of that land
was irrebuttably presumed to grant to his transferee an interest to
the center of the road.3 2' The revised statute makes the presump-
tion rebuttable by providing that the grantor may expressly grant or
reserve his entire interest in the road.322 Similarly, under the re-
vised code, a grantor who owns only one tract of land which borders
on a road may defeat the same presumption by expressly reserving
his entire interest in the road.323
7. Release of Mortgage and Release of Lien.-Before amendment
by the 1984 General Assembly, to release a mortgage under Real
Property Code, section 7-106(d), the mortgagee or the mortgagee's
agent was required to execute a separate release.324 Under the
revised provision, the mortgagee or the mortgagee's agent may
317. The specific costs outlined by the statute are administrative and other expenses,
losses expected due to defaults, and the interest cost of monies used to fund the pro-
gram. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 257L(c)(6)(i)(l)-(3) (1982).
318. Eligible low income participants will be identified by the Secretary of the
Department of Economic and Community Development. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 257L(c)(6)(iii)(1) (Supp. 1984).
319. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, SUMMARY OF COMMITrEE REPORT, SEN-
ATE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, H.B. 213 (1984).
320. Two state programs were directly affected by the statutory change and as a result
were able to lower interest rates charged low income participants. These programs are
the Maryland Home Financing Program and the Maryland Housing Rehabilitation Pro-
gram. Telephone interview with Nancy Rase, Deputy Director for Maryland Home Im-
provement Programs, State of Maryland, Community Development Administration
(Feb. 15, 1985).
321. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-114 (1981). This presumption was not express,
but was implied and resulted from the construction of the former statute. The proviso
that a contrary intent could be shown in the deed to rebut the presumption appeared
only in conjunction with tracts bordering on one side of the road. The former statute
failed to include the proviso when describing a tract which borders on opposite sides of
a road.
322. Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 236, 1984 Md. Laws 707 (codified at MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 2-114(c) (Supp. 1984)).
323. Id.
324. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-106(d) (1981).
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indicate that the mortgage has been released by marking the origi-
nal mortgage "paid" or "cancelled. ' 325 This change is an attempt
to alleviate the problems formerly presented when out-of-state
mortgagees, unfamiliar with the separate release requirement,
responded to a request for a release by marking and forwarding the
original mortgage document.32 6
The clerk of court may now accept the original mortgage
marked "paid" or "cancelled" by either the mortgagee or his agent,
in lieu of an executed release, as long as the original marked mort-
gage is accompanied by an affidavit of either the mortgagee, mort-
gagor, agent of either, or party making satisfaction.3 27 The affidavit
must state that the mortgage has been paid or satisfied and must
include the land record reference where the mortgage is recorded.
In addition to this amendment, the General Assembly enacted a
measure designed to protect the mortgagor who has satisfied his
debt but who is unable to obtain a recordable release from the mort-
gagee or holder of the deed of trust. The Code now provides that
the person responsible for the disbursement of funds in connection
with the grant of title to the property may, after having made a de-
mand, bring a civil action3 28 against satisfied lienholders who fail to
provide releases within thirty days. The lienholder, his agent or
both may be held liable for the delivery of the release as well as all
costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connec-
tion with the action.3 29 The legislation should discourage satisfied
lienholders and their agents from acting indifferently to debtors
who often need prompt evidence that their debt has been
satisfied. °
325. Id. § 7-106 (Supp. 1984). MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-105(b) (1981) also
requires that the separate release, or the marked mortgage document, be recorded in
the clerk of court office in which the original mortgage or deed of trust is recorded.
326. The revision also brings the law regarding releases of mortgages into conformity
with the law regarding the release of deeds of trust. Compare id. § 3-105(d)(2)(Supp.
1984) with id. § 3-105(d) (1981).
327. Id. § 3-105(d)(2) (Supp. 1984).
328. Id. § 7 -106(e). The civil action may be brought in the circuit court for the county
in which the property is located.
329. The provision makes no mention of damages resulting from the failure to pro-
vide the release, i.e., loss of potential financing.
330. Testimony in support of the bill suggested that debtors, unable to obtain prompt
evidence of the recorded release, occasionally have been forced to incur the additional
cost of retaining a title attorney to prepare periodic reports regarding the status of the
debt. Letter from Louis Cohen, President, State of Maryland Institute of Home Builders
to Hon. Joseph E. Owens, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 21, 1984).
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8. Mechanics' Liens, Streets.-Until the recent revision to the
Real Property Code, section 9-102(b),3 3 t mechanics' liens under the
statute were available only for the installation of water lines, sanitary
sewers or storm drains.332 In 1984, the Maryland General Assembly
extended the statute to give mechanics' liens to persons who build
streets in new developments.3 3 The extension of the statute is
considered to be equitable because roadbuilders are thought to de-
serve the same convenient mechanism for collection of contractual
payments as are provided other materialmen providing basic land
334improvements.
9. Validity of Certain Deeds of Maryland Corporations.-Title 3,
subtitle 1 of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Article 335
sets forth requirements to validate certain corporate consolidations,
mergers, or transfers of assets. 36 The requirements are intended to
protect stockholders.3
3 7
Section 14-113 of the Real Property Article3 3 8 extends protec-
tion to the innocent transferees of certain assets which are part of
transactions not satisfying the requirements of title 3, subtitle 1 of
the Corporations Article. An innocent party who accepts a deed
that could be found invalid under the Corporations Article, from a
Maryland corporation, is protected if the deed is accompanied by a
certificate which is executed by the person who executed the deed
on behalf of the corporation. The certificate must state that the
grant is not part of a transaction in which there is a sale, lease,
331. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 595, 1984 Md. Laws 3058.
332. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(b) (1981).
333. Id. § 9-102(b) (Supp. 1984).
334. Prior to the reenactment of the statute, roadbuilders had to rely on filing claims
against developer's bonds or letters of credit to collect their money. The availability of a
mechanics' lien should prove to be a faster and more effective method of obtaining pay-
ment. Letter from Harvey A. Epstein, Esq., Director of Governmental Affairs, State of
Maryland Associated Builders and Contractors to Hon. Joseph E. Owens, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 1, 1984) (submitted as evidence of the Association's
support of the bill).
335. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -117 (1975).
336. For example, § 3-105 requires that for any consolidation, merger, share ex-
change, or transfer of assets to be effective (with stated exceptions), a resolution propos-
ing the transaction must be adopted by the board of directors, the transaction must be
considered at a meeting of the stockholders for which adequate notice was given, and
the stockholders must approve the proposed transaction by two-thirds of all votes enti-
tled to be cast. Id. § 3-105.
337. Beccio v. Tawnmoore Apartments, Inc., 265 Md. 297, 302, 289 A.2d 311, 314
(1972) (quoting United States v.Jones, 229 F.2d 84, 86 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 939 (1956)).
338. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.4-113 (1981).
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exchange or other transfer of all or substantially all of the property
and assets of the corporation. 3 39 The statement need not be true to
protect the purchaser. Although there is no affirmative statutory re-
quirement that such a certificate be filed, by inference, failure to do
so could result in the invalidation of the deed if there is noncompli-
ance with the Corporations Article.
The 1984 Maryland General Assembly strengthened the protec-
tion extended innocent purchasers by requiring that the person exe-
cuting the deed execute the certificate. Under the old provision, the
corporate president and vice president were the only individuals
with such authority.3 40 The purpose of the change was to protect a
party granted a deed by a Maryland corporation who had no reason
to suspect that the person authorized to execute the deed might not




339. The language required in the certificate tracks the language formerly found in
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 66(a) (repealed 1975) (current version at MD. CORPS & Ass'NS
CODE ANN. § 3-105 (1975)). Inasmuch as the certificate protects an innocent purchaser
against any violation under title 3, subtitle 1 that might render the deed void, the re-
quired language appears to have little meaning.
340. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-311 (1981) (repealed and reenacted by Act of
May 8, 1984, ch. 235, 1984 Md. Laws 706).
341. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE REPORT, SEN-
ATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMITTEE, H.B. 888 (1984).
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X. TAXATION
A. Sales Tax. Computer Software
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., Ithe Maryland
Court of Appeals considered the applicability of the state sales tax
to transfers of "canned" computer programs2 through license
agreements. Under the sales tax statute3 the sale of any tangible
personal property is taxable.4 The issue in this case was whether the
computer programs acquired by Equitable were tangible or intangi-
ble property.
Equitable's position was that the computer programs trans-
ferred intangible knowledge by the temporary tangible medium of
1. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983).
2. "Canned" computer programs are "existing, prepackaged programs of general
application." Id. at 464, 464 A.2d at 250. The programs involved in this dispute were
not designed specially or developed exclusively for Equitable, but were developed to be
sold to many different purchasers. Id.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 325 (1980). Almost all states impose a tax on at least
some computer programs. Only in the few states in which courts have held that all
computer programs are intangible property, or in states in which tangible property in
general is not taxed, are all computer programs exempt from taxation. Currently
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Oregon have
either a gross receipts tax or no sales tax and do not tax tangible property in general;
Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota and Texas have determined that software is in-
tangible and not subject to sales tax; Alabama, California, Colorado, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Wash-
ington tax canned but not customized programs; and Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming tax all computer software. Roskam, The State Sales Tax Treatment of Com-
puter Software: A State-By-State Review, 36 TAX EXECUTIVE 239, 241, 244-47 (1984).
4. The statute states in part: "For the privilege of selling certain tangible personal
property at retail.. . and for the privilege of dispensing certain selected services defined
as sales at retail . . . a vendor shall collect from the purchaser a tax .. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 325(a) (1980) (emphasis added).
" 'Purchaser' means any person who purchases tangible personal property or to whom
services are rendered .... ." Id. § 324(c) (emphasis added).
" 'Sale' and 'selling' mean any transaction whereby title or possession, or both, of
tangible personal property is or is to be transferred by any means whatsoever for a consider-
ation including rental, lease, or license to use, or royalty, by a vendor to a purchaser
... ."Id. § 324(d) (emphasis added).
" 'Tangible personal property' means corporeal personal property of any nature."
Id. § 324(e).
" 'Retail sale' and 'sale at retail' mean the sale in any quantity or quantities of any




magnetic tape.5 The Commissioner, on the other hand, claimed
that Equitable had received tangible magnetic tape enhanced in
value by the programs encoded on it.6 The court held that Equita-
ble had acquired tapes containing program copies, and since mag-
netic tapes are tangible personal property, the tapes were subject to
state sales tax.7
Equitable's losing argument was that the court should concep-
tually sever the program copy from the tape and view the transac-
tion as: (1) a transfer of knowledge; and (2) the delivery of a tape. 8
The value of a blank tape is insignificant when compared with the
value of the program, and the entire transaction should be consid-
ered as a transfer of intangible knowledge not subject to sales tax.
The court rejected this argument because it would have necessitated
the adoption "as part of Maryland sales tax law [of] a principle that
the buyer's predominant purpose for a transaction controls the clas-
sification of the acquisition as either tangible or intangible." 9
The court stated two reasons for rejection of the predominant
purpose test.'0 First, the legislative policy inherent in the definition
of price 1 -that a price should include the cost of the property,
5. 296 Md. at 461, 464 A.2d at 249.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 481-84, 464 A.2d at 259-61.
8. Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 470-71, 464 A.2d at 254. The predominant purpose test was recognized as
one of several factors to be used in determining the applicability of use tax to a transac-
tion in Quotron Sys., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 287 Md. 178, 411 A.2d 439
(1980). The taxpayer in Quotron was involved in two interrelated activities. One was
maintaining a computerized data bank of economic information which its customers
could access, and the other was installing Quotron-owned hardware on customers'
premises for their use in accessing the data bank. The Comptroller argued that these
activities were subject to the state's use tax, which taxes the exercise of any right or
power over tangible personal property. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 372(d) (1980). In
determining the applicability of the use tax to these activities, the court considered who
has control of the equipment and whether the equipment furnished had any value exclu-
sive of services rendered. Quotron, 287 Md. at 188, 411 A.2d at 444. The main factor
considered by the court was the predominant purpose of the activity, which the court
found to be the provision of services. Id.
Quotron is not controlling in the Equitable Trust case because it discussed the dif-
ferences between the provision of services and the equipment furnished with those serv-
ices. Equitable is not arguing that the transfer of the computer program is a provision of
services, but rather that it is the transfer of intangible property, namely information.
Quotron applies only when the predominant purpose is the provision of services. In Equi-
table Trust, Equitable sought to have the Quotron predominant purpose test extended to
cases dealing with tangible vs. intangible property.
11. Price is defined as:
[Tihe aggregate value in money . . .promised to be paid or delivered by a
purchaser to a vendor in the consummation and complete performance of a
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materials, labor and services used in making the product-is incon-
sistent with the conceptual severing of the blank tape from the pro-
gram copy recorded as magnetic impulses.' 2  Second, the
predominant purpose test may be inconsistent with the existing
treatment of comparable transactions. For example, the predomi-
nant purpose in a purchase of books, motion pictures, video display
discs, phonograph records, and music tapes is ordinarily to obtain
knowledge, information or data.'" Yet all these transactions are
considered purchases of tangible personal property and are cur-
rently subject to Maryland state sales tax unless there is an applica-
ble statutory exemption.' 4
Other courts which have held that tape copies of programs are
intangible property have not found these concerns persuasive.'
5
These courts applied the predominant purpose test to tape copies of
programs, yet limited the test's potential use by distinguishing com-
puter programs from books, pictures, video display discs, phono-
graph records, and music tapes." The Maryland court, however,
did not accept the reasoning of these opinions, holding that canned
computer programs are tangible property and their transfer is sub-
retail sale without any deduction therefrom on account of the cost of the prop-
erty sold, cost of materials used, labor or services cost, or any other expense
whatsoever.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324(i) (1980).
12. 296 Md. at 470, 464 A.2d at 254.
13. Id. at 470-71, 464 A.2d at 254.
14. Id. at 471, 464 A.2d at 254. Transactions that are currently exempt from sales
tax include the sale of food, newspapers, medicines, and farm products. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 326 (1980).
15. See State v. Central Computing Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1156, 1160, aftrd, 349 So.
2d 1160 (Ala. 1977) (purchase of canned programs in the form of punched cards and
magnetic tapes was a purchase of knowledge and not taxable); Honeywell Information
Sys. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 173, 575 P.2d 801, 803 (1977) (computer
software, including programs, referred to as intangible property); First Nat'l Bank v.
Department of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d 84, 91, 421 N.E.2d 175, 178-79 (1981) (computer
programs are separable from tapes, and it is information which is the substance of the
transaction); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976)
(sales tax not assessed on the transfer of custom and canned application programs); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (purchase of canned
programs on tape viewed as "the purchase of the computer process an intangible").
But see Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of the Treasury, 122 Mich.
App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1980)(per curiam) (customized computer programs
distinguished from canned programs); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 274,
465 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1983) (computer software tape purchased by bank constituted
"tangible personal property").
16. In Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, the Tennessee court distinguished the
purchase of canned programs from the purchase of phonograph records. It pointed out
that the buyer cannot hear the music in his home unless he has the record, whereas a
computer program can be conveyed over telephone lines or manually typed into the
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ject to the state's sales tax provisions.17
The Maryland legislature recently codified the court's decision
in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co. 8 In addition, the
computer's memory. Thus, there are alternative methods of acquiring programs other
than by purchase on magnetic tape. Commerce Union Bank, 538 S.W.2d at 408.
In First Nat'l Bank v. Bullock, the Texas court distinguished phonograph record
and filmstrip purchases from computer tape purchases on the basis that when informa-
tion is transferred to the computer the tape is no longer of any value or importance to
the user. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d at 550.
The Illinois court also distinguished computer programs recorded on tapes from
phonograph records, movies, and books in First Nat'l Bank v. Department of Revenue.
Although tapes are not the only medium through which computer programs could be
transferred, the media used for books, phonograph records, and movies are the only
practicable ways of preserving those articles. Thus, those articles are inseparable from
their media, whereas computer programs are separable from tapes. 85 Ill. at 91, 421
N.E.2d at 178-79.
The Maryland Court of Appeals pointed to the inconsistencies within these opin-
ions. For example, the argument that books, phonograph records and movies cannot be
transferred by other media is simply incorrect. Technology exists for producing a copy
of a movie film on disc, of a phonograph record on tape, and of a book on microfiche.
296 Md. at 476, 464 A.2d at 257.
The court acknowledged that the computer program could have been acquired
in an alternative fashion. "But, because a taxable transaction might have been struc-
tured in a non-taxable form, it does not thereby become nontaxable." Id. at 484, 464
A.2d at 261. Moreover, the fact that each tape is used only once does not change its
tangible character. A dress pattern purchased at retail and used to make only one dress
is still taxable. Id. at 484, 467 A.2d at 261.
Finally, the program copy and tape are not truly separable. Even when used in
the computer, the program copy is not separated from the tape. To remove the pro-
gram copy from the magnetic tape requires that it be overwritten, or obliterated in a
magnetic field. Id. at 476, 464 A.2d at 257.
17.
A tape containing a copy of a canned program does not lose its tangible
character, because its content is a reproduction of the product of intellectual
effort just as the phonorecord does not become intangible, because it is a re-
production of the product of artistic effort. The price paid for a canned pro-
gram reflects the cost of developing the program . . . . Simply because the
canned program on tape is much more expensive than the typical phonorecord,
the program tape is not any less tangible.
296 Md. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261.
The court did not discuss transfers of custom software programs, which are dis-
tinguishable from "canned" computer programs. See supra note 2. Custom programs
are unique and are designed for a specific individual or organization. 296 Md. at 464,
464 A.2d at 250-51. Acquisition of such a program is a purchase of the services required
to design it. Here the rationale of Quotron applies. See supra note 10. The predominant
purpose in the acquisition of a custom software program is the acquisition of the per-
sonal services of the program's designer. Services are not subject to the sales tax
provisons. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(j) (1980). But see id., § 325(a) (subjecting to
sales tax "certain selected services defined as sales at retail").
18. Act ofJuly 1, 1984, ch. 249, 1984 Md. Laws 731 added the following subsection
to the retail sales tax exemption statute:
§ 326. Exemptions - In general.
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statute provides an express exemption from sales tax for custom
computer programs.' 9 The legislature did not, however, eliminate
all potential disputes in this area. The statute establishes a subjec-
tive test to determine when a custom program results from altera-
tions made to a "canned" program. Application of this test is likely
to be the subject of future litigation.
B. Unitary Business
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co.,20 the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals considered whether a Maryland cor-
poration's enterprises, including an out-of-state division,
constituted a unitary business,"' and, thus, required the corporation
to include income from the out-of-state division in its taxable state
22income.
The tax hereby levied does not apply to the following sales:
(zz) . . . (1) Sales of custom computer software services.
(2) As used in this subsection "custom computer software" means procedures
and programs created for and to be used exclusively by a specific person.
(3) "Custom computer software" does not include a program, procedure, or
associated documentation which is mass produced and sold to the general pub-
lic or to persons associated in a trade profession or industry.
(4) If the software includes standard or proprietary routines which would ordi-
narily be taxable under this article, the resultant product must incorporate sig-
nificant creative input in order to qualify for the exemption provided in this
subsection.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(zz) (Supp. 1984). This statute provides an exemption
from sales tax for custom computer programs and indicates that "canned" programs are
subject to sales tax.
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(zz)(1) (Supp. 1984).
20. 58 Md. App. 327, 473 A.2d 469 (1984).
21. A "unitary business" is one which has unity of ownership, unity of operation and
unity of use in its centralized executive force and general system of operation. See infra
notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
22. The controlling Maryland statute states:
[I]f the trade or business of the corporation is carried on partly within and
partly without this State so much of the business income of the corporation as
is derived from or reasonably attributable to the trade or business of the corpo-
ration carried on within this State, shall be allocated to this State and any bal-
ance of the business income shall be allocated outside this State. The portion
of the business income derived from or reasonably attributable to the trade or
business carried on within this State may be determined by a separate account-
ing where practicable, but never in the case of a unitary business.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980).
The statute is in accordance with the due process and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution. See Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 290 Md.
126, 142, 428 A.2d 1208, 1217 (1981). A state may tax income from out-of-state activi-
ties when there is: a minimal contact or nexus between the interstate activities and the
taxing state; and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the taxing
state and the interstate values of the enterprise. See Container Corp. of America v.
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Ramsay, Scarlett is a Maryland corporation engaged in steam-
ship agency and stevedoring operations in Baltimore.23 Around
1958 it entered the Louisiana market with a bulk terminal busi-
ness. 24 The activities of the unincorporated Louisiana division con-
sisted of warehousing and, to a lesser extent, barge loading and
unloading, stevedoring and steamship agency work. 25 The day-to-
day management of the Louisiana division was handled locally by a
manager who reported to the corporation's president in Balti-
more;26 major policy decisions affecting Louisiana had to be ap-
proved by the Baltimore board of directors.2 7 In addition, the
Baltimore office handled several business functions on a corporate-
wide basis and required surplus Louisiana earnings to be sent to
Baltimore.28
The court applied two tests, unities and dependency, to deter-
mine whether Ramsay, Scarlett is a unitary business. The unities
test 29 focuses on the presence of unity of ownership; 30 unity of oper-
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 158, 165-66, (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980). The "minimum contact or nexus" is present when the out-of-
state activities are part of a unitary business. 58 Md. App. at 341, 473 A.2d at 475-76.
As for a "rational relationship" between the intrastate and interstate values of the enter-
prise, the "linchpin of apportionability in the field of state taxation is the unitary busi-
ness principal." Id., 473 A.2d at 476 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 459 U.S. at 439).
The exception for a unitary business is a reasonable one. In the case of a unitary
business, some of the income of the "foreign" division is the result of activities per-
formed by the "home" division and should be allocated to it. The application of an
apportionment formula is an attempt to obtain a "rough approximation" of the corpo-
rate income that is "reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing
state." 58 Md. App. at 341, 473 A.2d at 476 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Revenue, 447 U.S. at 223).
23. 58 Md. App. at 334, 473 A.2d at 472.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 334-35, 473 A.2d at 472.
26. Purchasing of supplies, banking, borrowing, solicitation and choice of customers,
fees charged, credit terms, billing, election of accounting and legal assistance, and hiring
and firing of local personnel were all handled by the Louisiana management. Id. at 335,
473 A.2d at 472.
27. Payroll for administrative personnel, a profit-sharing plan, a health insurance
plan, workmen's compensation, and liability insurance were handled in Baltimore for all
employees including those in Louisiana. Id., 473 A.2d at 473. Additionally, the man-
ager's salary was set by the board of directors in Baltimore and the board had the power
to fire him. Id., 473 A.2d at 472.
28. 58 Md. App. at 335-36, 473 A.2d at 473.
29. This test was formulated by the Supreme Court of California in Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941), aftd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
The Maryland version of this test can be found in Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md.
126, 139, 428 A.2d 1208, 1215-16 (1981)(citing with approval Butler Bros.).
30. Xerox, 290 Md. at 139, 428 A.2d at 1215-16. Unity of ownership, while not deci-
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ation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting,
and management divisions; 3' and unity of use in a centralized exec-
utive force and general system of operation. 2 The dependency test
is concerned with whether one business enterprise is dependent
upon, or contributory to, another." It does not require a showing
that the "operations within and without the state are 'necessary and
essential' to each other and to the functioning of the business as a
whole."'34 It is enough that funds from the out-of-state division be
required to be sent to the home division and used as part of working
capital.35
The court held that Ramsay, Scarlett was a unitary business
based upon the application of either the unities test or the depen-
dency test.36 It is not clear, however, whether these two tests may
produce different results and, if they do, which test is to take prece-
dence in future cases. The court stated that "the unities test has
sometimes been described as merely a more particular statement of
the dependency test."' 37 It seems that the court believed the unities
sive alone, is a factor that must be considered in a unitary business determination. 58
Md. App. at 342-43, 473 Md. at 476.
31. Xerox, 290 Md. at 139, 428 A.2d at 1215-16. Unity of operation does not require
total integration of operations. 58 Md. App. at 343, 473 A.2d at 477. It is enough that
some staff functions are centrally performed and economies of scale are produced by the
cost saving administrative activities. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't,
458 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1982). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that inte-
gration of the insurance and payroll functions as well as the existence of a corporate-
wide profit-sharing plan was enough to satisfy the unity of operation requirement. 58
Md. App. at 344, 473 A.2d at 477. See supra note 27.
32. Xerox, 290 Md. at 139, 428 A.2d at 1216. The unity of use requirement relates
principally to control. 58 Md. App. at 344, 473 A.2d at 477. Control exists where nor-
mal corporate authority may be exercised by the home division over the foreign division.
An example of such authority is a home division's approval of the acquisition of a ware-
house site for its foreign division. Id. Occasional oversight with respect to capital struc-
ture, major debt and dividends which any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary is
not by itself enough to satisfy the unity of use requirement. F. W Woolworth Co., 458 U.S.
at 369. Actual exercise of operational control is not essential if the potential for such
control exists. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 577, 587, 393
N.E.2d 330, 336 (1979), cited with approval in 58 Md. App. at 345, 473 A.2d at 477-78.
33. This test was formulated in Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 272 Minn. 403, 408, 138 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 718
(1966). Maryland adopted the test in Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md. 126, 139,
428 A.2d 1208, 1216 (1981) (citing with approval Great Lakes Pipe Line).
34. 58 Md. App. at 346, 473 A.2d at 478 (quoting Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 413, 386 P.2d 33, 37 (1963)).
35. Id. at 346, 473 A.2d at 478. See also Xerox, 290 Md. at 140-41, 428 A.2d at 1216-
17, in which a similar flow of funds was found to be present.
36. 58 Md. App. at 345-46, 473 A.2d at 478.
37. Id. at 342, 473 A.2d at 476.
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and dependency tests to be equivalent and, therefore, yielding the
same result.
More guidance from the court in this area would be helpful.
There may be cases in which application of the more general depen-
dency test indicates the existence of a unitary business but the more
particular unities test cannot be applied due to a dearth of informa-
tion. No Maryland court has held that a business was unitary, basing
its decision solely on the dependency test. A statement from the
court indicating whether application of the dependency test alone is
sufficient to show the existence of a unitary business is in order.
C. Domicile
An individual is subject to Maryland income tax as a resident of
the state if he is domiciled in Maryland on the last day of the taxable
year 8.3  The meaning of the term "domicile" is therefore crucial to a
determination of tax liability. In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Has-
kin, ° the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the meaning of
this term in three cases heard jointly.4" The common issue in each
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 279(i), 288(a) (1980).
39. 298 Md. 681, 472 A.2d 70 (1983).
40. Id. at 683, 472 A.2d at 71.
The court decided three cases together because they involved a common issue.
The cases were: Comptroller of the Treasury v. Haskin; Comptroller of the Treasury v. Valette;
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Heacock. In each case the Court of Appeals decided in favor
of the taxpayer.
The Haskins moved to Iran in 1977 to work for American Bell International
(ABI). On ABI's advice, they rented their Maryland home, placed their furniture in stor-
age, and maintained a United States bank account. Once in Iran Mr. Haskin obtained an
unrestricted visa, residence permit, and an Iranian driver's license. Both he and his wife
allowed their Maryland driver's licenses to expire. Mr. and Mrs. Haskins both took lan-
guage lessons. In January, 1979, the Haskins were forced to leave Iran because of the
revolution. ABI policy was to return employees to their prior location and thus the
Haskins returned to Maryland despite their desire to live elsewhere. Id. at 685-86, 472
A.2d at 72-73.
Mr. Valette accepted a permanent position with Westinghouse in Iran in 1974.
On the company's advice the Valettes maintained a United States bank account. They
also rented their house, stored their furniture, sold their boat and one car, and stored
another car with Mr. Valette's parents. Since Westinghouse paid only for moving essen-
tial items, the Valettes spent some of their own money in order to move. In Iran they
rented a home, because foreigners could not purchase real property, enrolled their chil-
dren in school, and purchased a car. The Valettes participated in church activities and
studied the Iranian language. They returned to Maryland when the Iranian government
took over the English-speaking school the children attended. Id. at 687, 472 A.2d at 73.
In 1969 Mr. Heacock accepted a job with the European Space Research Organi-
zation (ESRO) in the Netherlands. He resigned from his job with the federal govern-
ment and rejected the government's offer of a three-year leave of absence. The
Heacocks closed all Maryland bank accounts and opened one in Illinois. They rented
their two houses as investments and arranged for a real estate agent to manage the
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was "whether a Maryland domiciliary who accepts employment in a
foreign country and moves there for an indefinite time, but later
returns to Maryland, continues to maintain a Maryland domicile,
and is therefore subject to state income taxes for the period of his
absence." 4' The court refused to apply a special test that the Comp-
troller of the Treasury argued was applicable,"2 and applied the
long standing test for domicile.
The Court of Appeals has defined a person's domicile as:
that place where a man has his true, fixed, permanent
home, habitation and principal establishment, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and to which
place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of
returning.
Even though a person may be absent from his domicile
for many years, and may return only at long intervals, nev-
ertheless he retains his domicile if he does not acquire a
domicile elsewhere. 43
In Shenton v. Abbot 4 4 the court developed a two-part test to deter-
mine whether there has been a change of domicile. The taxpayer
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a new resi-
dence was acquired with the intention of remaining there; and (2)
there was an abandonment of the old domicile so permanent as to
exclude the existence of an intention to return to the former place."3
Accepting the Shenton test, the court in Haskin properly rejected
the Comptroller's argument that a Maryland domiciliary who ac-
cepts employment in a foreign country and moves there for an in-
definite time, but later returns to Maryland, has continued to
properties. Mr. Heacock withdrew all funds from his government pension and moved
all possessions, including a car, to the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the Heacocks
enrolled their children in Dutch-speaking schools and took language lessons. In 1972
Mr. Heacock received a promotion from ESRO requiring a move to France. The chil-
dren were enrolled in French-speaking schools. In 1976 they returned to the United
States because Mr. Heacock was concerned about job security. When they returned,
their youngest child could not read or write English. Id. at 689, 472 A.2d at 74.
41. Id. at 683, 472 A.2d at 71. The underlying issue was "whether a special test of
domicile is appropriate in this situation, or whether the existing rest of domicile can be
applied validly." Id.
42. Id. at 692, 472 A.2d at 76. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
43. Shenton v. Abbot, 178 Md. 526, 530, 15 A.2d 906, 908 (1940).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 534, 15 A.2d at 909-10.
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maintain a Maryland domicile as a matter of law.46 The court previ-
ously has emphasized that the key factor in determining a person's
domicile is intent,47 which may be shown objectively by a multitude
of factors. 48 An individual's intent, therefore, must necessarily be
factually determined in each case."9 Moreover, the meaning of
domicile and the basic principles for determining domicile have
been the same in this state regardless of the context in which the
issue arose.5" Thus the same test should be applied for all cases in
46. 298 Md. at 692, 472 A.2d at 76. The Comptroller improperly relied on Comp-
troller v. Mollard, 53 Md. App. 631,455 A.2d 72 (1983). In that case Mollard accepted a
job in Belgium for an indefinite period but intended to return to the United States.
Thus he failed to meet the requirement of intent to establish a new domicile.
It is absurd to assume that in every case in which an individual finds employment
in a foreign country he does not intend to establish a domicile there. It would be just as
absurd to assume that employment is sought because of an individual's desire to change
his domicile. Clearly the question of domicile must be decided on the facts of each
particular case. 298 Md. at 692, 472 A.2d at 76.
47. See, e.g., Dorfv. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 116, 371 A.2d 1094, 1102 (1977).
48. Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 442, 397 A.2d 1009, 1017 (1979), aff'd, 458 U.S. 1
(1982). The two most important factors are where a person actually lives and where he
votes:
Where a person lives and votes at the same place such place will be determined
to constitute his domicile. Where these factors are not so clear, however, or
where there are special circumstances . . . the Court will look to and weigh a
number of other factors in deciding a person's domicile.
Dorfv. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 116, 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977).
Other factors which the court may consider include:
[T]he paying of taxes and statements on tax returns; the ownership of property;
where the person's children attend school; the address at which one receives
mail; statements as to residency contained in contracts or other documents;
statements on licenses or governmental documents; where furniture and other
personal belongings are kept; which jurisdiction's banks are utilized; member-
ship in professional, fraternal, religious, or social organizations; where one's
regular physicians and dentists are located; where one maintains charge ac-
counts; and any other factors revealing contact with one or the other
jurisdictions.
Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 499, 325 A.2d 392, 397 (1974).
49. 298 Md. at 692, 472 A.2d at 76.
50. Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 438, 397 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1979), afd, 458 U.S. 1
(1982). Cases defining domicile for one purpose have regularly relied upon cases defin-
ing domicile for a totally different purpose. Id. at 441, 397 A.2d at 1017. See, e.g.,
Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 497-98, 325 A.2d 392, 396 (1974) (defining domicile
required to be a candidate for nomination for the Maryland Senate); Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Lenderking, 268 Md. 613, 617-20, 303 A.2d 402, 404-406 (1973) (defining
domicile for purpose of state income tax statute); Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 180-82,
186 A.2d 482, 485-86 (1962) (defining domiciliary status required to recover under un-
satisfied claim and judgment fund); Shenton v. Abbot, 178 Md. 526, 530-33, 15 A.2d
906, 908-09 (1940) (defining domicile required for probate of a will); Wagner v.
Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 291-93, 170 A. 539, 542-43 (1933) (defining domicile to deter-
mine if defendant was subject to service of process).
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which domicile is at issue.5' The court, therefore, correctly con-
cluded that "[i]ntentions cannot be assumed merely because [a]
move is connected with employment ' 52 and, in finding for the tax-
payers,53 necessarily concluded in each case that the taxpayer's in-
tent was not to remain domiciled in Maryland.
D. Real Estate Taxation
1. Auxiliary Farm Structures.-In Supervisor of Assessments v. Car-
roll,5 4 the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the issue left open
in Warlick v. Supervisor of Assessments:55 "whether accessory or auxil-
iary structures on a farm, occupied by farm employees, need neces-
sarily be assessed" on the basis of the exemption for farmland.56
The taxpayer in this case owned two tracts of land that contained
several residences at various locations. Some of these residences
were occupied by farm employees, who lived there for the purpose
of the continued maintenance and operation of the adjacent farm-
land, and the remainder of the residences were rentedY.5  The tax-
payer claimed that the homesites occupied by farm employees
qualified for lower assessment on an agricultural basis. 8
The court rejected this claim, stating that "[t]he exemption in
Art. 81 § 19(b)(1) is for '[l]ands which are actively devoted to farm
or agricultural use . . . .' Everyone must have a place of abode
. . . . The use here is residential, not farm or agricultural use."'5 9
The court implied that a different result might be reached when
51. 298 Md. at 692, 472 A.2d at 76.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 694-95, 472 A.2d at 77.
54. 298 Md. 311, 469 A.2d 858 (1984).
55. 272 Md. 540, 325 A.2d 587 (1974). In Warlick the court ruled that the area
where a farmer's dwelling is located should be assessed as if it had been subdivided out
of the farm. It does not qualify for the exemption from tax of land devoted to farm or
agricultural use. Id. at 544-45, 325 A.2d at 589-90.
56. Id. at 544, 325 A.2d at 589. The exemption for farmland is statutorily provided
as follows:
Lands which are actively devoted to farm or agricultural use shall be assessed
on the basis of such use, and shall not be assessed as if subdivided, it being the
intent of the General Assembly that the assessment of farmland shall be main-
tained at levels compatible with the continued use of such land for
farming. . ..
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(l)(i) (Supp. 1984).
57. 298 Md. at 313, 469 A.2d at 859.
58. Id.




the farm employees are required to live on the land.6 ° For example,
on a dairy farm, where the continuous presence of employees is nec-
essary for its operation, the employees' residences would appear to
qualify for assessment on an agricultural basis. This is consistent
with the legislative intent in providing the special assessment for
farmland, which is to encourage farming "in order to maintain a
readily available source of food and dairy products close to the met-
ropolitan area of the state."'" The assessment of employees' home-
sites on a non-agricultural basis, when the employees are required
to live on the farm, may increase costs enough to make the farm
unprofitable. If, as a result, the land is no longer used for agricul-
tural purposes the legislature's intent will have been defeated.
Therefore, it is possible that homesites of employees required to
live on a farm will be assessed on an agricultural basis, if the contin-
uous presence of employees is necessary.
2. Recordation Taxes.-In Hampton Plaza Joint Venture, Inc. v.
Clerk, Circuit Court for Baltimore County,6 2 the Maryland Court of Spe-
cial Appeals considered the application of the Maryland Code provi-
sion that exempts the recording of a supplemental instrument
securing debt from recordation taxes.63 Generally, an instrument is
supplemental if it "merely confirms, corrects, modifies or supple-
ments an instrument previously recorded . . . [and] does not in-
crease the amount of the debt secured by the instrument previously
recorded."64 In Hampton Plaza the taxpayer claimed that, when the
proceeds of a new instrument were used to pay off older instru-
ments, the new instrument was supplemental.65 The State argued
that the new loan was a new transaction involving a new contractual
relationship. It could not be considered as supplemental because it
had the effect of extinguishing the old instruments. 66 The court
agreed with the State and held that when a new instrument effec-
tively extinguishes old instruments, the new one cannot be consid-
ered supplemental and recordation taxes must be paid.67
60. While deciding that the exemption did not apply to the case at bar, the court
said: "There is no requirement that these farm employees live on the land rather than at
some other location." Id. at 319, 469 A.2d at 862 (emphasis added).
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(l) (1980).
62. 55 Md. App. 50, 460 A.2d 633 (1983).
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 277(h) (1980).
64. Id.
65. 55 Md. App. at 53-54, 460 A.2d at 634-35.
66. Id. at 54, 460 A.2d at 635.
67. Id. The court noted that the State's argument was supported by the Court of
Appeals' decision in Hammond v. Philadelphia Elec. Power Co., 192 Md. 179, 63 A.2d
759 (1949), in which the court said:
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E. Statutory Changes
1. Tax Amnesty Program.-The Maryland Legislature has pro-
vided for the establishment of a tax amnesty program by the Comp-
troller of the Treasury.68 The statute allows for the Comptroller to
authorize a thirty-day period during which, if a taxpayer voluntarily
files a delinquent return and pays taxes owed, the penalties and in-
terest imposed by article 81, sections 318 and 32069 will be waived.
This waiver applies only to penalties attributable to taxable years
beginning prior to January, 1983. The Comptroller has the author-
ity to determine any other conditions of the program.
2. Estate Tax-Qualified Terminable Interest Property Election.-The
Maryland Legislature has enacted a statute70 responding to the
[I]n general it may be said that where there is a new creditor, a new loan and a
new contract relationship, and where the old note holders and their debts are
paid and these debts extinguished, where one mortgage is paid by a new agree-
ment, even though the latter is made with the same mortgagee, the new agree-
ment is taxable.
Id. at 188, 63 A.2d at 763, quoted in 55 Md. App. at 54, 460 A.2d at 635.
68. Act of July 1, 1984, ch. 128, 1984 Md. Laws 566 states:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the Comp-
troller of the Treasury may authorize for the fiscal year beginningJuly 1, 1984 a
30-day period during which all interest and penalties imposed by Article 81,
§ § 318 and 320 of the Code will be waived if any taxpayer voluntarily files de-
linquent returns and pays taxes owed. The waiver shall apply to nonreporting,
underreporting of tax liabilities, or to the nonpayment of tax previously as-
sessed, but shall extend only to penalties attributable to the taxes paid during
the 30-day period for taxable years beginning prior to January 1, 1983. The
terms and other conditions of such a program shall be determined by the
Comptroller.
69. Section 318 provides for the amounts of penalties and interest which may be
charged to a delinquent taxpayer. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 318 (Supp. 1984). Sec-
tion 320 explains the consequences of failing to file a return or report as required by the
Code. See id. § 320.
70. Act ofJuly 1, 1984, ch. 717, 1984 Md. Laws 3350 adds subsection (d) to MD. EST.
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106 (1974):
(d)(l) In this subsection the following words have the meanings indicated.
(i) "Marital deduction formula clause" means any provision of a will or other
controlling instrument that makes a bequest or transfer, the size or amount of
which is determined in whole or in part with reference to the amount allowable
to a decedent's estate as a marital deduction under the tax law of the United
States.
(ii) "Qualified terminable interest property" means property described in
§ 2056(b)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of the United States.
(2) If a will or other controlling instrument executed on or before September
12, 1981 contains a marital deduction formula clause, an election by the per-
sonal representative or other authorized person to treat property not trans-
ferred pursuant to the clause as qualified terminable interest property for
purposes of the estate tax marital deduction under the tax law of the United
States shall neither increase nor decrease the amount or fraction of the estate,
effect of a Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP)7' election
for a non-marital trust on the distribution of some estates pursuant
to wills executed before September 13, 1981. Under prior law, a
QTIP election reduced the amount passing to a spouse pursuant to
a marital deduction formula provision, which contained reduction
language for other property qualifying for the marital deduction.
The election would thus be worthless because the amount of prop-
erty qualifying for the marital deduction would remain unchanged.
The new statute makes a QTIP election worthwhile under the above
circumstances. It provides that when a will or trust contains a mari-
tal deduction formula clause and the personal representative elects
to treat other property includible in the decedent's estate as QTIP
under Internal Revenue Code section 2056(b)(7), the amount pass-
ing under the clause shall not be decreased by reason of the elec-
tion.72 The impact of the statute is shown by the following
example.73
Ex: Husband (H) executes a will on January 1, 1977, which
provides that his wife (W) is to receive one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate or $250,000, whichever is greater, re-
duced by the value of any other bequest, gift, or devise to
her under another paragraph of the will. A subsequent
paragraph provides for all tangible property to pass to W,
and the last provision was for a residuary trust to benefit W
for life and then pass to H and W's surviving children. At
H's death in 1985 the value of the adjusted gross estate was
$2,000,000, the tangible property was worth $100,000 and
the amount passing under the trust was $500,000.
Under prior law a QTIP election for the $500,000 passing
trust, or other fund transferred pursuant to the clause, unless a codicil to the
will or amendment to another controlling instrument executed after September
12, 1981 shall expressly otherwise provide.
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(d) (Supp. 1984).
71. Qualified Terminable Interest Property means property:
(I) which passes from the decedent,
(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for
life, and
(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies. 26 U.S.C.
§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i) (1982). For a more complete definition, see 26 U.S.C.
§ 2056(b)(7) (1982).
72. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(d)(2) (Supp. 1984).
73. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended § 2056 to increase the marital deduction
allowed in the case of small estates. For decedents dying after 1976, the marital deduc-
tion became the greater of $250,000 or 50% of the adjusted gross estate. 26 U.S.C.




under the trust would have resulted in Ws receiving only $400,000
outright ($1,000,000, less the $100,000 of tangible property, less
the $500,000 of QTIP) because of the reduction language in the
will. If no QTIP election were made, W would receive $900,000
outright and the $100,000 of tangible property. Whether or not the
QTIP election is made, only one-half of the estate would qualify for
the marital deduction. Thus, the purpose in including a marital de-
duction formula clause, to minimize estate taxes, would be thwarted
because the marital deduction is now unlimited.
The new law eliminates this problem. The statute provides that
a QTIP election will not decrease the amount or fraction of the es-
tate transferred pursuant to the marital deduction formula clause.
74
Thus, under the new law, if a QTIP election is made, W will receive
a marital deduction of $1,500,000 ($900,000 outright, plus
$100,000 tangible property, plus $500,000 QTIP). The new law will
allow a QTIP election to result in a larger marital deduction. This
result is consistent with the marital deduction formula clause's goal
of minimizing estate taxes.
It seems that the use of the word "increase" in section 11-
106(d)(2) is unnecessary. 5 Under prior law it was not possible for a
QTIP election to result in an increase in the amount of an estate
transferred pursuant to a marital deduction formula clause.
The statute applies only to wills executed before September 12,
1981 (when the maximum allowable marital deduction was less than
100% of a spouse's adjusted gross estate) and decedents dying after
July 1, 1984.76 The statute will not apply if a codicil to the will exe-
cuted after September 12, 1981 expressly provides otherwise. 77
F. Other Developments7"
1. Retaliatory Tax.-In Metropolitan Life v. Insurance Commis-
74. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(d)(2) (Supp. 1984).
75. See supra note 71.
76. Act of July 1, 1984 ch. 717, 1984 Md. Laws 3351, § 2 (codified at MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(d) (Supp. 1984)) provides that the provisions of the act
shall apply only to decedents dying on or afterJuly 1, 1984.
77. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(d)(2) (Supp. 1984).
78. Related Developments:
The following two cases, one relating to tax court procedure, and the other concerning
the imposition of franchise taxes on banks, are worthy of brief discussion.
1. In Boyd v. Supervisor of Assessments, 57 Md. App. 603, 471 A.2d 749
(1984), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that when the property tax
assessment board dismissed an action because of the taxpayer's failure to appear there
was effectively no appeal of the decision. Id. at 608, 471 A.2d at 751. Since an appeal to
the property tax board is a condition precedent to the Tax Court's jurisdiction, see MD.
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sioner,79 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute concerning the assessment of a retaliatory
tax80 as applied to New York insurance companies. A retaliatory tax
on companies from states with a uniform insurance premium tax
throughout the state has been upheld in the past.8 ' At issue in this
case was a special retaliatory tax allocation formula developed by
the Insurance Commissioner in response to New York City's assess-
ment of a premium tax which was separate from and in addition to
the New York state tax.
8 2
ANN. CODE art. 81, § 230 (1980), the Tax Court was without jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. 57 Md. App. at 608, 471 A.2d at 751.
2. In Maryland Nat'l Bank v. State Dep't of Assessments, 57 Md. App. 269, 469
A.2d 907, cert. denied, 299 Md. 656, 474 A.2d 1344 (1984), the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals considered the impact of a change in wording of the statute which defines net
income for purposes of calculating the franchise tax imposed upon Maryland financial
institutions. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A(b)(1) (1980). The statute in its original
form defined net income as the institution's federally taxable income plus any "income
taxes" imposed by the state. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A(b)(2) (1975). In 1977,
the statute was amended, clarifying that the income taxes required to be added back
meant state "taxes based on income." Act of June 1, 1977, ch. 759, 1977 Md. Laws
3006. Maryland National Bank reasoned that the change in wording meant that the
bank had been wrong to treat the franchise tax over the years as one of the "income
taxes" to be added back to federal taxable income for purposes of computing its state
franchise tax liability under MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 128A (1980). In other words, the
bank claimed a refund because the franchise tax was not an "income tax" but was rather
a "tax based upon income." The court held that the change in wording in the statute
did not change its meaning. "Income taxes" means "taxes based upon income" and
therefore franchise taxes always have been and still are required to be added back to
federal taxable income for purposes of computing the franchise tax itself. 57 Md. App.
at 273, 469 A.2d at 909.
79. 58 Md. App. 457, 473 A.2d 933 (1984).
80. The purpose of a retaliatory tax is to assure that insurance companies chartered
in the home (i.e., retaliating) state are not subjected to a greater tax burden in other
states than the insurance companies chartered in those states are subjected to in the
home state. Id. at 459, 473 A.2d at 934.
The Maryland Code provision for the retaliatory tax states in relevant part:
(1) When by or pursuant to the laws of any other state . . . any taxes . . . are
or would be imposed upon Maryland insurers . . . which are in excess of such
taxes . . . directly imposed upon similar insurers . . . of such other state...
under the statutes of this State. . . the same taxes . . . shall be imposed by the
Commissioner upon the insurers . . . of such other state.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 61(1) (Supp. 1984).
81. A retaliatory tax was upheld in Maryland in 1891. Talbort v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 74 Md. 536, 22 A. 395 (1891).
82. The New York State tax was 1.75%, N.Y. INS. LAw § 552 (McKinney 1966) and
the New York City tax was 0.4% of gross direct premiums allocable to New York City.
58 Md. App. at 460, 473 A.2d at 935. The Insurance Commissioner's formula
calculates the effect of the local tax by looking at the experience of all Maryland
insurance companies doing business in New York State during the year in ques-
tion (1971). It compares the total premium taxes actually paid by those compa-
19851
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Metropolitan claimed that allowing the Insurance Commis-
sioner to develop an allocation formula "vests legislative taxing au-
thority in an executive official in contravention of Md. Declaration
of Rights art. 8 (Separation of Powers)." 3 The court rejected this
argument and held that the grant of discretion to the Commissioner
was limited to devising a method or formula which "is a far cry from
a delegation of the actual power to levy a tax."18 4 Metropolitan also
argued that the statute was void for vagueness because it set no
standards or guidelines.8 5 Once again the court rejected Metropoli-
tan's argument, noting that grants of discretion to administrative of-
ficials in order to facilitate the administration of the laws are
permissible because of the growing complexity of governmental and
economic conditions.8 6
2. County Tax Rates for Personal and Real Property.-In Rosecrofi
Trotting & Pacing Assoc., Inc. v. Prince George's County,8 7 the county
claimed the power to levy taxes at different rates for personal and
real property, arguing that the Express Powers Act gave it this
right.8 8 The taxpayer, however, argued that the Maryland Code re-
quires a county property tax to be imposed at a single rate on all
nies to New York City with the total premiums which they earned throughout
New York State that were subject to the New York State premium tax.
Id. at 465, 473 A.2d at 937.
83. 58 Md. App. at 461, 473 A.2d at 935. This argument was based on the fact that
the Insurance Commissioner had "unbridled discretion" to develop an allocation
formula.
84. Id. at 467, 473 A.2d at 938. The court said that the Insurance Commissioner was
not given the power to make law, but was given "the authority to implement and enforce
the expressed legislative will." Id. at 473, 473 A.2d at 942.
85. Id. at 461, 473 A.2d at 935.
86. Id. at 472, 473 A.2d at 941 (citing with approval Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279
Md. 410, 440-41, 370 A.2d 1102, 1119 (1977), afd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)). The court
noted that "[t]he failure to provide any standards for the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion has been held to render the delegation of authority to the agency invalid." 58
Md. App. at 472, 473 A.2d at 941 (quoting Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 243 Md.
375, 388, 221 A.2d 370, 379 (1966)). However, "the modern tendency of the courts is
toward greater liberality in permitting grants of discretion to administrative officials in
order to facilitate the administration of the laws as the complexity of governmental and
economic conditions increases." Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 121 A.2d 816,
822 (1956).
87. 298 Md. 580, 471 A.2d 719 (1984).
88. Id. at 584, 471 A.2d at 721. The argument was based on the first paragraph of
§ 5(0) of the Express Powers Act, which provides that a charter county has the power
"[t]o direct the class or subclass of improvements on land and personal property which
shall be made subject to the county tax levy, and to provide for the levy thereupon and
upon the value of [the] land .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(0) (1981).
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property subject to that levy.89 The court held that when there is a
conflict between the Express Powers Act and a subsequent public
general law, the latter controls.9 Therefore, Prince George's
County could not tax separate classes of property at different rates.
3. Repeal of the Definition of "Homestead."-The Maryland Legis-
lature has repealed the statute defining the term "homestead,- 9 1
most likely because of the recent case of Supervisor of Assessments v.
Sloan.92 In that case the taxpayer claimed that his two adjacent sub-
divided lots should be assessed as one homestead property, rather
than as two separate properties. 3 An assessment as one property
would have been lower than the assessment of each of the proper-
ties on an individual basis. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held that the definition of homestead did not include subdivided
buildable lots and therefore each lot must be assessed on an individ-
ual basis.9 4 The court noted that the statutory section that had ne-
cessitated the enactment of a definition of homestead 5 had been
repealed in 1979.96 Thus, the definition of homestead, which was
89. 298 Md. at 584,471 A.2d at 721. The taxpayer's argument is based on article 81,
§ 30(a) which reads:
(a) Full County and City rate. - Except as hereinafter in this section provided
and as provided in § 12, all property subject to ordinary taxation in this State
shall pay the full county and/or city rate prevailing for the time being in the
county and/or city in which under this article the same is taxable ....
MD. ANN. COnE art. 81, § 30(a) (1980). The court held that the usage of the word "rate"
in the singular means only one rate is permissible. 298 Md. at 584, 471 A.2d at 721.
90. 298 Md. at 598, 471 A.2d at 728-29. The court found that the rule that a later
public general law controls is found in the Express Powers Act itself in section 5(S):
The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this article shall not
be held to limit the power of the county council . . . to pass all .. resolutions
• . .not consistent with . . . the laws of the State ....
Provided, that the powers herein granted shall only be exercised to the
extent that the same are not provided for by public general law ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(S) (Supp. 1984).
The court noted: "Indeed the rule could hardly be otherwise. When enacting a
public general law the General Assembly cannot be impeded by the possibility that its
subject matter conflicts with a power previously granted under the Express Powers Act."
298 Md. at 601, 471 A.2d at 730.
91. Act ofJuly 1, 1984, ch. 35, 1984 Md. Laws 74-75. This act repealed the obsolete
provisions of the Maryland Code referring to homestead property. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, §§ 14(a)(2)(v), 14A (1980).
92. 57 Md. App. 286, 469 A.2d 915 (1984).
93. Id. at 287, 469 A.2d at 916.
94. Id. at 293, 469 A.2d at 919.
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 14(b)(l)(iii) (Supp. 1978), repealed by Act of July 1,
1979, ch. 212, 1979 Md. Laws 809, provided for a special assessment for homestead
property.
96. Act of July 1, 1979, ch. 314, 1979 Md. Laws 989-91. The court considered the
title to that act to aid in its determination of whether or not the definition of homestead
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not repealed at that time, remained in the Maryland code but did
not refer to any other statutory provisions. Had the legislature re-
pealed the definition of homestead in 1979 when it became obso-
lete, this entire controversy would have been avoided.
DANIEL E. SYKES
included subdivided buildable lots. The court concluded that assessment was to be
based on current value and that required the lots to be assessed individually. See 57 Md.
App. at 293, 469 A.2d at 919.
XI. TORTS
A. Negligence
1. Duty. -In Carlotta v. T.R. Stark Associates, I the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals considered whether a property owner had a cause of
action against a surveyor who negligently prepared a plat of adjoin-
ing property' when the negligence allegedly caused damage to the
property owner.3 The court held that the property owner did not
have a cause of action because the surveyor owed no duty to the
property owner that could be breached.4 This was so because the
surveyor prepared the plat for the adjoining landowner; therefore,
there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the sur-
veyor.5 Moreover, the surveyor could not have reasonably foreseen
the third-party reliance that might give rise to liability, in the ab-
sence of privity.6 Finally, the plaintiff did not rely on the plat.7
2. Contributory Negligence. -In Cohen v. Rubin,8 a driver fatally
injured a pedestrian crossing a street outside the designated cross-
walk.' When sued for negligence, the driver contended that the pe-
destrian was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law 10
1. 57 Md. App. 467, 470 A.2d 838 (1984).
2. Id. at 469, 470 A.2d at 839. The surveyor negligently included a portion of land
in the survey plat that became the subject of a suit to quiet title by adverse possession in
Heath v. Carlotta, No. 80-440, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 25, 1981) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 291 Md. 776 (1981). See 57 Md. App. at 469 n.1, 470 A.2d at 839 n.l.
3. 57 Md. App. at 470, 470 A.2d at 839.
4. Id. at 472, 470 A.2d at 840. Maryland case law holds that duty is the basis of
liability for negligence. See, e.g., Bauman v. Woodfield, 244 Md. 207, 223 A.2d 364
(1966); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 454 A.2d 414 (1983).
5. 57 Md. App. at 470, 470 A.2d at 839. The court, however, did not state that
privity is an absolute necessity.
6. The court cited three cases in which the surveyor's ability to foresee that third
persons would rely on the plat was the basis for holding that the plaintiff-landowner had
a cause of action: Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975);
Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); and Tartera v. Palumbo, 224
Tenn. 262, 453 S.W.2d 780 (1970).
7. See 57 Md. App. at 471-72, 470 A.2d at 839-40 (referring to plaintiff as "non-
reliant third party adjacent landowner"). The court did not discuss whether liability
could be imposed in other circumstances in the absence of reliance. Other sources of
liability can be hypothesized, as when a person assumes a duty to a third party in an
agreement with a contracting party. See, e.g., Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App.
673, 325 A.2d 432 (1974) (architect's liability to injured construction worker predicated
on contractual assumption of duty to inspect and supervise the course of construction).
8. 55 Md. App. 83, 460 A.2d 1046 (1983).
9. Id. at 87, 460 A.2d at 1049.
10. Id. at 90, 460 A.2d at 1050.
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because a Maryland statute"1 requires pedestrians outside of cross-
walks to yield the right of way to any approaching vehicle. The
Court of Appeals, however, has consistently held that where a pe-
destrian crosses the street outside of a crosswalk, a factual issue of
negligence is raised, but that fact standing alone is insufficient to
establish that the pedestrian is negligent as a matter of law. 1 2
Therefore, the Cohen court held that the trial court properly submit-
ted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. 13
3. Last Clear Chance. -The Cohen court also held that the trial
court did not err in giving an instruction on the doctrine of last clear
chance.' 4 The driver in Cohen was primarily negligent for driving in
excess of eighty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone.' 5 As-
suming the pedestrian had been contributorily negligent in crossing
the street outside the designated crosswalk,' 6 the plaintiff argued
that the driver still had an opportunity to avoid an accident by slow-
ing down and taking evasive action after he saw the pedestrian. 17
The doctrine of last clear chance was also applied in Ritter v.
Portera.18 In Ritter, the plaintiff negligently climbed onto the hood of
the defendant's stationary automobile,' ° but the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid an accident by refusing to move his vehi-
cle. However, the defendant failed to avail himself of this opportu-
nity and quickly accelerated his car,2 ° causing the plaintiff to fall and
sustain serious injuries."
In both Cohen and Ritter, the court misapplied the doctrine of
last clear chance. To invoke the doctrine, the negligence of the de-
fendant must be sequential to that of the plaintiff and not concur-
11. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-503(a) (1980).
12. 55 Md. App. at 90, 460 A.2d at 1050 (citing Boyd v. Simpler, 222 Md. 126, 158
A.2d 666 (1960); Love v. State ex rel. Nelson, 217 Md. 290, 142 A.2d 590 (1958);
Thursby v. O'Rourke, 180 Md. 223, 23 A.2d 656 (1942); Weissman v. Hokamp, 171 Md.
197, 188 A. 923 (1937); Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927)).
13. Id. at 92, 460 A.2d at 1051.
14. Id., 460 A.2d at 1052.
15. Id. at 91, 460 A.2d at 1051.
16. The doctrine of last clear chance is applied when the defendant has been primar-
ily negligent, the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent, and the defendant fails to
avail himself of a fresh opportunity to avert the consequences of his original negligence
and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. at 92, 460 A.2d at 1051.
17. Id., 460 A.2d at 1052.
18. 59 Md. App. 65, 474 A.2d 556 (1984).
19. Id. at 72, 474 A.2d at 559.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 68, 474 A.2d at 557. Plaintiff fell off the defendant's car and was dragged
approximately 20 feet.
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rent.22 In Cohen, the pedestrian was negligently crossing the street
at the same time that the driver was exceeding the speed limit. In
Ritter, the plaintiff was climbing onto the hood of a car when the
driver moved the car. In each case, both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant were simultaneously negligent. Jurisdictions with compara-
tive negligence statutes decide cases like Cohen and Ritter without
involving the doctrine of last clear chance. In Maryland, however, a
finding of contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff bars re-
covery.23 Therefore, in cases like Cohen and Ritter, the court is
forced to twist the doctrine of last clear chance in an apparent effort
to allow contributorily negligent plaintiffs to recover.
B. Invasion of Privacy
Maryland has recognized the tort of invasion of privacy since
196224 and has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition,
which recognizes four distinct branches of the tort.25 In Lawrence v.
A.S. Abell Co.,26 Maryland adopted another Second Restatement con-
cept, the incidental use exception,27 in an invasion of privacy action
based on the appropriation of a person's name or likeness. The in-
cidental use exception establishes that there is no invasion of pri-
vacy when a person's likeness is published for a reason other than
taking advantage of that person's reputation or prestige for pur-
poses of publicity."
In Lawrence, a photographer for the Sunpapers requested and re-
ceived permission to photograph two children attending a festival in
downtown Baltimore. Permission was granted by the mother of one
of the children, who was watching both of them. The photograph
appeared the next day on the front page of The Evening Sun in an
22. Benton v. Henry, 241 Md. 32, 215 A.2d 226 (1965); Pitts v. Mahan, 39 Md. App.
95, 382 A.2d 1092 (1978).
23. Cincotta v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1973); Miller v. Mullenix,
227 Md. 229, 176 A.2d 203 (1962).
24. See Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962).
25. See Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47, 54, 351 A.2d 421, 424-25, cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1976) defines the
tort of invasion of privacy as follows:
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. . . or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . . . or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life . . . or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public . . .
26. 299 Md. 697, 475 A.2d 448 (1984).




article about the festival.29 After that, The Evening Sun began an ad-
vertising campaign, and a reproduction of the issue with the chil-
dren's photograph was displayed on billboards, commercials, and
rack cards. The mothers of the children brought suit for compensa-
tion, based on theories of invasion of privacy and unjust enrich-
ment.3 o In rejecting the mothers' argument, the court relied upon
several New York cases that have developed this incidental use ex-
ception, 3 ' and upon the Second Restatement. 2
In considering whether an invasion of privacy had occurred, the
court adopted a two-prong test: "(1) whether the initial use of the
photograph was proper; and (2) whether the republication of the
photograph was 'merely incidental' [to the purpose of the publica-
tion] or rather whether it amounted to an appropriation of the
plaintiffs' likenesses to promote the sale of the newspaper." 33 In
addition, the court held that "a person's name or likeness must have
'commercial or other value' before an appropriation is actiona-
ble."3 4 And, even if a person's likeness does have commercial value,
the incidental use exception allows a newspaper to use reproduc-
tions of past issues, when the purpose of the reproduction is to show
the quality and content of the publication, and not to imply that the
person whose picture is reproduced is endorsing the publication.
Applying the incidental use exception, the court found that the chil-
dren's identity had no proven value, and the reproduction was done
"to show a realistic sample of the product of the newspaper."
Hence, there was no invasion of privacy.3 5
With the decision in Lawrence, Maryland joins a small number of
jurisdictions that have interpreted and adopted the incidental use
exception.3 6 This is a common sense approach that protects the
existence of the newspaper industry. The incidental use exception
29. 299 Md. at 698-99, 475 A.2d at 449.
30. Id.
31. See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, afd, 39
N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976); Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, aFd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d
468 (1962), both cited in Lawrence, 299 Md. at 704-05, 475 A.2d at 452.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment d (1965).
33. 299 Md. at 705, 475 A.2d at 453.
34. Id. at 706, 475 A.2d at 453 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C
comment d (1965)).
35. See id. at 707, 475 A.2d 453.
36. See Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Nelson v. Maine
Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977); Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745,
400 N.E.2d 847 (1980); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d
224, 351 N.E.2d 454, rev'don other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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ensures that a newspaper will not be potentially liable to every per-
son whose name or likeness is published.
C. Defamation
1. Private Figure. -In Hearst Corp. v. Hughes,3 7 the Court of Ap-
peals addressed the issue of whether actual impairment of reputa-
tion must be proved in a negligent defamation action38 in order to
recover compensatory damages, or whether proof of emotional dis-
tress caused by the defamation is sufficient. The court held that
proof of actual impairment of reputation is not required to establish
the tort of negligent defamation. 9
In a preliminary discussion,40 the court traced the history of
defamation and clarified the effect of historical and constitutional
requirements on Maryland law. During this discussion, the court
adopted the Second Restatement definitions of "injury,"'. "harm, '42
and "damages." 43 The court then framed a series of formulas sum-
marizing the rules of defamation law at various stages of
development.44
The Hughes trial court found that the plaintiff sustained no out-
37. 297 Md. 112, 466 A.2d 486 (1983). For a detailed analysis of this case, see infra,
Hearst Corporation v. Hughes-The Presumption of Injury to Reputation in Per Se Defamation
Actions is Not Dead, 44 MD. L. REV. 688 (1985).
38. A negligent defamation action is brought by a private individual who cannot
prove that a false defamatory statement was made with actual malice. Id. at 114 n.1, 466
A.2d at 487 n.l.
39. Id. at 114, 466 A.2d at 487.
40. Id. at 118-26, 466 A.2d at 489-93.
41. Id. at 118, 466 A.2d at 489. Injury is "the invasion of any legally protected inter-
est of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965).
42. 297 Md. at 118, 466 A.2d at 489. Harm is "the existence of loss or detriment in
fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 7(2) (1965) (emphasis in original).
43. 297 Md. at 118, 466 A.2d at 489. Damages are "a sum of money awarded to a
person injured by the tort of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12A (1965).
44. The court stated the rules for cases not involving punitive damages nor ques-
tions of privilege as follows:
Common Law rule:
Where P is any person and D is any person, then defamatory publication + fal-
sity = cause of action for compensatory damages. 297 Md. at 119, 466 A.2d at 489-90.
New York Times/Butts rule:
Where P is a public figure and D is any person, then defamatory publication +
falsity + fault by constitutional malice standard = constitutionally permissible state
cause of action for compensatory damages (punitive damages also permitted). Id. at
120, 466 A.2d at 490.
Gertz rule:
Where P is a private person and D is engaged in media expression, then defama-
tory publication + falsity + fault by a standard less than constitutional malice = consti-
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of-pocket loss or impairment of reputation 45 but did suffer personal
humiliation and mental anguish. The court then awarded compen-
satory damages.46 The Hearst Corporation appealed, contending
that proof of emotional distress is an insufficient basis for compen-
satory damages in a defamation action. Hearst asked the court to
require proof of actual harm to reputation before awarding compen-
satory damages.4 7
In holding that proof of harm to reputation is not essential to
establish negligent defamation,4" the court stressed three factors.
First, the court emphasized the common law presumption of harm
to reputation which flows from words actionable per se.49 The rea-
son for the presumption of harm from words actionable per se was
the difficulty in proving harm to a reputation. 50 A second factor in
the court's analysis was its reading of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc..5
The court argued that, under Gertz, "compensable harm is not lim-
ited to harm to reputation," and thus an award of damages for defa-
mation would be proper after proof of emotional distress.52 The
third factor considered by the court was the fact that a defendant in
a negligent defamation case is protected by the prohibition against
tutionally permissible cause of action for compensatory damages (punitive damages not
allowed). Id. at 122, 466 A.2d at 491.
Jacron rule:
Where P is a private person and D is any person, then defamatory publication +
falsity + fault by negligence standard + harm = Maryland cause of action for compen-
satory damages (punitive damages not allowed). Id.
Firestone rule:
Where P is a private citizen and D is engaged in media expression, then defama-
tory publication + falsity + fault by negligence standard + harm by way of emotional
distress without proof of harm to reputation = constitutionally permissible cause of
action for compensatory damages (punitive damages not allowed). Id. at 125, 466 A.2d
at 492.
45. Id. at 117, 466 A.2d at 488.
46. Id. The Court of Appeals defined "emotional distress" as including personal
humiliation and mental anguish and used that phrase throughout the opinion. Id. at 114
n. 1., 466 A.2d at 487 n. 1.
47. Id. at 117, 466 A.2d at 488-89.
48. Id. at 114, 466 A.2d at 487.
49. Id. at 118-19, 466 A.2d at 489. "[A]s a matter of Maryland law, the presumption
of harm to reputation still arises from the publication of words actionable per se." Id. at
125, 466 A.2d at 493.
50. Id. at 129, 466 A.2d at 495. "[I]njury to reputation is extremely difficult to
demonstrate, even when it is obvious that serious harm has resulted." Id.
51. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. 297 Md. at 122, 466 A.2d at 491. The court also noted that the Supreme Court
had specifically allowed a recovery in defamation for emotional distress in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976), cited in id. at 123-24, 466 A.2d at 492.
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liability without fault. 53 Because compensatory damages are limited
to compensation for proven harm, the court found it unnecessary to
further protect the defendant by requiring that proven harm be lim-
ited to impairment of reputation.54
Judge Davidson, joined by Judge Eldridge, wrote a lengthy and
vigorous dissent criticizing the analysis and authorities relied upon
by the majority5 5 and citing a number of authorities to support the
position that proof of harm to reputation is essential to recover
damages in a defamation action.56 Judge Davidson conceded that
"federal constitutional law does not preclude recovery of damages
for actual injury in a negligent defamation action despite the ab-
sence of proof of impairment of reputation. '57 However, she ar-
gued that Maryland law requires proof of impairment of reputation
in a negligent defamation action,58 basing this conclusion on several
factors. One factor is that Maryland courts historically have recog-
nized that "the purpose of defamation actions is to permit recovery
for impairment of reputation."' 59  Allowing recovery in negligent
defamation actions without proof of impairment of reputation
would mean that "the insult, not the injury, is the cause of action." 60
Judge Davidson also pointed out that Maryland already recognizes a
cause of action for infliction of emotional distress, whether negli-
gently or intentionally inflicted. 61 A cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress requires proof of physical injury.6 2
Therefore, allowing damages for emotional distress in a negligent
defamation action without proof of physical injury created an incon-
sistency within Maryland tort law.63
The dissent is well reasoned, but it fails to address the issue of
the difficulty of proving damage to reputation. Because of this diffi-
culty, the common law rule of presumption of injury to reputation
53. Id. at 130, 466 A.2d at 495. SeeJacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 594-97,
350 A.2d 688, 696-98 (1976) (adopting negligence standard in cases of purely private
defamation).
54. 297 Md. at 130-31, 466 A.2d at 495.
55. Id. at 138, 466 A.2d at 499 (Davidson, J., joined by Eldridge, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 138-44, 466 A.2d at 500-02.
57. Id. at 146, 466 A.2d at 503.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 144, 466 A.2d at 502.
60. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc and Be-
yond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975), cited in 297 Md. at 144, 466 A.2d at
502.
61. 297 Md. at 145, 466 A.2d at 502.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 146, 466 A.2d at 503.
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evolved. The majority's recognition of this difficulty makes their po-
sition the stronger one.
2. Public Figure. -In Phillips v. Washington Magazine Inc.,64 the
Court of Special Appeals held that the plaintiff's pleadings were in-
sufficient to state a cause of action in libel or invasion of privacy
because the pleadings did not allege facts that would show that the
statements were defamatory, and the pleadings failed to allege ac-
tual malice. 65 The actual malice standard was applied because the
plaintiff conceded that he was a public figure. 66
The plaintiff, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer,
claimed an article published in The Washingtonian magazine defamed
him and invaded his privacy, by inaccurately linking him with the
assassination of President Kennedy and the overthrow of Salvadore
Allende. 67 The plaintiff cited two portions of the article, which he
claimed demonstrated defamation and actual malice on the part of
the author and the publisher.68 The court rejected these conten-
tions and found that the plaintiff failed to allege defamation in re-
gard to the first portion, and failed to plead actual malice.69 The
court held that the actual malice standard had not been met in this
instance because the only allegation in the pleadings that pertained
to the actual malice issue was clearly refuted in the article itself,
which indicated that the author had conducted carefully the investi-
64. 58 Md. App. 30, 472 A.2d 98 (1984).
65. Id. at 39, 472 A.2d at 103.
66. Id. at 35, 472 A.2d at 101. The actual malice standard was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and was inter-
preted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack,
293 Md. 528, 539, 445 A.2d 1038, 1044, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982):
"Actual malice" can be established by showing that: a defamatory statement
was a calculated falsehood or lie "knowingly or deliberately published"; a de-
famatory statement was the product of the publisher's imagination; a defama-
tory statement was so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would
have put it in circulation; or the publisher had obvious reasons to distrust the
accuracy of the alleged defamatory statement or the reliability of the source of
the statement ....
Id. (citations omitted).
67. 58 Md. App. at 34-35, 472 A.2d at 100-01.
68. Plaintiff complained about a caption underneath a photograph of Salvadore Al-
lende, which stated that he "was overthrown by a secret task force from the CIA headed
by David Atlee Phillips." Id., 472 A.2d at 100, and he noted that throughout the article,
his name was linked with the name of Maurice Bishop, described in the article as a spy
possibly involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Kennedy. Plaintiff further complained
that a composite sketch of Bishop was placed adjacent to a photograph of Phillips. Id. at
38, 472 A.2d at 102.
69. Id. at 39, 472 A.2d at 103.
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gation leading to the article. °
In a somewhat confusing footnote, the court stated that
"[r]egardless of whether a declaration is styled as a defamation ac-
tion or an invasion of privacy action, the same considerations and
legal standards apply."''- The court then concluded that the failure
to meet the actual malice standard also defeated the invasion of pri-
vacy claim. Presumably, the assertion that public figures must meet
the actual malice standard in invasion of privacy claims as well as in
defamation claims was limited to the type of invasion of privacy case
arising under the false light theory where, as defined by the Second
Restatement, "the right of privacy is invaded by. . . publicity that un-
reasonably places the other in a false light before the public."' 72 The
false light theory has not been interpreted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in the wake of Gertz,7" which modified earlier constitutional
analysis. However, in a carefully reasoned opinion, a federal district
court interpreting Maryland law held a limited public figure in a
false light case to the actual malice standard.74 Other jurisdictions
have recognized the Gertz public/private figure distinction in inva-
sion of privacy cases and have held that private individuals need
only show negligence in a false light suit.75
70. Id. at 40, 472 A.2d at 103. The allegation of actual malice was that the defendant
had fabricated the linl'to Maurice Bishop. The court noted that the author had carefully
investigated the possible connection between Phillips and Bishop. Id.
71. Id. at 36 n.1, 472 A.2d at 101 n.l. To support this proposition, the court cited
Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972), and Bilney v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (1979). Although Bilney involved
public figures (University of Maryland basketball players), it was inapposite here because
the cause of action was grounded upon "unreasonable publicity given to the other's
private life." Id. at 571, 406 A.2d at 659. The applicable standard in that situation is
"reasonableness under the facts presented." Id. at 573, 406 A.2d at 660. Bilney did not
discuss the actual malice standard.
Harnish did hold the plaintiff in a false light invasion of privacy case to an actual
malice standard, but it did so by relying on Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), both of which have been modified by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The plaintiff relied on this
theory in Phillips. See Plaintiffs Declaration at 21, Phillips, 58 Md. App. 30, 472 A.2d 98
(1984); Amended Declaration at 27, id.; Second Amended Declaration at 34, id..
73. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "Rather than asking if the
publication is newsworthy or concerns a public issue to determine if the actual malice
standard applies, Gertz requires that courts inquire into the type of damages (actual or
punitive) and the type of plaintiff (private or public) involved in a case." Wood v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983).
75. Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Dresbach v.
Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981).
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3. Newspaper Privilege. -In Maryland, a newspaper has a quali-
fied privilege to publish reports of arrests and the charges on which
arrests are made.7 6 In Steer v. Lexleon, Inc. ,77 the Court of Special
Appeals applied the qualified privilege doctrine to a new fact situa-
tion. In Steer, the police made an arrest and then issued a press re-
lease that listed plaintiff's name as the perpetrator of the crime.78
Based on the official news release, the newspaper printed an article
stating the plaintiff had been arrested.79 In fact, he had been the
victim of the crime and had not been arrested at all. The plaintiff
sued for defamation. In considering the defendant's argument that
the publication of the article fell under the qualified privilege, the
court stated that to enjoy this privilege, there must be "legitimate
reliance on an authorized governmental account of an official ac-
tion."80 The court found that this article was protected by the privi-
lege of the newspaper to publish reports of arrests, emphasizing the
fact that the newspaper obtained the erroneous information from an
authorized release through an established and official channel.8 '
The court relied on its decision in Koren v. Capital-Gazette News-
papers, Inc. ,82 which reaffirmed the qualified privilege for a newspa-
per that reported the arrest of someone erroneously arrested and
subsequently released. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the qualified privilege existed only if an arrest is actually made,
stating that "the defamation is the same whether one is actually but
erroneously arrested or not arrested but erroneously described as
having been arrested." 83 The nature of the error in the governmen-
tal account is immaterial. 84 It appears that a qualified privilege will
exist in Maryland as long as there is legitimate reliance on a govern-
mental account.
76. See Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D. Md. 1966) (construing
Maryland law), cited in Steer v. Lexleon, Inc., 58 Md. App. 199, 205, 472 A.2d 1021,
1024 (1984); Evening News v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 610-11, 141 A. 416, 419 (1928).
77. 58 Md. App. 199, 472 A.2d 1021 (1984).
78. Id. at 201, 472 A.2d 1022.
79. Id. at 201-02, 472 A.2d at 1022-23.
80. Id. at 210, 472 A.2d at 1027.
81. Id. at 205, 472 A.2d at 1024. The column "Police Blotter," in which the error
appeared, was based on the weekly press release prepared by the desk sergeant at the
Leonardtown Barracks of the Maryland State Police. While preparing the press release,
the desk sergeant erred and substituted the name of the victim for that of the arrestee.
The newspaper representative picked up the press release and printed it in the Police
Blotter column. Id. at 201-02, 472 A.2d at 1022-23.
82. 22 Md. App. 576, 325 A.2d 140 (1974).
83. 58 Md. App. at 206, 472 A.2d at 1025.
84. Id. at 210, 472 A.2d at 1027.
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D. Loss of Consortium
In a case of first impression, Gillespie-Linton v. Miles,85 the Court
of Special Appeals declined to expand the right to recover for loss
of consortium to couples who marry shortly after one of them suf-
fers an injury at the hands of a negligent third party.86 Linton filed a
joint claim for loss of consortium with Gillespie. Gillespie had been
injured in an automobile accident with another driver, Miles;87 four
days after the accident, Gillespie married Linton.8 8 The Court of
Special Appeals denied recovery, holding that only injury to a mari-
tal relationship that exists at the time of the injury can support an
action for loss of consortium.89 The court reasoned that, if it al-
lowed recovery to couples who were not married at the time of the
injury, it would have to apply a vague and indefinite standard to
decide what relationship sufficed to support a loss of consortium
claim.90 With Gillespie, Maryland joins the majority of jurisdictions
that limit recovery in loss of consortium claims to couples who are
married at the time of the injury.9 1
E. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process
Maryland courts recently considered two cases involving the
torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. These cases
affirmed existing law on the tort of abuse of process and clarified an
area of confusion in the law relating to malicious prosecution.
In a suit for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove four
elements:
(1) That criminal proceeding was instituted or continued by the
defendant against the plaintiff;
85. 58 Md. App. 484, 473 A.2d 947 (1984).
86. Id. at 487, 473 A.2d at 949.
87. Id. at 486-87, 473 A.2d at 948-49.
88. Id. at 487, 473 A.2d at 949.
89. Id. at 495, 473 A.2d at 953.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492, 473 A.2d at 951. Only one state court has allowed a person to recover
for loss of consortium when the cause of action arose prior to the marriage. See Butcher
v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983) (plaintiffs had cohabi-
tated for twelve years and used the same last name). Two federal district courts have
allowed recovery, see Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (plaintiffs
were divorced but living together); Sutherland v. Arch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366
F. Supp. 127, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1973), but the courts of the states in which they sat refused
to follow their decisions, see Leonards v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 445
A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1982); Childres v. Shannon, 183 N.J. Super. 591, 444 A.2d 1141
(Law Div. 1982); Akers v. Martin, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 325 (1980); Rockwell v. Liston, 71
Pa. D. & C.2d 756 (1975).
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(2) That the proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused;
(3) That there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and
(4) That malice or a purpose other than bringing the offender
to justice motivated the accuser.92
Malicious prosecution actions are not favored by the courts be-
cause they run counter to policies that encourage proceedings
against those who are apparently guilty. 93 Because of this attitude,
the cause of action has been made difficult to maintain; a key barrier
to suit is the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant,
who initiated the proceeding against the plaintiff, did so without
probable cause.94
In Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood,9 5 the major issue before the court
was whether the plaintiff had satisfied that burden of proving the
absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal proceeding.96
At the malicious prosecution trial, the plaintiff, Wood, used the fact
that criminal charges against him were dismissed as evidence that
the defendant, Palmer Ford, had no probable cause to have had
Wood prosecuted for embezzlement. During a trial on the merits,9 7
the jury was instructed to determine, inter alia, whether the defend-
ant had had probable cause to prosecute.9 8 The jury found Palmer
Ford guilty of malicious prosecution9 9 and awarded significant dam-
92. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 119, 871 (1984);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1965).
93. W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 876.
94. Id.
95. 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984).
96. Id. at 485, 471 A.2d at 297. The facts of the case were complicated. The plain-
tiff, Wood, had his Mustang repaired by the defendant, Palmer Ford, Inc. The bill for
the work "shocked" and "outraged" him and he could not pay for the release of his car.
He received a phone call from an unknown caller (whom he later identified as the de-
fendant's employee), telling him to put $400 under a trash can on the defendant's prop-
erty and he would find his bill marked "paid" and the keys to his car. The plaintiff did
so; the defendant, discovering no record of receipt of payment, met with the plaintiff to
find out what had happened, and learned of the illicit payment. In a disputed sequence
of events, the plaintiff agreed to pay the bill (allegedly after a promise that he would not
be prosecuted) and charges were filed against him for embezzlement. The plaintiff
eventually paid the bill, but amended charges were entered; several postponements oc-
curred, and a hearing "of some sort" was held. Although the plaintiff testified that the
charges were dropped, the record reflected a finding of not guilty. Id. at 487-92, 471
A.2d at 298-301.
97. In the initial trial, summary judgment was granted for the defendant. The Court
of Special Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial because there were issues of
fact concerning the institution of the embezzlement prosecution. Id. at 492, 471 A.2d at
301.
98. Id. at 493, 471 A.2d at 301.
99. Id. The trial court also found Palmer Ford guilty of abuse of process. See infra
text accompanying notes 119-28.
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ages to Wood. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, noting that
the jury could have inferred from the dismissal a lack of probable
cause for the embezzlement prosecution.'l 0 The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the pretrial dismissal of charges against
Wood was insufficient evidence of lack of probable cause. More-
over, the court held that the judge should have found the evidence
insufficient, as a matter of law, and should not have given the case to
the jury.'o
To reach this determination, the court specified what consti-
tutes probable cause for bringing a criminal prosecution, and clari-
fied the law on who determines whether probable cause exists. The
court found that "[flor probable cause purposes the focus is on
those facts known to, and genuinely believed by, the one initiating
or continuing the prosecution."'0 2 Prior to Palmer Ford, Maryland
law on who determines what facts are known and who determines
existence or absence of probable cause was unclear. The Wood court
looked to the leading early decision on the issue, Boyd v. Cross,'0 3
and noted that Boyd required the jury to determine the existence of
facts relied on to establish probable cause, and the judge to deter-
mine whether, as a matter of law, those facts indicated the presence
or absence of probable cause.'0 4 Later cases noting Boyd have been
confused as to whether, if the facts are contested, the jury is re-
quired not only to find the facts but also to find whether the facts
establish lack of probable cause.'0 5 After examining a number of
decisions,'0 6 the Wood court held that the rule of Boyd, that the judge
100. 298 Md. at 493, 471 A.2d at 301.
101. Id. at 507, 471 A.2d at 309.
102. Id. at 495, 471 A.2d at 302.
103. 35 Md. 194 (1872).
104. 298 Md. at 501, 471 A.2d at 306.
105. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Guercio, 249 Md. 181, 187, 238 A.2d 855, 858-59
(1968) (question of whether there is probable cause is one of fact and not law, for jury to
decide). In a case considered during the period that Palmer Ford was being decided,
Cottman v. Cottman, 56 Md. App. 413, 468 A.2d 131 (1983), the Court of Special Ap-
peals indicated that it would follow the line of cases deviating from the Boyd rule and
allow the jury to determine probable cause if facts were in dispute. Id. at 421, 468 A.2d
at 135 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 697-98, 381 A.2d 1146, 1151-52
(1978)).
106. The court stated that cases allowing the jury to determine the ultimate issue of
probable cause confuse the jury's function in negligence cases and malicious prosecu-
tion cases. 298 Md. at 503, 471 A.2d at 306. The court noted that the Boyd line of cases
held that, unlike in negligence cases, the jury in malicious prosecution cases does not
decide the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. Id. at 498, 471 A.2d at 304. The
only reason stated in the opinion as to why the jury should not decide that issue in
malicious prosecution cases was that "courts have always distrusted malicious prosecu-
tion actions." Id. at 499, 471 A.2d at 304 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw
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rules on the existence of probable cause, was still valid. The court
then applied the Boyd rule, examined the facts pertaining to the
probable cause issue,"°7 and determined that the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict should have been granted when the plain-
tiff failed to rebut evidence showing there was probable cause for
the embezzlement prosecution. 0 8
In Cottman v. Cottman,10 9 the court considered the related issue
of malicious use of process, a tort with elements similar to malicious
prosecution, and found that, as in Palmer Ford," ° there were suffi-
cient facts to show that the defendants had had probable cause to
institute civil proceedings."' Accordingly, the summary judgment
in favor of the defendants was affirmed.' 1 2
Both Palmer Ford and Cottman also involved abuse of process
claims. "The tort of abuse of process occurs when a party has
wilfully misused criminal or civil process after it has issued in order
to obtain a result not contemplated by law." ' " In a suit for abuse of
process, the plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) an ulterior pur-
pose not legitimate in the use of the process, and (2) a willful act
which is an improper or unauthorized use of the process.' 14 One
can be liable for abuse of process even if he had probable cause to
institute the proceedings and can, therefore, be guilty of abuse of
process though innocent of malicious prosecution.
In Cottman," 5 the Court of Special Appeals used language
OF TORTS 846-47 (4th ed. 1971)). This lack of principled analysis stood in stark contrast
to the ten-page discussion of seemingly irreconciliable precedent. Id. at 497-507, 471
A.2d at 304-09.
107. The court looked at Wood's testimony about leaving the $400 under the trash
can, uncontroverted evidence that he had been an accessory to embezzlement, and at
the fact that the case against Wood was dismissed. Finding that the dismissal could not
rebut Wood's uncontroverted testimony on his actions, the court ruled that the dismis-
sal created neither a presumption of lack of probable cause nor even an inference of that
lack. 298 Md. at 507-10, 471 A.2d at 309-10.
108. Id. at 511, 471 A.2d at 310.
109. 56 Md. App. 413, 468 A.2d 131 (1983).
110. Although the court in Cottman noted in dictum an incorrect rule of law related to
determining probable cause, the court did not use that standard as the facts were undis-
puted. The court ruled that, as a matter of law, probable cause existed. 56 Md. App. at
430, 468 A.2d at 139.
111. In litigation during divorce proceedings, defendants sought to impose a con-
structive trust on property held by the plaintiff. Id. at 419, 468 A.2d at 134.
112. Id. at 432, 468 A.2d at 140.
113. Palmer Ford, 298 Md. at 511, 471 A.2d at 310 (quoting Krashes v. White, 275 Md.
549, 555, 341 A.2d 798, 802 (1975)).
114. Id. at 511, 471 A.2d at 311 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 106, at 857); 56 Md.
App. at 430, 468 A.2d at 140.
115. 56 Md. App. 413, 468 A.2d 131 (1983). Ms. Cottman had sought to impose a
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which suggested that, if a party had reasonably believed that he had
grounds for maintaining suit, he could not be found to have had an
ulterior purpose or to have committed an improper act, the two ele-
ments of abuse of process. 1 6 If the court meant that one could not
commit the tort once probable cause to initiate the proceeding is
found, the court was wrong." 7 A better reading of Cottman would
be that, when there is no evidence in the record suggesting the
existence of either element, a court, considering a motion for sum-
mary judgment, should not infer their existence once probable
cause is established."18
The discussion of abuse of process in Palmer Ford centered on
whether liability under that tort required the improper act to occur
after the process is instituted." 9 The defendant contended that the
trial court should have granted its directed verdict because there
was no evidence that it had engaged in any improper act after the
process was instituted.' 20 While apparently conceding liability if it
had so acted, Palmer Ford argued that there is no liability when one
passively allows the prosecution to proceed and takes no action after
process is instituted, other than accepting the debt.12 ' This argu-
ment was supported by dicta in Maryland cases and by a majority of
decisions from other jurisdictions. 22
Because the court found that there was sufficient evidence that
Palmer Ford had acted improperly after process issued,' 23 it
avoided deciding whether or not abuse of process occurs when a
criminal proceeding is instituted in order to coerce the payment of a
debt, when no improper act is taken after instituting the process.
constructive trust on her brother-in-law's property because she believed her estranged
husband had purchased it with marital assets. Id. at 419, 468 A.2d at 134. The brother-
in-law's abuse of process claim was based on the contention that the true purpose of the
imposition of the trust was to locate his brother, who was effectively avoiding service of
process. Id. at 431, 468 A.2d at 140.
116. Id. This position was rejected in Palmer Ford.
117. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
118. The plaintiff had submitted no evidence to counter the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 56 Md. App. at 422, 468 A.2d at 135.
119. 298 Md. at 511-14, 471 A.2d at 310-12.
120. Id. at 513, 471 A.2d at 311.
121. Id.
122. The court collected the cites to the relevant Maryland cases. Id. at 513, 471 A.2d
at 312. The court also cited Annot., 27 A.L.R.3D 1202 (1969). That annotation, Use of
Criminal Process to Collect Debt as Abuse of Process, states that most states hold that an im-
proper act must occur after the process is instituted. Id. at 1206. Only two cases are
cited as holding that a tort is committed merely by instituting a criminal process for the
purpose of collecting a debt. Id. at 1207.
123. 298 Md. at 514, 471 A.2d at 312.
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Though the opinion started with quotes from Prosser that forcefully
state that there is no liability in the latter case,' 24 it then quoted
Harper and James, 2 5 who would impose liability for using the crim-
inal process to collect debts, even if no act was taken subsequent to
its initiation.126 The court cited many Maryland cases which state
that it is the improper acts that occur after process is issued which
constitute the tort, but then distinguished those cases as not involv-
ing the use of criminal process to collect a debt. 27 The court then
mooted its argument by finding that there was sufficient evidence to
support ajiiry finding that Palmer Ford had attempted to use crimi-
nal proceedings to collect its debt after the proceeding was insti-
tuted. 28 Thus, there is still no Maryland case that decides whether
a party is or is not liable for commencing a criminal proceeding for
the purpose of collecting a debt, if that party makes no effort to use
the process to accomplish that end after it is instituted.
F. Legal Malpractice
In Fishow v. Simpson,' 2 9 the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice
action based on a breach of contract theory, ° alleging that her at-
torney had failed to present her case adequately in a medical mal-
practice action.' 3 ' The Court of Special Appeals held that legal
malpractice gives rise to a breach of contract action only in "cases
involving employment of [the] attorney to perform a specific service
in accordance with clearly stated instructions from the client-em-
ployer.' 1 32 The court, noting that the client did not instruct the
124. See W. PROSSER, supra note 106, at 857 ("[T]here is no liability where the defend-
ant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even
though with bad intentions.") quoted in 298 Md. at 513, 471 A.2d at 311.
125. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OF TORTS 331 (1956), cited in 298 Md. at 512-13,
471 A.2d at 311.
126. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 125, would only look to the motive in institut-
ing the criminal process and would hold one liable whenever a party "attempts to attain
some collateral objective. . . .[A] person using the processes of criminal law to enforce
payment of a debt is abusing legal process and is liable in damages." Id. at 331.
127. 298 Md. at 513, 471 A.2d at 312.
128. Id. at 514, 471 A.2d at 312.
129. 55 Md. App. 312, 462 A.2d 540 (1983).
130. The plaintiff also brought a negligence claim against her attorney. She failed on
the negligence count because, unlike a contract claim, the negligence count required
expert testimony because the defendant's alleged conduct was not so flagrant that a
layman could infer or recognize negligence. Id. at 316-19, 462 A.2d at 544.
131. Id. at 317, 462 A.2d at 543.
132. Id. at 318, 462 A.2d at 544. Cases cited by the plaintiff involving breach of con-
tract actions were distinguished because the attorneys in those cases had been hired to
perform specific services. In Caltrider v. Weant, 147 Md. 338, 128 A. 72 (1925), the
plaintiff hired the attorney for the express purpose of obtaining a mechanic's lien, which
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attorney to adopt a particular theory in pursuing her claim, con-
cluded that a breach of contract action could not be supported. 33
G. Accrual of an Action
In Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,14 the Court of Appeals
held that a cause of action for cancer resulting from exposure to
asbestos accrues at the time the cancer is discovered, rather than at
the time asbestosis is discovered.' 35 The plaintiff filed a wrongful
death 36 and survival action 37 based on the death of her husband
from cancer, which allegedly resulted from exposure to asbestos
products manufactured by Johns-Manville.' 38  The decedent was
employed by Wallace and Gale Co. from 1949 until he resigned in
1973, when he discovered that he had asbestosis.' 39 Though Pierce
had developed asbestosis in 1973, he never sought recovery for that
injury. 140 He contracted cancer in 1979 and died in 1980,14 1 and
his widow filed suit shortly thereafter. 4 2 Johns-Manville contended
that the cause of action arose upon the discovery of the asbestosis in
1973, and that the 1980 action was therefore barred by the three-
he failed to do. In Watson v. Calvert Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Md. 25, 45 A. 879 (1900),
the attorney was hired to search a title that subsequently proved to be defective.
133. 55 Md. App. at 318, 462 A.2d at 544.
134. 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983).
135. Id. at 669, 464 A.2d at 1028.
136. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-902(a) (1984) provides that: "an action
may be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another."
Section 3-901(e) defines "wrongful act" as "an act, neglect, or default, including a felo-
nious act which would have entitled the injured party to maintain an action and recover
damages if death had not ensued." Id. § 3-901(1). The court addressed the issue of
whether the survival action was barred, and concluded that because the survival action
was not barred, neither was the wrongful death action. 296 Md. at 661-62, 464 A.2d at
1024.
137. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(x) (1984) permits the estate to recover
the damages the deceased might have recovered if he had survived and brought suit.
Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906). The survival
statute does not give the personal representative of the decedent's estate a new cause of
action. The cause of action is derivative in nature. Thus, the limitations period gov-
erning a survival action accrues when the underlying pre-death right of the decedent to
bring suit accrues. Brief for Respondent at 8, Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296
Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983).
138. 296 Md. at 658, 464 A.2d at 1022.
139. Id. at 658-59, 464 A.2d at 1022-23.
140. Id. at 658, 464 A.2d at 1022. In 1973 Pierce filed a claim with the Maryland
Workmen's Compensation Commission alleging that he had developed asbestosis as a
result of his employment with Wallace. The Commission determined that Pierce had
suffered a 50% permanent disability resulting from asbestosis. Id. at 660, 464 A.2d at
1023.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 660-61, 464 A.2d at 1023-24.
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year statute of limitations. 43 The Court of Appeals held that the
cause of action for the lung cancer arose upon its discovery in 1979,
and, therefore, the plaintiff's 1980 claim was timely and not barred
by the statute of limitations. 144
Johns-Manville conceded that, under the Maryland discovery
rule, a cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff discovers or
should discover the nature and cause of the injury, 145 but main-
tained that the cause of action accrued in 1973, when Pierce first
discovered the asbestosis. 14 6 Johns-Manville argued that Pierce's
contention that a cause of action accrued in 1979 amounted to an
application of the maturation of harm rule, 147 which Maryland
courts have consistently rejected.148 Under the maturation of harm
rule, a cause of action does not accrue until all damages or harm
arising out of a single wrong are fully ascertainable. 4 9 Johns-
Manville argued that the point of discovery took place when Pierce
became aware of the initial harm, asbestosis, rather than when he
became aware of the full extent of the harm arising out of asbestos
exposure. 150
The Court of Appeals, however, found that Pierce's cause of
action accrued in 1979, when Pierce discovered the lung cancer.1
5
'
143. Id. at 663, 464 A.2d at 1024-25. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101
(1984) provides in pertinent part: "A civil action at law shall be filed within three years
from the date it accrues unless another provision in the Code provides a different period
of time within which an action shall be commenced."
144. 296 Md. at 669, 464 A.2d at 1028.
145. Id. at 663, 464 A.2d at 1025. Because the term "accrues" is not defined in the
statute, the question of when a cause of action accrues is left to judicial determination.
The Court of Appeals first applied the rule in 1917 to malpractice cases, Hahn v. Clay-
brook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917), and extended the application of the rule to cases
involving latent diseases in 1978, Harig v: Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 39
A.2d 299 (1978). In 1981, the court held the rule to be applicable in all cases. Pof-
fenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 667, 680 (1981).
The result in Pierce is not a straightforward application of Harig, which held that a
cause of action accrues for a latent disease when the claimant knew or reasonably should
have known of the nature and cause of the harm. Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
284 Md. 70, 83, 39 A.2d 299, 306 (1978). Unlike the plaintiff in Harig, Pierce developed
another disease prior to contracting the latent disease. The issue in Pierce was whether
the prior discovery of asbestosis barred a later action on the cancer claim. 296 Md. at
664, 464 A.2d at 1025.
146. 296 Md. at 663, 464 A.2d at 1024-25.
147. Id., 464 A.2d at 1025.
148. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634 n.2, 431 A.2d 677, 679 n.2 (1981);
Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 512, 290 A.2d 529, 533 (1972); Leonhart v. Atkinson,
265 Md. 219, 224, 289 A.2d 1, 4 (1972).
149. 296 Md. at 663, 464 A.2d at 1025.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 669, 464 A.2d at 1028.
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The court held that this result was not an application of the matura-
tion of harm rule because there were two separate injuries involved,
each caused by exposure to asbestos. 152 The court reasoned that
Pierce did not discover the extent of the harm in 1979; rather, he
discovered a new and separate harm for which a separate cause of
action arose.'
Johns-Manville also argued that a finding that a new cause of
action arose in 1979 because a separate injury was involved violated
the doctrine of res judicata,'54 which states that one wrong gives
rise to a single indivisible cause of action.' 55 Even if the lung cancer
could be accurately characterized as a separate and distinct injury,
both of the injuries resulted from the same wrong, asbestos expo-
sure. 15 6 The court agreed with Johns-Manville's interpretation of
the doctrine of res judicata that one wrong gives rise to a single
cause of action, but dismissed the argument because, if, as in Pierce,
no recovery is sought for asbestosis, there is only "a single action
for damages resulting from asbestos exposure. ' 57
In determining that Pierce's cause of action accrued when can-
cer was discovered, rather than at the discovery of asbestosis, the
court looked to the policy rationale underlying the statute of limita-
tions. 15 The rationale supports the finding that the cause of action
accrued when Pierce discovered the lung cancer in 1979. The policy
of encouraging a timely suit in order to prevent the loss of evidence,
the disappearance of witnesses, and the fading of memories would
not be furthered by finding that the earlier asbestosis barred the
cancer claim. In suits involving latent diseases, evidence relating to
a latent disease tends to develop rather than disappear over time. 59
The court recognized that the policy of fostering repose would not
152. The court found that asbestosis and lung cancer are two separate injuries, point-
ing out that the only evidence in the record were studies showing that there is no medi-
cally accepted relationship between the two diseases. Id. at 662, 464 A.2d at 1024.
153. Id.
154. Brief, supra note 137, at 18.
155. See Frontier Van Lines, Inc. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 274 Md. 621, 625,
336 A.2d 778, 780 (1975); In re Carlin's Estate, 212 Md. 526, 532-33, 129 A.2d 827, 831
(1957); Vane v. C. Hoffberger Co., 196 Md. 450, 456-57, 77 A.2d 152, 155 (1950).
156. Brief, supra note 137, at 18.
157. 296 Md. at 668 n.9, 464 A.2d at 1027 n.9.
158. Id. at 664-65, 464 A.2d at 1025. The Court of Appeals in Pierce quoted the
Supreme Court: "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and conven-
ience rather than in logic. They represent expedients rather than principles." Id. (quot-
ing Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)).
159. Id. at 666, 464 A.2d at 1026.
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be furthered by allowing the later accrual, but determined that fair-
ness to the litigant overrode this policy.
The last reason given by the court for allowing the later accrual
was judicial efficiency. If potential plaintiffs who have manifested
asbestosis but have been compensated by workmen's compensation
know that there is a possibility of a second disease manifesting itself,
they would ordinarily have no reason to initiate litigation until the
second disease arose. If it never does, then there would be no litiga-
tion. But if they knew that recovery for the second disease would be
time-barred, they would sue on the possibility of contracting the
second disease.' 6
0
Finding that there were strong policy reasons for the cause of
action for lung cancer to accrue when the cancer was discovered, the
court reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment. The
decision is, however, limited to the facts of this case, in which the
tort recovery for asbestosis was never sought.' 6 ' Had Pierce sued
on the initial asbestosis injury, he would probably have been unable
to recover for the cancer, because future damages can only be re-
covered in Maryland when the plaintiff can show a reasonable medi-
cal probability or a greater than 50% chance that such damages will
occur. 162 Thus, plaintiffs stricken with asbestosis still face the possi-
bility that, if they sue for asbestosis and later develop cancer, recov-
ery for the later disease may be barred.i6
H. Agency
In Cox v. Prince George's County,'" the plaintiff sought to hold
Prince George's County liable for the acts of county police officers
who allegedly intentionally allowed and encouraged a police dog to
attack and bite Cox.1 6 5 Prince George's County argued that it could
not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior ' 6 6 because,
160. Id. at 667, 464 A.2d at 1027.
161. Id. at 668-69, 464 A.2d at 1027-28.
162. See Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975) (medical prognosis can-
not be admitted into evidence unless it is based on a reasonable medical certainty).
Although there was evidence in the record that asbestosis is associated with an increased
risk of lung cancer, the only evidence in Pierce indicating the degree of correlation was
one study estimating that 17.8% of those suffering from asbestosis subsequently devel-
oped lung cancer. 296 Md. at 666 n.7, 464 A.2d at 1026 n.7.
163. At least one court has allowed a second suit in this situation. See generally Good-
man v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976).
164. 296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983).
165. Id. at 164, 460 A.2d at 1039.
166. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an agent-principal relationship must ex-
ist before the principal can be held liable for the acts of the agent. Id. at 165, 460 A.2d
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in Wynkoop v. Hagerstown,167 the court had held that police officers
were agents of the state rather than agents of the municipality, and,
as agents of the state, were insulated from liability by the state's gov-
ernmental immunity. 1
6 8
The Court of Appeals in Cox correctly distinguished Wynkoop
from Cox. The issue in Wynkoop was whether the municipality was
immune from liability for injuries sustained as a result of the alleg-
edly tortious acts of police officers appointed by the city. Wynkoop
addressed the question of governmental immunity,' 69 rather than
the agent-principal relationship.
The question of governmental immunity was not an issue in Cox
because Prince George's County waived its immunity from suit.
170
Pursuant to its charter, Prince George's County can be held liable as
principal for the acts of its police officers if the officers are found to
be agents of the county acting within the scope of their employ-
ment. 17 1 One of the issues in Cox, therefore, was whether the of-
ficers were agents of the county. Because the question of agency is a
factual one to be determined by ajury, 172 the Court of Appeals held
that the circuit court should not have sustained the county's demur-
rer on the grounds that it did, that the police officers were not
agents of the county as a matter of law. 1 73
The Court of Appeals in Cox also held that the circuit court er-
roneously sustained the county's demurrer, which was based on the
ground that the county, assuming it was found to be the principal,
could not be held liable for the intentional acts of its agents., 74
Maryland law holds that a principal may be held liable for the inten-
at 1039. In Cox, Prince George's County argued that it would not be liable as principal
for the acts of the police officers if the officers were found to be agents of the state rather
than agents of the county. Id.
167. 159 Md. 194, 150 A. 447 (1930).
168. Id. at 201, 150 A. at 450.
169. Wynkoop considered the question of agency to determine whether the city was
immune from liability. Since the city, in appointing police officers, was exercising a gov-
ernmental as opposed to a municipal function, it was not liable by virtue of governmen-
tal immunity. Id.
170. See PRINCE GEORGE'S CouNTY, MD., CHARTER § 1013 (1979). The court noted
that although police officers, as public officials, are immunized from personal liability for
nonintentional torts, the county could still be sued under § 1013 of the county charter.
296 Md. at 168, 460 A.2d at 1041.
171. 296 Md. at 169, 460 A.2d at 1041.
172. P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc. v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 248 A.2d 473 (1968); Forest Hill
Permanent Bldg. Ass'n v. Fisher, 140 Md. 666, 118 A. 164 (1922); Heise & Bruns Mill
Lumber Co. v. Goldman, 125 Md. 554, 94 A. 159 (1915).
173. 296 Md. at 169, 460 A.2d at 1042.
174. Id. at 171, 460 A.2d at 1043.
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tional torts of his agent when the agent was acting within the scope
of his employment.' The question of what constitutes the scope of
employment is a factual issue to be decided by the jury.' 7 6 The de-
murrer therefore should not have been granted on the ground that,
as a matter of law, the officers acting intentionally were not acting
within the scope of their employment.177
After Cox, a county that has waived its governmental immunity
may be found liable as a principal for the acts of its police officers
acting within the scope of their employment.
L Interspousal Immunity
In Boblitz v. Boblitz, t ' the Maryland Court of Appeals abro-
gated 79 the interspousal immunity doctrine in negligence ac-
tions.18 0 The court looked to the status of the doctrine in other
jurisdictions' and concluded that because the majority ofjurisdic-
tions had abrogated the doctrine in such cases, it was appropriate
for Maryland to follow.'
8 2
The court in Boblitz rejected the argument that any change in a
175. Id. at 170, 460 A.2d at 1042 (citing Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 192, 153 A.
22, 23 (1931); Amusement Co. v. Spangler, 143 Md. 98, 121 A. 851 (1923); Cate v.
Schaum, 51 Md. 209 (1879)). The court in Cox found that a jury could conclude that the
officers were acting within the scope of their employment. Id. at 171, 460 A.2d at 1043.
An agent is acting within the scope of his employment when he acts in furtherance of the
principal's business and the harm complained of is foreseeable. Id., 460 A.2d at 1042-
43.
176. Id. at 170, 460 A.2d at 1042 (citing Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d
392 (1971)).
177. Id. at 171, 460 A.2d at 1043.
178. 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
179. Before Boblitz, the court had abrogated the interspousal immunity doctrine in
cases involving intentional torts. In 1978, in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77
(1978), the Court of Appeals allowed a wife to sue her husband for an outrageous, inten-
tional tort. Id. at 335, 390 A.2d at 77. In 1983, in Bender v. Bender, 57 Md. App. 593,
471 A.2d 335 (1983), the Court of Special Appeals held that Lusby had abrogated the
immunity in all intentional torts, not just in those which were outrageous. Id. at 602-03,
471 A.2d at 339.
180. 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522. Ms. Boblitz alleged that she sustained serious,
painful and permanent injuries as a result of her husband's negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. Id. at 243, 462 A.2d at 506. The trial judge granted summary judgment
to Mr. Boblitz, holding that he was immune from suit as a matter of law under the com-
mon law doctrine of interspousal immunity. Id. at 244, 462 A.2d at 506. The Court of
Appeals granted certiorari prior to the Court of Special Appeals' consideration of the
case and reversed. Id. at 242, 462 A.2d at 506.
181. Id. at 251-73, 462 A.2d at 510-21. As of the date of the Boblitz decision, a total of
36 states had abrogated the doctrine fully or partially. The opinion in Boblitz contained a
chart listing the status of the rule in various states. Id. at 276-81, 462 A.2d at 522-24.
182. Id. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
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well-established common law rule should emanate from the legisla-
ture and not the courts.' 3 The court reasoned that a common law
rule may be changed by judicial decision when a court finds "in light
of changed conditions or increased knowledge that the rule has be-
come unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the
past, no longer suitable to our people. ' 18 4
Until Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance Co. ' 5 was de-
cided, Boblitz had little practical effect on negligence suits brought
by an automobile passenger against a driving spouse. Prior toJen-
nings, automobile liability insurance policies routinely contained
household exclusions, which prevented recovery on the policy for
bodily injury caused by an insured to any family member of an in-
sured. Therefore, a guest spouse could sue a driver spouse but was
barred from recovery on the spouse's insurance policy.
In Jennings, the court held that the exclusion was inconsistent
with the public policy of Maryland 8 6 and was therefore invalid and
unenforceable.' 87 When read together, the Boblitz andJennings re-
sults indicate that, in future suits by passengers against negligent




183. Id. at 273-74, 462 A.2d at 521-22.
184. Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 522 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County, 295 Md.
442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)).
185. No. 27 (Md. Feb. 22, 1985).
186. Id., slip op. at 6. The General Assembly expressly authorized specified exclu-
sions from the insurance coverages required by chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. The
court has taken the position that it will not insert exclusions from the required coverages
beyond those expressly set forth by the legislature. Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins.
Co., 299 Md. 708, 725, 475 A.2d 454, 463 (1984); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Gartelmar, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980). The court has found
that insertion of such exclusions "would be contrary to the remedial legislative purpose
of assuring compensation for damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents." Id. at 156,
416 A.2d at 737.
187. Jennings, slip op. at 14. The court noted that a clear majority of jurisdictions
requiring mandatory automobile insurance have invalidated the exclusion. Id. at 12.
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